

JAHK

UDK: 179:61 | ISSN: 1847-6376 (Tisak)  
61:41 | ISSN: 1848-7874 (Online)

## JAHHR

Volume/godište 16, Issue/svezak 1, Number/broj 31, pp./str. 1–254

### IMPRESSUM

#### Publishers/Izdavači:

**Department of Social Sciences and Medical Humanities** (University of Rijeka, Faculty of Medicine, Croatia) / **Katedra za društvene i humanističke znanosti u medicini** (Sveučilište u Rijeci, Medicinski fakultet, Hrvatska) / **“Fritz Jahr” Documentation and Research Centre for European Bioethics** (University of Rijeka, Faculty of Health Studies) / **Dokumentacijsko-istraživački centar za europsku bioetiku “Fritz Jahr”** (Sveučilište u Rijeci, Fakultet zdravstvenih studija, Hrvatska)

#### Co-Publishers/Suizdavači:

**Humanities Research Institute** (Chung-Ang University, Seoul, Republika Koreja) / **Institut za humanistička istraživanja** (Sveučilište Chung-Ang University, Seul, Republika Koreja)

#### Advisory Board / Izdavački savjet:

**Ante Čović** (Zagreb, Croatia)  
**Jose Roberto Goldim** (Hospital de Clínicas de Porto Alegre; School of Medicine, Pontificia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre, Brazil)  
**Hrvoje Jurić** (Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Zagreb, Zagreb, Croatia)  
**Željko Kaluderović** (Faculty of Philosophy, University of Novi Sad, Novi Sad, Serbia)  
**Samuel J. Kerstein** (University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, U.S.A.)  
**Branko Kolarić** (Faculty of Medicine, University of Rijeka, Rijeka, Croatia)  
**Chankyu Lee** (Humanities Research Institute, University of Chung-Ang, Seoul, Republic of Korea)  
**Fernando Lolas Stepke** (Bioethics Centre, University of Chile, Santiago, Chile)  
**Kyumin Moon** (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Seoul, Republic of Korea)  
**Snježana Prijić Samaržija** (University of Rijeka, Rijeka, Croatia)  
**Walter Schweidler** (The Catholic University of Eichstätt-Ingolstadt, Eichstätt, Germany)  
**Antonio G. Spagnolo** (Faculty of Medicine and Surgery, Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Roma, Italy)  
**Florian Steger** (Institute of the History, Philosophy and Ethics of Medicine, Ulm University, Ulm, Germany)  
**Stavroula F. Tsinorema** (University of Crete, Rethymnon, Greece)

#### Editor-in-Chief / Glavni urednik: **Toni Buterin**

#### Executive Editor / Izvršni urednik: **Amir Muzur**

#### Managing Editor / Tehnička urednica: **Ana Depope**

#### Editorial Board / Uredništvo:

**Goran Arbanas** (Karlovac, Croatia), **Evgenia Arh** (Rijeka, Croatia), **Toni Buterin** (Rijeka, Croatia), **Matea Butković** (Rijeka, Croatia), **Jan Defrančeski** (Zagreb, Croatia), **Ana Depope** (Rijeka, Croatia), **Dejan Donev** (Skopje, North Macedonia), **Robert Doričić** (Rijeka, Croatia), **Igor Eterović** (Rijeka, Croatia), **Josip Guć** (Split, Croatia), **Saša Horvat** (Rijeka, Croatia), **Orhan Jašić** (Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina), **Hyeongjoo Kim** (Seoul, Republic of Korea), **Franjo Mijatović** (Rijeka, Croatia), **Amir Muzur** (Rijeka, Croatia), **Tomislav Nedić** (Osijek, Croatia), **Goran Pelčić** (Rijeka, Croatia), **Gordana Pelčić** (Rijeka, Croatia), **Evangelos D. Protopapadakis** (Athens, Greece), **Sandra Radenović** (Beograd, Serbia), **Natacha Salomé Lima** (Buenos Aires, Argentina), **Igor Salopek** (Karlovac, Croatia), **Jiwon Shim** (Seoul, Republic of Korea), **Siniša Smiljanić** (Rijeka, Croatia), **Gordana Šimunković** (Rijeka, Croatia), **Sanja Špoljar-Vržina** (Zagreb, Croatia), **Helena Štruelj** (Rijeka, Croatia), **Tajana Tomak** (Rijeka, Croatia), **Ivana Tutić Grokša** (Rijeka, Croatia), **Ivana Zagorac** (Zagreb, Croatia)

#### Administrative support / Administrativni poslovi: **Marinka Kruljac**

#### Language editing for Croatian / Lektura i korektura za hrvatski jezik: **Siniša Smiljanić**

#### Language editing for English / Lektura i korektura za engleski jezik: **Matea Butković**

*Jahr* is indexed in **HRCAK** (Portal of Scientific Journals of Croatia) since September 2010, in **ERIH PLUS** (The European Reference Index for the Humanities and Social Sciences) since November 2015, in **DOAJ** (Directory of Open Access Journals) since September 2016, and in **SCOPUS** since September 2017 / *Jahr* je indeksiran u bazama **HRCAK** (Portal znanstvenih časopisa Republike Hrvatske) od rujna 2010., **ERIH PLUS** (The European Reference Index for the Humanities and Social Sciences) od studenog 2015. **DOAJ** (Directory of Open Access Journals) od listopada 2016. i **SCOPUS** od rujna 2017.

#### Address / Adresa uredništva:

Katedra za društvene i humanističke znanosti u medicini, Medicinski fakultet Sveučilišta u Rijeci, V.C. Emina 5, 51 000 Rijeka, Hrvatska, Phone/Tel.: +385-51-688-261, Faks: +385-51-651-219. E-mail: [jahr.@uniri.hr](mailto:jahr.@uniri.hr); web: <https://hrcaj.srce.hr/ojs/index.php/jahr/index>

The views, results and conclusions expressed in published articles are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editorial Board or publishers. The journal assumes no responsibility for the accuracy of the content or any consequences arising from its use. /

Stajališta, rezultati i zaključci izneseni u objavljenim člancima osobna su odgovornost autora i ne odražavaju nužno mišljenja Uredništva ni izdavača. Časopis ne preuzima odgovornost za točnost sadržaja ni za bilo kakve posljedice koje bi mogle proizaći iz njegove uporabe.

*Jahr* is published twice a year. / *Jahr* izlazi dva puta godišnje.

*Jahr* is published in edition of 100 printed copies. / *Jahr* izlazi u nakladi od 100 tiskanih primjeraka.

The price of a copy is 3€.

IBAN number/IBAN broj: HR93 23600001101410222; reference number/poziv na broj 4200.

UDK: 179:61

61:41

<https://doi.org/10.21860/j>

ISSN: 1847-6376 (Print / Tisak)

ISSN: 1848-7874 (Online)



*EUROPEAN  
JOURNAL  
OF BIOETHICS*

EUROPSKI  
ČASOPIS  
ZA BIOETIKU

Artificial Intelligence Humanities  
Special Section

Number/broj **31** |  
Volume/godište 16 | Issue 1/svezak 1 |  
pp./str. 1–254 | June/lipanj 2025 |

Rijeka/Croatia



# Contents / Sadržaj

## **Editorial** (Toni Buterin)

A new chapter in continuity: Honoring the past, embracing the future of *Jahr* ..... 7

## **Dominik Sikirić**

Information asymmetry in social policy towards people with blindness and visual impairment ..... 9  
*Review article / Pregledni članak*

## **Iva Rinčić, Toni Buterin, Amir Muzur**

Bioetika na portugalskom tlu: kratki uvod s ograničenim uvidom ..... 37  
*Pregledni članak / Review article*

## **María del Carmen Garrido Hornos**

End-of-life decision-making: Euthanasia and assisted suicide under debate in Jojo Moyes's and Thea Sharrock's *Me before you* ..... 47  
*Preliminary communication / Prethodno priopćenje*

## **Uvodnik gostiju urednika** (Luka Janeš, Štefanija Kožić)

Bioetika i aporije psihe ..... 65

## **Vuk Trnavac**

*Metodoontološko* viđenje pojma *mentalnog zdravlja* kod Marxa, Freuda i frankfurtovaca ..... 67  
*Izvorni znanstveni članak / Original scientific article*

## **Toma Gruica**

From meaningful instructions to learned illness: Philosophical perspectives on psychopathology and the dynamics of information ..... 79  
*Review article / Pregledni članak*

## **Ivan Macut**

Moralna filozofija Stjepana Zimmermanna: od spekulativne teorije prema življenoj praksi ..... 99  
*Pregledni članak / Review article*

## **Ante Periša**

Psihoterapijski učinak promjene perspektive ..... 117  
*Pregledni članak / Review article*

## **Štefanija Kožić, Ana Kralj Duka, Luka Janeš**

Smisao života – od antike do egzistencijalizma i logoterapije ..... 131  
*Pregledni članak / Review article*

**Bojana Brajkov, Koshy Tharakan**

|                                                                                                   |     |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| A 'Pathless Land' of compassion: An ethical perspective of Jiddu Krishnamurti and Zen Kōans ..... | 145 |
| <i>Preliminary communication / Prethodno priopćenje</i>                                           |     |

**Jadranka Pavić, Mateja Krznar, Irena Kovačević**

|                                                                       |     |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| Poteškoće i podrška obitelji djece oboljele od rijetkih bolesti ..... | 157 |
| <i>Prethodno priopćenje / Preliminary communication</i>               |     |

**Filip Martin Svibovec**

|                                                         |     |
|---------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| <i>Homo absconditus</i> u duhu filozofske prakse .....  | 167 |
| <i>Prethodno priopćenje / Preliminary communication</i> |     |

**Artificial Intelligence Humanities Special Section****Jinyoung Han, Jung Lee, Juyeon Ham**

|                                                                                                                                   |     |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| Learner perception changes of ChatGPT over ten days: Focusing on psychological anthropomorphism, privacy concerns and trust ..... | 183 |
| <i>Original scientific article / Izvorni znanstveni članak</i>                                                                    |     |

**Kiseong Lee**

|                                                                                                        |     |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| Improving fine-grained emotion classification using LLMs through sequential learning of emotions ..... | 207 |
| <i>Original scientific article / Izvorni znanstveni članak</i>                                         |     |

**Book reviews / Prikazi knjiga****Jan Defrančeski**

|                                                                                                                                                         |     |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| Tomislav Nedić, <i>Presadivanje organa – pravo, (bio)etika i moral</i> , Medicinska naklada – Hrvatsko filozofsko društvo, Zagreb 2023., str. 264. .... | 229 |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|

**Ivana Lalić Čičković**

|                                                                                                                          |     |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| Draženko Tomić, <i>Bioethical Miscellany</i> , University of Zagreb, Faculty of Teacher education, 2024, 138 pages. .... | 233 |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|

|                                                                       |     |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| <b>Publication Ethics and Publication Malpractice Statement</b> ..... | 237 |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|

|                                                                    |     |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| <b>Izjava o etici objavljivanja i nesavjesnim postupcima</b> ..... | 241 |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|

|                                           |     |
|-------------------------------------------|-----|
| <b>Instructions for the Authors</b> ..... | 245 |
|-------------------------------------------|-----|

|                             |     |
|-----------------------------|-----|
| <b>Upute autorima</b> ..... | 249 |
|-----------------------------|-----|

# Editorial

## **A new chapter in continuity: Honoring the past, embracing the future of *Jahr***

Dear colleagues, collaborators and readers,

It is both a great honour and responsibility to assume the role of Editor-in-Chief of *Jahr – European Journal of Bioethics*. Founded fifteen years ago, the journal has grown into a respected platform within the European and international bioethics community.

Fifteen years may seem brief in academic terms, but for a journal, it represents a rich and rewarding journey. Over time, *Jahr* has found its place in the academic landscape thanks to the efforts of many. Each member of the Editorial and Advisory Board, every issue published, every article submitted and every thoughtful peer review has helped shape the journal into what it is today: a bridge connecting cultures, perspectives and disciplines.

I warmly thank my predecessors – Amir Muzur, Stjepka Popović and Igor Eterović – whose leadership and dedication laid strong foundations for this work to continue.

Having had the privilege of serving as Managing Editor (2018–2021) and Executive Editor (2021–2025), I now embrace this next chapter as Editor-in-Chief, supported by a committed team and inspired by the same guiding principles: openness to diverse bioethical approaches, interdisciplinary dialogue and deep respect for European intellectual traditions – especially the legacy of Fritz Jahr.

To the former, current and future members of the Editorial and Advisory Board, to our reviewers for their thoughtful insights, and to all the authors who have entrusted us with their work – thank you. Your contributions continue to shape the journal's identity and growth. I look forward to our ongoing collaboration as we meet new challenges and strive to further enhance the journal's quality and global reach.

*Jahr* will remain a welcoming space for the exchange of ideas, critical reflection and meaningful dialogue on the pressing bioethical challenges of our time.

Thank you for your trust. I look forward to all that we will build together.

**Toni Buterin**  
Editor-in-Chief



Dominik Sikirić\*

## Information asymmetry in social policy towards people with blindness and visual impairment

### SUMMARY

Information asymmetry is a term that describes the unequal distribution of information between two or more actors that, depending on the context in which it occurs, leads to inefficiency, mistrust and, in extreme cases, deception when one party (participant in the relationship) exploits an information advantage over the other. The description of the concept of information asymmetry in social policy towards people with blindness and visual impairment creates a framework in which it is possible to observe and recognize difficulties in the provision of information and the use of rights and services in social and health care. Due to the occurrence of information asymmetry, people with blindness and visual impairment are in a disadvantaged position, as they are not sufficiently informed about services and opportunities for additional social and health care and therefore do not perceive the services as such, which contribute to their development and improvement of living conditions. The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of the relevant literature and to update the occurrence of information asymmetry in the area of the above-mentioned systems and policies. The paper addresses three key aspects of information asymmetry for people with blindness and visual impairment: the impact on people with blindness and visual impairment, the role of experts and the factors that make it difficult for them to reach their professional standards in the field of information, and, finally, the aspect of social policy and opportunities for policy development.

**Keywords:** information asymmetry, social policy, social care, healthcare, people with blindness and visual impairment.

---

\* Department of Visual Impairments, Faculty of Education and Rehabilitation Sciences, University of Zagreb, Croatia. ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1634-8023>.

*Correspondence Address:* Dominik Sikirić, Department of Visual Impairments, Faculty of Education and Rehabilitation Sciences, University of Zagreb, Croatia. Email: [dominik.sikiric@erf.unizg.hr](mailto:dominik.sikiric@erf.unizg.hr).

## INTRODUCTION

The concept of information asymmetry essentially refers to the relationship between the provider and the recipient of a service that arises from an imbalance in the quantity and quality of information that the parties to this relationship possess about the object of interest. The concept of information asymmetry appears in various fields, especially in economics, where it is considered as an important factor influencing economic transactions and market dynamics. Through its effects, information asymmetry can lead to inefficiency, mistrust, and, in extreme cases, deception when one party (stakeholder of the relationship) exploits an information advantage over the other (Barbaroux, 2014; Clots Figueras, Hernán-González & Kujal, 2015; Li, 2020; Papadimitriou, 2023; Salhi, 2020). Despite its negative character, which leads to negative/undesirable results, information asymmetry can also open certain opportunities. Barbaroux (2014) notes that asymmetry holds the potential for entrepreneurs to capitalize on information advantages and develop new products and services. Although it is firmly embedded in economic concepts and in communication, information asymmetry is an everyday phenomenon that, due to its dual role (undesirable outcomes versus opportunities) and its complex nature, also applies and needs to be discussed in social and health care systems for persons with disabilities (PWD).

The problem of information asymmetry is particularly relevant and justified in the field of bioethics, as it has a direct impact on fundamental ethical principles such as autonomy, informed consent, fairness, and responsibility in professional practice. In the context of people with blindness and visual impairment (BVI), information asymmetry can lead to a power imbalance between people with BVI and professionals that threatens their ability to make independent and informed decisions about their own lives, rehabilitation, and rights. Bioethics as an interdisciplinary field recognizes the importance of equal access to information as a prerequisite for ethical action, especially in situations where people are in a more vulnerable position. Analyzing information asymmetry therefore enables a deeper understanding of the structural and communicative barriers that can limit the autonomy of individuals and provides guidelines for ethically responsible and inclusive practice in health and social care.

This paper aims to position and present the main aspects of information asymmetry in the social and health care system for people with BVI. The paper addresses the following issues:

1. How does information asymmetry affect access to social and health services for people with BVI?
2. What role do experts play in creating or overcoming information asymmetry?

### 3. What challenges does social policy face in implementing solutions to reduce information asymmetries?

The literature review aims to provide a conceptual and analytical framework for understanding information asymmetry in the field of social and health care for people with BVI. The review draws on relevant theoretical and empirical sources to critically consider the existing evidence and arguments and identify directions for future research. The literature review is based on a targeted search for papers analyzing the phenomenon of information asymmetry in the context of disability, with a particular focus on people with BVI. The Web of Science, Scopus and Google Scholar databases were searched and reports from international organizations and policy bodies (e.g., WHO, UNCRPD, European Commission) were also analyzed. The literature was searched using key terms including “information asymmetry,” “disability rights,” “visual impairment,” “policy barriers,” and “access to healthcare.” The selected sources include empirical studies, theoretical papers, and policy analyses that address the role of information in access to social and health services. The papers were selected based on their relevance to understanding the mechanisms of information asymmetry and its impact on people with BVI. The findings of the literature were analyzed along three interrelated dimensions: (1) how information asymmetry affects people with BVI in accessing social and health services; (2) what barriers and challenges exist in the provision of information by experts in these systems; and (3) how public policy can respond to the problem of information imbalance.

## **THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

Theories of information asymmetry in economics analyze how information inequalities between actors (parties involved in the process) lead to inappropriate outcomes in different contexts. Understanding this concept in economics allows for a better understanding of market dynamics, pricing, and/or market efficiency. As a basic framework for discussing information asymmetry, the foundational work of Akerlof’s (1978) Lemon model is used, which illustrates how information asymmetry leads to adverse selection, where the seller has more information about product quality than the buyer, leading to market inefficiency (Alogoskoufis, Malliaris & Stengos, 2023; Bar-Isaac, Jewitt & Leaver, 2021; Downing, 2024; Suri & Adnan 2016; Revilla, 2021). This basic concept has been extended to different contexts and applications, influencing policy and economic modelling in various sectors, including the labor market and insurance (Bar-Isaac, Jewitt & Leaver, 2021).

When describing the theoretical framework, it is important to introduce the concept of social justice. This concept is not in opposition to economic thinking

about information asymmetry, but rather enables its reflection in broader human actions and policy decisions, especially with regard to groups that are in some way marginalized and at risk of social exclusion. Social justice theory is a framework and set of hypotheses for understanding the human condition, within which systemic changes for equality are promoted and demanded while attempting to challenge injustices in various social structures (Killen, Yee & Ruck, 2021). The concept of social justice has evolved over centuries, inspiring and integrating various philosophical, socio-political, and practical fields. Thus, theories of social justice have been shaped by various actors, from ancient thinkers to modern scholars who have emphasized justice for marginalized communities (Hantal, 2022). In contemporary times, social justice is applied in areas such as education (Jornet-Meliá, Sancho-Álvarez & Bakieva 2015), healthcare (Hosseinzadegan, Habibzadeh & Jasemi 2024), public administration (Abel, 2014), transport planning (Adli & Chowdhury, 2021), and employment (Moffa & Longo, 2016).

The dimensions of social justice and information asymmetry for PWD encompass key aspects that shape individual experiences. Distributive justice focuses on the fair distribution of resources, including information, where unequal access to information can exacerbate existing inequalities (e.g., a lack of access to digital technologies). Research shows that resources such as accessible digital tools are often inadequate, resulting in PWD having limited access to important information (Danermark & Gellerstedt, 2004; Pudrianisa, Astari & Agustina, 2024). The digital divide is a significant barrier, as many PWD have difficulty accessing tools that facilitate access to information (Pudrianisa, Astari & Agustina, 2024). Procedural justice refers to the fairness of processes and systems. Barriers to access to information are often the result of inadequate legal and institutional procedures that do not provide for the necessary adaptations such as sign language interpreters or accessible documents (Mor, 2019; Paikah, 2024). The digitalization of justice further complicates the approach because although digital platforms offer potential benefits, they can create new barriers if they are not designed inclusively (Creutzfeldt et al., 2024). Interactional justice involves respect and fair treatment in interactions, and interactional injustices can lead to the exclusion of PWD from information exchange. Research shows that professionals, such as social workers, are often not adequately trained to interact appropriately with PWD, perpetuating information asymmetries (Boda, 2022; Goulden et al., 2023). Equality of recognition emphasizes the importance of acknowledging diverse identities and experiences. A failure to recognize disability as a valued aspect of diversity contributes to information asymmetry. Excluding the perspective of PWD in policy making and service delivery leads to policies that do not meet their particular needs and thus perpetuate their marginalization (Danermark & Gellerstedt, 2004; Thill, 2019). Dealing with information asymmetry requires a multidimensional approach

that encompasses all dimensions of social justice. The dimensions of social justice — distributive justice, procedural justice, interactional justice, and recognition justice — are closely interlinked when it comes to creating and maintaining information asymmetries for PWD.

Although economic theories of information asymmetry and theories of social justice originate from different theoretical frameworks, they are connected by a shared recognition of social inequality and its effects on both individual groups and society as a whole. By combining the insights of these theories, we create room for discussion and a deeper understanding of how information asymmetry contributes to socio-economic inequalities, as well as how social justice-based solutions (focused on the equal distribution of resources and opportunities) can help overcome these inequalities. In this context, information asymmetry can be considered as one of the factors contributing to social injustice. Social justice theory provides a framework for addressing inequalities caused by information asymmetry and advocates for fair, comprehensive and timely access to information and resources.

When we apply social justice theory to the discussion of disability, social justice theory is not only about ensuring basic rights, but also about creating an environment in which PWDs can fully participate in society. Social justice theory recognizes the importance of autonomy and choice. PWDs are often confronted with paternalistic approaches, that is, decisions are forced upon them under the pretense of protection. The autonomy-based social justice theory emphasizes the protection and promotion of an individual's ability to lead an autonomous life. It assumes that a just society should invest in the competencies of its members in order to reach the threshold of autonomy (Claassen, 2022). A society that is considered inclusive must ensure that PWD can make their own decisions in all areas of life. In this sense, it is necessary to recognize socially imposed limitations and vulnerabilities that threaten the autonomy of the individual and work towards their removal (Anderson & Honneth, 2005). PWDs need to be empowered to make their own choices, with comprehensive information playing a central role (Begon, 2023). Freedom of choice means not only the ability to choose between available options, but also the right to create conditions that enable choice. For PWDs, this connection is extremely important because in their everyday lives, their choices are often limited by a lack of information, inaccessible spaces or discrimination.

## HOW DOES INFORMATION ASYMMETRY AFFECT ACCESS TO SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES FOR PEOPLE WITH BVI?

The occurrence of information asymmetry in accessing information about social and health services is a major challenge for people with BVI. Information asymmetry in access to health and social services for people with BVI occurs when different actors in the system (users, service providers, and institutions) do not have equal access to information that is crucial for decision-making (Sikirić, 2023). When relevant actors in one or both systems withhold information or provide only partial details about a right or service, people with BVI (blind and visually impaired) may be denied access to essential resources, or face significant uncertainty about how and to what extent that right or service can be exercised. As Rossi (2016) notes, the presence of information asymmetry is a challenge in accessing social benefits.

Research shows that people with BVI face multiple, interrelated challenges in accessing information about health and social care services. Stolwijk and colleagues (2023) and Kim, Jang, and Lim (2022) suggest that a lack of information from healthcare providers limits access to services for people with BVI. Speedwell, Stanton, and Nischal (2003) emphasize that people with BVI need to be provided with timely and comprehensive information and that the lack of accessible information contributes to inequalities in access to healthcare services (Nguyen, 2024). People with BVI have a high need for various information in the health and social care system, that are often neglected in traditional methods of information dissemination (Beverley, Bath & Booth 2004). Visual impairment is associated with high levels of unmet need, where individuals need to build complex networks of formal and informal support to fulfil their needs (Hodge et al., 2015), and many people with BVI are unaware of the rights, services, or support systems available to them. Wang and Yu (2017) state that people with BVI feel excluded from information that would help them resolve critical situations in their daily lives, including information about social rights. The same authors also say that people with BVI focus primarily on familiar sources such as family and friends when seeking information, and that this dependence hinders access to information through broader networks. According to Beverley (2009), several factors influence the information-seeking process of people with BVI, including the accessibility of information, the availability of information sources (civil society organizations (CSOs) are cited by people with BVI as the main source of information), personal preferences and needs, the ability to use technology, and the influence of social factors, such as support from the immediate and wider social environment. Varma, Singh, and Kumar (2020) and Olaopa (2017) emphasize in their research the issue of information literacy, that is, the ability of people with BVI to identify, evaluate, and use information. Beverley, Bath, and Barber (2007)

identify the following key challenges in accessing information: 1) inappropriate information formats, which relate to both format and timeliness as well as level of detail; 2) communication barriers, which include poor communication strategies; 3) the complexity of information needs; 4) lack of information on important topics; and 5) trust in information sources.

Lack of information occurs in various possible situations and is the result of different utilization of information. The hypothesized situations include (Sikirić, 2023): 1) the actor of the system or institution that should provide the information does not have or is not fully familiar with the content or procedure that should be communicated; 2) the actor of the system or institution that has the information but does not provide it to the person who needs it (and when it is needed); 3) the information is provided, but the people with BVI do not process the information for individual reasons; and 4) the people with BVI do not request the information.

The first situation indicates that the system or the individual is unable to obtain information that is crucial for the fulfilment of their professional duties. The second situation, which leads to a lack of information, occurs when an individual or system that has the information does not pass it on to the person who needs it. The reasons for this series are the lack of competency of individual professionals in communicating with people with BVI (verbally or in writing), the lack of time to pass on the information, the professional identity, or the attitude of individual professionals toward the abilities of people with BVI and their rehabilitation needs. It is possible that people with BVI build up an image and trust toward all future actors based on these experiences and view them with the same distrust from this position. Due to feelings of inferiority, helplessness, disbelief, anger, aggression, sadness, and rage, the relationship between people with BVI and the institutions and individuals involved in the social protection and welfare system (Sikirić, 2023) is permanently damaged, making it difficult to access rights and benefits that would ensure adequate living conditions for the individual. Past experiences lead to a reluctance to seek help in the future. The result is negative reactions to help-seeking, ingratitude, dissatisfaction, sadness, or anger (Frank, 2003). The healthcare system produces and shares information about health and services that result from impaired health (Bloom, Standing, & Lloyd, 2008). If we extend this statement to the social care system, considering how medical care (diagnosis and care of eye damage) continues in the social care system, we can reflect on how the social care system also produces and shares information about social protection and social care services. In this context, an information imbalance or asymmetry is possible. Experts in the system often use technical information that users do not fully understand, especially when it comes to specialized health services or complex social rights. Communication can be further complicated for people with BVI if clear and understandable terminology is not used.

In this context, people with BVI do not make informed decisions because they do not fully understand the information provided. The situation is further complicated by the lack of expertise of service providers since social workers, doctors, administrative staff, and others do not know the specifics of people with BVI. Therefore, it is not uncommon for a paternalistic approach (Pourgholam, Shoghi & Borimnejad, 2022; von Humboldt, Silva, & Leal, 2024) to be viewed as the best for people with BVI, without active involvement in decision making. The complexity and diversity of the health and social care system often puts people with BVI in a situation where they must rely on their own initiative to manage these processes, which penalizes those who have not developed self-advocacy skills (Hodge et al., 2015). The lack of awareness of the services available logically affects the utilization frequency of these services.

The third situation relates to the psychological impact on the uptake and understanding of information provided to individuals with BVI at any point of contact. People with BVI, particularly those with acquired (non-congenital) visual impairments, often experience intense psychological pressure following the onset of vision loss—pressure that stems from the trauma and shock of adjusting to profound changes in daily living (Binder, Wrzesińska & Kocur, 2020; Boerner & Wang, 2012; Demmin & Silverstein 2020; Dodds et al., 1991; Holloway et al., 2015; Lundeen et al., 2022; Nyman, Gosney & Victor, 2010; Stevelink, Malcolm & Fear, 2015; Sun et al., 2012). In cases where information is provided through health and social services, people with BVI in the described context are often unable to access the information fully or to the same extent as it is provided by professionals. Haas-Wilson (2001), in the context of patients' ability to access information, points out that people who need information are often unable to gather and understand information related to diagnosis and further treatment and rehabilitation procedures in times of poor health. Brashers and colleagues (2000) point out that in some cases when information is provided, other contextual barriers hinder the acquisition and understanding of information. For example, they cite a decrease in cognitive ability when people are faced with increased levels of stress or anxiety due to an illness or medical procedure. The occurrence of a psychological block or an inability to process information helps explain situations where, on one hand, individuals with BVI feel inadequately informed, and on the other, professionals assume they have communicated effectively without confirming how, or to what extent, the information has been received and understood.

The fourth situation in the information process concerns the behavior of people with BVI, which is shaped by how information is accessed and by the possibility of avoiding information altogether. There are various reasons why individuals with BVI might choose not to seek information, even when doing so could provide crucial insights into their diagnosis, the current status of their visual impairment, or available options for care and support. As Brashers, Goldsmith, and Hsieh (2002)

note, the reasons for this may be a lack of information-seeking skills (direct or indirect), a lack of motivation (a conscious decision to avoid information), doubts related to relationship or identity (a desire to respect authority and confront the needs of experts), or a combination of the above. Confronting the reality of life with visual impairment and its long-term prognosis can lead individuals with BVI to consciously avoid information related to everyday adaptations and the need for extended rehabilitation. This avoidance may stem from a desire to maintain a sense of control and independence, and to delay or resist acceptance of their new identity as a person with BVI within society. Help-seeking (including information) implies helplessness and dependence rather than autonomy and independence, and the person feels inadequate when seeking help and therefore avoids seeking help or information to maintain their self-confidence (Addison, 2017; Case et al., 2005; Frank, 2003). In the context of the four types of information deprivation described above, it is interesting to consider the adult's personal responsibility to seek and gather information. In a given context, it can be assumed that adults themselves are responsible for finding out about rights and services in certain care systems. In fact, the responsibility can be attributed to the adult at the moment when all conditions are met for the person to search for information independently. In the age of the internet and digital information, access to information seems to be a simple and short-term task. However, if we apply the same mindset to people with BVI who have lost their sight at a later age and have no experience in using technology under the conditions of visual impairment, we end up in a vicious circle of shifting responsibility, not providing information and not taking the necessary measures aimed at social and health protection and improving the living conditions of people with BVI. People with BVI must be able to inform themselves about their rights and benefits, although these skills are acquired precisely through psychosocial rehabilitation, which is one of the services provided by the social system. The expectation that people with BVI will independently learn how to use the same resources to obtain appropriate information without formal or informal training in the use of assistive devices is unfounded. Brashers, Goldsmith, and Hsieh (2002) note that people with the greatest need for health information and information about rehabilitation services may have difficulty with the technology required to access the Internet. The same authors note that even when people have access to technology, the information may be confusing and contradictory, or they may be overwhelmed by the amount of information. However, if we assume that people with BVI are educating themselves in the use of information technology, they will encounter websites where navigating and finding information is inaccessible. This does not mean that the responsibility lies solely with the policy-driven system or with the experts in the information chain, but it does explain that there are certain prerequisites for taking responsibility that the system and the experts

have not provided. People with BVI face marginalization and lower expectations from society, which also affects their willingness to seek help or information. If they are also confronted with a non-transparent system, their commitment to exercising their rights decreases. In addition to the lack of customized formats, another challenge lies in the complexity of administrative procedures, which are often not intuitive even for the general population (Numans et al., 2023). For example, many systems require visual interaction (filling out forms or accessing digital platforms), which exacerbates the problem of providing adequate information. Important information should be designed inclusively, with materials that can be easily translated into non-visual formats and accessed through multiple modalities (Harrison & Lazard, 2015; Wang & Yu, 2017).

Due to information asymmetry, people with BVI are in a disadvantaged position as they are not sufficiently informed about services and opportunities for additional social and health care and therefore do not perceive the service as contributing to their development and improvement of living conditions.

Considering that there is no financial benefit here, as in the case of the market economy, in addition to the reasons described for each series, the motivation of the service provider for withholding information and maintaining a position of information power to the detriment of people with BVI remains unclear. It should be noted that information asymmetry is not necessarily the result of the expert-patient relationship, that is, the information that the parties seek and/or share with each other also contributes to this relationship. Brashers, Goldsmith, and Hsieh (2002) note that the parties involved may have different ideas about what is needed (further procedures) or that individuals (potential service users) withhold important information from the service provider.

## **WHAT ROLE DO EXPERTS PLAY IN CREATING OR OVERCOMING INFORMATION ASYMMETRY?**

Given that we are dealing with two interconnected systems relevant to people with BVI, we will examine the role of professionals within both systems. To make the discussion more concise and focused, we will concentrate on two experts whose role is unavoidable in the context of the health system and the social system. When entering one and/or the other system, they are the experts with whom the person must come into contact and where the further process of treatment/rehabilitation/realization of other rights is not possible without consulting these experts. In the healthcare system, the role of primary informant is performed by ophthalmologists; in the social system, by social workers. Of course, other experts can also act as informants,

especially educational rehabilitators and psychologists, but the way the care system for people with BVI is currently organized, they only meet after certain requests for services and rights have been made, that is, after the primary informants have already provided sufficient information.

In this section, we will also focus on CSOs, which are actors in the provision of information and other services and whose presence is increasingly emphasized. We will consider CSOs as a factor in their own right and place them on an equal footing with experts in the context of a combined social policy. After all, their expertise is based on many years of practical work, the use of professionals of different profiles (educational rehabilitator, psychologist, social worker), the implementation of professional projects, and co-operation with institutions and users of their services. We argue that their expertise is grounded in an understanding of the everyday challenges faced by people with BVI. As such, their role extends beyond mere advisory functions to actively informing and educating individuals.

