TRADE AS A TOOL OF MIGRATION GOVERNANCE AND THE LIMITS OF NORMATIVE POWER IN EU-TUNISIA RELATIONS

Abstract

With the rise of globalisation, the management of labour migration has entered the realm of trade relations. In this context, this article examines how migration-related objectives are embedded and operationalised through trade-based conditionality in EU-Tunisia relations. It asks how trade instruments, particularly within the framework of bilateral trade agreements, contribute to governing labour mobility beyond the boundaries of migration law and policy. A combined methodological approach based on critical discourse analysis and qualitative content analysis is applied to EU-Tunisia trade-related documents, particularly the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement and two chapter proposals from the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement negotiations concerning trade and sustainable development, and services and investment. Coding is structured around four forms of external conditionality: positive and negative conditionality, each examined through political and economic dimensions. The results indicate a clear predominance of positive political and positive economic conditionality. Market access, regulatory cooperation, and liberalisation commitments are closely associated with expectations concerning regulatory approximation and political dialogue. Labour mobility therefore emerges as governed through a hybrid logic, merging trade liberalisation with external relations objectives and norm-based conditionality. In conclusion, the paper nuances interpretations of EU external action based solely on normative power by showing the parallel relevance of market-based leverage and regulatory approximation. Tunisia’s position in migration management for the European Union adds further complexity to this conclusion by reflecting the asymmetry of negotiations and the possibility of reversed conditionality.