Healthcare workers are confronted with a variety of problems that affect their availability and present them with major challenges. The Croatian healthcare system faces challenges related to the efficient use of human resources, which is critical for maintaining a sustainable healthcare system. This includes ensuring that healthcare professionals are adequately supported and that their work environment is conducive to high-quality care (Šimunković & Babić, 2023). One of the main problems is the imbalance between the demand for healthcare services and the supply of qualified professionals, which is exacerbated by the global labor shortage (Džakula, Relić, & Michelutti, 2022). The same authors emphasize that this shortage is not just a problem of numbers but is also about having the right skills in the right place at the right time, which has a direct impact on the quality and accessibility of healthcare services. In Croatia, for example, the total number of healthcare workers is sufficient but unevenly distributed, with urban areas having a higher concentration of healthcare facilities and professionals than rural and remote regions (Džakula et al., 2024). This geographical inequality leads to unmet medical needs, particularly in rural areas, where recruitment and retention of healthcare workers is hindered by factors such as family responsibilities and lack of professional support (Džakula et al., 2024). In addition, healthcare workers are burdened by poor management and organizational inefficiencies, which are perceived as major financial problems in the healthcare system (Orešković & Benković, 2024). Many experts believe that the financial management of the system is flawed, leading to irrational spending, and suggest that part of the public services should be offered to the private market to improve efficiency (Orešković & Benković, 2024). The Croatian healthcare system faces challenges related to the efficient use of human resources, which is critical for maintaining a sustainable healthcare system. This includes ensuring that healthcare

professionals are adequately supported and that their work environment is conducive to high-quality care. The COVID-19 pandemic has further highlighted the challenges for mental health and burnout of healthcare workers and emphasized the need for comprehensive human resource management and support systems to effectively address these issues (Džakula, Relić, & Michelutti, 2022). Furthermore, political influence on healthcare management decisions in Croatia is seen as an obstacle to accountability and efficient resource allocation. Experts argue in favor of data-driven decision-making and improved governance to improve the efficiency of the system (Orešković & Benković, 2024). These challenges highlight the complexity of healthcare workforce management and the need for strategic planning that considers both the needs of healthcare workers and the populations they serve.

In the healthcare system, ophthalmologists occupy a unique position in the information process. When discussing people with BVI, the first step following the onset of visual impairment is typically the diagnosis and medical treatment of the eye. This is exactly why ophthalmologists are called primary informants, because people with BVI cannot bypass them or have them bypassed. A diagnosis by an ophthalmologist is required for any right or benefit. Although ophthalmologists have a clear picture of the diagnosis and prognosis of the development of the situation, they fail to provide information in terms of support and rehabilitation. Brashers, Goldsmith, and Hsieh (2002) cite several authors in their paper who reinforce the difficulties in providing information. Doctors spend little time providing information to patients. They overestimate the amount of time spent on information and, at the same time, underestimate the patient's desire for information (Waitzkin, 1985, as cited in Brashers, Goldsmith & Hsieh, 2002). Furthermore, Guttman (1993, as cited in Brashers, Goldsmith, and Hsieh, 2002) states that doctors overestimate the amount of information patients possess, while Hines and colleagues (2001, as cited in Brashers, Goldsmith & Hsieh, 2002) believe that the information provider and patients have different ideas about what information is needed.

The characteristics of the information provider may also influence the likelihood that a person will seek help and act on the information provided. For example, cancer patients have reported that they most value information support from healthcare professionals and other cancer patients or survivors, rather than from well-meaning but less knowledgeable relatives and friends (Dakof & Taylor, 1990, as cited in Brashers, Goldsmith & Hsieh, 2002). 'Weak' network connections (i.e., supporters who are outside one's primary network of family and friends with whom one typically interacts less frequently or intimately) may be particularly useful as sources of information support because they increase access to new information, promote social comparison with various others, facilitate low-risk discussion of high-risk topics, and foster a sense of community (Adelman, et al., 1987, as cited in Brashers, Goldsmith & Hsieh, 2002).

There are several lines of evidence supporting the importance of ophthalmologists in some of the information problems mentioned. For example, Power and Dell Orto (1980, as cited in Moore, 1984) state that early and appropriate communication and information by healthcare professionals generally reduces anxiety and allows the family to begin to adapt to the visual impairment. Appropriate communication was clearly recognized as a question of information. Accessibility in healthcare also means accessible communication between healthcare professionals and PWDs with certain impairments, such as the blind, visually impaired, deaf-mute, people with intellectual disabilities, etc., which includes the removal of communication barriers – creation of accessible information materials, knowledge of sign language, adaptation of the way of ordering, and providing information (Šogorić, Sanković & Štefančić, 2018). Many healthcare workers are insufficiently informed about the purpose and benefits of certification and registration (Boyce et al., 2014). Consequently, only a small number of healthcare workers are aware of what the welfare system offers to certified and registered people with BVI.

The role of social workers is equally important in relation to ophthalmologists; however, due to the heterogeneity of the population they serve and the working conditions, the fulfilment of their role is the most complex of all those involved. Social workers working in social care have community work tools and the ability to identify people with BVI in their area, but struggle to fulfil this role in practice due to documentation overload of documentation and the number of people they care for (Sikirić, 2023). Asch and Mudrick (2013) set out several principles for social workers working with people with BVI. The focus should be on the individual perspective of the problem when assessing and responding, rather than assuming that the visual impairment is the main problem to be solved or the main cause of the person's problems. The second principle is not to assume that the presence of a severe visual impairment or blindness prevents the person from actively participating in everyday activities such as education, employment, personal relationships, leisure activities, etc. Social work with people with BVI should aim to facilitate inclusion in such activities and to develop certain environmental adaptations and personal skills that enable full participation. The third principle is to focus on the strengths and individual potential of people with BVI. Fourth, social workers should be familiar with a wide range of services and programs for people with BVI while supporting independence and independent decision-making. The role of social workers as advocates is important, as is awareness of discrimination and exclusion in accessing services. While the above authors discuss which aspects of a social worker's work are crucial for communicating and informing people with BVI, in addition to the difficulties mentioned above, social workers in the Republic of Croatia are also burdened by the number of changes that are completely out of their control. Due to

the numerous legal and administrative regulations they must follow in their work, the professionals of the Institute of Social Welfare are often perceived by the public as a mechanism of state control, with the emphasis on detecting misconduct rather than on the quality of professional work (Podobnik & Ilijaš, 2021). According to the same authors, experts in the field of social work argue in favor of reducing the administrative burden<sup>1</sup> of the institution to create space for professional work and the quality of services for users.

Improving working conditions and increasing the number of staff working with users opens up the possibility of increasing the development of individual plans (currently hindered by the administrative burden) and the time spent working directly with users on the full range of social work objectives (Podobnik & Ilijaš, 2021). Some of these difficulties in the work of social workers are confirmed, but many others are also mentioned by Milić Babić, Žganec, and Berc (2021). In their findings, they point out that social workers face problems in working conditions, which include insecure funding, insufficient number of professionals, inadequate spatial conditions, lack of official vehicles, excessive work and administrative burden, difficulties in cooperating with users, other institutions and experts, etc. In their study, Milić Babić, Žganec, and Berc (2021) show that social workers are concerned about the safety aspect and protection at work. Filipaj and Buljevac (2021) also mention the constant overload of too many beneficiaries and additional administrative tasks in the work of social workers as the main obstacles to adequate access to the rights and services of the social system for current and potential beneficiaries.

Gović and Buljevac (2022) demonstrate an example of inequality and arbitrariness in the process of information about services and rights, as they recorded social workers' professional but also unprofessional behavior. However, in addition to the traditional role of social workers in the welfare system, it is interesting to consider the possibility of their involvement at an earlier stage, through the provision of healthcare to people with BVI. A social worker available to eye clinics would have the opportunity to reach out to people with BVI and establish a link and communication between the welfare and healthcare systems and inform about the rights of the individual in each of these systems.

The role of healthcare social workers, according to Milić Babić and Lakić (2019), is to help patients and their families, as part of the work of a multidisciplinary team, to understand a particular illness, the associated emotions and the diagnostic process, and to advise them on the decision to be made. The role of a healthcare

---

<sup>1</sup> The continuous support of vulnerable people (including PWDs) is a great burden due to the framework conditions formed by administrative requirements, imposed tasks, and strict legal controls (Podobnik & Ilijaš, 2021).

social worker may include, but is not limited to, an initial interview with the patient and family, a psychosocial assessment of the patient, helping the patient understand the illness, helping the patient and family adjust to the changing roles that have arisen with the onset of the illness, exploring the emotional/social response to the illness and treatment, assisting in communication with members of the medical team and family members; education about rights and services in the local community; professional support in decision making for the patient and their family; educating medical staff about the patient's psychosocial difficulties; promoting communication and collaboration between members of the healthcare team; coordinating healthcare services and planning future treatments and services; and promoting patients' rights to information and decision making (Milić Babić & Laklija, 2019). The research participants (Milić Babić & Laklija, 2019) define their role in the healthcare system through the role of the informant and the process of informing patients and families about the rights and condition and needs of a child or adult family member, but also about other service providers in the local community. Despite the fundamentally defined role in the health care system, the same research shows that social workers in the Republic of Croatia face two basic problems in their work in the health care system: discrimination and a hierarchically subordinate position (dissatisfaction with communication by healthcare staff, discrimination against the profession, interference of medical staff in the work of social workers, lack of autonomy at work) and poor working conditions (lack of clear structure and job descriptions; numerous roles but poor position; small number of social workers in the healthcare system; lack of communication among social workers in the healthcare system; low salary coefficient).

Brodkin and Majmundar (2010) describe an organizational approach whose central premise is that social policy does not work by itself, but depends on organizational practices that produce it. The practices that these authors discuss emerge at the interface between formal rules that establish explicit criteria for the realization of certain rights and/or benefits (extent of documentation and frequency of re-collection of the same documentation), management style (relationship between incentives and practices), which indirectly influences organizational behavior, and informal activities<sup>2</sup> (reading medical records, showing up for scheduled appointments, determining whether a person really wants a service or needs a change in environment, providing information only about financial entitlements) of professionals interacting with people claiming a particular right. Informal procedures can be influenced not only by the legal framework, but also by working conditions and management characteristics. Šućur (2004) mentions, among other obstacles to access to social assistance in the Republic of Croatia, the frequent changes in legal provisions that

---

<sup>2</sup> Brodkin and Maimundar (2010) also use the term procedural discretion. In fact, it refers to shortcuts that experts use in triage of users seeking a right or service to separate those who fulfil the criteria from those who do not.

lead to confusion among social workers and other professionals, which is due to frequent changes and, consequently, waiting for additional provisions, which often take longer to be adopted than the adoption of a new law. As Ilijaš and Podobnik (2019) note, such instability undoubtedly leads to unfavorable outcomes for all stakeholders, as it makes it difficult or impossible for users to exercise their rights and leads to great uncertainty of action and, often, to an additional workload for experts. Administrative exclusion occurs when organizational practices, which can be formally designed and informally created, influence participation in public programs rather than a person's material status or preferences (Brodkin & Majmundar, 2010). Administrative barriers behave like a vicious circle of factors, where one causes the other. However, the relationship is often two-sided and reciprocal, so that the roles of cause and effect frequently change. According to Brodkin and Majmundar (2010), organizations act as gateways to public goods and are formally empowered to interpret and apply rules for access to certain services. Outside of their specific role, they also act as informal "gatekeepers," developing different functional models that influence the facilitation or obstruction of the process of exercising rights or services. In their research findings, authors Crudden and Sansing (2011) cite a large number of cases handled by professionals and a large amount of documentation that needs to be collected as hindering factors in accessing services for people with BVI. The same authors also cite the non-standardized provision of services by different local service providers, including non-standardized information and lack of family support services. Rossi (2016) argues that social and health service providers have more information than service users, which ultimately gives them more power in the relationship, although their assumed relationship is a partnership and aims to co-create the service.<sup>3</sup> Rossi (2016) also argues that information asymmetry hinders the ability to align institutional policies and organizational and professional activities with the needs and demands of users.

One of the central concepts that characterize modern civil society is the right of citizens to freedom of association. Civil society is the space between the family, the state, and the market where citizens come together to promote common interests. The non-profit sector means that these organizations are not founded and do not operate primarily for profit and that they are active in an area that cannot always be organized on a commercial basis. Civil society refers to organizations and initiatives that have a positive approach to social problems and contribute to the common good (associations, foundations, private institutions, some cooperatives and unregistered initiatives) (Bežovan & Zrinščak, 2007). This definition expresses the key role of CSOs in general. The area that CSOs focusing on people with BVI occupy includes

<sup>3</sup> Co-creation - citizen participation in the provision of public services and includes various ways in which citizens and/or the CSOs participate in the design and implementation of policies (Pestoff, 2012).

providing advice and information on rights and services for people with BVI, as well as implementing some parts of the rehabilitation program for those members who are not satisfied with the content or manner of service provision at state service providers. In cases where the services are provided by non-profit organizations, this is referred to as social entrepreneurship and social economy (Bežovan, 2009).

As an actor in bridging social capital,<sup>4</sup> CSOs for people with BVI have a unique opportunity for relative access to people with BVI who have left the health system and have not yet entered the welfare system. In addition to the information seekers and providers identified by Beverley, Bath, and Barber (2007), information processors were also identified, with organizations for people with BVI identified as the main information processors for the benefit of members. They have an absolute reach to people with blindness if they are also their members, but given the extensive support network, they also have a relative reach to people with blindness who are not members. CSOs are also associated with a form of negative social capital (Portes, 1998), namely the exclusion of non-members. As their name suggests, they are organizations that deal with blind people. Membership in these organizations and, therefore, the services they offer, are linked to the international classification of blindness. In this context, people with visual impairments, who do not fulfil these criteria, do not fall within the remit of CSOs.

CSOs play a key role in creating bridging social capital in society. They can serve as bridges that connect different groups of people and ensure that the resources and services they offer are accessible to all. In the context of people with BVI, CSOs can connect them to the various resources and services they need but might not otherwise have access to. CSOs can support people with BVI in their efforts to integrate into society and in various activities. In addition, the use of CSOs as bridging social capital can lead to the creation of new networks and relationships between people from different social and cultural groups and help to break down prejudices and stereotypes. CSOs are not always sufficiently organized or equipped to adequately support people with BVI. However, as they are important actors in the implementation of continuous social policy, their position has considerable potential to prevent information asymmetry. Strengthening the capacity of CSOs to provide support and information can be achieved through collaboration with other CSOs, structured and formal participation in decision-making, securing financial support for core programs, and building professional communication capacity at the policy-maker level (McVeigh et al., 2021).

---

<sup>4</sup> Bridging social capital is inclusive and is created through networks and associations that bring together people who are dissimilar. Such a connection creates trust, reciprocity and social capital that positively influences economic and political development (Bežovan & Matancevic, 2017).

## WHAT CHALLENGES DOES SOCIAL POLICY FACE IN IMPLEMENTING SOLUTIONS TO REDUCE INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES?

Due to the way social policy is implemented, although it aims at an inclusive society, it leads to the social exclusion of vulnerable groups (Numans et al., 2023). As key challenges in the implementation of inclusive social policy, Numans and colleagues (2023) cite the excessive bureaucracy that individuals encounter when interacting with the professionals involved; rigid protocols that professionals must follow which do not allow for flexibility or adaptation to the individual's needs; financial constraints that further limit the possibilities of individualized support; and inappropriate practices by professionals where the approaches they use do not match the dynamics and complex needs of the individual. Based on the conclusions of Numans and colleagues (2023), it is necessary to develop more transparent and accessible communication channels for health and social care system actors, as well as to improve professionals' communication through training to understand individual needs and ways of communicating, all with the aim of overcoming the information gap. Regarding access to information about health and social services as key challenges and social policy interventions, Noreau and colleagues (2020) cite inconsistent access to services, rapid technological change, cultural barriers (stigma and stereotypes, low awareness of PWD and/or people with BVI, resistance to change), policy framework challenges (inadequate legal framework, fragmented services), and insufficient support for families of PWD.

Although Speedwell, Stanton, and Nischal's (2003) research focus was on the provision of information to parents of children with blindness, the findings related to information asymmetry and implications for social policy are significant. They found that the key elements in the provision of relevant information are the timing of information and the general lack of knowledge about where and to whom to turn when seeking information. As part of these findings, the formation of Patient Liaison Teams is being considered, whose role would be precisely to provide important, comprehensive and timely information about both visual impairment and all other aspects of health and social care. Buechel and colleagues (2023), discussing information asymmetry in general, emphasize the role of communication channels in the dissemination of information. In this context, it is necessary to change those channels that prove to be inefficient or hinder the even distribution of information. Beverley, Bath, and Booth (2004) and Sharby, Martire, and Iversen (2015) speak of the need for a coordinated approach and collaboration between health professionals, social care system experts and information providers. Through his research on the accessibility of written information for the use of medication, Nguyen (2023)

emphasizes the need to develop tools to standardize information, to maintain the tools that have been shown to be effective, and to use easy-to-understand language and information in multiple formats (Braille, audio, electronic), including the compatibility of digital content with assistive technologies. The focus is also on professionals who need to be trained on how and when to use each format.

Following the work of Dari-Mattiacci, Onderstal, and Parisi (2021) in the field of information asymmetry in the context of economics, we can observe certain principles in the context of health and social policy. First, it is about a basic understanding of what information asymmetry is and in what way and with what results it affects people with BVI. The authors also propose asymmetric solutions as a means of overcoming asymmetry, as a symmetric approach is not effective in all scenarios. The concept of incentive alignment can also be applied to the discourse on the information asymmetry of people with BVI. Incentive alignment is interpreted as a process in which we ensure or encourage the motivation of actors who have information in order to make it more accessible and understandable. This form of incentive requires a systematic approach that includes not only technical and organizational adjustments, but also investment in education and resources. A key component of this approach is the training of experts in effective communication with people with BVI, with a focus on developing skills that enable the clear transmission of information through alternative channels. In addition, the provision of appropriate tools such as tactile and auditory materials and the provision of time and support to adapt the communication process further contributes to the motivation of professionals to adopt the practice of inclusive information. This process not only improves access to information, but also promotes systemic responsibility and awareness of the need for inclusive action.

Hodge and colleagues (2015) recognize similar challenges and advocate for solutions related to the proactive provision of information and services, where health and social system actors accept a proactive approach to people with BVI that goes beyond diagnosis by providing information, referral to other support actors, follow-up or regular needs assessments and more. As a further solution, the development and integration of the role of CSOs in providing support and information is encouraged.

Based on the literature, the most important challenges for which health and social policy makers must find a solution can be identified. The main challenges for social and health policy in relation to people with BVI and information asymmetry are: proactive provision of information and services, timely provision of information, standardization of information, defining the role of experts in the information process and providing appropriate training, reducing the bureaucratic burden on experts, developing support/information systems including the development of liaison teams

and developing and integrating the role of CSOs. Timely information is the basis of an inclusive policy. For people with BVI, this means providing the necessary information at the right time and in a way that suits their communication needs and the psychophysical state they are in due to their visual impairment. The timely provision of information is important for decision-making, especially in situations that require a rapid response. Experts such as health professionals, social workers and educational rehabilitators play a central role in reducing information asymmetries. Their competencies in communicating complex and specific information are essential for strengthening the capacity of people with BVI in terms of autonomy and decision-making based on comprehensive information. These competencies require continuous training and the development of specific communication skills, bearing in mind that such training cannot be limited to technical aspects, but also includes the development of empathy, cultural sensitivity and awareness of the challenges faced by people with BVI. Bureaucratic simplification opens the possibility of additional development of services and support networks for people with BVI. Reducing excessive administrative burdens will free up additional time for direct work and a personalized approach to service seekers. By strengthening the social policy framework and investing in experts and developing an effective information process, the system will have the opportunity to be proactive and not rely on the passive expectation that people with BVI will seek out information themselves in a context that is not accessible for effective information gathering. The development of social and health policies that integrate these elements requires the coordination of different sectors, such as the aforementioned social welfare and health care, but also the education, pension, and justice systems. On the one hand, the implementation of such a policy reduces information asymmetry and increases the efficiency of the system, by reducing the need for subsequent interventions and corrections due to inadequate communication, on the other.

## FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

Information asymmetry undoubtedly plays a key role in access to and utilization of health and social care services by people with BVI, but it is not the only factor influencing their participation. Although many people with BVI have basic information about their rights and the services available, these are still underutilized in practice, particularly in the area of social care. This phenomenon points to the need for a more comprehensive understanding of the interaction between information, economic, access and psychological barriers.

The example of psychosocial rehabilitation as a service of the social system illustrates that the availability of information does not automatically mean that the service will

be utilized. Due to the link with other rights – such as the inclusion allowance (Act on the Inclusion Allowance, NN 156/2023), which is suspended during institutional rehabilitation – families often postpone the decision on integration, even if they are informed about the possibilities. Such an intertwining of social rights and their (in)compatibility in application points to a systemic information asymmetry that requires intervention in the area of regulation and communication of rights.

In addition to financial accessibility, the physical accessibility of spaces and the information and communication accessibility of digital platforms represent further levels of limitations. If digital solutions are not adapted to people with BVI, the asymmetry is not only not alleviated, but even deepened. Thus, digital exclusion builds on existing vulnerability and reduces opportunities for active inclusion in society.

Personal factors such as denial of visual impairment or lack of motivation to access services also contribute to the complexity of the decision to exercise rights. However, these internal barriers often interact with professional practices and systemic deficiencies, confirming the need for trained and sensitized professionals who can recognize, understand, and address psychological resistance in the context of professional communication.

The literature confirms that there is a gap between the need for information and the concrete forms of information provision for people with BVI. Although some authors (e.g., Rossi, 2016) point to potentially constructive aspects of information asymmetry when users take an active role in seeking and advocating for services, such an outcome is only possible with the support of structured, proactive and accessible information mechanisms. In situations where people with BVI do not have basic insight into their rights, we cannot speak of true autonomy or equal participation.

Therefore, it is crucial that policies and practices targeting people with BVI include clear strategies to overcome information asymmetry: from standardization of communication formats and proactive information to training of professionals and digital inclusion. In addition, systemic changes – including reducing bureaucratic hurdles, shortening procedures and improving cross-sector coordination – must accompany these efforts in order to lead to real improvements.

Introducing the concept of information asymmetry into the social policy discourse allows for a more precise definition of the system's weaknesses and provides a basis for developing more inclusive and effective practices. Recognizing and systematically addressing this phenomenon is crucial for ethically sustainable and socially just policies towards people with BVI.

## REFERENCES

- Abel, C. F. (2014). Toward a Theory of Social Justice for Public Administration: How Public Administration Might Be Informed by Catholic Social Theory. *Administrative Theory & Praxis*, 36(4), 466–488. <https://doi.org/10.2753/ATP1084-1806360402>
- Act on the Inclusion Allowance, NN 156/2023. Retrieved 14 November 2024, from [https://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/2023\\_12\\_156\\_2383.html](https://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/2023_12_156_2383.html)
- Addison, C. V. (2017). *The issue of avoidance : information avoidance in the context of personal health concerns* (Doctoral dissertation). University of British Columbia.
- Adli, S. N., & Chowdhury, S. (2021). A Critical Review of Social Justice Theories in Public Transit Planning. *Sustainability*, 13(8), Article 8. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su13084289>
- Akerlof, G. A. (1978). The Market For „Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty And The Market Mechanism\*. In P. Diamond & M. Rothschild (Eds.), *Uncertainty in Economics* (pp. 235–251). Academic Press. <https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-214850-7.50022-X>
- Alogoskoufis, G., Malliaris, A. G., & Stengos, T. (2023). The scope and methodology of economic and financial asymmetries. *The Journal of Economic Asymmetries*, 27, e00297. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeca.2023.e00297>
- Anderson, J., & Honneth, A. (2005). Autonomy, Vulnerability, Recognition, and Justice. In J. Anderson & J. Christman (Eds.), *Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism: New Essays* (pp. 127–149). Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511610325.008>
- Asch, A., & Mudrick, N. R. (2013, June 11). *Blindness and Visual Impairment*. Encyclopedia of Social Work. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780199975839.013.37>
- Barbaroux, P. (2014). From market failures to market opportunities: Managing innovation under asymmetric information. *Journal of Innovation and Entrepreneurship*, 3(1), 5. <https://doi.org/10.1186/2192-5372-3-5>
- Bar-Isaac, H., Jewitt, I., & Leaver, C. (2021). Adverse selection, efficiency and the structure of information. *Economic Theory*, 72(2), 579–614. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01300-1>
- Begon, J. (2023). *Disability Through the Lens of Justice*. Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198875611.001.0001>
- Beverley, C. A. (2009). *The health and social care information needs and behaviour of people with a visual impairment* (Doctoral dissertation). University of Sheffield.
- Beverley, C. A., Bath, P. A., & Barber, R. (2007). Can two established information models explain the information behaviour of visually impaired people seeking health and social care information? *Journal of Documentation*, 63(1), 9–32. <https://doi.org/10.1108/00220410710723867>
- Beverley, C. A., Bath, P. A., & Booth, A. (2004). Health information needs of visually impaired people: A systematic review of the literature. *Health & Social Care in the Community*, 12(1), 1–24. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2524.2004.00460.x>
- Bežovan, G. i Zrinščak, S. (2007). *Civilno društvo u Hrvatskoj*. Zagreb. Jesenski i Turk.
- Bežovan, G. (2009). Civil Society And Public Administration As Partners In The Development Of Combined Social Policy In Croatia. *Hrvatska i komparativna javna uprava*, 9(2), 355-390.
- Bežovan, G., & Matančević, J. (2017). *Civilno društvo i pozitivne promjene*. Školska knjiga, Zagreb.
- Binder, K., Wrzesińska, M., & Kocur, J. (2020). Anxiety in persons with visual impairment. *Psychiatria Polska*, 54(2), 279–288. <https://doi.org/10.12740/PP/OnlineFirst/85408>
- Bloom, G., Standing, H., & Lloyd, R. (2008). Markets, information asymmetry and health care: Towards new social contracts. *Social Science & Medicine*, 66(10), 2076–2087. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2008.01.034>
- Boda, P. A. (2022). On the methodological and epistemological power of epistemic (de)centering as a reflexive praxis of resistance toward disability justice. *Qualitative Research Journal*, 23(1), 114–129. <https://doi.org/10.1108/QRJ-05-2022-0072>

- Boerner, K., & Wang, S. (2012). Targets for rehabilitation: An evidence base for adaptive coping with visual disability. *Rehabilitation Psychology*, 57(4), 320–327. <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0030787>
- Boyce, T., Leamon, S., Slade, J., Simkiss, P., Rughani, S., & Ghanchi, F. (2014). Certification for vision impairment: Researching perceptions, processes and practicalities in health and social care professionals and patients. *BMJ Open*, 4(4), e004319. <https://doi.org/10.1136/bmjopen-2013-004319>
- Brashers, D. E., Goldsmith, D. J., & Hsieh, E. (2002). Information Seeking and Avoiding in Health Contexts. *Human Communication Research*, 28(2), 258–271. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2958.2002.tb00807.x>
- Brashers, D. E., Neidig, J. L., Haas, S. M., Dobbs, L. K., Cardillo, L. W., & Russell, J. A. (2000). Communication in the management of uncertainty: The case of persons living with HIV or AIDS. *Communication Monographs*, 67(1), 63–84. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03637750009376495>
- Brodikin, E. Z., & Majmudar, M. (2010). Administrative Exclusion: Organizations and the Hidden Costs of Welfare Claiming. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 20(4), 827–848. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mup046>
- Buechel, B., Klößner, S., Meng, F., & Nassar, A. (2023). Misinformation due to asymmetric information sharing. *Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control*, 150, 104641. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2023.104641>
- Case, D. O., Andrews, J. E., Johnson, J. D., & Allard, S. L. (2005). Avoiding versus seeking: The relationship of information seeking to avoidance, blunting, coping, dissonance, and related concepts. *Journal of the Medical Library Association*, 93(3), 353–362
- Claassen, R. (2022). Autonomy and Justice. In B. Colburn (Ed.) *The Routledge Handbook of Autonomy* (pp. 335–345). Routledge.
- Clots Figueras, I., Hernán-González, R., & Kujal, P. (2015). Information asymmetry and deception. *Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience*, 9. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fnbeh.2015.00109>
- Creutzfeldt, N., Kyprianides, A., Bradford, B., & Jackson, J. (2024). *Access to Justice, Digitalization and Vulnerability: Exploring Trust in Justice* (1st ed.). Bristol University Press. <https://doi.org/10.2307/jj.9692614>
- Crudden, A., & Sansing, W. (2011). Unmet Needs: Service Issues for Persons who are Blind or Have Low Vision. *Journal of Visual Impairment & Blindness*, 105(3), 170–180. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0145482X1110500311>
- Danermark, B., & Gellerstedt, L. C. (2004). Social justice: Redistribution and recognition—a non-reductionist perspective on disability. *Disability & Society*, 19(4), 339–353. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09687590410001689458>
- Dari-Mattiacci, G., Onderstal, S., & Parisi, F. (2021). Asymmetric solutions to asymmetric information problems. *International Review of Law and Economics*, 66, 105981. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irl.2021.105981>
- Demmin, Docia L., and Steven M. Silverstein. (2020). ‘Visual Impairment and Mental Health: Unmet Needs and Treatment Options’. *Clinical Ophthalmology*, 14(4), 229–251. <https://doi.org/10.2147/OPTH.S258783>
- Dodds, A. G., Bailey, P., Pearson, A., & Yates, L. (1991). Psychological Factors in Acquired Visual Impairment: The Development of a Scale of Adjustment. *Journal of Visual Impairment & Blindness*, 85(7), 306–310. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0145482X9108500711>
- Downing, G. (2024). The Origin of Asymmetric Information: Revisiting the Rationale for Regulation. *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies*, 44(1), 28–53. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/ggad023>
- Džakula, A., Relić, D., & Michelutti, P. (2022). Health workforce shortage – doing the right things or doing things right? *Croatian Medical Journal*, 63(2), 107–109. <https://doi.org/10.3325/cmj.2022.63.107>
- Džakula, A., Vočanec, D., Banadinovic, M., Vajagic, M., Lončarek, K., Lukačević Lovrenčić, I., Radin, D., & Rechel, B. (2024). *Croatia: Health system summary 2024* (p. 21). European Observatory on Health

- Systems and Policies, WHO Regional Office for Europe. Retrieved from: <https://eurohealthobservatory.who.int/publications/i/croatia-health-system-summary-2024>
- Filipaj, A., & Buljevac, M. (2021). Providing Social Services To Children With Developmental Disabilities: The Role Of A Social Worker Employed In A Social Welfare Institution. *Annual of Social Work*, 28(1), 257–271. <https://doi.org/10.3935/ljsr.v28i1.418>
- Frank, J. J. (2003). The avoidance of help-seeking: A study of the experiences of persons with severe visual impairment with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) accommodation request process for print access (Order No. 3115850). Retrieved from: <https://www.proquest.com/dissertations-theses/avoidance-help-seeking-study-experiences-persons/docview/305261201/se-2>
- Goulden, A., Kattari, S. K., Slayter, E. M., & Norris, S. E. (2023). ‘Disability Is an Art. It’s an Ingenious Way to Live.’: Integrating Disability Justice Principles and Critical Feminisms in Social Work to Promote Inclusion and Anti-Ableism in Professional Praxis. *Affilia*, 38(4), 732–741. <https://doi.org/10.1177/08861099231188733>
- Gović, J., & Buljevac, M. (2022). Social Welfare System from Parents’ of Children with Developmental Disabilities Perspectives. *Revija za socijalnu politiku*, 29(2), 213–228. <https://doi.org/10.3935/rsp.v29i2.1778>
- Haas-Wilson, D. (2001). Arrow and the information market failure in health care: The changing content and sources of health care information. *Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law*, 26(5), 1031–1044. <https://doi.org/10.1215/03616878-26-5-1031>
- Hantal, B. (2022). A Review of the Perspectives of Social Justice with Special Reference to the Ambedkarism. *Contemporary Voice of Dalit*, 16(3), 361–373. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2455328X221076623>
- Harrison, T., & Lazard, A. (2015). Advocating for a Population-Specific Health Literacy for People With Visual Impairments. *Health Communication*, 30(12), 1169–1172. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10410236.2015.1037424>
- Hodge, S., Thetford, C., Knox, P., & Robinson, J. (2015). Finding your own way around: Experiences of health and social care provision for people with a visual impairment in the United Kingdom. *British Journal of Visual Impairment*, 33(3), 200–211. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0264619615596198>
- Holloway, E. E., Xie, J., Sturrock, B. A., Lamoureux, E. L., & Rees, G. (2015). Do problem-solving interventions improve psychosocial outcomes in vision impaired adults: A systematic review and meta-analysis. *Patient Education and Counseling*, 98(5), 553–564. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pec.2015.01.013>
- Hosseinzadegan, F., Habibzadeh, H., & Jasemi, M. (2024). The contribution of the nursing profession to the establishment of social justice: A grounded theory study. *Nursing Ethics*, 31(5), 759–776. <https://doi.org/10.1177/09697330231200566>
- Ilijaš, A., & Podobnik, M. (2019). Instability Of The Social Welfare Act - How Does It Affect The Work Of Social Workers In Social Care Centres?. *Annual of Social Work*, 25(3), 427–450. <https://doi.org/10.3935/ljsr.v25i3.242>
- Jornet-Meliá, J. M., Sancho-Álvarez, C., & Bakieva, M. (2015). Diseño y Validación del Construtto Teórico de Justicia Social Percibida por el Alumnado en los Centros Escolares. *Revista Internacional de Educación para la Justicia Social*, 4(2), Article 2. <https://doi.org/10.15366/riejs2015.4.2.006>
- Killen, M., Yee, K. M., & Ruck, M. D. (2021). Social and Racial Justice as Fundamental Goals for the Field of Human Development. *Human Development*, 65(5–6), 257–269. <https://doi.org/10.1159/000519698>
- Kim, H.-J., Jang, S.-N., & Lim, J.-Y. (2022). Service Demand for and Awareness of a Primary Healthcare Pilot Project for People With Disabilities. *Journal of Korean Medical Science*, 37(30). <https://doi.org/10.3346/jkms.2022.37.e241>
- Li, K. (2020). Does Information Asymmetry Impede Market Efficiency? Evidence from Analyst Coverage. *Journal of Banking & Finance*, 118, 105856. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2020.105856>
- Lundeen, E. A., Saydah, S., Ehrlich, J. R., & Saaddine, J. (2022). Self-Reported Vision Impairment and Psychological Distress in U.S. Adults. *Ophthalmic Epidemiology*, 29(2), 171–181. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09286586.2021.1918177>

- McVeigh, J., MacLachlan, M., Ferri, D., & Mannan, H. (2021). Strengthening the Participation of Organisations of Persons with Disabilities in the Decision-Making of National Government and the United Nations: Further Analyses of the International Disability Alliance Global Survey. *Disabilities*, 1(3), 202–217. <https://doi.org/10.3390/disabilities1030016>
- Milić Babić, M., & Laklija, M. (2019). Socijalni rad u zdravstvu: Pogled iz kuta socijalnih radnika zaposlenih u bolnicama. *JAHR*, 10(1), 9–32. <https://doi.org/10.21860/j.10.1.1>
- Milić Babić, M., Žganec, N., & Berc, G. (2021). Social worker perspective on working conditions, social attitudes towards the profession and recommendations for its advancement. *Annual of social work*, 28(2), 353–373. <https://doi.org/10.3935/ljsr.v28i2.449>
- Moffa, C., & Longo, J. (2016). Social Justice as a Lens for Understanding Workplace Mistreatment. *Advances in Nursing Science*, 39(3), 216. <https://doi.org/10.1097/ANS.0000000000000124>
- Moore, J. E. (1984). Impact of Family Attitudes toward Blindness/Visual Impairment on the Rehabilitation Process. *Journal of Visual Impairment & Blindness*, 78(3), 100–106. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0145482X8407800302>
- Mor, S. (2019). With Access and Justice for All. *Cardozo Law Review*, 39(2), 611–648.
- Nguyen, C. (2024). Improving health equity: Evaluation of accessible written medication information for patients with visual impairment. *Journal of the American Pharmacists Association*, 64(3). <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.japh.2023.06.023>
- Noreau, L., Boucher, N., Edwards, G., Fougereyrollas, P., Morales, E., Routhier, F., Vincent, C., & Gascon, H. (2020). Enhancing independent community access and participation: Services, technologies, and policies. In V. Dietz, N. S. Ward, C. Kennard, V. Dietz, & N. S. Ward (Eds.), *Oxford Textbook of Neurorehabilitation* (pp. 477–496). Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/med/9780198824954.003.0035>
- Numans, W., Boog, J., Regenmortel, T. V., & Schalk, R. (2023). Narratives of societal vulnerability. An insider's critical reflection on social policy practice. *Social Work and Social Sciences Review*, 23(3), Article 3. <https://doi.org/10.1921/swssr.v23i3.1837>
- Nyman, S. R., Gosney, M. A., & Victor, C. R. (2010). Psychosocial impact of visual impairment in working-age adults. *British Journal of Ophthalmology*, 94(11), 1427–1431. <https://doi.org/10.1136/bjo.2009.164814>
- Olaopa, S. (2017). Information Literacy Skills, Alternative Format Availability and Information Sources Utilization by Visually Impaired Secondary School Students in South-West, Nigeria. *Library Philosophy and Practice (e-Journal)*. <https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/libphilprac/1550>
- Orešković, S., & Benković, V. (2024). Healthcare professionals' perspective on managing the healthcare system in Croatia: A cross-sectional study. *Croatian Medical Journal*, 65(4), 339–348. <https://doi.org/10.3325/cmj.2024.65.339>
- Paikah, N. (2024). Problems of Inclusive Legal Services for Persons with Disabilities. *Journal of Indonesian Scholars for Social Research*, 4(1), Article 1. <https://doi.org/10.59065/jissr.v4i1.133>
- Papadimitriou, D. (2023). Trading under uncertainty about other market participants. *Financial Review*, 58(2), 343–367. <https://doi.org/10.1111/fire.12333>
- Pestoff, V. (2012). Co-production and Third Sector Social Services in Europe: Some Concepts and Evidence. *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*, 23(4), 1102–1118. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-012-9308-7>
- Podobnik, M., & Ilijaš, A. (2021). The Efficiency Of General Social Assistance Benefits And The Role Of Social Welfare Centers In Combating Poverty. *Annual of Social Work*, 27(3), 449–479. <https://doi.org/10.3935/ljsr.v27i3.350>
- Portes, A. (1998). Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 24, 1–24.

- Pourgholam, N., Shoghi, M., & Borimnejad, L. (2022). Patients' Lived Experiences of the Paternalistic Care Behavior: A Qualitative study. *Journal of Caring Sciences*, 11(3), Article 3. <https://doi.org/10.34172/jcs.2022.10>
- Pudrianisa, S. L. G., Astari, D. W., & Agustina, D. P. (2024). Inclusive Disability Empowerment: Utilization of Digital Applications in Accessing Information for People With Disabilities. *CHANNEL: Jurnal Komunikasi*, 12(2), Article 2. <https://doi.org/10.12928/channel.v12i2.996>
- Revilla, P. (2021). Economics and Information: Asymmetries, Uncertainties and Risks. In C. Rosillo-López & M. García Morcillo (Eds.), *Managing Information in the Roman Economy* (pp. 21–39). Springer International Publishing. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54100-2\\_2](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54100-2_2)
- Rossi, P. (2016). Looking for an emergency door: The access to social services between informational asymmetries and sensegiving processes. *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy*, 36(1/2), 102–118. <https://doi.org/10.1108/IJSSP-12-2014-0121>
- Salhi, Y. (2020). A Framework for Measuring Information Asymmetry. *Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence*, 34(03), Article 03. <https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v34i03.5691>
- Sharby, N., Martire, K., & Iversen, M. D. (2015). Decreasing Health Disparities for People with Disabilities through Improved Communication Strategies and Awareness. *International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health*, 12(3), Article 3. <https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph120303301>
- Sikirić, D. (2023). *Factors For Access To Rehabilitation Within The Framework Of Social Policy For People With Blindness And Visual Impairment* (Doctoral Thesis). University of Zagreb.
- Speedwell, L., Stanton, F., & Nischal, K. K. (2003). Informing parents of visually impaired children: Who should do it and when? *Child: Care, Health and Development*, 29(3), 219–224. <https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1365-2214.2003.00334.x>
- Stolwijk, M. L., van Nispen, R. M. A., van der Ham, A. J., Veenman, E., & van Rens, G. H. M. B. (2023). Barriers and facilitators in the referral pathways to low vision services from the perspective of patients and professionals: A qualitative study. *BMC Health Services Research*, 23(1), 64. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s12913-022-09003-0>
- Stevellink, S. A. M., Malcolm, E. M., & Fear, N. T. (2015). Visual impairment, coping strategies and impact on daily life: A qualitative study among working-age UK ex-service personnel. *BMC Public Health*, 15(1), 1118. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-015-2455-1>
- Sun, W., Wu, F., Kong, J., Nakahara, Y., Xuan, D., Li, X.-Y., & Qu, B. (2012). Analysis on the psychological factors of glaucoma and the influence of the psychological therapy after the education on the glaucoma club. *Chinese Journal of Practical Nursing*, 12(9), 35–38. <https://doi.org/10.3969/j.issn.1672-5123.2012.09.03>
- Suri, A. K., & Jawabri, A. (2016). Educational institutions and information asymmetry observation in UAE. *Journal of Global Economics*, 4(3), Article 213. <https://doi.org/10.4172/2375-4389.1000213>
- Šimunković, G., & Babić, Z. (2023). Koncept socijalnih investicija u zdravstvenom sustavu. *Revija za socijalnu politiku*, 29(3), 367–392. <https://doi.org/10.3935/rsp.v29i3.1813>
- Šogorić, S., Sanković, M., & Štefančić, V. (2018). Persons With Disability – Test Of The Health System Accessibility. *Acta medica Croatica*, 72(2), 205–205.
- Šućur, Z. (2004). Pristup pravima opće socijalne pomoći. *Revija za socijalnu politiku*, 11(1), 21–38. <https://doi.org/10.3935/rsp.v11i1.66>
- Thill, C. (2019). Listening for Intersectionality: How Disabled Persons' Organisations Have Improved Recognition of Difference in Australia's National Disability Insurance Scheme. In O. Hankivsky & J. S. Jordan-Zachery (Eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Intersectionality in Public Policy* (pp. 689–704). Springer International Publishing. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98473-5\\_32](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98473-5_32)
- Varma, A. K., Singh, K., & Kumar, T. K. G. (2020). A Scientometric Review of Global Research on Information Literacy and Visually Impaired. *Journal of Information and Knowledge*, 361–368. <https://doi.org/10.17821/srels/2020/v57i6/151722>

- von Humboldt, S., Silva, S., & Leal, I. (2024). Back to Kindergarten? Paternalistic Care Behavior in Healthcare Contexts and Older Adults' Mental Health. *Social Sciences*, 13(9), Article 9. <https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci13090437>
- Wang, S., & Yu, J. (2017). Everyday information behaviour of the visually impaired in China. *Information Research*, 22(1), Paper 743. <https://informationr.net/ir/22-1/paper743.html>

## Informacijska asimetrija u socijalnoj politici prema osobama oštećena vida

### SAŽETAK

---

Informacijska asimetrija pojam je koji označava neravnomjernu distribuciju informacija između dva ili više dionika, a koja, ovisno u kontekstu kojem se događa dovodi do neučinkovitost, nepovjerenje te u krajnjem slučaju i obmanu, gdje jedna strana (dionik odnosa) iskorištava informacijsku prednost u odnosu na drugu. Opisivanje pojma informacijske asimetrije u socijalnoj politici prema osobama oštećena vida stvara okvir u kojem je moguće promatrati i identificirati poteškoće u informiranju te korištenju prava i usluga u socijalnom sustavu i sustavu zdravstva. Zbog pojave informacijske asimetrije, osobe oštećena vida su u nepovoljnom položaju budući nisu na adekvatan način informirane o uslugama i mogućnostima dodatne socijalne i zdravstvene zaštite te tako uslugu ne percipiraju kao onu koja će pridonijeti njihovom razvoju i unapređenju životnih okolnosti. Cilj ovog rada je pružiti pregled relevantne literature te aktualizirati pojavu informacijske asimetrije u prostoru navedenih sustava i politika. U radu se problematiziraju tri ključna aspekta informacijske asimetrije za osobe oštećena vida, kroz aspekte samog utjecaja na osobe oštećena vida, uloge stručnjaka i čimbenika koji otežavaju ostvarivanje njihovih profesionalnih standarda na području informiranja te završno kroz aspekt socijalne politike i mogućnosti razvoja politika.

**Ključne riječi:** informacijska asimetrija, socijalna politika, sustav socijalne skrbi, zdravstveni sustav, osobe oštećena vida.



Iva Rinčić\*, Toni Buterin\*, Amir Muzur\*

## Bioetika na portugalskom tlu: kratki uvod s ograničenim uvidom

### SAŽETAK

Bioetika je u Portugal stigla sa stanovitim „zakašnjenjem”: prvi je centar osnovan 1988. u Coimbri (*Centro de Estudos de Bioética*), potom prva katedra 1996. pri Medicinskom fakultetu Sveučilišta u Portu (*Serviço de Bioética e Ética Médica*), a 1998. osnovan je i Centar za bioetiku Medicinskog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Lisabonu (*Centro de Bioética da Faculdade de Medicina da Universidade de Lisboa*). Kao i Portugalsko društvo za bioetiku, koje je osnovano 2003., ove se ustanove bave isključivo biomedicinskom etikom. Nešto širu vizuru bioetike, izvan one angloameričke sužene na medicinsku praksu i biomedicinska istraživanja, gaji samo Institut za bioetiku Portugalskoga katoličkog sveučilišta.

Pionirima portugalske bioetike i suosnivačima prvih institucija bili su patolog Daniel dos Santos Pinto Serrão (1928. – 2017.), farmakolog Walter Friedrich Alfred Osswald (r. 1928.), isusovac-molekularni genetičar Luís Jorge Peixoto Archer (1926. – 2011.), isusovac-filozof Roque Cabral (1927.-2021.), pedijatar Jorge Bisciaia (1928. – 2014.), kao i filozofski par Renaud – Isabel Carmelo Rosa (r. 1942.) i Michel (r. 1941.).

Temeljem pregleda literature, osobnih kontakata i rezultata terenskog istraživanja ovaj rad nudi kratak pregled nastanka i razvoja bioetike na portugalskom tlu: počev od institucionalnog doprinosa pa sve do prinosna pojedinaca.

**Ključne riječi:** bioetika, Mediteran, Portugal, povijest bioetike.

\* Katedra za društvene i humanističke znanosti u medicini, Sveučilište u Rijeci, Medicinski fakultet, Rijeka, Hrvatska / Katedra za javno zdravstvo, Sveučilište u Rijeci, Fakultet zdravstvenih studija, Rijeka, Hrvatska. ORCID: Iva Rinčić – <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1028-8813>, Toni Buterin – <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0725-1008>, Amir Muzur – <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9770-6733>.

*Adresa za korespondenciju:* Toni Buterin, Katedra za društvene i humanističke znanosti u medicini, Sveučilište u Rijeci, Medicinski fakultet / Katedra za javno zdravstvo, Sveučilište u Rijeci, Fakultet zdravstvenih studija, V.C. Emina 5, 51000 Rijeka, Hrvatska. E-pošta: [toni.buterin@uniri.hr](mailto:toni.buterin@uniri.hr).

*Ovaj je rad sufinanciralo Sveučilište u Rijeci projektom uniri-iskusni-human-23-125; Ovaj je rad sufinancirala Hrvatska zaklada za znanost projektom IP-2020-02-7450.*

S obzirom na ulogu autora kao članova uredništva, autori izjavljuju kako nisu sudjelovali ni u kojem dijelu uredničkog procesa, uključujući izbor recenzenata, recenziju rukopisa i donošenje uredničke odluke. Cjelokupni urednički i recenzijski postupak neovisno je vodila tehnička urednica.

## UMJESTO UVODA: O PORTUGALU (I BIOETICI)

Površno gledajući, Portugal je zemlja na kraju (našeg) svijeta. Kao što su Grci Sjever omeđivali „ultimom Tulom”, kasnijim Islandom, a Zapad Herkulovim stupovima, koje će Berberi i Arapi nazvati Gibraltarom, Portugal nije mogao biti drugo nego „marginalnim” (neke posuđenice, ipak, poput bajadere, baroka ili grčkoga odnosno makedonskoga naziva za naranču – portokali/ova – mogu pobuditi sumnju da „Portugal” i njegova kultura nisu, povijesno gledano, bili pasivnima). Ali ta mu je pozicija – Europi, dakle, nezanimljiva – omogućila globalnu ekspanziju koju inače, kao relativno mala zemlja, ne bi mogao osigurati: od princa Henrika Moreplovca u prvoj polovini XV. stoljeća Portugal se širio na Azore, Zelenortske otočje, Brazil, pa konačno indijsku Gou i kineski Makao. Možda najbolje o značaju te konkviste pripovijedaju dva groba u belemskom samostanu Sv. Jeronima: Vasca da Game, umrlog 1524., i Luísa de Camõesa, rođenog 1524. Prvi je osvojio svijet osiguravši ovom drugom da proдре u nj svojim pisanjem...

Vjerojatno je rubni položaj Portugala kumovao i njegovoj minornoj ulozi u povijesti bioetike: izložen vjekovnim sporazumima s Engleskom – političkim, trgovinskim i vojnim – i pritisnut sa svih strana Španjolskom poput jastuka koji guši, Portugal, za razliku od te iste Španjolske, dosad nije razvio širu bioetiku od glavnostrujne „školske” (da ne kažemo skolastičke), dobro znane po tematskoj zatvorenosti u medicinske teme, probleme znanstvenog istraživanja i etičkih povjerenstava, uz metodološko pragmatično forsiranje četiriju principa proizašlih iz georgetownskog laboratorija i povezanih angloameričkih tradicionalnih vrijednosti (cf. De la Torre, 2017; Teixeira da Cunha, 1993).

U Portugalu je bioetika, barem na institucionalnoj razini, doplavljen tek krajem 1980-ih (Doričić et al., 2024). U Italiju ju je, u Milano, još 1973. uveo (na kasnije zaboravljena vrata) biolog Menico Torchio, u Belgiju istodobno isusovac Édouard Boné (osnivač centra za bioetiku u Leuvenu 1983.), a u Kataloniji je isusovac Francisc Abel 1976. osnovao Institut za bioetiku *Borja* (Buterin i sur., 2024). Čak je i Hrvatska čula za bioetiku 1985. zahvaljujući isusovcu Valentinu Pozaiću, koji će godinu dana kasnije u Zagrebu osnovati i prvi bioetički centar (Pozaić, 1985a; 1985b). Zemlje istočne i jugoistočne Europe, povezujući bioetiku sa slobodama i ljudskim pravima, mahom će potkraj 1980-ih i početkom 1990-ih započeti uvoziti bioetiku iz SAD-a ili, indirektno, Rima (Muzur, Rinčić i Buterin, 2019).

U Portugalu je, međutim, demokracija obnovljena još sredinom 1970-ih, pa se pojava bioetike ondje može smatrati začuđujuće zakašnjelom.

## INSTITUCIONALNI DOPRINOS

Kako bilo da bilo i kad bilo da bilo, bioetika se logično ukazala u Coimabri, na najstarijem sveučilištu u zemlji.<sup>1</sup> *Centro de Estudos de Bioética* (CEB, koji postoji i danas) osnovan je po uzoru na centre *Hastings* i *Kennedy* kao mala skupina liječnika, pravnika, teologa i filozofa zabrinutih za etičke probleme koji se pojavljuju u medicini i biologiji napretkom tehnologije. Centar je kasnije osnovao podružnice diljem zemlje, povezivao se na međunarodnoj razini članstvom u srodnim udrugama i općenito postao poznat po organizaciji predavanja i skupova, a pokrenuo je i izdavanje časopisa *Revista Portuguesa de Bioética: Cadernos de Bioética*, koji izlazi kvartalno (bez značajnijeg čimbenika odjeka ili indeksacije). Godine 1988. u Coimabri se pojavljuje i Centar za biomedicinsko pravo, koji je pri Pravnom fakultetu osnovao Guilherme de Oliveira, a koji izdaje časopis *Lex medicinae: Revista Portuguesa de Direito da Saúde* (semestralno, 20 godišta).

U Lisabonu je, pak, 1990. osnovano prvo Nacionalno etičko povjerenstvo (po uzoru na seriju američkih predsjedničkih povjerenstava), kasnije Nacionalno vijeće za etiku u znanostima o životu (CNECV), koje se povremeno oglašava svojim „mišljenjima”. Ministarstvo zdravlja će 1995. osnovati Povjerenstvo za zdravstvenu etiku, a 2005. će biti oformljeno i Nacionalno povjerenstvo za klinička istraživanja. Kao i u mnogim drugim zemljama, i ovdje se sintagme „etika u znanostima u životu”, „zdravstvena etika” i slične javljaju paralelno, kao neka vrsta nomenklature opozicije „bioetici”.

U Portu je, opet, 1995. utemeljen Kabinet za bioetička istraživanja (GIB) pri Teološkom fakultetu Portugalskoga katoličkog sveučilišta, koji se također bavi organizacijom skupova, objavljivanjem mišljenja, nastavom i istraživanjem. Ovaj je centar po prvi puta izravno povezao bioetiku s jednim sveučilištem, a 2002. je prerastao u Institut za bioetiku (danas ima podružnice u Lisabonu, Sintri i Portu).

Godine 1996. osnovana je prva katedra za bioetiku, pri Medicinskom fakultetu Sveučilišta u Portu (*Serviço de Bioética e Ética Médica*; danas poznata po proučavanju etičkih aspekata gluhoonijemosti), a 1998. i Centar za bioetiku Medicinskog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Lisabonu (*Centro de Bioética da Faculdade de Medicina da Universidade de Lisboa*). Predvodnicima filozofskog pristupa bioetici svakako su odsjeci za filozofiju u Ponti Delgadi (Sveučilište na Azorima) i Bragi (Portugalsko katoličko sveučilište).

Kao i Portugalsko društvo za bioetiku (osnovano 2003.), sve se ove ustanove bave isključivo biomedicinskom etikom, dok nešto širu vizuru bioetike, koja nadilazi medicinsku, gaji samo Institut za bioetiku Portugalskoga katoličkog sveučilišta (Carvalho, 2014; Biscaia i Osswald, 2010; Teixeira da Cunha, 1993). Zaštita voda

<sup>1</sup> Osnovano u Lisabonu 1290., kasnije se, 1537., skrasilo u Coimabri, oko 200 kilometara sjeverno od glavnog grada.

i ekoetika spominju se kao interesi, ali su očito posve zasjenjeni medicinskoetičkim temama, a svakako nisu stvorili vlastitu školu ili stekli prepoznatljivost. Posve je drugačija situacija u Brazilu, s kojim Portugal najviše surađuje zahvaljujući jezičnoj bliskosti (održavajući, između ostaloga, i redovite „Luzo-brazilske bioetičke susrete“). Utjecajne bioetičke škole u Braziliji (Volnei Garrafa), São Paulu (Leo Pessini), Porto Alegreu (José Roberto Goldim), Santa Mariji (Diego Carlos Zanella) i drugdje razvijaju vlastite pristupe i teme ili ih grade na učenju Fritza Jahra i Vana Rensselaera Pottera. Medicinskoetički aspekti bioetike (dakle, ono što se naziva „glavnom strujom“) su se, pak, početkom XXI. stoljeća naglo raširili portugalskim sveučilištima, pa se procjenjuje da je samo do 2014. najmanje stotinjak studenata steklo naslov magistara bioetike, a njih desetak i titulu doktora znanosti (Carvalho, 2014, str. 1421).<sup>2</sup>

## INDIVIDUALNI PRINOSI RAZVOJU BIOETIKE NA PORTUGALSKOM TLU

Među pionirima portugalske bioetike najčešće se spominju: patolog **Daniel dos Santos Pinto Serrão** (1928. – 2017.), suosnivač Centra za bioetičke studije u Coimbri (CEB), član Papinske akademije za život i Nacionalnog vijeća za etiku u znanostima o životu (CNECV); farmakolog **Walter Friedrich Alfred Osswald** (r. 1928.), također suosnivač Centra u Coimbri i član Nacionalnog vijeća za etiku u znanostima o životu, ravnatelj Instituta za bioetiku Portugalskog katoličkog sveučilišta i prvi voditelj Kabineta za bioetička istraživanja u Portu; isusovac-molekularni genetičar **Luís Jorge Peixoto Archer** (1926. – 2011.), suosnivač Centra u Coimbri i predsjednik Nacionalnog vijeća za etiku u znanostima o životu; isusovac-filozof **Roque de Aguiar Pereira Cabral** (1927. – 2021.), suosnivač Centra u Coimbri; **Maria do Céu Patrão Neves** (r. 1959.), filozofkinja sa Sveučilišta na Azorima i aktualna predsjednica Nacionalnog vijeća za etiku u znanostima o životu; **José Henrique Silveira de Brito** (r. 1945.), filozof iz Brage zainteresiran za antropologiju; pedijatar **Jorge Biscaia** (1928. – 2014.), suosnivač Centra za bioetičke studije u Coimbri, dugogodišnji urednik časopisa *Cadernos de Bioética*, član Nacionalnog vijeća za etiku u znanostima o životu; kao i filozofski par **Renaud – Isabel Carmelo Rosa** (r. 1942.), suosnivačica Centra u Coimbri i filozof **Michel** (r. 1941.), suosnivač Centra u Coimbri i član Nacionalnog vijeća za etiku u znanostima o životu (usp. de la Torre, 2017).

Jedan od svakako ključnih momenata razvitka bioetike u Portugalu bilo je objavljivanje zbornika „Bioetika“, koji su uredili Osswald, Archer i Biscaia (1996.), a među važnijim su knjigama svakako i „Novi izazovi bioetike“, s istim urednicima kojima se pridružio Michel Renaud (Osswald et al., 2001), te „Prinosi bioetici u

<sup>2</sup> Teme doktorata su, jasno, medicinskoetičke (usp. Ivankovich, 2023).

Portugalu” (Ribeiro da Silva, Barbosa i Martins Vale, 2002). Kao i u mnogim drugim europskim zemljama, paralelno će se, međutim, i dalje pojavljivati publikacije koje rabe pojam „etike života” ili slično (Carvalho i Osswald, 2004).

Kada se promatra mlađa generacija portugalskih bioetičara, ističe se **Ana Sofia Carvalho** (r. 1973.), biotehnologinja i mikrobiologinja, ravnateljica Instituta za bioetiku Portugalskoga katoličkog sveučilišta u Portu i UNESCO-ove katedre za bioetiku, članica Nacionalnog vijeća za etiku u znanostima o životu, i **Mara de Sousa Freitas**, izvorno medicinska sestra, a potom specijalizirana za medicinsko pravo i antropologiju, doktorica bioetike koja od 2022. vodi lisabonski Institut za bioetiku Portugalskoga katoličkog sveučilišta (koja je 2023. sudjelovala s pozvanim predavanjem – *online*, doduše – na 25. riječkim danima bioetike). Glavne su istraživačke teme Instituta koji vodi de Sousa palijativna skrb, sindrom *burnouta*, etika javnog zdravstva, poučavanje bioetike u srednjoj školi i bioetika kao strategija približavanja znanosti laicima (Carvalho, 2014, str. 1422). **Rui Nunes** (r. 1961.) predsjednik je i osnivač Portugalskog društva za bioetiku te bivši član Nacionalnog vijeća za etiku u znanostima o životu, a **Jorge Teixeira da Cunha** (r. 1958.) svećenik i moralni teolog iz Porta koji (za razliku od svih ostalih) pokazuje interes za mediteransku bioetiku.<sup>3</sup> Teixeira misli da bi povratak na antičku etiku vrlina bio anakron zbog njena „individualizma, elitizma i farizejstva”, ali mediteranski „korektiv” principalizmu vidi kao nužnost i ističe prednost „narativnog karaktera” nad imperativnim (dakle, kantovskim, ali i jahrovskim) u promidžbi života, i to još zato što „istina ima metaforičku dimenziju koja ne derogira racionalnost, već je upotpunjuje” (pri čemu ne misli samo na bliskost odnosa liječnik – pacijent, već i na odnos čovjek – okoliš). Ukratko, načela (principalizam) postoje, ali nisu dovoljna: ona nalikuju krutoj formi lišenoj sadržaja, koji se očituje u ljudskoj težnji k sreći i humanosti (Teixeira da Cunha, 1996).<sup>4</sup>

## PREMA DISKUSIJI I ZAKLJUČCIMA

Luís Jorge Peixoto Archer je školovan (kao genetičar) u Georgetownu, Roque de Aguiar Pereira Cabral u Barceloni (Francisc Abel) i rimskoj Gregoriani, Maria do Céu Patrão Neves na Institutu za etiku Kennedyjevih i u Leuvenu, Jorge Teixeira da Cunha na Gregoriani, a par Isabel Carmelo Rosa i Michel Renaud u belgijskom Leuvenu: nije li očito da portugalska bioetika nije pobjegla (niti je mogla pobjeći) od katoličke (dakle, glavnostrujne) bioetičke doktrine? Dodamo li k tome i agresivnu

<sup>3</sup> O konceptu „mediteranske bioetike” vidi više u Mallia (2012) i Leone (2012).

<sup>4</sup> Povezan sa Sicilijancem Salvatoreom Priviterom i njegovim krugom „mediteranskih bioetičara”, Teixeira će biti i suurednikom „Rječnika bioetike” iz 2001.

kampanju UNESCO-a koja pokušava progurati angloameričke recepte bioetičkog kurikula, nije čudo da studije preporučuju unificiranje programa na štetu bilo kakve raznolikosti (Alvares Lavigne de Lemos Tavares i sur., 2022). Oni rijetki koji se u Portugalu osvrću na povijest bioetike, poput Antónija Fernanda Cascaisa (profesor na Fakultetu za društvene i humanističke znanosti Novog sveučilišta u Lisabonu, koji piše i o filmu, književnosti, rodu i sl.), oslanjaju se, nažalost, samo na definicije iz Reichove „Enciklopedije bioetike”.<sup>5</sup> Kao glavna disonanca u portugalskoj bioetici vidi se sukob laika-utilitarista i katolika, dakle, ono što se vidi i u Španjolskoj i, u većoj mjeri, Italiji (Teixeira da Cunha, 1993). Najstariji živući pionir portugalske bioetike, Walter Osswald, u svojim djelima bavi se isključivo medicinskom etikom i etikom istraživanja, čak i kada je perspektiva kulturna ili religijska (Oswald, 2018). Ne treba posebno naglašavati da takve teme jedine otvaraju vrata Zapadnih znanstvenih časopisa, uspješno „filtrirajući” globalnu bioetičku sliku (Lampreia Carvalho, 2007).

Ipak, ohrabrujuća je i iznenađujuće lucidna prosudba koju ističe **Miguel Oliveira da Silva** (r. 1952.), ginekolog, profesor medicinske etike pri Medicinskom fakultetu Sveučilišta u Lisabonu i raniji predsjednik Nacionalnog vijeća za etiku u znanostima o životu, da je „neobjašnjivo kako su u Portugalu bioetički centri zanemarili u svom postdiplomskom studiju etička pitanja životinja i etiku prirode, zaboravljajući na proročanski duh Pottera, koji se referirao na sve oblike života, a ne samo na ljudski” (Oliveira da Silva, 2014, str. 11). Osam godina kasnije, to isto Nacionalno vijeće za etiku u znanostima o životu spominje u „Prioritetima bioetike u Portugalu” jedino medicinskoetičke teme, miješajući paternalizam, ljudska prava, etiku istraživanja i sl.<sup>6</sup> Možda se stanoviti napredak može nazrijeti i u činjenici da je Maria do Céu Patrão Neves, vjerojatno nautjecajnija bioetičarka u Portugalu u ovome času, kao suurednica Henku ten Haveu u „Rječniku globalne bioetike” (ten Have i do Céu Patrão Neves, 2021) „moralā” ubaciti u „Rječnik” i crtice o Potteru i Jahru (od ukupno samo šest crtica o osobama). Premda se ovaj „ustupak” vjerojatno dogodio zahvaljujući ten Haveu, koji je učio na greškama vlastite, pet godina starije, „Enciklopedije globalne bioetike”, Patrão Neves i u svojim ranijim publikacijama posvećuje dostojnu pažnju temi povezanosti bioetike i prirode – konkretno, (bio)etici životinja i vode, suprotstavljajući antropocentričnu perspektivu ekocentričnoj (do Céu Patrão Neves i Oswald, 2007), a zanima se često i temeljito i za povijest portugalske bioetike (do Céu Patrão Neves, 2017) i njenu budućnost – pa makar se i vratila na antropocentrične pozicije (do Céu Patrão Neves, 2016). Ni pozdravna poruka na mrežnim stranicama Portugalskog društva za bioetiku, predsjednika Društva Nunesa, ne čini se lošim

<sup>5</sup> Fernando Cascais, „Bioethics: from the early days to the present”, [https://www.academia.edu/842168/Bioethics\\_From\\_The\\_Early\\_Days\\_To\\_The\\_Present](https://www.academia.edu/842168/Bioethics_From_The_Early_Days_To_The_Present)

<sup>6</sup> Maria do Céu Patrão Neves, „Prioridades da Bioética em Portugal”, [https://www.insa.min-saude.pt/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/PrioridadesBioetica\\_conclusoes.pdf](https://www.insa.min-saude.pt/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/PrioridadesBioetica_conclusoes.pdf)

početkom, spominjući okoliš, biodiverzitet, zaštitu životinja (ne i biljaka, doduše), kao i važnost perspektiva filozofa, antropologa i psihologa, a ne samo liječnika i pravnika.<sup>7</sup>

Kako bilo da bilo, Fritz Jahr je stigao do Portugala: vjerojatno prva u znanstvenoj literaturi spominje ga Marta Raquel Riberio Bessa u svojoj doktorskoj disertaciji, koja, međutim, ne citira nijedan od mogućih izvora (Riberio Bessa, 2013).

Možda je Portugal bio zakinut za širu bioetiku jer je izoliran, a možda zato što, za razliku od Španjolske, Italije i Hrvatske, nije imao svog „predstavnik” u Potterovoj „Mreži globalne bioetike”. I kada Teixeira kaže (i to još 1992.) da se portugalski bioetički diskurs širi na „odnose čovjeka prema biosferi”, zapravo to ni sa čim ne potkrepljuje (Riberio Bessa, 2013; do Céu Patrão Neves, 2014), premda se drugdje navodi da je skup na temu „Bioetika i ekologija” razmjerno rano organizirao Centar za bioetičke studije u Coimbri (Biscaia i Osswald, 1995).<sup>8</sup> U svakom slučaju, širiti blagovijest u Portugalu o Fritzu Jahru i europskoj bioetici bit će velikim izazovom koji će morati uključiti prije svega one koji sami sebe ne smatraju (primarno) bioetičarima, poput fiziologinje biljaka Isabel Marije Alves Barrote sa Sveučilišta Algarve u Faru: na takvima, koji sami proizvode (eksperimentima potkrijepljeno) znanje, a ne samo puku refleksiju, počiva najsolidnija bioetika, osobito ona fragilna kakva je bioetika bilja.

## LITERATURA

- Alvares Lavigne de Lemos Tavares, A. C., Alvares Travassos, A. G., Rego F. i Nunes, R. (2022). Bioethics curriculum in medical schools in Portuguese-speaking countries. *BMC Medical Education*, 22(99), 1-9.
- Archer, L., Biscaia, J. i Osswald, W. (Ur.). (1996). *Bioética*. Lisbon: Verbo.
- Archer, L., Biscaia, J., Osswald, W. i Renaud, M. (Ur.). (2001). *Novos desafios à bioética*. Porto: Porto Editora.
- Buterin, T., Doričić, R., Eterović, I., Gensabella Furnari, M., Giacobello, M. L., Guć, J., Kalokairinou, E., Kaluđerović, Ž., Rinčić, I., Trako Poljak, T., Tutić Grokša, I., Vantsos, M., Zagorac, I. i Muzur, A. (2024). How European Countries bordering the Mediterranean affected Bioethics with special emphasis on Croatia, Greece, Italy and Spain. *Jabr – European Journal of Bioethics*, 15(2), 365-398..
- Biscaia, J. i Osswald, W. (1995). Bioethics in Portugal: 1991-1993. U A. Lustig (Ur.), *Bioethics Yearbook*, sv. 4 (str. 285-289). Amsterdam: Kluwer Academic Publisher.
- Biscaia, J. i Osswald, W. (2010). Bioethics in Portugal. U L. Pessini, C. de Paul de Barchifontaine i F. Lolas Stepke (Ur.), *Ibero-American Bioethics: History and Perspectives* (str. 223-231). Dordrecht: Springer.

<sup>7</sup> Pozdravna poruka predsjednika *Associação Portuguesa de Bioética* Nunesa dostupna je na: <https://upbioetica.org/quem-somos/>.

<sup>8</sup> Autori u svom godišnjem izvješću spominju i prava životinja, ali samo kao prilagodbu europskom zakonu o provođenju pokusa na životinjama.

- Carvalho, A. S. (2014). Portugal. U H. T. Have i Bert Gordijn (Ur.), *Handbook of Global Bioethics*, sv. 4 (str. 1417-1425). Dordrecht: Springer.
- Carvalho, A. S. i Osswald, W. (2004). Publicações portuguesas em bioética. *Revista Bioética* (Brazil), 11(2), 61-72.
- Cascais, F. (N/A). Bioethics: from the early days to the present, [https://www.academia.edu/842168/Bioethics\\_From\\_The\\_Early\\_Days\\_To\\_The\\_Present](https://www.academia.edu/842168/Bioethics_From_The_Early_Days_To_The_Present) (pristup: 12. kolovoza 2024).
- Costa Gomes, C. i Carvalho A. S. (2018). *Walter Osswald: 90 anos, 90 textos*. Porto: Instituto de Bioética da Universidade Católica Portuguesa.
- de la Torre, J. (2017). Grandes figuras de la bioética en Portugal. *Revista Iberoamericana de Bioética*, 5, 1-6.
- do Céu Patrão Neves, M. (2022). Prioridades da Bioética em Portugal. Dostupno na: [https://www.insa.min-saude.pt/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/PrioridadesBioetica\\_conclusoes.pdf](https://www.insa.min-saude.pt/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/PrioridadesBioetica_conclusoes.pdf) (pristup: 12. kolovoza 2024).
- do Céu Patrão Neves, M. (2014). Para uma leitura da história do Centro de estudos de bioética. *Revista portuguesa de bioética*, 20(19), 13-24.
- do Céu Patrão Neves, M. (2016). *O admirável horizonte da bioética*. Lisabon: Glaciar.
- do Céu Patrão Neves, M. (2017). *A origem da bioética em Portugal: através dos seus pioneiros*. Porto: Fronteira do caos.
- do Céu Patrão Neves, M. i Osswald, W. (2007). *Bioética simples*. Lisabon: Verbo.
- Doričić, R., Buterin, T., Eterović, I., Gensabella Furnari, M., Giacobello, M. L., Guć, J., Kalokairinou, E., Kaluđerović, Ž., Rinčić, I., Trako Poljak, T., Tutić Grokša, I., Vantsos, M., Zagorac, I., Muzur, A. (2024). Mediterranean Bioethics in the bioethically lessknown Mediterranean: a struggle for identity. *Medicina e Morale*, 2, 219-225.
- Have, H. T. i do Céu Patrão Neves, M. (Ur.). (2021). *Dictionary of Global Bioethics*. Cham: Springer.
- Ivankovich, I. G. (2023). *O princípio bioético da beneficência aplicado ao tratamento cirúrgico da obesidade severa*. Doktorska disertacija. Porto: Faculdade de Medicina da Universidade do Porto.
- Lampreia Carvalho, F. (2007). Regulation of clinical research and bioethics in Portugal. *Bioethics*, 21(5), 290-302.
- Leone, S (2012). The features of a „Mediterranean“ Bioethics. *Medicine, Health Care, and Philosophy*, 15, 431-436.
- Mallia, P. (2012). Is there a Mediterranean bioethics. *Medicine, Health Care, and Philosophy*, 15, 419-429.
- Muzur, A., Rinčić, I. i Buterin, T. (2019). Bioetika na istoku Europe: panorama pogleda, pojava i pojmov. *Jahr – European Journal of Bioethics*, 10(2), 311-324.
- Oliveira da Silva, M. (2014). Introdução. U *Bioética e Políticas Públicas* (str. 7-13). Lisabon: Conselho Nacional de Ética para as Ciências da Vida.
- Pozaić, V. (1985a). Deklaracija o eutanaziji. *Obnovljeni život*, 40(2), 170-176.
- Pozaić, V. (1985b). Eutanazija – smrt po vlastitu ili tuđem izboru. *Obnovljeni život*, 40(2), 126-144.
- Ribeiro da Silva, J., Barbosa, A. i Martins Vale, F. (Ur.). (2002). *Contributos para a bioética em Portugal*. Lisabon: Cosmos.
- Riberio Bessa, M. R. (2013). *A densificação dos princípios da bioética em Portugal: Estudo de caso – a atuação do CNECV*. Doktorska disertacija. Porto: Faculdade de Direito da Universidade do Porto.
- Teixeira da Cunha, J. (1993). La bioéthique: situation au Portugal. U E. Agius (Ur.), *The Quality of Life in the Mediterranean Countries: 1<sup>st</sup> Mediterranean Meeting on Bioethics* (Quaderni di Bioetica e Cultura 1) (str. 89-100). Palermo: Edi Ofes.
- Teixeira da Cunha, J. (1996). La ‘ragione’ iberica delle radici mediterranee. U S. Privitera (Ur.), *Bioetica mediterranea e nordeuropea* (str. 61-75). Roma: Armando Editore.

# Bioethics in Portugal: A short introduction with limited insight

## SUMMARY

---

Bioethics arrived in Portugal with a certain ‘delay’: the first center was established in 1988 in Coimbra (*Centro de Estudos de Bioética*), followed by the first chair in 1996 at the Medical Faculty of the University of Porto (*Serviço de Bioética e Ética Médica*), and in 1998, the Bioethics Center at the Medical Faculty of the University of Lisbon (*Centro de Bioética da Faculdade de Medicina da Universidade de Lisboa*) was founded. Along with the Portuguese Society for Bioethics, established in 2003, these institutions focus exclusively on biomedical ethics. A broader perspective on bioethics, extending beyond the narrow Anglo-American focus on medical practice and biomedical research, is only fostered by the Institute for Bioethics of the Portuguese Catholic University.

Pioneers of Portuguese bioethics and co-founders of the first institutions include the pathologist Daniel dos Santos Pinto Serrão (1928–2017), pharmacologist Walter Friedrich Alfred Osswald (b. 1928), Jesuit molecular geneticist Luís Jorge Peixoto Archer (1926–2011), Jesuit philosopher Roque Cabral (1927–2021), pediatrician Jorge Biscaia (1928–2014), as well as the philosophical couple Renaud – Isabel Carmelo Rosa (b. 1942) and Michel (b. 1941).

Based on a review of literature, personal contacts, and field research findings, this paper provides a brief overview of the emergence and development of bioethics in Portugal: from institutional contributions to the work of individuals.

**Keywords:** bioethics, Mediterranean, Portugal, history of bioethics.



María del Carmen Garrido Hornos\*

## End-of-life decision-making: Euthanasia and assisted suicide under debate in Jojo Moyes's and Thea Sharrock's *Me before you*

### SUMMARY

---

At a certain stage in our existence, death will inevitably come to us all. Euthanasia and assisted suicide raise issues and pose questions that cannot be answered from the perspective of medicine alone. Disciplines such as bioethics, philosophy, and even literature and cinema also offer compelling frameworks from which to address such a complex phenomenon. The present paper explores the notions of euthanasia and assisted suicide through the lens of a contemporary British novel and its cinematic adaptation: Jojo Moyes' *Me Before You* (2012), which was brought to the big screen by Thea Sharrock and released four years later in the UK. As has occurred with other writings and films that will be referenced, the novel and its adaptation provoked opposing reactions—many of them controversial. Is death a private choice in which no one but ourselves should interfere?

**Keywords:** euthanasia, literature, cinema, disability; sexuality, self-determination.

### INTRODUCTION

Literature and cinema bring to the fore controversial themes that often require elucidation and lead to debates yielding new insights. Both disciplines stand as powerful representative methods for sharing knowledge, developing aptitudes, and expressing attitudes toward various topics (Holgado Sáez, 2013).

---

\* Departamento de Filología Inglesa. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Jurídicas y de la Comunicación. Universidad de Valladolid, Campus *María Zambrano*, Segovia, Spain. ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3030-5409>.

*Correspondence Address:* María del Carmen Garrido Hornos, Departamento de Filología Inglesa. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Jurídicas y de la Comunicación. Universidad de Valladolid, Campus *María Zambrano*, Segovia, Spain. Email: [mariacarmen.garrido@uva.es](mailto:mariacarmen.garrido@uva.es).

One might wonder what makes drama books and films so appealing – especially novels, motion pictures, or documentaries that address issues such as premature death, mercy killing, and assisted suicide. Perhaps it is the realistic depictions of a dimension of life we would never wish to experience that helps explain our identification with the protagonists or their loved ones. After all, discourses on euthanasia frequently include both fictional cases and real-life stories and testimonies throughout the history of the practice. Our engagement as readers or viewers allows us to explore the phenomenon of death in past and present societies, along with its biological consequences (Salar Sotillos, 2020).

For many decades, cancer has claimed an unacceptably high and disproportionate number of victims. Other chronic and progressive diseases – such as ALS (Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis), Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s – as well as accidents, or simply aging and the natural course of life, have likewise required the intervention of terminal wards providing palliative care to dying patients. Magazine articles, novels, films, TV series, and documentaries have portrayed euthanasia and assisted suicide as a dignified conclusion to these non-curative but palliative treatments and/or painful processes. Is it ethically right to end the life of a terminally ill patient undergoing severe pain? Under what circumstances, if any, can euthanasia or assisted suicide be justified? Is there a moral distinction between killing a person and allowing them to die? Broadly speaking, supporters of euthanasia argue that everyone has the right to die, and that no specific “right to die” is needed, as other human rights already imply it.

Will Traynor, the protagonist of *Me Before You* (Moyes, 2012), explicitly states that his assisted suicide “[...] is the first thing [he has] been in control of since [his] accident” (2012, p. 469). This statement implies not only his firm conviction in the right to die but also his *will* – curiously reflected in his name – to end what he considers an unbearable existence.

In both Moyes’ novel and its subsequent film adaptation—directed by the English author herself—Louisa Clark, or “Lou” (portrayed by *Game of Thrones* star Emilia Clarke), is hired by the wealthy and respected Traynor family as a caregiver and companion for William (Sam Claflin), their 35-year-old son. Once an adventurous and extravagant man, Will’s life was drastically altered after a motorbike accident left him with irreversible quadriplegia. Despite two years of intensive physical therapy, a severe spinal cord injury (SCI) rendered him wheelchair-bound, though his cognitive abilities remained fully intact.

His lack of hope, chronic pain, and recurrent infections lead him, during the post-adjustment process, to opt for assisted suicide in Switzerland – a possibility not legal in the UK. He informs his parents that everything will be arranged within six

months. Lou's efforts to dissuade Will from his decision and her determination to show him that life is still worth living are ultimately not enough to change his mind. Although he falls deeply in love with the woman who helps him emerge from his emotional isolation, he cannot bear the thought of being a burden to her.

Tragedy and love intertwine in a narrative that highlights a broader societal divide. Thirteen years after the novel's release and nine years after the film's premiere, the debate surrounding assisted suicide and euthanasia continues to polarize opinions. Some critics view the story as a sentimental romantic tragedy lacking artistic depth, while activists see in it a deeply problematic and pessimistic portrayal of disability—one that equates paralysis with a terminal condition. While the plot offers moments that encourage reflection on the meaning of life, many outraged protesters argue that it fails to convincingly portray the “right to decide” it ostensibly seeks to explore.

In the following section, we will reflect on the controversial topic of euthanasia and assisted suicide by providing clear definitions and a comprehensive historical overview of both concepts, applying this context to the narratives under study. The legal criteria for the practice and the arguments for and against euthanasia will be examined in depth to illuminate Moyes' novel and Sharrock's film. Themes such as sexuality and autonomy will emerge as key elements in this exploration of mercy killing and self-determination.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

### Euthanasia: Concept and History

The so-called “mercy killing” (Dimmock & Fisher, 2017), or euthanasia, has indisputably become a sensitive ethical issue and continues to challenge contemporary society. Public debates, political deliberations, and legal controversies across various countries have, for years, attempted to clarify its legal acceptability and religious implications. The topic is particularly topical in Spain, where the government recently legalized a practice that had previously been rejected as unconstitutional.

Etymologically – despite its relatively recent coinage – the term *euthanasia* originates from the Ancient Greek words *eu* (“well”) and *thanatos* (“death”), thus conveying the classical notion of a “good” or “easy death,” meaning the act of allowing someone to die without severe suffering or agony (Dimmock & Fisher, 2017; Minocha et al., 2011). Both Greeks and Romans tolerated suicide under certain circumstances, particularly when no relief could be offered to the dying (Young, 2020). Stoics and Epicureans even regarded suicide as a viable option when life had become intolerable or grief unbearable (Minocha et al., 2011).

Following the pagan antiquity of figures like Socrates, Plato, or Eurydice, religious tradition placed Christ as the model of endurance and martyrdom – an embodiment of redemptive suffering and sacrificial atonement. His acceptance of torture and death through faith and grace (Sánchez Sáez, 2020) – devoid of personal choice – stood in stark contrast not only to ancient Greek and Roman ideals but also to later movements such as Protestantism, Secular Liberalism, and Marxism.

The modern understanding of euthanasia, however, began to take form during the early modern period. In *Utopia* (1516), Sir Thomas More imagined a society that permitted death for those whose suffering rendered life unbearable. Similarly, Sir Francis Bacon, in *Of the Proficiency and Advancement of Learning, Divine and Human* (1605), advocated for euthanasia as a fair and humane solution for incurable patients. For Bacon, euthanasia meant an easy, painless death, and it was “a physician’s responsibility to alleviate the physical sufferings of the body” (p. 141). He distinguished “outward euthanasia” (physical) from its spiritual counterpart, which involved the soul’s preparation for death (p. 199).

In line with these early thinkers, modern philosophers such as Plato, Nietzsche, Hume, Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and Émile Zola also openly supported the idea of assisted suicide for those who might otherwise face a cruel end. After all, few would dispute that death may be considered “good” when it occurs naturally, free from physical or moral suffering, when autonomy is respected, and when one passes surrounded by loved ones—reconciled with others, oneself, and, in the case of practising Christians, with God (Poole Derqui, 2020).

Overall, the evolution of the concept has been shaped by ethical, intellectual, and, more recently, medical dimensions. In Hindu culture, for example, the practice of *moksha* – self-administered death – is viewed as a form of liberation from *samsara*, the cycle of death and rebirth (Minocha et al., 2011). Buddhism introduced the idea of *nirvana*, a release from suffering (*dukkha*) and the cyclical nature of existence. In countries like Iceland, decisions surrounding the end of life often revolve around natural law, fate, and divine will (Einarsdóttir, 2009).

Today, euthanasia is globally associated with medical interventions aimed at alleviating end-of-life suffering, which may include the premature ending of life (Minocha et al., 2011). As defined in the Netherlands in 1985, euthanasia refers to “the administration of drugs with the explicit intention to end life at the explicit request of a patient” (in Rietjens et al., 2009, p. 272).

Today, euthanasia is globally understood as a medical intervention aimed at reducing end-of-life suffering, which may involve the premature termination of life (Minocha et al., 2011). According to the definition established in the Netherlands in 1985, it

refers to “the administration of drugs with the explicit intention to end life at the explicit request of a patient” (Rietjens et al., 2009, p. 272).

### **Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide (EAS) around the World: Legality and Criteria**

Since therapeutic innovations have provided increasingly effective mechanisms to control life processes and improve quality of life, patients have assumed a more active role in contemporary medicine. They can now choose to accept or refuse treatment – or even request an intervention to end their lives. The patient has become “an empowered and informed person endowed with several rights vis-à-vis the doctors to protect his/her own interests” (Minocha et al., 2011, p. 25). Physicians, therefore, now consider achieving a good quality of dying to be as pertinent and necessary a goal as curing disease or prolonging life – when possible.

Nevertheless, at present, assisted suicide and euthanasia remain subject to criminal prosecution in many jurisdictions. In fact, the legality of such practices varies widely from country to country. In 2002, the Netherlands became the first nation to legalize euthanasia and assisted suicide (EAS) for competent adults and emancipated minors. The country had officially tolerated euthanasia since 1985, and in 1994, a provisional law preceded the comprehensive legislation enacted eight years later (Groenewoud et al., 2021).

Following the Netherlands, Belgium (2002), Luxembourg (2009), and Canada (2016) also legalized EAS. In 2021, despite public debate, Spain became the fifth country to decriminalize euthanasia.

With this approval, Spain legalized not only euthanasia but also medically assisted suicide, which is permitted in various other countries. Unlike euthanasia, assisted suicide does not involve a third party administering the fatal dose; instead, life-ending medication is prescribed, and the patient ingests it themselves. In the United States, physician-assisted suicide has been legalized in several states over the past 25 years: Oregon (1997), Washington (2008), Montana (2009), Vermont (2013), California (2015), Colorado (2016), Washington D.C. (2016), Hawaii (2018), New Jersey (2019), and Maine (2020). In the Southern Hemisphere, Australia (including Tasmania, Victoria, and Western Australia) has passed similar laws, while New Zealand legalized the practice in November 2021.

In Colombia, the Constitutional Court legalized assisted suicide in 2015, but the practice has yet to be formally regulated by the government. A similar situation exists in Austria, where the Constitutional Court ruled that prohibiting the practice was unconstitutional, and thus no criminal offense is recognized in its execution.

Switzerland, however, has taken a distinct approach. Altruistic assisted suicide – performed even by non-physicians – is legally permitted (Hurst & Mauron, 2003). The country allows this practice for both residents and non-residents, including those who are not terminally ill. Often labeled “suicide tourism,” this phenomenon involves organizations such as Dignitas and Lifecircle, which have assisted more than 2,500 people in ending their lives over the past two decades. Volunteers, rather than physicians, typically carry out the process, with medical professionals mainly responsible for evaluating decision-making capacity and prescribing the lethal medication (Botica, 2019).

The Swiss Academy of Medical Sciences has stated that “assisted suicide is not a part of a physician’s activity” (Hurst & Mauron, 2003, p. 271), a position that has placed the practice outside the formal scope of healthcare. As a result, doctors are viewed under the law as equivalent to general citizens in this context. This ambiguity effectively permits physicians – like any other individuals – to assist in ending life, almost in a philanthropic capacity.

What nearly all of these jurisdictions have in common is the requirement that every request for euthanasia or assisted suicide undergo thorough scrutiny. In Spain, for example, a patient must suffer from a “serious or incurable illness” or a “chronic or incapacitating condition” that results in “intolerable suffering” to be eligible to request either practice (Ley Orgánica 3/2021, 34040). The request must be submitted twice in writing within 15 days, and the individual must be “fully aware and conscious” (Ley Orgánica 3/2021, 34041), not acting under external pressure, and must have been informed about any subsidies available under the Dependency Act as well as potential palliative care options and sedation. Approval must then be granted by both a second physician and an evaluation committee composed of at least seven members – typically including doctors, legal professionals, and nursing staff. A physician may refuse to proceed on the grounds of conscientious objection or if the legal requirements are not fulfilled (Ley Orgánica 3/2021).

Similarly, in the Netherlands, death by non-natural causes is legal only when the conditions outlined in the Dutch *Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act* are strictly followed. The physician must report the euthanasia or assisted suicide and adhere to the “statutory due care criteria”, which require that:

1. The physician is satisfied that the patient’s request is voluntary and well-considered.
2. The physician is satisfied that the patient’s suffering is unbearable and without prospect of improvement.
3. The patient has been informed of their condition and prognosis.

4. Physician and patient have concluded together that no reasonable alternative exists.
5. At least one other independent physician has been consulted.
6. The physician has exercised due medical care and attention.  
(Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002)

As previously noted, physicians may express hesitation or even refuse to perform euthanasia without facing professional or legal penalties. Ultimately, “patients have no absolute right to euthanasia, and doctors no absolute duty to perform it” (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002).

### **Arguments For and Against Euthanasia**

As indicated, euthanasia remains an issue marked by deeply clashing ideological positions and contradictory opinions.

Several ethical theories support its acceptability and legal recognition. One such perspective is the *Quality of Life* rationale, which argues that death may be preferable to a life sustained through therapeutic obstinacy. In other words, prolonging life serves little purpose when its quality is severely diminished and death appears to be the most compassionate outcome (Dimmock & Fisher, 2017). Moreover, assisting someone in dying with dignity does not contradict the primary aim of medicine: the alleviation of suffering.

Closely related to this is the *argument from Personal Autonomy* – or *Self-determination, Liberty, and Dignity* (Sánchez Sáez, 2020). This position rests on the belief that individuals have the right to make decisions about every aspect of their lives, including how and when to die. The ability to accept or refuse treatment and to choose death over prolonged agony should be recognized as a fundamental element of our final wishes (Dimmock & Fisher, 2017). Exercising this right is not an obligation, but it reflects our ownership over our own bodies, lives, and deaths.

A more utilitarian approach is the *argument from Resource Use*, which posits that voluntary euthanasia could be ethically justified from an economic standpoint. If we accept the moral undesirability of allocating limited medical resources to individuals with no chance of recovery, then respecting the wish of someone who no longer desires to live could be seen as socially responsible. The death of terminally ill patients might allow for the redirection of financial and medical resources – such as palliative care, hospital space, and pensions – toward patients whose conditions are treatable or whose suffering can be alleviated more effectively.

From a political perspective, euthanasia should be legally permitted and regulated in democratic societies that support its decriminalization. For example, 85% of the Spanish population reportedly favored legalizing euthanasia in a 2019 survey (Poole Derqui, 2020). In largely secular states, opponents argue that banning the practice amounts to enforcing Christian religious ethics on citizens who may not share those beliefs.

Opposing these ideologies are several direct objections to euthanasia. The *objection from the Sanctity of Life* has deep religious roots and stands in stark contrast to the previously mentioned pro-euthanasia arguments. From a Christian perspective, human life is sacred, inherently valuable under all circumstances, and should not be subject to qualitative assessment (Dimmock & Fisher, 2017). Life is considered the foundation of all goods, ultimately belonging to God; thus, we are not entitled to dispose of it at will (Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, 1980): “If we live, we live to the Lord, and if we die, we die to the Lord” (Rom. 14:8, cf. Phil. 1:20). Additionally, the *objection from Valuable Suffering* holds that end-of-life suffering forms part of God’s divine plan: “It is in fact a sharing in Christ’s passion and a union with the redeeming sacrifice which He offered in obedience to the Father’s will” (Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, 1980).

The *Slippery Slope* – or *Wedge* – argument contends that legalizing euthanasia under seemingly justified circumstances could ultimately lead to its acceptance in ethically problematic cases. This objection is rooted in the fear that what begins as voluntary euthanasia may gradually expand to include non-voluntary or even involuntary euthanasia. Supporters of this view criticize the argument from resource allocation, suggesting that if euthanasia is justified on the grounds that resources should be redirected, then the patient’s consent may eventually be deemed irrelevant. As Dimmock and Fisher (2017, p. 133) argue: “If euthanasia can be justified on teleological grounds when resources would be better deployed elsewhere, then what is to stop us justifying not merely voluntary and non-voluntary euthanasia, but involuntary euthanasia also?”. Should the depletion of medical resources be considered a valid reason to justify euthanasia, the entire process could shift away from personal choice and toward a dangerous norm—potentially transforming it into an unconsented, involuntary procedure.

Finally, from a civic and societal standpoint, the *objection from Modern Treatment* equates euthanasia with abandoning any potential for future recovery or for benefitting from advancements in palliative care. Advocates of this objection argue that euthanasia is unjustifiable, as modern pain management and end-of-life care can effectively relieve suffering. Moreover, it may exert emotional pressure on elderly, terminally ill, or dependent patients – who might feel compelled to request

euthanasia in order to relieve their families of emotional or financial burdens. In direct opposition to the Liberty argument, Poole Derqui (2020) even refers to this dynamic as a form of emotional blackmail against the most vulnerable, which intensifies their despair and fosters resignation.

In conclusion, objectivity in discussing euthanasia requires careful attention to the wide range of underlying arguments – whether juridical (e.g., its impact on individual rights and medical responsibilities, the willingness or refusal of healthcare professionals to carry it out, and the appropriateness of legal regulation) or spiritual (e.g., Christian moral teachings, the imposition of religious norms in pluralistic societies, and the emotional consequences for patients and their families).

### **EAS IN *ME BEFORE YOU***

Jojo Moyes stated in several interviews that her story was inspired by the real-life case of Daniel James, a Nuneaton rugby player who, after living for several years with tetraplegia caused by a dislocation in his neck vertebrae, persuaded his parents to support his decision to end his life in Switzerland. Since 2007, James had attempted suicide on multiple occasions until, on Friday, 12 September 2008, he finally traveled to Bern to fulfill his wish. For James' parents, accepting his self-determination was heartbreaking, but as they explained, “he was not prepared to live what he felt was a second-class existence” (in Booth, 2008).

The case, widely reported in the media, moved Moyes so deeply that she decided to write *Me Before You* – the story of a man whose choice to die stems from the profound loss of identity after an accident results in a life-altering, irreversible disability. For Moyes, the suffering experienced by both James and her fictional protagonist was “not just a matter of being in a chair, [...] [but] a constant series of interventions, indignities and health problems” (in Warner, 2016). If life is to be lived with dignity, then, according to the motto of Dignitas – the assisted suicide center in Zurich mentioned explicitly five times and indirectly in others throughout the novel – death must also come with dignity.

We do not choose when we enter this world; do we, then, possess both the capacity and the right to decide when and how we should leave it? Should ending life be a legitimate option when pain is unbearable and the possibility of recovery nonexistent?

As readers of *Me Before You*, we meet a handsome, sexually active, jet-setting businessman with an eccentric and adventurous past. References throughout the novel to extreme sports – skiing, paragliding, bungee jumping – and international travel – China, Kenya, Tanzania – define William Traynor as a vibrant, high-energy

man who “led a big life” (Moyes, 2012, p. 426). His current trauma and resulting disability leave him feeling entitled to make the decision to die. The novel – more explicit in its engagement with euthanasia and assisted suicide (EAS) than its film adaptation – openly references real-life cases from which Will draws information. Among these are the case of a woman with a degenerative disease who seeks legal protection for her husband should he accompany her to Dignitas when her suffering becomes intolerable (p. 241), and the story of Leo McInerney, a 24-year-old footballer who died in a Swiss flat after being seriously injured during a match (pp. 242-243, 258-259).

Sharrock’s film adaptation – described by the director herself as “a chance to pause and reflect on the real value of life” (*The Observer*, 2016) – sought to remain as faithful as possible to Moyes’ novel. Still, the West End director emphasized that she had no intention of taking sides in the debate or of passing judgment on such a complex issue (*The Observer*, 2016). At her request, Moyes, who also wrote the screenplay, remained loyal to her original narrative. Based on this shared commitment, the film preserves the essence of William’s character—a man unable to reconcile with the irreversible transformation brought on by his physical limitations.

### Portraying Disability in the Story: Autonomy and Virility Lost

Unable to move past his disability, William Traynor is physically and emotionally exhausted by chronic pain, recurrent infections, and frequent hospitalizations. His daily intake of high doses of blood-pressure medication, antispasmodics, painkillers, and sleeping pills underscores the unrelenting nature of his suffering. The pro-euthanasia *Quality of Life* rationale (Dimmock & Fisher, 2017) appears to drive Will’s decision, as the alleviation of his excruciating physical pain seems, to him, to justify his desire to die. Lou’s narration in Moyes’ novel reveals the extent of Will’s physical torment:

“The days with Will were subtly different – depending on his mood and, more importantly, how much pain he was in” (Moyes, 2012, p. 121).

“There were all sorts of things that caused him pain: [...] general aches that came with loss of muscle, [...] stomach pain from digestive problems, shoulder pain, pain from bladder infections, [...] a stomach ulcer from taking too many painkillers, [...] pressure sores from being seated in the same position for too long, [...] headaches – a side effect, I thought, of his anger and frustration” (p. 122).

“Sometimes he was in so much pain that his face actually leached colour, turning to pale putty. Those were the worst days” (p. 123).

Given this grave clinical condition, it is not difficult to infer the resulting psychological distress. Although Moyes’ script makes no direct mention of clinical depression or

psychological therapy, forensic and clinical psychologist Jeremy Clyman notes that Will's "[...] behaviour, post-accident, show[s] all the signs of a major depression (sadness, hopelessness, social withdrawal, loss of pleasure in life, fatigue, poor appetite/sleep, suicidality)" (Clyman, 2016).

Both the novel and its film adaptation present direct references to Will's abandonment of his career, personal interests, and social life. His trauma is spatially symbolized by his confinement to the "annex" – a part of the Traynors' castle adapted for wheelchair accessibility. The novel and film underscore his emotional disconnect from the world he once thrived in. One striking moment comes when Lou encourages Will to dream about visiting Paris, and he retorts: "[...] I want to be in Paris as me, the old me" (*Me Before You*, 2016, 01:03:27). He elaborates, expressing how his immobility would taint his memories: "I do not want those memories erased by the struggle to fit behind a table, the taxi drivers who refuse to take me, and my wheelchair power pack that won't charge in a French socket" (01:03:49).

In the novel, recurrent references to Will's condition – "the disabled man" (pp. 20–21, 39, 168, 184), "your disabled bloke" (p. 247), "man in a wheelchair" (pp. 80–90, 194), "quadriplegic" (pp. 20–21, 42, 163, 171, 292–293) – establish a sense of vulnerability and isolation that the reader anticipates before even encountering the protagonist. Will's total paralysis, which he sees as a burden to his family, is perceived as potentially off-putting to others. This is evident when Lou is asked during her job interview whether her son's quadriplegia would bother her. Lou replies sarcastically, "Well, not as much as it would bother him, obviously" (p. 27), but her later apprehension about Will's "intimate needs" reveals her unease: "[...] [H]is 'intimate needs' (I shuddered at the phrase)" (p. 24); "What if he needs... to go to the loo? [...] I tried not to let my face betray my panic" (p. 44).

Nathan, Will's male nurse, reassures Lou that her role is emotional support, not physical care (p. 45). Yet despite this, Lou's narration conveys the discomfort and awkwardness of witnessing the vulnerable details of Will's everyday life. His total dependence, even for the most basic tasks, is made starkly clear:

[I] found it hard not to feel squeamish as Nathan peeled down the waist of Will's pyjama bottoms, revealing a pale strip of bare stomach, and carefully removed the gauze dressing around the little tube in his abdomen, cleaning it gently and replacing the dressing. He showed me how to change the bag on the bed, explained why it must always be lower than Will's body, and I was surprised how matter-of-fact I was about walking out of the room with the pouch of warm fluid. I was glad that Will wasn't really watching me [...] because I felt that me witnessing some part of this intimate routine would in some way have embarrassed him too. (Moyes, 2012, p. 101)

Reading such heartbreaking lines, the assumption that Will is incapable of developing a fulfilling personal life does not seem unwarranted. Alicia – his former girlfriend – justifies her engagement to Will's best friend by acknowledging that it was Will who distanced himself: "[...] I did try. [...] And he just pushed me away. [...] He actually didn't want me here" (p. 65). Is it simply his emotional devastation that drives Will's refusal, or is it his paralysis from the neck down that compels him to let Alicia go?

For a young and attractive man, the inability to consummate love symbolizes a perceived loss of virility. Will's overt masculinity is made explicit in the film's opening scene, where he is shown in bed with Alicia after sex. His disability, however, becomes a nearly insurmountable barrier. He believes he has lost Alicia – and, with her, any possibility of future sexual intimacy or romantic fulfillment.

All of this occurs before Lou. In her efforts to "re-engage him with a life he could deem worth living" (Clyman, 2016), Louisa takes Will on a trip to Mauritius, where she confesses her love. In a poignant night scene on the beach, Will candidly reveals the emotional weight of his physical limitations as he guards himself against her affection. For Will, being impaired means being unable to express love physically – something that clashes painfully with his former self-image: "I can't [...] see you naked and not... not be able to... Oh, God, Clark, if you had any idea what I wanna do to you right now" (*Me Before You*, 2016, 01:26:06). In the novel, he echoes this conflict: "I can't do this because I can't... [...] be the man I want to be with you. And that means that this [...] just becomes... another reminder of what I am not" (Moyes, 2012, p. 423).

Will's choice to die is not only a rejection of his physical condition but also a decision to end the pain of unfulfilled longing – for idealized sexuality, freedom, and masculine identity. As previously discussed, flashbacks to his adventurous and sexually active past suggest a man who once embraced vitality. Now, however, his dependence on others highlights what is framed, both narratively and visually, as a form of emasculation. He needs liberty. As Mr. Traynor tells his wife: "Will needs to be allowed to feel like a man" (p. 167; 01:46:07). Will himself voices a similar longing: he needs "to be a man who has been to a concert with a girl in a red dress" (p. 216). But he also needs empathy and for his despair to be heard: "You thought you knew best. Everyone thinks they know what I need" (p. 73; 01:45:45).

Ultimately, Lou is unable to dispel Will's suicidal resolve. His insistence that life in his current state is not dignified supports his belief that he alone is the owner of his body – and thus the only one entitled to decide when to end his life. But does this suggest that, for Will, death is preferable to living with a disability?

In this way, *Me Before You* compels both readers and viewers to confront this difficult question and take a position – either in support of the protagonist’s right to self-determination and a “dignified death,” or in opposition to what some interpret as a troubling equation of disability with a life not worth living.

### **Protests to *Me Before You***

*Me Before You* sparked international outrage among disability rights activists who opposed what they interpreted as the central message of both the novel and the film.

According to Jojo Moyes, both works present “a fine balance of humour and tragedy, and the moral and ethical issues are quite delicate” (Dadds, 2016). However, many appalled viewers harshly criticized the film, labelling it a “disability snuff movie” (Pring, 2016; Quinn, 2016) that implies disabled individuals are “better off dead” (Pring, 2016). For these critics, portraying disability as a fate worse than death was deeply offensive – especially for young disabled viewers. They argued it harmed public perception of disability, particularly affecting people with spinal cord injuries and their hope for the future. To them, disability is a complex issue requiring serious and realistic treatment, not a sentimental or superficial one.

One of the major points of contention was the casting of non-disabled actor Sam Claflin – best known for his role as Finnick Odair in *The Hunger Games* series (2013–2015) – as Will Traynor. Activists viewed this as an affront to disabled people, who remain underrepresented in mainstream media. Actress Cherylee Houston (*Coronation Street*) expressed frustration: “Dear Mr. and Ms. Hollywood, why can’t disabled people just be characters, not this skewed view of our lives?” (Kadrou, 2016). In response, director Thea Sharrock defended the casting, stressing their commitment to portraying Will’s condition with authenticity:

It is really important to me that the film seems real to anyone who knows anything about this kind of disability. Over five months, Sam and I sent each other lots of cuttings and book recommendations to work out how to create this character who does not do what you necessarily expect. (Kadrou, 2016)

Despite these efforts, many wheelchair users felt alienated. They argued Will should have been portrayed not as “confined” by his wheelchair, but as empowered through it. One viewer commented:

I don’t think the message that committing suicide so my partner doesn’t have to live with a wheelchair user is particularly romantic. [...] It’s pretty harmful for people like me, especially those newly adjusting to life as a disabled person. I’m not against death and euthanasia, but when it is one of the key plotlines, it becomes harmful. I think that would have been far more worthy of investigation. (Pritchard, 2016)

In the same vein, disabled actress Liz Carr, a leading member of the anti-euthanasia campaign *Not Dead Yet UK*, denounced the film as “offensive to disabled people, the vast majority of whom want to live, not die” (Pring, 2016). For Carr and others, *Me Before You* frames the lives of disabled individuals – and those of their loved ones – as tragic. Activists took to social media, using Twitter to directly address Claflin: “Why should I have to sit here tweeting about how us, disabled people, want to live? This disgusts me!”; “Is being dependent on others really so bad that the only viable solution is death?” (Pring, 2016).

Under the hashtag #MeBeforeEuthanasia, disabled filmmakers, producers, actors, and Paralympic athletes voiced their rejection of the film’s message. They asserted that what disabled people want is not to be encouraged or assisted to die, but to be supported in living full and meaningful lives. They pointed to positive cinematic representations such as *My Left Foot: The Story of Christy Brown* (Jim Sheridan, 1989) and *Intouchables* (*Untouchable*, Olivier Nakache & Éric Toledano, 2011) – both portraying strength, intellect, and resilience in paralysed bodies. *My Left Foot*, for instance, tells the story of the severely paralysed Irish writer and painter who used the small toe of his left foot to create art and poetry. Christy Brown falls in love, marries, and remains sexually and emotionally active – challenging the stereotype of the asexual disabled body. Notably, no backlash followed Daniel Day-Lewis’s portrayal of Brown, possibly because, unlike Will Traynor, Christy’s story is one of empowerment and triumph over adversity.

However, contrary to protestors’ claims, Sharrock’s film does not portray Will as a burden to his family or carers. On the contrary, the film repeatedly shows his parents’ desperate attempts to dissuade him. When Camilla Traynor finds the letter from Dignitas, a powerful scene follows:

Camilla: Freedom?! You call this ‘freedom’?!

Mr. Traynor: [...] We made an agreement with Will. Six months.

Camilla: No, I only agreed so that we had six months to change his mind. I cannot believe that you are willing to help our son end his life! [...] He’s my son!

Mr. Traynor: He’s my son, too!! [...]. You know how much pain he’s in.

Camilla: God! [...] We can still persuade him.

Mr. Traynor: And do you think the pretty waitress is going to do that? (0:42:03)

Lou, too, opposes Will’s decision when she discovers his intentions. Speaking to Nathan, she declares: “I can’t just let this happen. I can’t. And we’re running out of time” (1:17:05). If the film truly endorsed a stereotype of the disabled as worthless, why would a young, beautiful, sexually active woman be depicted as falling in love with a man who cannot reciprocate physically, enjoy sex, or father children?

Moreover, the film does not convey the message that disabled people are “better off dead.” Will’s family and Lou actively resist his decision. Moral and spiritual themes are woven throughout the narrative – embodied particularly in the character of Jossie, Lou’s devout Christian mother. During her daughter’s birthday celebration, she offers a blessing at the table: “Dear Lord, [...] thank you for [...] the strength to face the challenges we meet on our journey” (1:56:37). Later, she voices her absolute opposition to assisted suicide, calling it murder. The golden cross hanging from her neck symbolizes the *Sanctity of Life* objection to euthanasia. For Jossie, as for many believers, life belongs to God, and only He can decide when it ends.

In sum, the love story of Louisa and Will reignited public interest in the ethics of EAS and mercy killing, echoing earlier cinematic works such as *An Act of Murder* (Michael Gordon, 1948), *The Greatest Show on Earth* (Cecil B. DeMille, 1952), *Johnny Got His Gun* (Dalton Trumbo, 1971), *Right to Die?* (Paul Wendkos, 1987), *One True Thing* (Carl Franklin, 1998), *The Sea Inside* (*Mar adentro*, Alejandro Amenábar, 2004), *Million Dollar Baby* (Clint Eastwood, 2004), and *You Don’t Know Jack* (Barry Levinson, 2010). All these narratives feature protagonists whose voluntary desire to die is respected and, in some cases, facilitated.

As Rivaya García et al. (2008) argue, any decision made under adverse circumstances – especially one as irreversible as death – demands close attention to the conditions under which it is made. Is the choice truly authentic, autonomous, and free from coercion? In Will’s case, the answer seems to be yes. His decision is taken in full awareness of his condition and supported by legal arrangements he finalizes before his death. His choice meets the “statutory due care criteria” outlined earlier: his suffering is unbearable, the prognosis hopeless, and the decision voluntary and informed (Dimmock & Fisher, 2017; Young, 2020). As Mr. Traynor states clearly: “It’s his choice, and this is what he wants” (0:42:01).

Traynor says to Camilla, “[i]t’s his choice, and this is what he wants” (0:42:01).

## CONCLUSION

End-of-life issues remain in the public eye, and the debate will likely continue to generate insights into the broader questions surrounding suffering, dignity, and personal choice. For their detractors, euthanasia and assisted suicide are felonies; for their advocates, they represent fundamental rights. For medicine, they raise bioethical questions with toxicological and forensic implications (Salar Sotillos, 2020). Further empirical research from diverse disciplinary perspectives is therefore still necessary.

What might lead a person to wish to die? While agonising pain is often assumed to be the primary motivation for euthanasia, studies conducted in the United States and the Netherlands show that fewer than one-third of requests are made for this reason alone (Rietjens et al., 2009). In addition to physical factors that drastically reduce quality of life – such as partial or total paralysis, incontinence, or breathlessness – psychological factors also play a significant role. Severe depression, feelings of lost dignity or autonomy, alienation, depersonalisation, perceived burden, and dependence may all be directly linked to the desire to end one's life.

Determining whether *Me Before You* is a fair representation of the right to choose remains challenging, even after multiple readings of the novel, repeated viewings of the film, and consideration of the surrounding commentary. Director Thea Sharrock explained that she “wanted to stick to the universal theme of the simple and yet wonderful way these people fall in love, while creating a space for people to think about what matters” (Quinn, 2016). For her, the subjects of life-altering disability and euthanasia are not dark but difficult – topics best approached through empathy and emotional openness. The key, she suggests, lies in allowing someone into our lives and trusting them to help us see things differently.

Are we the true owners of our lives? Do we possess any real power over our deaths? *Me Before You* does not answer these questions definitively – but it does compel readers and viewers to confront them. Since the film's release in 2016, the novel has sold over fourteen million copies, and the movie has earned more than \$350 million globally from box office and home media distribution. Most viewers report being moved by the romance between Will and Lou, with her quirky, vibrant personality serving as a lens through which to process the gravity of the subject matter.

The truth is that euthanasia is a reality in many parts of the world, but moral standards are far from universal. Whether one should have the right to decide when and how to die is a question each reader and audience member must answer for themselves. Literature and cinema possess both the extraordinary power and the profound responsibility to raise such questions – and to create the space in which they can be explored.

## REFERENCES

- Bacon, F. (1605 [2004]). *Essays*. Penguin Classics.
- Booth, R. (2008). ‘He Wasn’t Prepared for a Second-Class Life’: Why Injured Rugby Star Went to Switzerland to Die. *The Guardian*, October 18. [Accessed January 12, 2023].
- Botica, M. (2019). El Suicidio Asistido en Suiza. In Marcos del Cano, A. M. & De la Torre, J. (Eds.). *Y de Nuevo la Eutanasia: Una Mirada Nacional e Internacional*. (pp. 105-115) Dykinson.

- Clyman, J. (2016). The Protest of *Me Before You*. The Psychology of Self-Assisted Suicide. *Psychology Today*, June 7. [Accessed April 11, 2016].
- Dadds, K. (2016). 13 Things You Might Not Know About *Me Before You*, According to Writer Jojo Moyes. *BuzzFeed*, June 3. [Accessed January 18, 2023].
- Dimmock, M. & Fisher, A. (2017). *Ethics for A-Level*. Open Book Publishers.
- Einarsdottir, J. (2009). Emotional Experts: Parents' Views on End of Life Decisions for Pre-term Infants in Iceland. *Medical Anthropology Quarterly*, 23(1), 34-61.
- Goldberg, H. (2016). Why Some Disability Rights Activists Are Protesting *Me Before You*. *Self*, May 26. [Accessed April 19, 2023].
- Groenewoud, S., Atsma, F., Arvin, M., & Boer, T. A. (2021). Euthanasia in the Netherlands: A Claims Data Cross-Sectional Study of Geographical Variation. *BJM Supportive and Palliative Care*, 0, 1-11.
- Holgado Sáez, C. (2013). El Cine como Herramienta Didáctica para la Historia de Alemania: A Propósito del Programa de Eugenesia en el Nacionalsocialismo. *ASRI: Arte y Sociedad. Revista de Investigación*, 4.
- Hurst, S. A. & Mauron, A. (2003). Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in Switzerland: Allowing a Role for Non-Physicians. *BJM: Education and Debate*, 326, 271-273.
- Kadrou, H. (2016). Corrie's Cherylee Houston Slams Film *Me Before You* over Representation: 'Why Can't Disabled People Just Be Characters?'. *Closer*, May 26. [Accessed March 3, 2023].
- Ley Orgánica 3/2021 de Regulación de la Eutanasia. *Boletín Oficial del Estado*. Madrid, March 25. 72, 34037-34049.
- Minocha, A., Mishra, A. & Minocha, V. R. (2011). Euthanasia: A Social Science Perspective. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 46(49), 25-28.
- More, T. (1516 [2020]). *Utopia*. Penguin Classics. Pocket Hardbacks.
- Moyes, J. (2012). *Me Before You*. Penguin Books.
- Nakache, O. & Toledano, E. (2011). *Intouchables*. Quad Productions, Gaumont.
- Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2002). *A Guide to the Dutch Termination of Life Request and Assisted Suicide. Review Procedures Act*. [Accessed December 9, 2022].
- Poole Derqui, D. (2020). La Despenalización de la Eutanasia en España: 9 Razones a Favor y 9 Respuestas. In Sánchez Sáez, A. J. (Coord.). *Dignidad y Vida Humana: Eutanasia, Gestación Subrogada y Transhumanismo*. Thomson Reuters Aranzadi, 27-48.
- Pring, J. (2016). Activists Protest Outside Premiere of 'Disability Snuff Movie'. *DNS: Disability News Service*, May 26. [Accessed April 22, 2023].
- Pritchard, S. (2016). The Readers' Editor on... Portraying Disability. *The Guardian*, May 29. [Accessed February 14, 2023].
- Quinn, B. (2016). Disability Rights Campaigners Protest at Premiere of *Me Before You*. *The Guardian*, May 25. [Accessed February 14, 2023].
- Rietjens, J. A. C., Van der Maas, P. J., Onwuteaka-Philipsen, B. D., Van Delden, J. J. M., & Van der Heide, A. (2009). Two Decades of Research on Euthanasia from the Netherlands. What Have We Learnt and What Questions Remain? *Bioethical Inquiry*, 6, 271-283.
- Rivaya García, B., García Manrique, R. & Méndez Baiges, V. (2008). *Eutanasia y cine*. Tirant Lo Blanch.
- Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. (1980). *Declaration on Euthanasia*. [Accessed December 8, 2022].
- Salar Sotillos, M. J. (2020). El Final de la Vida: Algunas Visiones en el Cine. In Sánchez Sáez, A. J. (Coord.). *Dignidad y Vida Humana: Eutanasia, Gestación Subrogada y Transhumanismo*. Thomson Reuters Aranzadi, pp. 289-301.
- Sharrock, T. (Dir.). (2016). *Me Before You*. DVD. Warner Bros Entertainment Inc. and Metro Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures Inc.
- Sheridan, J. (1989). *My Left Foot: The Story of Christy Brown*. DVD. Ferndale Films.

- The Observer*. (2016). *Me Before You*: Not Just a Tearjerker. May 22. [Accessed April 23, 2023].
- Young, R. (2020). Voluntary Euthanasia. In Zalta, E. & Nodelman, U. (Eds.). (2020). *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Stanford University. [Accessed April 20, 2023].
- Warner, K. (2016). How *Me Before You* Author's Own Family and a Real-Life Paraplegic Inspired her Heartbreaking Best-Seller and Movie. *People*, June 3. [Accessed April 20, 2023].

## Odluke na kraju života: eutanazija i potpomognuto samoubojstvo u fokusu rasprave u romanu *Tu sam pred tobom* Jojo Moyes i filmskoj adaptaciji Thea Sharrock

### SAŽETAK

U određenom trenutku našeg postojanja svi ćemo se suočiti sa smrću. Eutanazija i potpomognuto samoubojstvo otvaraju pitanja i potiču rasprave koje se ne mogu sagledati isključivo iz medicinske perspektive. Discipline poput bioetike, filozofije, ali i književnosti i filma nude okvire za promišljanje ovoga složenog fenomena. Ovaj rad istražuje pojmove eutanazije i potpomognutog samoubojstva kroz prizmu suvremenoga britanskog romana i njegove filmske adaptacije *Tu sam pred tobom* autorice Jojo Moyes (2012), koji je na filmsko platno prenio Thea Sharrock, a film je premijerno prikazan četiri godine kasnije u Ujedinjenom Kraljevstvu. Kao i druga književna i filmska ostvarenja koja će biti spomenuta, roman i njegova adaptacija izazvali su podijeljene reakcije često popraćene kontroverzama. Je li smrt privatna odluka u koju nitko osim nas samih ne bi smio zadirati?

**Ključne riječi:** eutanazija, književnost, film, invaliditet, seksualnost, samoodređenje.

Luka Janeš, Štefanija Kožić

## Bioetika i aporije psihe

*Bioetika i aporije psihe* transdisciplinarni je projekt dugogodišnjeg vijeka i široka značaja. Dosad je iznjedrio mnogobrojne javne događaje, tribine, međunarodne simpozije, nastavne programe i razne društvene inicijative vezane uz promicanje mentalnog zdravlja i napose destigmatizaciju osoba sa psihičkim izazovima i poteškoćama. Također i vrijedne opsežne publikacije – tri zbornika radova i također tri temata objavljena u znanstvenim časopisima. Stoga nam je velika čast i radost što u ovome posebnom tematskom broju časopisa *Jahr – European Journal of Bioethics* nastavljamo uhodanu tradiciju, imajući priliku predstaviti radove nastale na osnovu izlaganja tijekom 8. Međunarodnog transdisciplinarnog simpozija *Bioetika i aporije psihe*. Glavni organizator skupa bio je Centar za bioetiku Fakulteta filozofije i religijskih znanosti Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, a održan je 9. i 10. svibnja 2024. u dvoranama Fakulteta na Jordanovcu.

Simpozij je okupio sudionike iz trinaest zemalja, a brojna izlaganja oslonjena o glavnu temu ovogodišnjeg skupa, „empatija i mentalno zdravlje”, navode nas na zaključak da smo kao civilizacija, korak po korak, dogurali do značajnog porasta javnog interesa i prepoznavanja paradigme nerazdvojne veze empatije i zaštite mentalnog zdravlja – ukazujući na zrelost i spremnost suočavanja s mnogobrojnim izazovima po mentalno zdravlje, navirućima u doba mehanizacije i virtualizacije osobe, kao i načelno hiperprimjene tehničkih instrumenata, koja iziskuje adekvatnu aktualnu orijentaciju. Empatija, svojevrsna fuzija kognitivnih i sentimentalnih elemenata pokretača osobe, nosi bitan znanstveni, bioetički, filozofski, kulturni i duhovni značaj istraživačke oaze i praktične primjene napose u pomagačkim i skrbničkim djelatnostima. U ovom tematu na tom tragu raspravljaju Bojana Brajkov i Koshy Tharakans radom pod naslovom „A ‘Pathless Land’ of Compassion: An Ethical Perspective of Jiddu Krishnamurti and Zen Kōans”.

Kroz horizont ostalih tema ovogodišnjeg skupa – „filozofsku praksu usmjerenu na rad s posebnim skupinama”, „egzistencijalnu psihoterapiju u suvremenom kontekstu”

te „unapređenje i zaštitu mentalnog zdravlja u zajednici” – nastojasmo otvoriti prostor za razmjenu ideja, iskustava i perspektiva. Filozofska praksa i egzistencijalna psihoterapija pružaju nam vrijedne alate i perspektive za suočavanje s raznim suvremenim životnim dilemama i poteškoćama te nam pomažu pronaći smisao i svrhu vlastita postojanja. U ovom tematu tim se tragovima kreću Filip Martin Svibovec člankom „*Homo absconditus* u duhu filozofske prakse” te Štefanija Kožić, Ana Kralj i Luka Janeš prilogom „Smisao života – od antike do egzistencijalizma i logoterapije”, kao i Ante Periša naslovom „Psihoterapijski učinak promjene perspektive”.

Ostali članci koji upotpunjavaju stranice ovog temata jesu Toma Gruica s člankom „From Meaningful Instructions to Learned Illness: Philosophical Perspectives on Psychopathology and the Dynamics of Information”, Vuk Trnavac s prilogom „*Metodoontološko* viđenje pojma *mentalnog zdravlja* kod Marxa, Freuda i frankfurtovaca”, Ivan Macut s člankom „Moralna filozofija Stjepana Zimmermanna: od spekulativne teorije prema življenoj praksi” te Jadranka Pavić, Mateja Krznar i Irena Kovačević s radom „Poteškoće i podrška obitelji djece oboljele od rijetkih bolesti”.

Cilj je projekta *Bioetika i aporije psihe*, baš kao i svih uspješnih godina do sada, na bioetičkoj transdisciplinarnoj platformi potaknuti raspravu i suradnju u vezi s temama koje su od suštinskog značaja za sve nas te dati doprinos širenju svijesti o važnosti kulture empatije, mentalnog zdravlja i njihovom integriranju u svakodnevni život i rad. U tom kontekstu, važno je naglasiti važnost kontinuiranog rada na unapređenju i zaštiti mentalnog zdravlja kako bi se stvorila otpornija i zdravija zajednica. Nadamo se da će ovaj tematski odjeljak jasno orijentacijski i argumentacijski ukazivati u postavljenom smjeru, potičući i inspirirajući na daljnja istraživanja, praksu i promišljanja o ovim bitnim temama. Te prije svega – povezati razne dimenzije i jezgre znanja u integrativno bioetički orijentacijski organizam brige i skrbi.

Zaključno – optimistično ustvrđujemo da se bioetička ploha ususrećivanja osoba, znanja i perspektiva nastavlja pokazivati plodnom i na putu druge polovice 2020-ih godina, napose na tlu Republike Hrvatske. Dio toga nastojimo predstaviti u ovome tematskom broju.

Vuk Trnavac\*

## Metodoontološko viđenje pojma mentalnog zdravlja kod Marxa, Freuda i frankfurtovaca

### SAŽETAK

Autor u ovom istraživanju želi iz vlastita *metodoontološkog* viđenja razmotriti u današnje doba sve češće korišten pojam *mentalnog zdravlja*. To se nastoji ostvariti prateći tragove Ericha Fromma u okvirima VII. poglavlja knjige „S onu stranu okova iluzije” (1962), koje upravo nosi naziv „Pojam mentalnog zdravlja”. Ovdje on govori samo o Marxu, koji smatra *zdravim čovjekom onoga tko je produktivan i tko se iskreno zanima za svijet*, dok bi za Freuda „samo primitivan čovjek mogao biti nazvan *zdravim*”. Osim svih važnih Marxovih i Freudovih radova, kao i ovoga Frommovog djela, posebna će se pažnja posvetiti i drugim njegovim djelima, poput „Zdravog društva” (1955) i godinu dana kasnijeg „Umeća ljubavi” (1956), ali svakako i rada Herberta Marcusea, posebno u djelu koje je objavljeno u godini (1955) kada i Frommovo „Zdravo društvo” – „Eros i civilizacija”.

**Ključne riječi:** metodoontologija, mentalno zdravlje, Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud, frankfurtovci, Erich Fromm, Herbert Marcuse.

### UVOD – METODOONTOLOŠKI POJAM ZDRAVLJA

Autor u svojoj metodoontološkoj postavci, čija je ideja da se uspostavi „jedna *nova i (još) slobodnija – putna ontologija ili ontologija (misaonih) puteva i putovanja* koja svoje puteve uvijek ostavlja prohodnima za sve moguće (svoje) prolaznike i koja nikada na početku primjene svog postupka nema pretenzije na unaprijed zacrtane putanje”<sup>1</sup>

\* Odeljenje za filozofiju Filozofskog fakulteta Univerziteta u Beogradu, Čika Ljubina 18–20, Beograd, Srbija. ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9841-7821>.

Adresa za korespondenciju: Vuk Trnavac, Kosančić Ivana broj 6, 21000 Novi Sad, Srbija. E-pošta: [vuktrnavac@gmail.com](mailto:vuktrnavac@gmail.com).

<sup>1</sup> Naredne rečenice o metodoontologiji mogu se pronaći u Trnavac (2021, str. 11):

Neizvesnost posvedočena *konstitutivnom neodredivošću* problema, puta i cilja i *apsolutnom nepredvidljivošću* krajnjeg (praktičnog) ishoda, a koja karakterizira sva putovanja načinjena putem nje, ali i skice svih mogućih

označava svoj primarni predmet na četiri različita načina – zdravlje, *zdravlje*, *Zdravlje* i *Zdravlje*.

Prva bi oznaka bila za svakodnevni ili kolokvijalni govor, koji ujedno predstavlja i *input* u ovakvo istraživanje, a naredni je termin upravo (kao) vid *metodoontologiziranog zdravlja* stavljen u kontekst filozofskog ili nekoga sličnog diskursa o njemu. Pretposljednje je *Zdravlje* njegovo određenje kako ga vide određeni mislioci i stvaraoci, a *Zdravlje* označeno velikim slovom bez *kurziva* transcendentni je pojam *Zdravlja*<sup>2</sup> (Trnavac, 2023, str. 207–208).

Stoga će u ovom istraživanju biti riječi o problematizaciji pozicioniranja pojma *mentalnog zdravlja* u ovoj *metodoontološkoj* shematici, odnosno treba li ga promatrati kao pojam intelektualnog, emocionalnog ili uopće psihološkog – *duševnog zdravlja*, ili pak kao *duhovno Zdravlje*, odnosno *Zdravlje* koje je u neposrednoj vezi s transcendentnim i transcendencijom te kao takvo predstavlja jednu *metafizičku drugost*.

Autori o kojima će biti riječi predstavljeni su u naslovu, a veoma su zanimljivi jer bi se svi mogli predstaviti kao pobornici struje lijevog hegelijanstva i, kao takvi, svakako se intuitivno može zaključiti da imaju jednu *zajedničku nit* koja povezuje njihov misaoni napor u pogledu najrazličitijih tema, pa tako i ove *mentalnog zdravlja*.

Ta nit ili princip na kojima se temelji njihova misao svakako je pokušaj drugačije artikulacije upravo onoga što je Hegel uradio svojom spekulativno-dijalektičkom metodom, ali više ne u domeni *idealizma*, nego *dočekivajući slijetanje njegovih ideja s neba na zemlju*, odnosno u domenu *materijalizma*.

---

njenih putanja, svoje idejno i inspiracijsko utemeljenje ima upravo u misli spomenutog jevrejsko-litvansko-francuskog (meta)fenomenologa, koja ispostavlja krajnji vid slobode i otvorenosti prema drugosti(ma) i drugima kao bilo kome (apsolutno) Drugom ili Drugoj. Njezini putevi svakako su nešto više i drugačije nego 'motiv preplitanja drugog i istog' zbog dolaska do točke u kojoj se ukrštavaju Odisejevi *otiči da bi se vratilo putevi* i putanje i Abrahami *otiči da se (nikada) ne bi vratilo* putanje i putevi.

Zatim:

Pomalo je i rozencajgovski postavljena ova ideja *metodoontologije*, slično onome kako Dragan Prole opisuje razumijevanje prave prirode sebstva kod ovoga mislioca: '[...] nepravilna putanja koja iz nepoznatog ide ka nepoznatome.' [...] Ovakav (*metoda*)*ontološki* pristup anticipira i metodološki i epistemološki koji je kasnije i Michel Serres koristio kako bi pomoću pojma *Randonnee*, koji potječe od starofrancuskog *randon* (i etimologijom sličnom s engleskim *random*) s izvornim značenjem: 'životinja koja ide do izvora', objasnio koncept po kojem je sa-znanje i obrazovanje putovanje, ali ne kao kretanje kroz vrijeme, već kretanje kroz prostor. Ono je svojevrstan vidlutanja, ekskurzije, ekspedicije, odnosno obilazak i otkrivanje novih puteva, kao što to čini i spomenuta životinja kada ide do izvora, uvijek drugačijom putanjom i načinima mnogobrojnih drugosti. (Trnavac, 2021 str. 11–12)

2 „Neki su od primjera gdje je, prema mišljenju autora, prikladno upotrijebiti ovaj oblik pojam Marka Aurelija „Zdravlje Kozmosa” (grč. *Κόσμον υγειαν*) i cjelokupan judeokršćanski korpus, kojim ćemo se ovdje baviti, a svakako je primjenjiv i na ostale religije i vjere.”

Pojam *mentalnog zdravlja* proučavali su i predsokratovski materijalisti, poput Milećana ili Demokrita i Leukipa, *metodoontološki ustanovitelj materijalizma* – Platon, zatim filozofske škole iz helenističkog perioda, poput stoika i epikurejaca, ali i novovjekovni mislioci poput Lockea, Humea, La Mettriea te enciklopedisti poput Diderota, d'Alemberta i Hobbsa, ali svakako i Jeana Jacquesa Rousseaua.

Ipak, ovi su mislioci odabrani jer autor smatra da je u ovom trenutku prije svega važno objasniti iz perspektive kojih suvremenih autora dolaze ideje poput *Festivala mentalnog zdravlja*, koji u Novom Sadu traje skoro cijelu prvu polovicu desetog mjeseca.

Budući da je jedan od ključnih organizatora ove manifestacije i Filozofski fakultet u Novom Sadu, čija je katedra za Filozofiju, na kojoj je i autor magistrirao, izrasla upravo iz odsjeka koji se zvao Marksizam, jasno je od kojeg će se autora početi.

## KARL MARX I MENTALNO ZDRAVLJE

*Ali taj isti g. Smith, koji silno uživa u tome da kao neki vladalac govori u prvom licu množine, dodaje smeškajući se: „Mašinski je posao lak.” Tako isto govore poslodavci kod kojih se štampa rukom (block printing): „Ručni rad je zdraviji od mašinskog.” Uglavnom su se gospoda fabrikanti s negodovanje izjasnili protiv predloga „da se mašine zaustave bar u pauzama kad se uzima jelo. (Marx, 1974, str. 222)*

Ono što Erich Fromm u VII. poglavlju, koje upravo nosi naziv „Pojam mentalnog zdravlja”, knjige „S onu stranu okova iluzije” iz 1962. godine zaključuje kad je u pitanju usporedna analiza, odnosno spomenuta *zajednička nit zdravog čovjeka* za Marxa i Freuda, svakako je pojam *nezavisnosti* (Fromm, 1980, str. 61), koji je po njegovu sudu najkonstitutivniji od svih koncepata za uspostavljanje *Zdravlja Drugog*. S tim će se zaključkom i autor ovdje složiti. Kad je riječ samo o Marxovoj perspektivi promatranja *zdravog čovjeka*, spomenuti autor Frankfurtske škole nešto ranije ističe kako ona izrasta iz jednog *par excellence humanističkog pojma*, „neovisnog, aktivnog i produktivnog čovjeka kako su ga razvili Spinoza, Goethe i Hegel” (Fromm, 1980, str. 61).

To prije svega potvrđuju i „Rani radovi” Karla Marxa (iz razdoblja 1843–1845) u kojima on na ovu temu *nezavisnosti* kaže:

Jedno biće je za sebe samostalno tek onda kada stoji na vlastitim nogama, a na vlastitim nogama stoji tek onda, kada svoje *postojanje* zahvaljuje samom sebi. Čovjek koji živi od milosti drugoga ako sam mu obavezan ne samo na izdržavanje svoga života nego ako je on još osim toga *stvorio* moj život, ako je on *izvor* mog života, a moj život

nužno ima takvu osnovu izvan sebe, ako on nije moje vlastito djelo. (Marx i Engels, 1976, str. 285)<sup>3</sup>

U svome najčuvenijem djelu objavljenom dvadesetak godina kasnije, „Kapital” (1867), kritizirajući određeni tip manufakture, on naglašava da su neke od njih, osim što su odvratne, zapravo i veoma **nezdave**, dodajući: „i tako ozloglašena da joj samo najpropaliji deo radničke klase, poluizgladnele udovice itd., daje svoju decu, „izdrpanu, poluizgladnelu, sasvim zapuštenu i nevaspitanu decu. [...] Dante bi našao da ta manufaktura nadmašuje i najgroznije njegove fantazije iz *Pakla*” (Marx, 1974, str. 71 i 221).<sup>4</sup>

Kritiku *bilo kakve ideje kapitalizma* on vidi i u tome što u:

svom bezmernom slepom nagonu, u svojoj vampirskoj gladi za viškom rada, kapital ruši ne samo moralne već i čisto fizičke maksimalne granice radnog dana. On uzurpira vreme za rastenje, za razvijanje tela i njegovo održavanje u **zdravlju**. On otima vreme potrebno za trošenje svežeg vazduha i sunčeva svetla. On zakida od vremena za jelo i gde god je moguće nastoji da ga pripoji procesu proizvodnje, tako da se radniku dodaje hrana kao da je kakvo sredstvo za rad, kao što se parnom kotlu dodaje ugalj, a mašini loj ili ulje. **Zdrav san** za pribiranje, obnavljanje i osvežavanje životnih snaga on svodi na onoliko časova umrtvljenosti koliko je neophodno za ponovno oživljavanje apsolutno iscrpenog organizma. (Marx, 1974, str. 237–238)<sup>5</sup>

Dakle, kad je ova tema radničke pozicije u kapitalizmu u pitanju, Marx nedvojbeno zaključuje: „Stoga je kapital bezobziran prema radnikovu **zdravlju** i trajanju njegovog života, gde god ga na taj obzir ne prisili društvo” (Marx, 1974, str. 113).

Imajući u vidu sve što je rekao, postaje jasno da je i za tjelesno i *mentalno zdravlje*, po Marxovu sudu, zaista neophodno biti *nezavisan*, kao što je to i Fromm uvidjeo, ali nezavisan od *kapitala i po njemu ustrojenom sustava proizvodnje*, do te mjere da čovjekov *rad* mora biti u tim *fizičko-mentalnim zdravonosnim granicama*, jer kako ovaj čuveni teoretičar navodi: „i konj se može upotrebljavati samo 8 časova dnevno ako hoćemo da ostane zdrav” (Marx, 1974, str. 333).

## SIGMUND FREUD I MENTALNO ZDRAVLJE

Odnosno, *ni pojmovi zdravlja/zdravog razuma i bolesti/ludila ne smeju da predstavljaju konačnu granicu za dijalektičku misao. Ako je ona jednom vladajuće opšte i njegove proporcije saznala kao ono bolesno – i u najdoslovnijem smislu ga označila kao paranoju, kao ‘bolesnu projekciju’ – onda njoj kao ćelija ozdravljenja ostaje jedino*

<sup>3</sup> U izdanju iz 1961. jednoimenog izdavača, na str. 250.

<sup>4</sup> Bold prim. aut. V. T.

<sup>5</sup> Bold. prim. aut. V. T.

*ono što se po meri tog poretka prikazuje i samo kao bolesno, nastrano, paranoidno – štaviše kao 'uvrnuto', pa kao i u srednjem veku, i danas važi da jedino lude kazuju vlasti istinu.* (Krstić, 2007, str. 47, fusnota br. 34; Adorno, 1997, str. 81–82)<sup>6</sup>

Iako je u „Predavanjima za uvod u psihoanalizu” (1915–1917) Freud detektirao nešto što će kasnije i Jung formulirati na način da su *za Zdravlje neophodne prepreke*, a to je da: „kad bolesnik vodi normalan sukob s otporima koje smo mu tijekom analize razotkrili, tada mu je potreban snažan poticaj koji utječe na ishod u smislu u kojemu mi to želimo, i dovodi ga do ozdravljenja” (Freud, 2000, str. 469), ipak je *otac psihoanalize* već ovdje bio svjestan *da je i zdrava osoba neurotičar*: „no čini se da je san jedini simptom koji je ona sposobna oblikovati” (Freud, 2000, str. 482). Shodno tome, on razliku između neurotičara i nervoznih zdravih osoba vidi u tome da se ona ograničava „na praktično, a određuje se prema rezultatu – je li toj osobi preostala dostatna mjera sposobnosti za uživanje i djelovanje” (Freud, 2000, str. 482).

I na drugim mjestima, kao što su „Spisi o psihoanalitičkoj tehnici”, nastojeći da objasni suštinu svoje *psihoanalitičke metode*, ovaj autor potvrđuje da je ova razlika između zdravog i bolesnog zapravo sukladna odnosu nesvjesnog i svjesnog, jer „kao što je i razlika između normalnog i bolesnog stanja samo relativna, ne postoji idealno svesno stanje” (Freud, 1990, str. 87).

Dakle, iz ovoga bi se dalo zaključiti da kod Sigmunda Freuda stvar stoji nešto drugačije nego kod Marxa, što on u konačnici i potvrđuje u svom djelu „Mojsije i monoteizam” iz 1939. godine, u kojem također ističe kako „granica između normalnih i patoloških procesa nije oštra, njihovi mehanizmi su isti” (Freud, 2006, str. 410).

Shodno ovakvim *metodoontološkim* postavkama samog Freuda, kad je u pitanju odnos zdravog i bolesnog, ne trebaju nas čuditi ni karakterizacije njegova tumača, već spomenutog Ericha Fromma, iz knjige čiji je podnaslov upravo „Moj susret s Marxom i Freudom”. Naime, također u VII. poglavlju „Pojam mentalnog zdravlja”, Fromm u knjizi „S onu stranu okova iluzije” zaključuje da, iako je prikazao osnovne crte ovog pojma, „ne može se poreći da taj pojam ostaje ponešto nejasnim i da mu nedostaje preciznosti i dubine koju poseduje njegov pojam mentalne bolesti” (Fromm, 1980, str. 60).

Ipak, ono što je Fromm o ovom pojmu kod Freuda naveo kao sadržajno pozitivno, ne samo da treba biti usvojeno, već teško da se tome može nešto proturječiti. Naime, frankfurtovac kaže da bi za Freuda „s jednog stajališta samo primitivan čovjek mogao biti nazvan ‘zdravim’. On zadovoljava sve svoje instiktivne prohtjeve bez potrebe za potiskivanjem, frustracijom ili sublimacijom (ova Freudova slika primitivca kao onog koji živi neograničavan život ispunjen instiktivnim zadovoljenjem jest romantička

<sup>6</sup> Bold prim. aut. V. T.

fikcija što su bogato primjerima pojasnili suvremeni antropolozi)” (Fromm, 1980, str. 59).

Ipak, kad je o ovome riječ, autor bi dodao ono što je već pokazao, a to je da su na ovom stajalištu, kad je u pitanju afirmacija principa *divljeg zdravlja*, prije Freuda već bili Jean Jacques Rousseau, transcendentalisti, među kojima se najviše isticao Henry David Thoreau, i, naravno, vjerojatno najglasnije od svih, onaj što je za sebe rekao da *Nije Filozof, nego Dinamit*, jedan jedini, Friedrich Nietzsche.

Međutim, Fromm ipak skreće pažnju i na to da „kad Freud skreće s povijesnih spekulacija na kliničko ispitivanje suvremenog čovjeka, ova slika primitivnog mentalnog zdravlja jedva da je od kakva značenja. Čak i ako držimo na umu da civiliziran čovjek ne može biti potpuno zdrav (ili sretan, zbog toga), Freud ima uprkos tome određene kriterijume za tvorbu mentalnog zdravlja”. Erich Fromm ističe kako „ove kriterije valja shvatiti unutar okvira odnosa u njegovoj teoriji evolucije. Ta teorija ima dva glavna aspekta: evoluciju libida i evoluciju čovjekovih odnosa spram drugih” (Fromm, 1980, str. 59).

I za Freuda je *Zdravlje* nemoguće uspostaviti bez *drugih*, ali prije svega u onom smislu u kojem će se pojedinac moći odrediti i postaviti kao *nezavisan od njih*. U prvom redu ta je nezavisnost ona „i od oca i od majke”, gdje se zapravo očituje Freudova ideja uspješnog razrješavanja Edipove situacije.

Shodno tome, Erich Fromm jasno zaključuje: „Prema Freudu je zdrava osoba, dakle, ona koja je dostigla genitalnu razinu i koja je postala vlastitim gospodarom, neovisnom od oca i majke, oslanjajući se na vlastiti razum i vlastitu snagu” (Fromm, 1980, str. 60).

Koncept *mentalnog zdravlja*, u kontekstu njegove *metodoontologizacije* kod Sigmunda Freuda, Erich Fromm u krajnjem vidi kao: „pojam dobro funkcionirajućeg člana srednje klase s početka 20. stoljeća koji je spolno i ekonomski potentan” (Fromm, 1980, str. 60–61), s čime će se autor također složiti.

Kako ovaj pojam stoji kod drugog, ali također vrsnoga frankfurtskog tumača, i Hegelove i Marxove odnosno Freudove misli, pokazat će se u sljedećem poglavlju.

## HERBERT MARCUSE I MENTALNO ZDRAVLJE

*Zdravi razum i znanost izvlače se od ove protivurječnosti; ali filozofsko mišljenje počinje s priznavanjem da činjenice ne odgovaraju pojmovima što ih nameću zdrav razum i znanost, ukratko, s odbijanjem da ih prihvati.*

*...borba protiv zdravog razuma je početak spekulativnog mišljenja.*

(Marcuse, 1987, str. 3 i 54)

Imajući na umu ovakve Freudove stavove o *mentalnom zdravlju*, ne trebaju čuditi ni oni Herberta Marcusea iz knjige koja je objavljena 1955. godine pod naslovom „Eros i civilizacija”, jer je njezin podnaslov upravo „Filozofsko istraživanje Freuda” (Marcuse, 1985).

Naime, Marcuse u samom epilogu ovog djela pod nazivom „Kritika neo-Freudovskog revizionizma”, pruža apologiju čuvenom osnivaču psihoanalize i na njegovu tragu uočava da:

Teorijski, razlika između duševnog zdravlja i neuroze počiva samo u stupnju i djelotvornosti rezignacije: duševno zdravlje je uspješna, efikasna rezignacija – normalno tako efikasna da se pokazuje kao umjereno sretno zadovoljenje. Normalnost je nesigurno stanje. [...] I neuroza i psihoza su izraz pobune ida protiv vanjskog svijeta, njegova ‘bola’, njegove nevoljkosti da se prilagodi nuždi – Ananke, ili, ako je komu draže, njegove nesposobnosti da to učini. [...] Ta je pobuna, iako potječe iz nagnoske ‘prirode’ čovjeka, bolest koju treba liječiti – ne samo zbog toga što se bori protiv beznadno nadmoćnije sile, nego zbog toga što se bori protiv ‘nužde’. (Marcuse, 1985, str. 189<sup>7</sup>, 215<sup>8</sup>)

Ovaj frankfurtovac zatim dodatno naglašava da: „Mislim da je jasno da treba Freudovu koncepciju kontra-transferencije razlikovati od današnje koncepcije analize kao međusobnog procesa. U izmeđuosobnoj situaciji, vidi se analitičar u odnosu prema svojem pacijentu ne samo s njegovim iskrivljenim afektima nego i s njegovom zdravom ličnošću. To jest, analitička situacija je bitno ljudski odnos” (Marcuse, 1985, str. 220).<sup>9</sup>

Ono što je osnovni cilj i Marcuseova zamisao ovdje pokazati je kako: „ličnost teži stanju koje nazivamo duševno zdravlje ili uspjeh u međusobnom podešavanju,

<sup>7</sup> U jednom od najnovijih izdanja originala stoji upravo pojam *mental health*; radi se o: H., Marcuse, *Eros, and Civilization A Philosophical Inquiry Into Freud*, Routledge, London and New York, 2023.

<sup>8</sup> Ovdje u 9. referenci navodi se: „*The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis*, u *Collected Papers* (London: Hogarth Press, 1950), II, 279.”

<sup>9</sup> Ovdje on nudi referencu broj 20, koja glasi: „Clara Thompson, *Psychoanalysis*, str. 108.”

usprkos teškoćama zbog akulturacije. Osnovni smjer organizma je prema naprijed” (Marcuse, 1985, str. 220).<sup>10</sup>

U konačnici, Marcuse zaključuje:

‘Osnovni’ smjer organizma pokazuje se drugačijim u neprestanim poticajima na oslobođanje od napetosti, prema zadovoljenju, spokoju, pasivnosti – borba protiv napretka vremena bitna je ne samo za narcistički Eros. Sadomazohističke težnje jedva da se mogu spojiti s naprednim smjerom u duševnom zdravlju, ukoliko se ‘naprijed’ i ‘duševno zdravlje’ ne redefiniraju da znače gotovo suprotno od onoga što oni jesu u našem društvenom poretku – društvenom poretku koji je u nekim vidovima grubo neprimjeren razvoju zdravih i sretnih ljudskih bića. (Marcuse, 1985, str. 222–223)<sup>11</sup>

Dakle, po njegovu sudu, to „operaciono” poistovjećivanje duševnog zdravlja s napretkom i ‘uspjehom u prilagođavanju’ odbacuje sve rezerve kojima je Freud ogradio terapijski cilj prilagođivanja neljudskom društvu, i tako psihoanalizu potčinjava ovome društvu daleko više nego što je to Freud ikad učinio” (Marcuse, 1985, str. 224).<sup>12</sup>

Međutim, čini se da njegov suvremenik i kolega frankfurtovac, Erich Fromm, ima nešto drugačiji stav o zajedničkom Učitelju i njegovu poimanju *mentalnog Zdravlja*, što je i sam Marcuse navodio u fusnotama, prvenstveno kad je riječ o Frommovoј knjizi iz 1947. godine pod naslovom *Man of Himself*, pa ćemo na kraju prikazati i šta sam Erich Fromm kaže o svemu tome, pogotovo kad su u pitanju njegova kasnija i do sad u tekstu nespomenuta djela.

## ERICH FROMM I MENTALNO ZDRAVLJE

*Ljubav je jedini zdrav i zadovoljavajući odgovor na problem ljudske egzistencije*  
(Fromm, 2023, str. 174).

Kao samo dvije godine mlađi Marcuseov kolega iz Frankfurske škole, s kojim je stvarao kao suvremenik, Erich Fromm (1900) je također, kao što je to već naznačeno, bio pod veoma velikim utjecajem dvojice spomenutih prethodnika, velikana Materijalizma – Taurusa,<sup>13</sup> koji su uz Friedricha Nietzschea misaono vjerojatno najviše obilježili, ali

<sup>10</sup> Ref. broj 21 je: „Harry Stack Sullivan, *Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry* (Washington: W. Alanson White Psychiatric Foundation, 1947), str. 48.”

<sup>11</sup> Ovdje Marcuse nudi referencu broj 24, koja glasi: „Patrick Mullahy, Uvod u *A study of Interpersonal Relations*, str. XVII.”

<sup>12</sup> Kao što je i ovdje, tako je i kod Marcusea ovo referenca broj 27: „Vidi Freudovu tvrdnju u *A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis*, str. 332–333.”

<sup>13</sup> Rođeni su datum za datumom. Karl Marx 5. svibnja 1818. u Tիրu, na današnjoj granici Njemačke (*trećega svjetskog gospodarstva*) s Luksemburgom, državom sa trenutačno (2008–2025) najvećim BDP-om u svijetu po *glavi stanovnika*, na 5. rođendan Sørensa Kierkegaarda (Kopenhagen, 1813.), dok je Sigmund Freud rođen na samo

i utjecali na mnogovrsna događanja u drugoj polovici XIX. i prvoj polovici XX. stoljeća.

Stoga ne treba čuditi što Fromm u III. poglavlju svoje knjige „Umeće ljubavi” iz 1956. godine, pod nazivom „Ljubav i njena dezintegracija u savremenom zapadnom društvu”, kritizirajući Freuda da je bio naklonjen tipu materijalizma 19. stoljeća u kojem je čovjek bio uvjeren da se „supstrat svih duhovnih fenomena može naći u fiziološkim pojavama”, ističe Marxov *istorijski materijalizam* „u kome ni telo, ni instinkt, kao što su potreba za hranom ili posedovanjem, ne služe kao ključ za razumevanje čoveka, već totalni proces čovekovog života, njegova ‘životna praksa’.” Ovaj mislilac ističe kako: „Po Frojdu, potpuno i neinhibirano zadovoljenje svih instinktivnih želja stvorilo bi zdravlje i sreću” (Fromm, 2023, str. 128).

Unatoč tome, ovaj frankfurtovac suprotstavlja neke jasne pokazatelje iz kliničke prakse i statistike koje dokazuju da muškarci, ali i žene koji posvećuju svoje živote neutaživom seksualnom zadovoljenju, ne samo da ne postižu sreću, nego i veoma često pate od teških neurotičkih sukoba ili simptoma. Fromm je na ovom mjestu više nego jasan:

Potpuno zadovoljenje svih instinktivnih potreba ne samo što nije osnova sreće nego ne garantuje čak ni **zdravlje**. Ipak, Frojdova ideja mogla je jedino tako postati popularna u periodu posle Prvog svetskog rata samo zbog promena koje su se dogodile u duhu kapitalizma; težište se sa štednje pomaklo na potrošnju, od samosuzdržavanja kao sredstva ekonomskog uspeha na potrošnju kao osnovu sve šireg tržišta i kao glavno zadovoljstvo teskobnog, automatizovanog pojedinca. Ne odlagati zadovoljenje bilo koje želje postala je glavna tendencija u sferi seksa, a takođe i u sferi materijalne potrošnje. (From, 2023, str. 129)<sup>14</sup>

Suprotno tome, Fromm je već u drugom poglavlju ove knjige, „Teorija ljubavi”, i potpoglavlju broj 2, „Ljubav između roditelja i deteta”, utvrdio da *se osnova mentalnog zdravlja i dostizanja zrelosti* nalazi u „tom razvoju od vezanosti za majku do vezanosti za oca”, a po stavu ovog mislioca „u neuspehu ovog razvoja leži osnovni uzrok neuroze” (Fromm, 2023, str. 74–75).

Primjer za ovo Fromm daje, sada nešto ranije, u spomenutom 3. poglavlju riječima:

Ako biti zdrav znači otisnuti se iz utrobe u svet, onda je za tešku mentalnu bolest karakteristično da nas utroba privlači, da nas upija u sebe – a to znači da smo isključeni iz života. Ova vrsta fiksacije obično se dešava u odnosu na majke koje se vežu za svoju decu na taj »gutajuće razarajući« način. Ponekad u ime ljubavi, a ponekad u ime dužnosti, one žele da dete, adolescenta, muškarca zadrže u sebi; on ne treba da sam diše, osim uz njihovu pomoć, ne treba da bude sposoban da voli, sem površno, na

jedan dan razmaka, na Đurđevdan, 6. svibnja, 38 godina poslije Marxa, 1856. godine u Priboru, što je današnja Češka.

<sup>14</sup> Bold prim. aut. V. T.

nivou seksa – degradirajući sve druge žene; on ne treba da bude slobodan i nezavisan, već večni bogalj ili kriminalac. (From, 2023, str. 133)<sup>15</sup>

Međutim, iako je imao što reći o svojim prethodnicima, Erich Fromm je već godinu dana ranije u svojoj knjizi „Zdravo društvo” iz 1955. godine, odmah na početku IV. poglavlja „Mentalno zdravlje i društvo”, istaknuo kako ovaj *ključni pojam zavisi od našeg shvatanja čovekove prirode* (From, 1989, str. 59).

Pokušavajući da ga na koncu potpuno definira, Erich Fromm iznosi da:

**Na kraju, može se reći da pojam mentalnog zdravlja proizlazi iz samih uslova ljudske egzistencije i da je isti za ljude svih doba i svih kultura.** Mentalno zdravlje karakteriše sposobnost da se voli i stvara, izlaženje iz rodoskrvnih veza prema plemenu i zemlji, osećanje identiteta koje je zasnovano na čovekovom doživljavanju svoga ja kao subjekta i nosioca sopstvenih moći, shvatanje stvarnosti u njemu i van njega, tj. razvitak objektivnosti i razuma. **Ovaj pojam mentalnog zdravlja odgovara u osnovi normama koje su postavili veliki duhovni učitelji ljudskog roda.** (Fromm, 1989, str. 60)<sup>16</sup>

Stoga, nikako ne treba čuditi ni *credo* citat iz odlomka, kojim on završava *Umeće ljubavi* (1956) i IV. poglavlje „Ljubavna praksa”, o tome kako je u svim epohama, društvima, civilizacijama i kulturama koje žele opstati i biti samoodržive *ljubav jedini zdravi i zadovoljavajući odgovor na problem ljudskog postojanja* (Fromm, 1993, str. 165).

## ZAKLJUČAK – *Mentalno kao Duhovno Zdravlje danas!?*

*Mentalno zdravlje pojedinca je pod napadom. Društveni i osamljeni čovek osjeća neku vrstu napetosti unutar mentalne stvarnosti, nekakvu disharmoniju prije uređenog kozmosa koja mu ne dopušta da bude mentalno stabilan i zdrav, kao da gotovo svaki pojedinac pati od nekog oblika mentalnog problema i zbog toga potražnja za ‘doktorima duše’ raste. No, što je s Duhom? Je li čovek zbog opterećenosti svojih problema zaboravio Duh?*

*Mentalno zdravlje povezano je s čovjekovim vježbanjem u liječenju, odnosno s čovjekovim htijenjem da bude zdrav i načinom na koji on tu želju prevodi Duhu. Duh je zdravlje i u suradnji s duhom čovek je sposoban liječiti. Pojam liječenja ovdje je prije svega povezan s intencijom, sa željom da se bude zdrav, da se druge liječi i tek onda s liječenjem pojedinačnih bolesnih područja psihe i tijela. Duh može liječiti čitava čovjeka, njegov psihičko-tjelesni organizam samo onda ako se čovek dopusti liječiti, ako mu Duh da zdravlje.* (Svibovec, 2023, str. 239 i 235)

<sup>15</sup> Na str. 146. str. u BIGZovom izdanju.

<sup>16</sup> Bold prim. aut. V. T.

Kao što i Svibovec jasno uočava, sve ono što se opisuje riječju *mentis* upućuje na mogućnost čovjekova osjećanja *Duha i njegove racionalizacije*, što zatim utječe na domenu ljudske tjelesnosti. Odnosno kako ovaj autor zaključuje: „Ono što se razumije pod pojmom mentalnog zdravlja, svoj izvor ima u sferi duše, psihe, sferi koja je u odnosu s tjelesnošću” (Svibovec, 2023, str. 224–225).

Na tragu Berdjajeva, njemu je jasno da lijek za *mentalno zdravlje* nije u stvarnosti psihe i psiho-tenika, nego u Duhu, tj. *sensus divinus*, koje je „čulo za božanstven duh koji zbog svojeg posredovanja u čovjeku otkriva zametak bogočovjštva” (Svibovec, 2023, str. 240).

Kada se svemu ovome dodaju i riječi Milanka Govedarice, po kojima „Duhovna dimenzija ukupnog zdravstvenog stanja ljudske ličnosti najviše se tiče vrednosne (dez) orijentacije, tj. ispravnog ili pogrešnog odnosa prema univerzalnom aksiološkom poretku i konkretnom sistemu vrednosti” (Govedarica, 2020, str. 184), postaje jasno da je u *materijalističkom sustavu vrijednosti* teško iznaći bolju poziciju od one koja se ističe u Freudovoj koncepciji, po kojoj su razlike između *Zdravlja* i bolesti zapravo minorne i počivaju na čovjekovim naturalističkim i autosugestibilnim načelima samooblikovanja.

Međutim, ako s druge strane medalje, koja za svoj gradivni element ima *ljudsko mentalno zdravlje*, iznađemo Duh koji svoj osnovni princip ima u *idealističkom sustavu vrijednosti*, koji se ističe u ideji Božje Ljubavi kao jedinoga *istinski zdravog odgovora na problem ljudske egzistencije*, onda znamo čemu se prioritarno treba zahvaljivati kad je u pitanju ovo najviše odličje za čovjeka na Olimpijadi Zdravlja.

## LITERATURA

- Adorno, T. W. (1997). *Gesammelte Schriften 4*. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp.
- Freud, S. (2006). Mojsije i monoteizam. *Psihologija mase i analiza Ega*. Beograd: Fedon.
- Freud, S. (1990). *Spisi o psihoanalitičkoj tehnici. Knj. 1, 1895-1919*. Beograd: Društvo za proučavanje psihoanalitičkog metoda.
- Freud, S. (2000). *Predavanja za uvod u psihoanalizu*. Zagreb: Stari grad.
- Fromm, E. (1980). *S onu stranu okova iluzije*. Zagreb: Naprijed.
- Fromm, E. (1989). *Zdravo društvo*. Zagreb: Naprijed.
- Fromm, E. (1993). *Umijeće ljubavi*. Beograd: BIGZ.
- Fromm, E. (2023). *Umeće ljubavi*. Beograd: Vulkan izdavaštvo.
- Govedarica, M. (2020). *Smisao erosa i ljubavi*. Beograd: Vulkan izdavaštvo.
- Krstić, P. (2007). *Subjekt protiv subjektivnosti: Adorno i filozofija subjekta*. Beograd: IFDT, Filip Višnjić.
- Marcuse, H. (2023). *Eros, and Civilization A Philosophical Inquiry Into Freud*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Marcuse, H. (1985). *Eros i Civilizacija. Filozofsko istraživanje Freuda*. Zagreb: Naprijed.

- Marcuse, H. (1987). *Um i revolucija. Hegel i razvoj teorije društva*. Sarajevo: Veselin Masleša – Svjetlost.
- Marx, K. (1974). Kapital. *Marx, K., Engels, F., Dela, tom 21*. Beograd: Prosveta.
- Marx, K. i Engels, F. (1976). *Rani radovi*. Zagreb: Naprijed.
- Svibovec, F. M. (2023). Mentalno zdravlje pod vidom duhovne tehnologije i duhovnih tehnika. U L. Janeš i Š. Kožić (Ur.), *Bioetička motrišta o mentalnom zdravlju* (str. 223-240). Zagreb: Centar za bioetiku Fakulteta filozofije i religijskih znanosti Sveučilišta u Zagrebu.
- Trnavac, V. (2023). Molitva kao put (do) mentalnog/duhovnog zdravlja. U L. Janeš i Š. Kožić (Ur.), *Bioetička motrišta o mentalnom zdravlju* (str. 207-213). Zagreb: Centar za bioetiku Fakulteta filozofije i religijskih znanosti Sveučilišta u Zagrebu.
- Trnavac, V. (2021). *Zdravlje drugih. Pokušaj uspostavljanja jedne metodoontologije zdravlja*. (Završni master rad). Novi Sad: Filozofski fakultet Univerziteta u Novom Sadu, Odsek za filozofiju. Dostupno na: <http://remaster.ff.uns.ac.rs/?rad=3e700a399fc67e8b6fa47142507803bd>.

## *Methodoontological* view of the concept of *Mental Health* by Marx, Freud, and the Frankfurt School

### SUMMARY

In this study, the author considers, from his *methodoontological* point of view, the concept of mental health, which is increasingly used nowadays. This is done along the lines of Erich Fromm in Chapter VII of the book *Beyond the Chains of Illusion* (1962), which is titled *The Concept of Mental Health*. In that part of the book he only talks about Marx, who considers a healthy person to be productive and one who is genuinely interested in the world, while for Freud, *only a primitive man could be called healthy*. In addition to all the important works of Marx and Freud, as well as this work by Fromm, special attention will be paid to his other works, such as *The Sane Society* (1955), *The Art of Love* (1956), as well as the works of Herbert Marcuse, especially the work published in the same year (1955) as Fromm's *The Sane Society*, namely, *Eros and Civilization*.

**Keywords:** *methodoontology, mental health*, Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud, the Frankfurt School, Erich Fromm, Herbert Marcuse.

Toma Gruica\*

# From meaningful instructions to learned illness: Philosophical perspectives on psychopathology and the dynamics of information

## SUMMARY

This paper explores the balance between stability and adaptability in cognitive development, particularly through an enactivist lens, mainly through Piaget's concepts of assimilation and accommodation and Eigen's concept of self-organization. The central idea is that while stability is necessary for cognitive resilience, adaptability is essential for handling new experiences. Psychopathology is examined as a breakdown in this balance, where maladaptive coping mechanisms prevent accommodation, reinforcing negative mental patterns. Disorders like OCD, BDD, and anxiety are discussed to show how fears or negative beliefs can become self-sustaining cycles, leading to entrenched maladaptive behaviors. The text also emphasizes that an accurate self-concept is crucial for mental health, as distorted self-perceptions can fuel psychopathological cycles.

**Keywords:** cognition, enactivism, Jean Piaget, Manfred Eigen, psychopathology.

## INTRODUCTION

Before we can speak of cognition, of world, or of self, we must attend to the field in which all of these appear. There is no pure point of origin; only an already unfolding encounter, a "being-in-the-world" that precedes the conceptual and grounds it (Heidegger, 1967, p. 52). Reflection is not a mirror turned inward, but an event

---

\* Katedra za klasičnu fenomenologiju, Odsjek za filozofiju, Karl-Franzens-Sveučilište u Grazu, Graz, Austrija. <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0547-5825>

*Correspondence Address:* Toma Gruica, Duhovnoznanstveni fakultet, Odsjek za filozofiju/Katedra za klasičnu fenomenologiju, Karl-Franzens-Sveučilište u Grazu, Universitaetsplatz 3, 8010 Graz, Austrija. Email: [toma.gruica@protonmail.com](mailto:toma.gruica@protonmail.com)

that discloses a structure already at work in perception. To perceive is not to look out at a world from within a mind, but to find oneself already thrown into a sense-making process, one that gives rise to both world and self. Merleau-Ponty captures this primordial condition:

When I begin to reflect, my reflection bears upon an unreflective experience, moreover my reflection cannot be unaware of itself as an event, and so it appears to itself in the light of a truly creative act, of a changed structure of consciousness, and yet it has to recognize, as having priority over its own operations, the world which is given to the subject because the subject is given to himself... Perception is not a science of the world, it is not even an act, a deliberate taking up of a position; it is the background from which all acts stand out, and is presupposed by them: The world is not an object such that I have in my possession the law of its making; it is the natural setting of, and field from, all my thoughts and all my explicit perceptions (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. xi.).

This insight forms the basis of embodied cognition and enactivism. These approaches, as a philosophy and position in the cognitive sciences, represent the idea that human experience is fundamentally that of an embodied entity, and this embodiment manifests in consciousness through “common-sense” or “ready-at-hand” knowledge. It is in the way we interact with and engage the environment that this embodiment is experienced. However, it is only through psychopathology, or disturbances in typical engagement with the world, that this embodiment is brought into explicit awareness. Phenomenology, with famous examples like Heidegger’s “Carpenter and his Hammer” (Heidegger, 1967, p. 69), or Merleau-Ponty’s “The Hand touching itself” (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 106) illustrate that embodiment is our primary mode of being. This can be understood as embodied engagement, where cognition relies on experiences derived from having a body equipped with various sensorimotor capacities. These sensorimotor capacities exist within a broader ecological, historical, social, cultural, biological, and psychological context, known as the phenomenological life world, or being-in-the-world. Consequently, engagement implies that sensory and motor processes, perception, and action are fundamentally inseparable in lived cognition.

In contrast to the Cartesian model, which conceives perception as an internal reconstruction of a pre-given external world, the enactivist perspective understands perception as a mode of skilled engagement. Rather than extracting objective properties from the environment, the perceiver navigates a dynamic and mutable field shaped by their embodied capacities. What matters is not the representation of a static world, but the organism’s sensorimotor possibilities for action. Accordingly, the reference point for understanding perception shifts: not from a world existing independently “out there,” but from the structure of the perceiver’s embodiment; the lived body that defines how one can act and be affected. But this embodied capacity is not self-generated. As Heidegger reminds us, we are “thrown” into a world not of our

choosing, a world that precedes us and makes itself known only gradually, through our involvements. Our being is always already situated, and this situatedness is the condition under which perception, understanding, and reflection become possible (Heidegger, 1967, p. 135). As we age and experience life, we start contemplating its nature. The world isn't a product of our making, but rather a revelation awaiting our discovery. However, it's this very world that enables us to engage in reflection. Thus, a cycle ensues: the world precedes our contemplation, yet it intertwines inseparably with our experience.

Thus, this paper aims to explore how cognition is an emergent property of the specific structure or system that our experiential structure represents. The goal is to examine how cognition arises from dynamic and reciprocal interaction with the environment, considering being-there as an organism. This dynamic and reciprocal interaction is most effectively explained through the concept of *Autopoiesis*, which refers to the self-creating and self-maintaining processes inherent in living systems. Building on this, the paper explores the potential application of concepts from enactivism and the philosophy of biology to psychopathology. The focus will be on the notion of embodied cognition and *Autopoiesis* as elucidated by Francisco Varela, contrasting it with the insights of Manfred Eigen, notably with the so called Eigen's paradox, and the cognitive philosophy of Jean Piaget. *Autopoiesis*, here is examined as a theory of mind and experience, in the sense of emphasizes the generation and utilization of experiences as information within open processes. While Eigen's insights are pertinent for understanding the transition from chemical systems to self-replicating entities, in this paper, I will argue that they might hold significance in comprehending experiential structures within the realm of psychopathology. Eigen's paradox prompts an examination of mechanisms underlying "negative constructions," highlighting their role as constructions rather than mere deconstructions of a healthy self. This discourse navigates the meaningfulness and meaninglessness of experiences as information, where the focus lies not only on information transmission but also on its initial generation.

## ENACTIVISM AND EMBODIED COGNITION

The theoretical approach of embodied cognition, originally presented by Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch in their 1991 work, "*The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience*", represents a departure from traditional Cartesian assumptions about cognition. Embodied cognition holds that cognitive processes extend 'beyond the brain' and are fundamentally influenced by sensory and motor experiences, which in turn are shaped by the individual's interactions with their environment (Varela et al., 2017, p. xx). Embodied cognition has also

been described as the “4E” model of cognition: embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended cognition – all of which propose that cognition emerges from the interplay between the brain, the body, and the world. The intriguing aspect here lies in the fact that while the whole is comprised solely of its constituent parts, it possesses emergent characteristics that defy straightforward prediction, perhaps even in theoretical terms, based solely on the qualities of those parts in isolation. Thus, the body, *Leib*, and the environment are not viewed as separate entities, but as a unified, *Autopoietic* system through which cognition occurs (Varela et al., 2017, p. xxv). This means that the body’s movements, sensations, and interactions with the environment are considered integral to the cognitive processes that take place “in the brain” and the body. In other words, cognitive processes do not take place only “in the brain” but are distributed throughout the body and the environment, *Umwelt* (von Uexküll, 1928, pp. 108-112).

Context, including social, cultural, and environmental factors, is considered crucial in shaping cognitive processes that are not limited to passive perception but involve active engagement with the environment (Varela et al., 2017, p. 174). Thus, the way a person interacts with the environment may vary depending on whether they are in a familiar or unfamiliar context. Agency, the active shaping of the environment by the individual, is a key aspect of embodied cognition that has far-reaching implications for psychopathology and philosophy. Embodied cognition essentially states that the interpenetration of enactivism and phenomenology inevitably breaks down the traditional Cartesian dichotomy between the thinking subject and the material world and challenges the privileged status of pure thought and its ability to know “objective” truths. For to truly understand the nature of human experience and cognition, one must look beyond the traditional Cartesian dichotomy between the thinking subject and the material world, as well as beyond all the reductionist and eliminativist positions that have emerged from that dichotomy. Rather, one must recognize that the body and its sensory interactions with the environment play a fundamental role in shaping our understanding of reality. In this way, embodied cognition opens new avenues for a phenomenological investigation of subjective experience, of which in the following chapters will be the focus on the cyclical nature of experiences, and experiencing as an aspect of the human being.

## FRANCISCO VALERA’S CONCEPT OF *AUTOPOIESIS*

The concept of *Autopoiesis* was first proposed by Francisco Varela in collaboration with Humberto Maturana in the 1970s, predating the theoretical framework and thesis of embodied cognition developed in the 2000s, in which it is now often included. The theory arose in response to the limitations of traditional approaches

to understanding living systems, which focused on the study of the parts of an organism rather than the organism as a whole. *Autopoiesis*, or simply the theory of self-organization, proposes that living systems are characterized by a self-organizing process of continuous self-generation and self-preservation (Varela et al., 2017, p. xiv). Maturana and Varela argue that living systems are not simply passive recipients of external stimuli, but active producers of their own structure and organization. *Autopoietic* systems maintain their own identity by constantly producing and repairing their own components. It is in this sense, that living systems are self-referential, self-sustaining, and self-organizing. Varela's thesis of embodied cognition, which, as mentioned, was formulated later in a dialogue with Eleanor Rosch, Evan Thompson, and J.J. Gibson, posits *Autopoiesis* as a fundamental principle that enables an organism to interact with the environment, in the form of cycles or "feedback loops" between the organism and the environment (Varela & Maturana, 1972, p. 78). The organism itself does not have complete control over what the feedback-loops do and why or how they change; the organism cannot fully control the ways in which the feedback-loops affect its development (Varela & Maturana, 1972, p. 79-82).

Another key aspect of *Autopoiesis* is the distinction between the system and the environment, where the boundaries of a living system are not fixed or predetermined but are dynamically constructed by the system itself. The system defines its own boundaries and selectively interacts with its environment to maintain its own identity and integrity. *Autopoiesis* also underscores the importance of cognition and perception in living systems; perception is not simply the passive reception of information from the environment, but an active process of sense-making and interpretation (Gibson, 2014, pp. 121-122, 133). Living systems create their "own reality"<sup>1</sup> by selectively perceiving and responding to stimuli from their environment (Varela & Maturana, 1972, pp. 88-90, 93). Typically, the term *Autopoiesis* is employed to elucidate the processes within the simplest life forms, specifically cellular life forms, as it seen in the virological work of Manfred Eigen (Stegmüller, 1975, pp. 413-439).<sup>2</sup> As cell components are reorganized, they tend to return to their original positions in relation to other components, demonstrating a remarkable capacity for self-renewal and self-organization. The implication of this self-assembly and self-ordering is

<sup>1</sup> The phrase "own reality" is meant here to represent a perspectivist position rather than a relativist one.

<sup>2</sup> Manfred Eigen (1927–2019) was a German biophysical chemist who made significant contributions to the understanding of complex biological systems. His interests extended beyond traditional chemistry and virology, leading him to explore the fundamental question of how life originated and evolved. In the 1970s, he developed the concept of the self-organizing autocatalytic theory of life, which aimed to explain the emergence and evolution of life through principles of chemistry and *Autopoiesis*. Eigen's theory emphasizes the role of dynamics and feedback loops in evolution, suggesting that early molecular systems, or "proto-cells," had the ability to catalyze their own formation, resulting in a self-sustaining cycle of replication and evolution. Over time, this process could have given rise to increasingly complex and sophisticated life forms.

that cellular structures have an inherent adaptability and responsiveness to their surrounding conditions (Varela & Maturana, 1972, p. 78) As they accommodate themselves to the environment, they display a dynamic resilience, enabling cells to sustain their functional integrity and fulfill their roles within the broader organism (Varela, 1991, pp. 79-80).

In this context of what has been said, a complex metabolic network generates its own limit, a “membrane,” as an integral component of the network (Peat, 1985, p. 26). This leads to the constitution of a distinct form through an ongoing dialectical interaction between the emergent whole and the enabling network. Essentially, a metabolic network gives rise to a specific whole that, in turn, facilitates the unfolding of these processes. This involves processes that bring forth a system as a whole, while simultaneously allowing these processes to unfold (Eigen, 1971, p. 473, 490, *passim*). Crucially, this is a dynamic, process-driven phenomenon, lacking static characteristics. The identity of the entity is an ongoing process, involving minute changes that sustain its unitary existence. The interplay between determinism (as described by the underlying chemical and physical principles, the Cartesian “body”) and stochasticity (randomness and fluctuations, but also radical freedom) is essential for understanding how *Autopoietic* systems can emerge and evolve, regardless if we talk about biochemistry of cells or how an organized whole exists in and through its environment (Eigen, 1971, pp. 484-487). In Eigen’s work on self-replicating molecular systems, the initial emergence of replicators and the subsequent evolution of life-like processes could be influenced by chance events at the molecular level: “If all processes in the universe were governed by strictly deterministic laws, we would not exist” (Stegmüller, 1975, p. 419).

*Autopoiesis* delves into the realm of information theory, particularly focusing on the generation and utilization of information in the context of molecular processes; in other words, “how information originates or gains value by selection” and “how selection occurs with special substances under special conditions” (Eigen, 1971, pp. 469-470). Following the example of Eigen’s concept of *Autopoiesis*, which involves self-replicating entities implementing instructions from a ‘genetic’ plan, in this framework, information is not merely a passive carrier of data but a dynamic and fundamental component that drives the organization and functionality of molecular systems. Information theory, as applied by Eigen, goes beyond traditional cybernetics and communication theory by addressing questions related to the meaning and significance of information (Eigen, 1971, p. 467). The distinction concerning the meaningfulness and meaninglessness of information (in the sense of biosemantics) is particularly pertinent. For *Autopoiesis*, the focus is not just on the transmission of information but on the initial generation of information; the creation of a meaningful plan or set of instructions that can guide the self-organization and replication

of molecular entities. Here, Eigen's perspective underscores the importance of understanding how information, in the form of coded instructions, can arise and be processed within *Autopoietic* systems. While in the context of Eigen is relevant when exploring the transition from simple chemical systems to self-replicating entities, the meaningful generation of information in the context of psychopathology is critical.

For Eigen, the principles of evolution, particularly the contrast between the “survival of the fittest” and the intriguing perspective of the “survival of the survivors,” reflect the dynamics of adaptation and persistence in organisms (Eigen, 1971, p. 430). Darwin's concept of fitness highlights traits conducive to survival, while an alternative notion emphasizes enduring qualities that contribute to long-term viability. These enduring qualities play a primary role in the interplay of segregation, selection, and, consequently, evolution within *Autopoietic* hypercycles – further demonstrating the “dual-cyclical,” interactive, and dynamic nature of these systems. One cycle for self-replication (which, for Eigen, refers to nucleic acids), and another for construction (coding proteins, which are necessary for the formation of nucleic acids), with the second cycle including the construction of the first (Eigen, 1971, p. 503). These two cycles illustrate the interconnected processes necessary for the emergence and maintenance of *Autopoietic* systems – whether in Eigen's concept of life or Varela's concept of cognition and mental well-being. Just as the interplay of accidental and deterministic molecular interactions contributes to the dynamic narrative of life's origin and continuity, so too does the lived, dynamic existence of a worldly being. Their life, cognition, and sense of self emerge from a dual-cyclical interaction of assimilation and accommodation, which in turn contributes to their overall well-being. (Piaget, 2017, p. 131). Following the example, the intricate mechanism of translation, which decodes genetic information from RNA to synthesize proteins, reflects the delicate balance between accidental creation, logical necessity, chemical-physical laws, and mechanical randomness required for an *Autopoietic* system to emerge. In other words, just as life, for Eigen, emerges from and is embedded in the complex *Autopoietic* interaction between parts and wholes—between the organism and the environment – so too is cognition, for Varela, not merely a behaviorist “black box” of inputs and outputs (Skinner, 1971, p. 97), nor a Cartesian spirit pressing on the pineal gland (Descartes, 2016, p. xxii), but a necessarily embedded and enacted *Autopoietic* whole. One simply cannot isolate a part and expect to understand the whole.

The pivotal aspect is the circular process, which, rather than leading to a detrimental circularity, engenders a productive and virtuous circularity, as articulated by Varela (Varela et al., 2017, pp. 10–14, 18). It is an efficacious, formative process. While initially applied to the cellular level, Varela expanded this logic to encompass other systems. He sought to formalize this circular logic by developing mathematical

languages, ensuring its integration into formal systems without leading to paradoxes. His proposition asserted that systems such as the immune system and the nervous system exhibit the same structural organization. He referred to these as “closed systems” – not in the sense of being cut off from environmental exchange, but in that their organization is determined by internal processes (Varela et al., 2017, p. 209, 211). Organisms maintain a constant exchange with the environment through thermodynamic processes; however, in organizational or operational terms, once these systems are constituted, they function as closed systems. All internal operations transpire within the system itself, collectively upholding the system as a cohesive whole (Eigen, 1971, pp. 471-473). This encapsulates the core notion underpinning *Autopoiesis* and autonomous systems, demonstrating how circularity plays a fundamental role (Varela et al., 2017, pp. 89-91). Circular processes, as I previously mentioned, constitute the essence of biological, vital logic; the logic inherent in the workings of life. The significance of a boundary or demarcation lies in the purpose of maintaining a closed system, nestled within the broader whole. Thus, it functions to contain a complete system within itself.<sup>3</sup>

## EIGEN’S PARADOX

Coming back to the example of Manfred Eigen [Chapter 4.1.1.], one of his contributions to *Autopoiesis* is the introduction of Eigen’s paradox,<sup>4</sup> which offers a valuable analogy when examining psychopathology, allowing us to reveal the intricate dynamics within the *Autopoietic* relationship that underpins cognition. Much like the challenges faced in the replication of genetic information, the core of this analogy lies in the trade-offs inherent in processes vital to sustaining both life and cognitive functions. At its essence, Eigen’s paradox – within the context of the philosophy of biology, molecular biology, and the origin of life – is rooted in the constraints imposed by error thresholds during genetic replication (Eigen, 1971, p. 480). The replication of genetic material, exemplified by nucleic acids, is susceptible to imperfections, leading to the introduction of errors into the new sequence. This phenomenon gives rise to mutations, both malign and benign (Eigen, 1971, p. 475). The parallel between the *Autopoietic* organization of molecular replication, and

<sup>3</sup> This endeavor reveals the influence of the philosophy of mathematics on enactivism.

<sup>4</sup> “Eigen’s paradox,” at its core, centers on the limitations imposed by error thresholds in molecular replication. The replication of genetic material – such as nucleic acids – is inherently prone to errors, leading to the incorporation of mutations into newly synthesized sequences. This process gives rise to mutants and establishes the concept of a quasispecies: a population of closely related genetic variants that coexist due to the high mutation rate. The paradox becomes more pronounced as the need for longer nucleotide sequences emerges to encode complex structures like proteins. However, longer sequences are more susceptible to replication errors, creating a dilemma: encoding complexity requires longer sequences, but longer sequences increase the risk of fatal mutations, potentially destabilizing the entire system.

cognition, becomes apparent when considering the need for longer sequences to encode complex structures, be it proteins or intricate cognitive frameworks such as one's self-identity and coping mechanisms. Longer sequences heighten the likelihood of errors, creating the paradox: the necessity for longer sequences to encode complexity comes with an elevated risk of introducing errors. Or as Eigen puts it: "This means that any sequence of digits will instruct its own reproduction. If an error occurs in the reproduction, the error copy will be further reproduced" (Eigen, 1971, p. 475). Akin to genetic replication, a delicate balance must be struck in the cognitive process, since, on one hand, the imperfections introduced during the formation of cognitive frameworks contribute to the generation of diversity, fostering adaptability and evolution; on the other hand, this diversity introduces the risk of distortion and the need for more specialized cognitive processes capable of integrating errors into our understanding of the world and the self through accommodation.

But how are experiences encoded and integrated? To offer a comprehensive response to this question, I turn to the insights of the French-Swiss philosopher and psychologist Jean Piaget. His contributions notably mark him as a pioneer in the development of embodied cognition as a philosophical position, and his philosophical stance closely parallels our contemporary understanding of this concept. Jean Piaget dedicated his work to understand how a child develops from an immature biological organism at birth to an adult capable of abstract reasoning. Thus, his work is of immense value, and need to be understood correctly, since the child at birth, is a pure phenomenological and enactive agent. At birth, the child possesses only a rudimentary sensorimotor system. Piaget sought to understand how this sensorimotor intelligence transforms into a sophisticated understanding of an external world—one populated with permanent objects situated in space and time – and into a self-conception as both an object among other objects and as an internal, thinking mind (Varela et al., 2017, p. 176). When discussing perception, we usually assume two primary positions. The first holds that the world possesses inherent properties, which exist independently and prior to perception. In this view, the cognitive system passively receives these properties and interprets them, whether through symbolic representations or global subsymbolic states. This position appears intuitive and often renders alternatives implausible. The second, typically cast as the only alternative, is the idealist stance: the idea that the cognitive system constructs its own reality, and the perceived external world is a projection or reflection of internal laws (Varela et al., 2017, p. 172). It is important to note that both positions emphasize representation: the former seeks to recover external reality, while the latter projects internal constructs. However, if we follow Heidegger's ontology – which serves as a foundation for Varela and Thompson (Varela et al., 2017, pp. xvii, xx) – we move beyond this dichotomy of internal versus external. Instead, cognition is explored through embodied engagement with the

world, bypassing representational frameworks entirely. As Heidegger writes: “Being-in-the-world is a totality of involvement [...] in everyday Being-in-the-world, *Dasein* is always already outside itself. It is dispersed among the equipment with which it concerns itself” (Heidegger, 1967. pp. 107-110).

In Piaget’s framework, the child is neither an objectivist – where cognition is seen as the recovery of a pre-given outer world – nor an idealist – where cognition is viewed as the projection of a pre-given inner world. Rather, the infant initially knows only their own activity (Varela et al., 2017, p. 172). Even the simplest act of recognizing an object can be comprehended only in terms of this activity. From this basis, the child constructs the entire edifice of the phenomenal world, complete with its laws and logic. This process exemplifies how cognitive structures emerge from recurrent patterns of sensorimotor activity, which Piaget refers to as “circular reactions” (Varela et al., 2017, p. 176). Thus, I believe that a solution can be found in Piaget’s constructivist perspective, which posits that cognitive development occurs through a series of stages, each marked by distinct cognitive structures and ways of thinking, where a interplay between accommodation and assimilation plays a pivotal role in advancing from one stage to another. The concepts of Accommodation and Assimilation are, in Piaget’s framework, the fundamental mechanisms that drive cognitive development and change (Piaget, 1999, p. 42).

Accommodation refers to the process by which individuals modify their existing cognitive structures to incorporate new information or experiences; it represents a dynamic adaptation to novel experiences that do not fit within the current cognitive framework, worldview, or self-image. Through accommodation, individuals refine and adjust their mental representations to align with the complexities of the external environment they find themselves in (Piaget, 1985, p. 6). Assimilation, on the other hand, complements accommodation by incorporating new experiences into pre-existing cognitive structures (Piaget, 1999, pp. 42-43). This process involves interpreting new information in a manner consistent with existing knowledge and mental frameworks (Piaget, 1985, pp. 4-5). Assimilation thus allows individuals to make sense of the world by integrating novel experiences into familiar patterns, creating our sense of coherence, self- and world-continuity, in our cognitive schema. As individuals encounter new challenges or discrepancies in their understanding, they engage in accommodation to refine their mental structures, allowing for the assimilation of new information and progression to a more sophisticated cognitive stage. This dynamic interplay between accommodation and assimilation constitutes what Piaget termed “equilibration.” Equilibration being a dynamic and iterative process through which individuals strive to maintain a balance between accommodation and assimilation. It reflects the innate human drive for cognitive harmony, as individuals

seek to reconcile new experiences with their existing understanding of the world (Piaget, 1985, p. 3).

## JEAN PIAGET’S GENETIC EPISTEMOLOGY

As a genetic epistemologist, Piaget’s work explores how individuals construct their understanding of the world through their unique perspectives, how knowledge structures are formed and evolve within this personalized framework (Piaget, 1970, p. 59). Genetic epistemology, as proposed by Jean Piaget, is essential in understanding the intricate systems, and processes, of creating mental images, the concept of self, knowledge frameworks,<sup>5</sup> object permanence, perceptions about the world and one’s place in it etc., and how these images interact with each other. As stated by Piaget:

In any possible domain of constituted thought (contrasted with the states of disequilibrium which mark its development), psychological reality consists of complex operational systems and not of isolated operations conceived as elements prior to these systems; thus, only in so far as actions or intuitive representations organize themselves in such systems do they acquire the nature of ‘operations’ (and they acquire it by this very fact). The essential problem of the psychology of thought is then to work out the laws of equilibrium of these systems [...] the real work of the mind seems to us to be the formulation of the laws governing these wholes as such (Piaget, 1972, p. 36).

The need for genetic epistemology arises from its unique focus on the developmental origins and evolution of cognitive and mental structures, helping us understand how individuals progress from simple sensorimotor activities to complex thought patterns, but also how they might regress or “break,” over time. Piaget’s perspective underscores the active agency and embodiment of individuals in shaping their “reality,” showcasing a stance of perspectivism rather than relativism. Notably, in his work on *Structuralism* (1970), Piaget challenges the traditional notion that knowledge is a static fact rather than a dynamic process (Piaget 1970, p. 100). He asserts that our forms of knowledge are inherently incomplete, and our sciences are perpetually imperfect, emphasizing the need to study knowledge as an evolving process (Piaget, 1971, p. 1). Moreso, Piaget’s *Psychology of Intelligence* (1972) and *Genetic epistemology* (1971), reflects the evolving perspective on knowledge, stating that, under various influences, there is a growing inclination to view knowledge more as a embodied process than a fixed state (Piaget 1972, p. 8). But how do individuals construct perspectival representations of the world, and what cognitive processes come into play during this intricate endeavor?

---

<sup>5</sup> To be understood as subjective knowledge.

According to Piaget, this cognitive endeavor involves a dynamic interplay between a state of equilibrium and its disruption – what he termed disequilibrium – which leads to a period of disintegration. This disintegration marks a transitional phase between cognitive stages, during which individuals grapple with adjusting to new and disruptive experiences (Piaget, 1972, p. 36). An individual’s emotional and mental well-being is intricately connected to their cognitive processes, and various factors can disrupt this equilibrium – these carefully learned and practiced strategies – regardless of age. Personal problems, worries, or internal tensions can significantly affect daily life, often giving rise to a range of emotional responses. These responses, and their underlying causes, may not be immediately apparent through casual observation. However, it is essential to recognize that every person has limits – limits that shape how they perceive themselves, their environment, and others. For instance, the equilibrium derived from feeling loved, when lost, can result in emotions such as depression or hostility. Conversely, an excess of love – such as overprotection – may foster dependency and undermine self-confidence. On the other hand, disequilibrium occurs when one’s actions in the world deviate from expected outcomes. Such deviations indicate a rift between one’s mental representation of the world, the self, or the body, and the actual experiences encountered. It is a state of tension that motivates us to adjust our beliefs, our actions, or both, in order to reduce cognitive dissonance (Piaget, 1972, p. 39). Expanding on the notion of disequilibrium, Piaget’s framework prompts reflection on the intricate relation between the mind and the world. Disequilibrium not only act as signals for cognitive restructuring but also reveal the complex relationship between perception and wordliness (Piaget, 1972, p. 36). The ability to confront and navigate these disruptions becomes a skill essential for adaptive learning and a more complete understanding of the complexities inherent in the construction of cognitive frameworks. Piaget’s emphasis on disequilibrium as a disintegration period, but also as a transformative phase, aligns with the broader context of his work on cognitive development (Piaget, 1972, pp. 40-41). This transitional state serves as a crucible for refining not only cognitive structures but also one’s self-conception, and understanding of the environment one finds themselves in.

Piaget’s examination of embodied cognition also offers us a unique insight into the connection between physical, bodily experiences and abstract knowledge. Piaget contends that abstract knowledge is intricately tied to the body’s structure, unfolding from the corporeal realm “upwards” into abstraction (Piaget 1972, pp. 43, 45). Essentially, all our knowledge is embodied, rooted in tangible, concrete experiences. Piaget’s perspective on child development adds depth to this understanding by suggesting that a child’s learning journey is not merely a cognitive process, but a fundamentally embodied one. Knowledge acquisition begins with the exploration of movement – a dynamic interaction between the child’s body and the surrounding

environment (Piaget 1972, p. 49). Finally, genetic epistemology offers insights into the role of social interactions and environmental factors in the shaping of cognitive development. As individuals engage with the world, their self-image and perceptions of the world are not formed in isolation but are profoundly influenced by the dynamic interplay between inherent cognitive structures and experiences (Piaget 2017, p. 254). Thus, what sets Piaget's viewpoint apart is his emphasis on the social dimension within embodied cognition; the presence of other people, he argues, profoundly influences the [child's] cognitive landscape (Piaget 1972, pp. 123-124, 156-159).

Building on Piaget's insights, contemporary discussions on embodied cognition underscore the inseparable link between the mind and the body. The body is not a mere vessel for abstract thoughts; it actively participates in knowledge construction.

Reality is perpetually being "assimilated" by the motor schemas of the organism, without it being possible for consciousness to take part in this assimilation. Assimilation is therefore not an induction. It is the expression of the complete continuity which binds the organism to its biological environment. It is prior to any distinction between the external world and the ego [self] (Piaget 1972, p. 131)

For example, in the context of childhood development, the acquisition of motor skills assumes a pivotal role. As a child undergoes the process of learning how to move, the intricate development of procedural memory becomes apparent, intricately influenced by the surrounding social environment. In a child's developmental process, according to Piaget, the acquisition of motor skills plays a pivotal role and is intricately connected to the development of procedural memory. This procedural memory – vital for executing various actions – is significantly shaped by the pervasive influence of social interactions and the presence of others (Piaget, 2002, pp. 58-59). The fundamental premise lies in the incorporation of the implicit knowledge of "knowing how to act" into one's behavioral *repertoire*. Embedded within our behavioral responses is a learned manifestation of the social structure from which we have emerged. The ability to discern and understand one's actions becomes a mechanism through which social rules are extracted, revealing the interplay between individual behavior and societal norms. It is not a conscious awareness of these rules, but rather an implicit integration of social norms into the very fabric of individual conduct (Piaget, 1970, pp. 79, 103). The detection of societal norms often occurs when they are transgressed, underscoring the implicit nature of their integration into individual behavior. Much like Heidegger's famous example of the carpenter's "hammer *hammering*" and the "hammer breaking" (Heidegger, 1967, pp. 69-71) the awareness of societal norms is heightened when they deviate from the expected course. The origin of these norms lies in the intrinsic structure of individuals and the consequences of learning within a social environment. The developmental trajectory involves not only the internalization of norms but also the nuanced realization that

these norms, though external, come to manifest in our behavior as if they were inherently personal. This paradoxical interplay allows for the state of inauthenticity, where individuals act in accordance with norms that, despite being foreign, are assimilated and enacted *as if they are* an inherent part of their identity.

Psychopathology here emerges as the asymptotic limit of human behavior under the breakdown of societal norms.<sup>6</sup> This breakdown unveils socially unacceptable experiences that transcend the veneer of interpersonal constituted reality, revealing the inherent fractures in the perception of our shared existence. The recognition of these unsettling experiences propels the individual toward a state of equilibrium, albeit one fraught with societal dissonance and divergence from conventional norms. Piaget offers a complementary perspective on the integration of societal norms, contending that our inclination to assimilate and adhere to such norms is rooted in the inherent tendency of our initial representations to veer away from complexity. He posits that individuals find comfort and familiarity in the simplicity of their surroundings. Consequently, everyday life is predominantly navigated through partial representations – knowledge structures that are inherently incomplete.

The notion of maintaining social identity becomes a critical aspect within this socio-cognitive framework. Individuals, operating with partial and often fragmented representations, are themselves inherently incomplete – yet they project a sense of assurance and understanding through their actions. This inclination to present a composed and coherent social identity reflects the complex interplay between individual self-representation and societal expectations. Individuals establish a set of expectations and desires regarding the unfolding of their world. This process unfolds within a social context, emphasizing the shared nature of expectations embedded in societal norms. The alignment between actions and societal expectations fosters a sense of being “at home” – a state of emotional regulation and comfort. As long as this alignment persists, individuals experience a sense of familiarity and emotional stability within their social milieu. This dual interplay between the inherent incompleteness of individual knowledge, the influence of societal norms, and the alignment of individual actions with social expectations creates a dynamic socio-cognitive landscape. In the event of discrepancies between our actions and the expected outcomes based on our understanding, Piaget introduces a perspective centered on the generation of a multiplicity of potential environments. Piaget’s proposition

---

<sup>6</sup> The definition of psychopathologies invariably hinges upon categorizing them as “behaviors outside of societal norms,” due to the inability to peer into one’s experiential structure. This limitation serves as the fundamental boundary for substantiating the “illness” aspect of mental health. While there is some acknowledgment of contributing factors such as organic or chemical systems, psychopathology has traditionally avoided a comprehensive exploration of these complexities. A similar skepticism surrounds research involving neuroscience and brain imaging, making it difficult to envision a trajectory that moves beyond treatment models focused primarily on behavioral interventions.

underscores the cognitive response to incongruities in our interactions with the world. When faced with disruptions, individuals engage in a mental process wherein a range of potential environments, akin to avatars, is generated. This multiplicity of potential environments reflects a cognitive strategy to navigate uncertainties and adapt to varying circumstances (Piaget, 2017, pp. 130, 240). Failure to envisage oneself in future scenarios leads to anxiety, a sentiment germane to a Piagetian exploration of psychopathology. The inability to envision one's existence in future contexts disrupts temporal continuity, engendering a state of existential unease. Anxiety emerges as a significant manifestation of maladaptive cognitive processes and disruptions in temporal continuity.

## CONCLUSION

Assimilation, within the context of Piaget's framework, can be understood analogous to the "encoding" of new information into existing cognitive structures, as with the autocatalytic replication process of Eigen's theory, where novelty is assimilated into a pre-existing sequence. Here, a paradox arises when considering that, despite the inherent instability introduced by constant accommodation to novel experience, it is precisely this adaptive instability that is required to regain stability and resilience of the cognitive system. Eigen's paradox thus sheds light on the inherent tension between cognitive stability and change in cognitive development. The paradoxical nature arises from the simultaneous need for cognitive stability – achieved through assimilation, and cognitive adaptability – achieved through accommodation. The interdependence of these processes mirrors the delicate balance Eigen observed in biological systems, emphasizing the dual role of instability and stability in fostering developmental progression.

Psychopathology, in short, can thus be understood as a refusal to accommodate assimilated information (Piaget, 1985, p. 14). For example, the psychopathology of coping mechanisms delves into the ways individuals navigate and respond to stressors, adversity, and challenging circumstances (Humpston & Broome, 2016, p. 255). Coping strategies, which are essential for psychological well-being, can exhibit maladaptive patterns such as isolation, avoidance, denial, or reliance on harmful behaviors as a means of managing stress, contributing thus to psychopathological manifestations (Castellini, 2016, p. 86). The therapeutic implications of Eigen's paradox in this context of Piagetian concepts are also noteworthy – interventions targeting psychopathology often aim to disrupt this cyclic process by modifying maladaptive cognitive patterns (accommodation) while facilitating the assimilation of healthier cognitive processes. Moreover, excessive or inappropriate coping mechanisms can disrupt normal functioning, exacerbating mental health challenges.

While the construction of coping mechanisms is a common human response to navigate stress and adversity, it is a vicious cycle, a self-perpetuating feedback loop that exacerbates psychological challenges. When individuals employ coping mechanisms that are not inherently healthy or sustainable, there is a risk of entering a cycle where the temporary relief provided by these strategies is short-lived. As the underlying stressors persist or intensify, individuals may resort to increasingly challenging coping mechanisms, leading to a continuous and escalating pattern. This cycle can eventually contribute to a breakdown in mental well-being, as the coping mechanisms themselves can be the sources of additional stress and strain, culminating in a collapse of adaptive functioning (Bertelli et al., 2019, pp. 1315-1317). In other words, the parallel between Eigen's paradox and cognitive development becomes clear when we understand that *Autopoiesis*, a concept describing self-maintaining systems, applies to various levels exhibiting similar reciprocal and membranous or boundary-maintaining mechanisms. The paradoxical element lies in the fact that building mental resilience requires exposure to mentally challenging events and situations. According to Piaget's pedagogic principles, an isolated child, though protected from the chaos and unknown dangers of the environment, remains vulnerable. To cultivate mental resilience, exposure to risk is necessary. A child needs to scrape their knee to learn that the pain is bearable. However, if the lessons learned are flawed, those errors will be perpetuated. Factors such as an entitled sense of self-worth, a spoiled upbringing, or a lack of love can significantly influence how future events and situations are encountered and managed.

By constructing elaborate and fantastical beliefs, individuals may seek to create a sense of stability and control in an otherwise overwhelming and chaotic world. The escalating nature of delusions, as described by Piagetian assimilation and accommodation, can be interpreted as a further manifestation of this escapist tendency. As delusions become more elaborate and convoluted, they provide an increasingly impenetrable shield from the discomforts of unaccommodated phenomena. The fragility of grandiose delusions, as highlighted by Eigen's paradox, suggests that this escapist strategy is inherently unsustainable. The more elaborate the delusion, the more fragile it becomes, as it becomes increasingly difficult to reconcile with reality. An individual afflicted with disorders such as Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) or Body Dysmorphic Disorder (BDD) assimilates anxieties or fears into their daily experiences (Ahern et al., 2019, pp. 710–714). In OCD, accommodation often takes the form of compulsive rituals. For example, someone with contamination fears may continually assimilate the notion of impurity in their surroundings, leading to ritualistic handwashing or avoidance behaviors as a form of accommodation (Fuchs, 2019, pp. 534-535). Similarly, individuals with BDD assimilate perceived flaws in their appearance into a wide range of situations, interpreting external stimuli

through the lens of their body image concerns (Castellini & Ricca, 2016, p. 861–865). Accommodation in this context may involve engaging in compulsive grooming or seeking excessive reassurance about their appearance (Castellini & Ricca, 2016, p. 870). When it comes to Eigen, consider a person who experiences a single negative event – such as a minor failure or rejection – and, as a result, develops a simple negative thought: “I’m not good enough.” Over time, this initial thought may replicate and evolve within the individual’s mind, giving rise to a complex network of negative beliefs about the self, one’s capabilities, and the future. This progression can ultimately contribute to the development of a depressive disorder. In this context, Eigen’s paradox invites us to reflect on how a seemingly simple negative cognition can evolve into a complex, self-sustaining pattern of depressive thinking – mirroring the paradoxical challenge in biology where increasing informational complexity demands fidelity in replication, even as replication remains prone to error.

Similarly, consider a person who has a simple fear response to a specific situation, like speaking in public, eating in front of others, etc. This fear response could, over time, replicate and generalize to other situations, leading to a complex pattern of anxiety that affects multiple areas of the person’s life. Here yet again, Eigen’s paradox, as understood through the concepts of Accommodation and Assimilation, might help us understand how a simple fear response can evolve into a generalized anxiety disorder. Central to mental well-being is an accurate self-concept – one in which an individual possesses a genuine understanding of themselves. A distortion in this self-image – as seen in conditions like Body Dysmorphic Disorder (BDD), where one perceives themselves as significantly inferior or, in some cases, superior to reality – can lead to maladaptive behaviors. These may include social withdrawal or attempts to reinforce the distorted self-image, whether through exaggerated displays of confidence or through self-destructive actions (Castellini & Ricca, 2016, p. 869).

## REFERENCES

- Ahern C., Fassnacht, D. B., & Kyrios, M. (2019). Obsessions and Phobias. In G. Stanghellini (Ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Phenomenological Psychopathology* (pp. 706–714). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bertoli, M. O., De Groef, J., & Rondini, E. (2019). Phenomenological Psychopathology of Neurodiversity. In G. Stanghellini (Ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Phenomenological Psychopathology* (pp. 1299–1337). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Castellini, G. & Ricca, V. (2019). Eating Disorders as Disorders of Embodiment and Identity. In G. Stanghellini (Ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Phenomenological Psychopathology* (pp. 861–877). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Castellini, G. (2016). Gender Dysphoria. In G. Stanghellini & M. Aragona (Eds.), *An Experiential Approach to Psychopathology: What is it like to Suffer from Mental Disorders?* (pp. 675–692). Heidelberg: Springer.
- Descartes, R. (2016). *The Passions of the Soul and Other Late Philosophical Writings*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Eigen, M. (1971). Selforganization of Matter and the Evolution of Biological Macromolecules. *Die Naturwissenschaften*, 58(10), 465-523. <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00623322>
- Fuchs, T. (2019). The Experience of Time and its Disorders. In G. Stanghellini (Ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Phenomenological Psychopathology* (pp. 527-539). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gibson, J. J. (2014). *Ecological approach to visual perception*. New York: Psychology Press.
- Heidegger, M. (1967). *Sein und Zeit*. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag.
- Humpston, C. S. & Broome, M. R. (2016). Perplexity. In G. Stanghellini & M. Aragona (Eds.), *An Experiential Approach to Psychopathology: What is it like to Suffer from Mental Disorders?* (pp. 245-264). Heidelberg: Springer.
- Merleau-Ponty, M. (2012). *Phenomenology of Perception*. London: Routledge.
- Peat, R. (1985). *Mind and Tissue: Russian Research Perspectives on the Human Brain*. Eugene: Borgo Press.
- Piaget, J. (1970) *Structuralism*. New York: Basic Books.
- Piaget, J. (1971) *Genetic Epistemology*. New York: Norton & Company.
- Piaget, J. (1972). *The Psychology of Intelligence*. Totowa: Littlefield, Adams & Company.
- Piaget, J. (1985). *The Equilibrium of Cognitive Structures: The Central Problem of Intellectual Development*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Piaget, J. (1999). *The Construction Of Reality In The Child*. New York: Routledge.
- Piaget, J. (2002). *The Language and Thought of the Child*. London: Routledge.
- Piaget, J. (2017). *The Child's Conception of Physical Causality*. New York: Routledge.
- Skinner, B. F. (1971). *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Stegmüller, W. (1975). Die Evolution des Lebens: zu den Theorien von J. Monod, M. Eigen, H. Kuhn. In W. Stegmüller (Ed.), *Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie 2* (pp. 376-483). Tübingen: Alfred Kröner Verlag.
- Varela, F. & Maturana, H. (1972). *Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living*. Boston: D. Reidel Publishing.
- Varela, F. (1991). Organism: A Meshwork of Selfless Selves. In R. Cohen (Ed.), *Organism and the Origins of Self*. London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Varela, F., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (2017). *The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- von Uexküll, J. J. (1928). *Theoretische Biologie*. Berlin: Julius Springer Verlag.

## Od smislenih uputa do naučene bolesti: filozofske perspektive psihopatologije i dinamike informacija

### SAŽETAK

Rad istražuje ravnotežu između mentalne stabilnosti i prilagodljivosti u kognitivnom razvoju, posebno kroz enaktivističku prizmu, uglavnom kroz Piagetove koncepte asimilacije i akomodacije i Eigenov koncept samoorganizacije. Središnja ideja je da dok je stabilnost neophodna za kognitivnu otpornost, prilagodljivost je neophodna za rukovanje novim

iskustvima. Psihopatologija se ispituje kao poremećaj te ravnoteže, gdje neprilagodljivi mehanizmi suočavanja sprječavaju akomodaciju, jačajući negativne mentalne obrasce. Raspravlja se o poremećajima kao što su OKP, BDD i anksioznost kako bi se pokazalo kako strahovi ili negativna uvjerenja mogu postati samoodrživi ciklusi, što dovodi do ukorijenjenih neprilagodljivih ponašanja. U tekstu se također naglašava da je točna predodžba o sebi ključna za mentalno zdravlje, jer iskrivljena percepcija sebe može potaknuti psihopatološke cikluse.

**Ključne riječi:** enaktivizam, Jean Piaget, kognicija, Manfred Eigen, psihopatologija.



Ivan Macut\*

# Moralna filozofija Stjepana Zimmermanna: od spekulativne teorije prema življenoj praksi<sup>1</sup>

## SAŽETAK

Ovaj rad, uz uvod i zaključak, podijeljen je na tri dijela. U prvom dijelu ukratko se izlažu biografski i bibliografski podatci hrvatskog filozofa Stjepana Zimmermanna (Virovitica, 24. prosinca 1884. – Zagreb, 13. travnja 1963.). U drugom dijelu predstavlja se Zimmermannova teistička filozofska pozicija. Zimmermann vrlo jasno u svojim filozofskim radovima zastupa kršćanski teistički nazor na život, a iz toga filozofskog nazora onda posljedično izvodi i daljnje korake za život pojedinca. O čovjeku i njegovu životu, odnosno o čovjekovoj egzistenciji kao pojedincu i kao onome koji živi među drugim ljudima, filozof Zimmermann promišlja u kontekstu filozofije života. U trećem dijelu rada izlaže se Zimmermannova moralna filozofija, koja obuhvaća i teorijsku i praktičnu stranu. Prema teističkom pogledu na moral Bog je vrhovna norma moralnosti, a osobni moralni život u svojoj biti nije ništa doli usavršavanje u Bogu, tj. osoba se sjedinjuje s Bogom, koji je vrhovno mjerilo moralne dobrote. Zaključak je rada da Zimmermann ne smatra nevažnim živi li pojedinac moralnim ili nemoralnim životom te da njegov život ima utjecaj i na njega osobno i na društvo u cjelini.

**Ključne riječi:** Stjepan Zimmermann, moralna filozofija, praksa, teizam, ateizam.

## UVOD

Talijanski moralni filozof Gianfranco Mormino svoje djelo „Storia della filosofia morale” započinje sljedećom tvrdnjom:

\* Institut za filozofiju, Ulica grada Vukovara 54, 10000 Zagreb, Hrvatska. ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8343-8902>.

Adresa za korespondenciju: Ivan Macut, Institut za filozofiju, Ulica grada Vukovara 54, 10000 Zagreb, Hrvatska. E-pošta: [imacut@ifzg.hr](mailto:imacut@ifzg.hr).

<sup>1</sup> Ovaj znanstveni članak rezultat je istraživanja na projektu *Nove teme u hrvatskoj filozofiji od 1874. do 1945. godine*, IP-2022-10-5438, koji financira Hrvatska zaklada za znanost.

Za razliku od drugih disciplina, moralna je filozofija područje u kojem svatko posjeduje vlastito gledište i već je načinio osobne izbore, ponekad i vrlo zahtjevne. Ako i ne studiramo filozofiju, teme poput dobra, jednakosti, sreće, egoizma, prava i pravde uključene su u naše razgovore i naše izbore; i svatko iz vlastita iskustva zna da ova pitanja i neslaganja mogu biti vrlo duboka. (Mormino, 2020, str. 9)

Istražujući filozofsku misao hrvatskog filozofa Stjepana Zimmermanna, može se zaključiti kako su ove riječi talijanskoga moralnog filozofa Mormina točne. Naime, već samim uvidom u njegov općeniti filozofski rad, pogotovo kad se u obzir uzme Zimmermannova teistička pozicija, moguće je predvidjeti kojim će smjerom ići i njegova moralna filozofija i promišljanja u okviru iste te filozofije. Ova činjenica svjedoči o jednom vrlo sustavnom filozofskom promišljanju, koje je Zimmermann njegovao cijeli svoj život i u svojim objavljenim djelima iz područja filozofije, a isto tako i o konzistentnosti u njegovu filozofiranju i kršćanskom teističkom nazoru na svijet, pa tako i na čovjeka i njegov život u svijetu. Osim što u svojim radovima razvija i filozofski brani teističku poziciju i moral u okviru iste te pozicije,<sup>2</sup> Zimmermann također propituje i filozofskim argumentima odbacuje ostale filozofske nazore na svijet i čovjeka koji se njegovu osobnom stavu suprotstavljaju, kao što su ateizam, materijalizam i sl. Možemo, dakle, reći da dok vodi određenu raspravu sa suprotnim mišljenjima, Zimmermann istovremeno izgrađuje i brani svoj teistički kršćanski, filozofski i moralni nazor.

S ciljem da naznačenu temu našeg istraživanja što je više moguće sadržajno obuhvatimo, ali istovremeno svjesni ograničenosti prostora koji nam je na raspolaganju, u ovom ćemo se radu ponajprije pozabaviti kratkim izlaganjem o Zimmermannovu životu i općenito stvaralaštvu, a s ciljem osvjetljivanja njegove bio-biografije. Zatim prelazimo na Zimmermannovu teističku poziciju, koja je ključna za svako daljnje razumijevanje njegovih moralnih promišljanja i stavova. Konačno, izložit ćemo Zimmermannovo filozofsko shvaćanje morala koje, kako ćemo na samom kraju rada vidjeti, ima vrlo konkretno usmjerenje za život čovjeka kao pojedinca i kao člana određenog društva. Zimmermann je uvjeren da samo moralni život pojedinca može doprinijeti boljitku društva, odnosno da nemoralni život pojedinca šteti društvu u cjelini.

<sup>2</sup> Tomislav Bracanović u djelu „Normativna etika“ ukratko sažima što bi to bila teistička etika:

Stajalište teističke etike glasi da je etika ovisna o religiji i da je moral na neki način povezan s postojanjem Boga. Iako se u teističku etiku u širem smislu mogu svrstati i moralna učenja raznih pučkih i domorodačkih religija, filozofske rasprave o odnosu etike i religije u pravilu se odnose na moralna učenja razvijena u okvirima velikih monoteističkih religija poput judaizma, kršćanstva i islama. (Bracanović, 2018, str. 43)

## **UKRATKO O ŽIVOTU I RADU FILOZOFA STJEPANA ZIMMERMANNA**

### **Život i djelovanje**

Hrvatski filozof Stjepan Zimmermann rodio se 24. prosinca 1884. godine u Virovitici. U rodnom je mjestu završio osnovnoškolsko obrazovanje. Sa srednjoškolskim obrazovanjem nastavlja u Varaždinu i Zagrebu gdje pohađa gimnaziju. Nakon dovršetka srednjoškolskog obrazovanja Zimmermann studira teologiju na Bogoslovnom fakultetu u Zagrebu (Macut, 2018, str. 307). Za vrijeme teološkog studija mladi Zimmermann sve više razvija i zanimanje za filozofiju (Zimmermann, 1945, str. 54–55). Upravo je proučavanje različitih filozofskih tekstova brojnih filozofskih pisaca Zimmermanna navelo na to da na svoju vlastitu inicijativu 1906. godine privremeno napusti bogosloviju i ode na Bečko sveučilište. U Beču ostaje godinu dana. Zatim se vraća u Zagreb, gdje je 1907. godine zaređen za svećenika (Kljajić, 2011, str. 556). Nakon završetka bogoslovnog studija i ređenja za svećenika Zimmermann odlazi na poslijediplomski studij filozofije na Papinsko sveučilište Gregorijana u Rim. Nekoliko godina kasnije, točnije 1910. godine, Zimmermann je na istom sveučilištu stekao doktorat iz filozofije (Macut, 2018, str. 307).

Vrativši se u domovinu, započinje i njegovo aktivnije djelovanje. Godine 1912. Zimmermann postaje nastavnik na Nadbiskupskoj gimnaziji u Zagrebu. Godine 1918. Zimmermann je habilitirao tezom iz filozofije pod naslovom „Opća noetika”, a iste je godine izabran i za docenta na Filozofskom fakultetu Sveučilišta u Zagrebu te izvanrednog profesora na Bogoslovnom fakultetu u Zagrebu. Već sljedeće godine postaje redovitim profesorom iz filozofije na Bogoslovnom fakultetu u Zagrebu. Na Bogoslovnom fakultetu, kao i na Zagrebačkom sveučilištu, Zimmermann je obnašao najviše dužnosti. Spomenimo tako da je u akademskoj godini 1919./1920. bio prodekan, a u akademskoj godini 1920./1921. i dekan Bogoslovnog fakulteta u Zagrebu. Godine 1921. postaje redoviti član Jugoslavenske akademije znanosti i umjetnosti. Nadalje, u akademskoj godini 1923./1924. Zimmermann obnaša dužnost rektora Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, a sljedeće akademske godine obnaša i dužnost prorektora (Macut, 2018, str. 307).

Što se tiče odlikovanja, spomenimo da je u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji odlikovan dva puta, i to Ordenom Sv. Save 2. stepena i Ordenom Sv. Save 1. stepena s lentom i Belim orlovima (Macut, 2012, str. 168).

Uspostavom Nezavisne Države Hrvatske Zimmermann je dobio zaduženje u novoj državi: postavljen je za predsjednika Povjerenstva za izradbu novoga sveučilišnog statuta, koje je pod njegovim predsjedanjem odradilo zadatak i izradilo novi statut. Kada je statut objavljen, Zimmermann podnosi ostavku na dužnost predsjednika

Povjerenstva za izradbu novoga sveučilišnog statuta, a razlog je taj što je Ministarstvo bogoštovlja i nastave u gotov statut ubacilo paragraf 114, kojim je praktično ukinuta autonomija Zagrebačkog sveučilišta. Nakon ostavke Zimmermann nije primao nikakva druga zaduženja. Nakon sloma Nezavisne Države Hrvatske i uspostave nove Jugoslavenske države Zimmermann je prestao s objavljivanjem. Od 1945. pa sve do svoje smrti Zimmermann se javio samo s dva rada, i to jednim na slovenskom i jednim na hrvatskom jeziku. Ostatak njegove ostavštine ostao je u rukopisima (Čehok, 1993, str. 111–119), koji se polako otkrivaju, a u zadnje vrijeme i objavljuju (Zimmermann, 2020). Filozof Stjepan Zimmermann preminuo je dana 13. travnja 1963. godine u Zagrebu (Macut, 2018, str. 308).

### Stvaralaštvo

Kad je riječ o Zimmermannovu filozofskom stvaralaštvu, onda je potrebno istaknuti da je bio iznimno plodan filozofski pisac. Mogu se izdvojiti i nabrojati samo njegova filozofska djela, dok se njegovi brojni članci ovdje neće posebno izdvajati i nabrajati: „Opća noetika, teorija spoznaje i kritika njezine vrijednosti” (1926); „Ontološko-noetički problem u evoluciji filozofije” (1919); „Kant i neoskolastika, I. dio” (1920); „Kant i neoskolastika, II. dio” (1921); „Uvod u filozofiju” (1922); „Temelji psihologije” (1923); „Juraj Dragišić kao filozof humanizma” (1923); „Kantov kritičizam u svjetlu savremene noetike” (1924); „Psihologija za srednja učilišta” (1927); „Historijski razvitak filozofije u Hrvatskoj” (1929); „Wundt u suvremenoj psihologiji” (1932); „Temelji filozofije” (1934); „Od materijalizma do religije” (1935); „Filozofija i religija I. i II.” (1936, 1937); „Religija i život” (1938); „Bauer kao filozof” (1939); „Spoznaja istine” (njemački 1940, hrvatski 1941); „Filozofija života” (1941); „Nauka o spoznaji” (1942); „Kriza kulture” (1943); „Smisao života” (1944); „Putem života” (1945).

Filozof Stjepan Zimmermann za svojega plodnog stvaralačkog života na poseban se način bavio filozofijom, iako se u posljednje vrijeme pojavljuju i pojedina istraživanja koja otkrivaju i njegova opća teološka promišljanja (Macut, 2023a), a također i pojedine teološke teme kojima se bavio, kao na primjer njegova promišljanja o molitvi (Macut, 2022b) i o Isusu Kristu, utemeljitelju kršćanstva (Macut, 2024a). Od filozofskih tema svakako je potrebno izdvojiti Zimmermannovo bavljenje filozofijom spoznaje – noetikom, intenzivno promišljanje o slobodi volje, o skolastičkoj filozofiji i dr. Kada je, pak, riječ o Zimmermannovoj filozofskoj poziciji, Zimmermann je, nasuprot relativizmu i skepticizmu (Škarica, 2004, str. 149), zastupao poziciju da je objektivna spoznaja moguća, a moguća je i metafizička spoznaja. Poznate su i njegove rasprave u kojima se suprotstavlja Kantovoj filozofiji, kao i njegove rasprave u odnosu na pozicije drugih filozofa. Zimmermann, nadalje, nakon traženja vlastita

smisla života te propitivanja i ateističke i materijalističke pozicije (Macut, 2022a, str. 215), odbacuje oboje i pristaje uz teističku poziciju, odnosno uz kršćanski teizam.

Uzimajući u obzir cjelokupno Zimmermannovo stvaralaštvo, sa sigurnošću se može zaključiti kako je bio naš najvažniji neoskolastički filozof prve polovice 20. stoljeća, a također i jedan od naših najplodnijih filozofa uopće. Njegovu filozofsku misao snažno je obilježio i na nju bitno utjecao filozof sv. Toma Akvinski,<sup>3</sup> kao i neki drugi autori, na primjer Mercier i Geysler (Škarica, 2020, str. 24).

## ZIMMERMANNOVA TEISTIČKA POZICIJA

Za razumjeti Zimmermannova moralna promišljanja, odnosno za razumjeti zbog čega je moralni život važan za pojedinca, a posljedično i za društvo u cjelini, ovdje ćemo ukratko –gotovo pa shematski – prikazati Zimmermannovu filozofsku teističku poziciju jer upravo na njoj gradi dalje svoja filozofska i, unutar filozofije, moralna promišljanja koja primjenjuje na život pojedinca. Iako je Zimmermann bio katolički svećenik, pa bismo samim time od njega i očekivali da zastupa kršćanski teistički pogled na svijet i teističku antropologiju, on ipak svoja uvjerenja utemeljuje isključivo na filozofiji, preciznije na skolastičkoj filozofiji, za koju je držao da je i u njegovo vrijeme suvremena i relevantna (Zimmermann, 1923a, str. 150). Na jednom mjestu Zimmermann o filozofiranju o životu, odnosno o potrazi za sigurnim odgovorima na životna pitanja, piše sljedeće: „Filozofirati pak o životu znači razmišljati, tražiti odgovore ili sigurne i istinske spoznaje drukčije, sa drugog stajališta, nego kad život psihološki motrimo” (Zimmermann, 1941, str. 19). Jasno je Zimmermannu da je određeni filozofski stav pojedinca prema životu umnogome određen stajalištem, odnosno kompleksom pitanja na koja pojedinac traži odgovor te, u tom kontekstu, nalazi se i temeljni čovjekov nazor na život (Zimmermann, 1941, str. 19).

Zimmermann jasno u svojim filozofskim radovima zastupa kršćanski teistički nazor na život te iz njega onda posljedično izvodi daljnje korake za život pojedinca. Na jednom mjestu jasno piše o tome što je to teistički nazor na svijet koji on u svojim promišljanjima čvrsto zastupa:

Tko je filozofskim razmišljanjem došao do priznanja, da postoji Bog kao naš izvor i svrha, ima ‘teistički’ nazor o životu. Prema ovom je nazoru ljudski život svršno (finalno,

---

<sup>3</sup> Škarica na jednom mjestu piše:

Obnoviti tomizam u današnjem, modernom vremenu za Zimmermanna (i Merciera) znači potvrditi njegovu vrijednost i u novome, modernom, sekulariziranom filozofskom okruženju. U tom smislu, Zimmermann i Mercier u svojoj spoznajnoj teoriji najprije sekulariziraju tomistički nauk o istini, kako bi ga u konačnici obranili na nov, moderan način. Ta je sekularizacija, dakle, privremena, a ne konačna – dapače, ona je i poduzeta s vjerom da će u konačnici biti, zapravo, prevladana povratkom na stari, tomistički nauk o istini. (Škarica, 2020, str. 27)

teleološki) uređen tako da je 'svrha života' određena s obzirom na vrsnu (specifičnu) određenost čovjeka. Zbog svoje 'razumne' naravi – kojom se čovjek vrsno razlikuje od životinje, tj. po kojoj nije samo osjetilno ili životinjsko biće – čovjeku je najviša ili zadnja životna svrha ostvariva tako da on u svakome svom svršnom pothvatu ili u svemu, što god radi s nekim ciljem, slijedi upute razuma. Između svrhe, koju ima čovjek po svojoj razumnoj naravi – od Boga stvorenoj – i onih čina, kojima će svrhu oživotvoriti, postoji nužna veza. To je temeljni princip teističkog nazora o životu. (Zimmermann, 1941, str. 20)

Dakle, ovaj teistički nazor na svijet Zimmermann želi isključivo filozofskim putem pred drugima opravdati, a razlog je taj jer je upravo filozofija ona koja je sposobna podvrgnuti ozbiljnoj kritici te, također, i razumski opravdati ili pak opovrgnuti pojedini nazor na svijet. „Kritički prikazati taj put, opravdati na temelju filozofije kršćanski nazor o životu, to je glavno obilježje moga nastojanja” (Zimmermann, 1945, str. 183).

Susrećući se svakodnevno s onim što je čovjek svojim rukama izgradio, na primjer, pojedinim građevinama, isti taj čovjek postavlja pitanje o tome tko je njih izgradio. Isto tako, čovjek koji promišlja o svojem vlastitom životu i o životima drugih ljudi i životinja, postavlja opravdano pitanje o njihovu uzroku. „Da li s obzirom na bivstvovanje čovjeka postoji bivstvodavac, koji ujedno znade zašto je ljudima dao živote, tj. koji je njihov svrhodavac – i koga zovemo *Bog*?” (Zimmermann, 1941, str. 20). Kako smo već ranije istaknuli, za filozofa Zimmermanna isključivo teistički nazor daje ispravan odgovor na ova pitanja misaonog čovjeka. Međutim, ovdje se javlja ključni problem: potrebno je moći razumnim putem dokazati da je teistički nazor ispravan, inače bi bilo besmisleno zastupati nazor na svijet koji ne počiva na razumnim dokazima. Kako bi to uspio, Zimmermann je svjestan da je potrebno krenuti od metafizike, odnosno od dokazivanja da je metafizika uopće moguća (Zimmermann, 1941, str. 96), a onda dalje izvesti dokaze za ispravnost teističkog nazora na svijet. „Ukoliko čovjeku nije razumski moguće doći do Boga, ostaje mu samo fideizam koji Zimmermann snažno odbacuje. Čovjek ima sposobnost razumski se izdići iznad pojavnosti, iskustvenosti ovoga svijeta, i proniknuti u ono nadosjetilno, tj. metafizičko. Metafizika čovjeku u tome stoji na raspolaganju i jedino ona može čovjeka povesti u tom smjeru. Sve druge znanosti zapinju na ovezemaljskoj stvarnosti i ne mogu čovjeka uzdići iznad ovoga materijalnoga svijeta” (Macut, 2023b, str. 553). Dok, s jedne strane, ateistički mislioci i znanstvenici ne prihvaćaju metafiziku kao moguću jer se metafizika po svojoj definiciji izdiže iznad isključivo fizičkog svijeta te govori o meta-fizici (Zimmermann, 2020, str. 79–80), s druge strane, Zimmermann je uvjeren u to da je stav naturalizma i materijalizma pogrešan (Macut, 2023b, str. 551) te da razumni čovjek posjeduje mogućnost spoznaje koja tako nadilazi isključivo materijalni svijet. Usto, čovjek posjeduje i sposobnost spoznaje objektivne istine.

Bez mogućnosti spoznaje objektivne istine niti sama metafizika ne bi bila moguća (Zimmermann, 1945, str. 177–178).

U kontekstu Zimmermannova promišljanja o mogućnosti metafizike i objektivne spoznaje potrebno je istaknuti kako je ovo dokazivanje za Zimmermanna samo, nazovimo ga tako, pomoćno sredstvo kako bi opravdao mogućnost čovjekova razumnog izdizanja iznad ovoga materijalnog, odnosno pojavnog svijeta, jer u protivnom teistička pozicija, filozofski gledano, postaje neodrživa. U svojem zadnjem radu objavljenom na hrvatskom jeziku Zimmermann jasno kaže kako „filozofiranje privodi Bogu i da se na kršćanskoj religiji osniva nadnaravni smisao života” (Zimmermann, 1963, str. 50). Ovom Zimmermannovom tvrdnjom ulazimo u područje morala. Naime, filozof Zimmermann u svojim se radovima trudi filozofskim putem opravdati i dokazati da je smislen samo onaj život koji u sebe uključuje nadnaravni smisao, a taj nadnaravni smisao u sebe uključuje i potrebu za ispravnim moralnim življenjem. Zato Zimmermann na jednom mjestu piše sljedeće: „Po teističkoj je filozofiji naš život povezan s Bogom, i po bezuvjetnoj obvezi (kao izrazu Božje volje) na čudorednost, i po tome, što se u neprolaznom sjedinjenju s Bogom sastoji smisao najviše sreće ili blaženstva. Život tako ulazi po čudoredu stvarnosti u perspektivu vječnosti, koja nam nije ni teoretski sasvim nepoznata, a niti doživljajno” (Zimmermann, 1945, str. 21), a malo dalje isti filozof zaključuje: „Kritički prikazati taj put, opravdati na temelju filozofije kršćanski nazor o životu, to je glavno obilježje moga nastojanja” (Zimmermann, 1945, str. 183).

Dakle, može se reći kako je Zimmermannova teistička pozicija jedan misaoni povezani krug u kojem pojedinac koji posjeduje sposobnost metafizičke spoznaje i ima pristup objektivnoj istini filozofskim promišljanjem dolazi do toga da je kršćanski nazor na svijet jedini ispravan nazor, a taj se nazor ne iscrpljuje u ovome materijalnom svijetu, nego čovjeka otvara za nešto više, odnosno za nadnaravno. Da bi čovjek imao pristup nadnaravnom, treba živjeti ispravnim moralnim životom, a moralni zakon po kojem čovjek treba živjeti objavljen nam je u kršćanstvu, čiji je utemeljitelj Isus Krist (Macut, 2024a).

Iako povijesna Objava Boga (Logosa) u Isusu Kristu sadrži razumne argumente o svojoj autentičnosti, ipak s obzirom na to da čovjek njezino prihvaćanje izvršava slobodno preko osobnog odnosa s Bogom u Isusu Kristu, čovjek može, unatoč ponuđenim mu dokazima, ne prihvatiti Objavu Boga u Isusu Kristu. (Relja, 2021, str. 408)

Prije nego što prijedemo na zadnji dio našega rada, u kojem ćemo vidjeti što konkretno za Zimmermanna znači živjeti ispravnim moralnim životom, odnosno zašto je bitno takvim životom živjeti i do čega dovodi suprotan život, potrebno je istaknuti da je Zimmermann u svojim filozofskim promišljanjima krenuo od spekulativnog dokazivanja „da je logička istina objektivna, tj. da ima apsolutnu vrijednost jer je

ovisna o predmetu (objektu) koji je nezavisan od subjekta”, što ga je posljedično dovelo do „skolastičke definicije logičke istine prema kojoj se vrijednost spoznaje tumači u njenoj ovisnosti o predmetima, a ne psihičkim zakonima mišljenja”. Stoga Mihaela Lovrić, istraživačica filozofske misli Stjepana Zimmermanna, zaključuje:

Unatoč njegovu iscrpnom pokušaju dokazivanja istinite spoznaje koji je sproveo u okvirima vlastite noetike, bio bi veliki propust ne istaknuti da je i sama noetika Zimmermannu poslužila još jednom, višem cilju njegove filozofije, a to je otkrivanje odgovora na pitanje o smislu života. (Lovrić, 2012, str. 499)

Smisao života čovjek pronalazi isključivo živeći ispravnim moralnim životom, a taj ga ispravnim moralni život dovodi do posmrtnog sretnog života u zajedništvu s Bogom (Lovrić, 2012, str. 500).

## OD SPEKULATIVNE TEORIJE PREMA ŽIVLJENOJ PRAKSI

Filozof Stjepan Zimmermann svojim noetičkim promišljanjima i raspravama na jedan spekulativan način izlaže o mogućnosti čovjekove spoznaje, o mogućnosti čovjekove metafizičke i objektivne spoznaje i sl.<sup>4</sup> Kada je, pak, riječ o njegovim promišljanjima iz filozofije morala, onda je potrebno istaknuti kako je tu izrazito praktičnog usmjerenja, odnosno teorijsko izlaganje o utemeljenju moralnosti, u kontekstu njegove filozofije života, usko je povezano uz konkretno opravdavanje potrebe da čovjek isti taj moral i živi. Polazište je filozofsko pitanje o životu i smislu života, a ta pitanja za Zimmermanna izrazito su praktične naravi (Macut, 2024b, str. 81–82).

Na jednom mjestu Zimmermann, kada piše o moralnom smislu života, svoje izlaganje započinje sljedećim riječima:

Mi pronalazimo naš život kao gotovu stvarnost. Svak zna, da živi, koliko je sebi toga svijestan unutarnjim ili neposrednim opažanjem (samoopažanjem). Kao što znamo, da živimo, tako znamo i to, da gdješto smatramo kao zlo za život, a gdješto kao dobro. Za dobrim težimo, od zla zaziremo; dobro hoćemo da postignemo, a zla ne ćemo. (Zimmermann, 1941, str. 6)

Ne samo da čovjek teži za dobrim, a od zla zazire, filozof Zimmermann tvrdi i to da su ljudi „oduvijek razlikovali moralno dobro i zlo”, a to se u biti odnosi na razlikovanje ljudskih čina na one koji su dobri i na one koji su zli, odnosno „jedne

<sup>4</sup> Čehok sažeto o cjelokupnom opusu filozofa Stjepana Zimmermanna piše sljedeće:

Cjelokupni opus Stjepana Zimmermanna uklapa se u neoskolastičku filozofsku orijentaciju. Njezina su obilježja: pokušaj utemeljenja objektivističke noetike dokazom da se istina suda nalazi u evidenciji podudaranja stvarnih odnosa spram intencionalnog sadržaja suda, te pokušaj dokazivanja mogućnosti metafizičke spoznaje što ju je zaniijekao Kant. (Čehok, 1993, str. 139)

treba da činimo, druge ne smijemo” (Zimmermann, 1941, str. 6). Zimmermann dalje pojašnjava: „Obilježje moralne svijesti ili razlikovanja ljudskih čina u zle i dobre bilo je oduvijek to, da se zlo ne smije činiti: imperativ obvezuje ljudsku volju, postavlja joj granice, do kojih smije i mora da radi, a preko kojih ne smije. To znači, moralno dobrim činima naše volje ostvaruje se moralna vrijednost čovjeka” (Zimmermann, 1941, str. 6). Ne samo da se moralno dobrim činima ostvaruje moralna vrijednost čovjeka, nego također, prema Zimmermannu, čineći moralne čine, čovjek izgrađuje i svoj moralni karakter (Zimmermann, 1923b, str. 181).

Promišljajući o čovjekovoj konkretnoj egzistenciji, Zimmermann je svjestan da se čovjek ponekad nalazi pred pitanjem: da li živjeti moralno ili, pak, nemoralno, odnosno trebam li raditi po moralnim normama ili, pak, ne moram? Da bi čovjek ispravno mogao odgovoriti na ovo pitanje, a ispravan odgovor za Zimmermanna znači uvijek živjeti po moralnim normama, osoba mora moralne vrijednosti držati i shvaćati kao one koje su nešto najvrjednije, odnosno mora prihvatiti da je najviše dobro života živjeti moralno dobrim životom. Ukoliko čovjek tako gleda na život i njegov smisao, onda nema nikakve dvojbe da će uvijek birati živjeti po moralnim normama, ako, pak, nema takav pogled na život, onda će smisao svojeg života tražiti u nekome drugom dobru (Zimmermann, 1941, str. 7).

Tako se dolazi do pitanja: u čemu je životni smisao? Do toga, dakle, pitanja dolazimo na osnovu činjenice da je naš život stavljen pred različite vrijednosti, koje možemo da ostvarujemo (oživotvorujemo, voljom svojom uzbiljujemo), a pri tom hoćemo znati: za koju od ovih vrijednosti jest vrijedno da živimo? Ima li, napose, smisla da živimo bez ikojeg obzira na moralne vrijednosti. (Zimmermann, 1941, str. 7)

Važno je ovdje naglasiti da filozof Zimmermann ne traži odgovor na pitanje o nekome općenitom smislu života, nego se zanima isključivo za moralni smisao života,<sup>5</sup> a taj moralni smisao čovjekova života mora biti utemeljen izvan čovjeka.

Kada bi čovjek bio i nositelj i ostvarivatelj moralnih vrijednosti, onda i čovjekov život bez njih ne bi imao smisla. Međutim, Zimmermann drži da izvan čovjeka postoji moralni zakon koji je zavisao od Boga. Ukoliko moralna razlika između dobrih i zlih djela ne bi postojala izvan čovjeka (objektivno i apsolutno), nego bi ta razlika bila plod običaja ili pak odgoja ili uvjerenja, tj. ukoliko bi moralni zakon zavisio samo od čovjeka, onda savjest ne bi mogla biti mjerilo niti bi čovjek imao mjerilo za pravi smisao života niti bi, na koncu, postojala objektivna razlika između dobrih i zlih čina. Za Zimmermanna je istinit isključivo teistički nazor prema kojemu postoji Bog koji je

<sup>5</sup> Na jednom mjestu filozof Zimmermann o bolnoj činjenici neostvarenosti moralnog smisla života piše sljedeće: Nastojanje oko moralnog smisla života moglo bi na očigled krute zbilje, koju danas proživljavamo, ostaviti u nekome dojam filozofskog snatrenja o neostvarivim, ‘uzvišenim abstrakcijama’. Ali priznati njezinu neostvarivost značilo bi priznanje, da je neostvarivo postati boljim čovjekom, - a to bi značilo proglasiti čovjeka barbarom kraj sve njegove više-tisućljetne kulturne prošlosti, značilo bi proglasiti bezsmislenima sve nade i sve napore oko sretnije budućnosti čovječanstva. (Zimmermann, 1944, str. 95)

moralni zakonodavac te je taj Bog postavio ljudima moralni zakon i ljudi su obvezatni bezuvjetno po tom moralnom zakonu živjeti. (Macut, 2024b, str. 83)

Ukoliko se izvor morala ne nalazi u čovjeku te ukoliko postoji razlika između dobrih i zlih čina, a Zimmermann sve ovo zastupa, potrebno je ponajprije filozofski opravdati moralnost.<sup>6</sup> Prvi je korak na tom putu Zimmermannovo zapažanje da je čovjek obdaren moralnom svijesću te tu moralnu svijest psihološki i analizira. Kako filozof Zimmermann opisuje moralnu svijest?

Ljudima je poznato, u ljudskoj se svijesti nalazi razlika između zla i dobra, poštenih i nepoštenih čina, a ta je razlika svjestita, prije nego spoznamo, u čemu se ona sastoji, na čemu se ona osniva, tj. prije nego znademo doživljenu razliku opravdati ili spoznajno (teoretski, logički) shvatiti. Mi dakle shvaćamo moralno zlo i dobro – kao i druge vrijednosti (estetske, noetičke) – neposredno, bez dokazivanja ili zaključivanja. (Zimmermann, 1941, str. 31)

Važno je istaknuti da se moralna svijest ne smije pomiješati sa savješću. Naime, moralna svijest nije isto što i savjest, ističe Zimmermann, i nastavlja tvrdnjom da „moralna svijest postaje savjest istom onda, kad zlo i dobro doživljujemo u vezi s vlastitom našom voljom, tj. kad upravo hoćemo nešto učiniti, pa se u svijesti javi imperativni glas ‘to ne smiješ činiti’, a” – nastavlja dalje Zimmermann – „kad općenito prosuđujemo, što je zlo i dobro, a takva općenita sposobnost prosuđivanja jest moralna svijest” (Zimmermann, 1941, str. 32).

Dok s moralnom svijesću prosuđujemo i tuđa djela kao zla ili, pak, dobra, dotle savješću prosuđujemo svoja vlastita djela, odnosno čine. „Savjest ne kaže: ‘to je zlo i zato se ne smije činiti’, nego: ‘to je zlo, i zato *ja* ne smijem’” (Zimmermann, 1941, str. 32).<sup>7</sup> Ovdje je važno, nadalje, uočiti sljedeću bitnu Zimmermannovu napomenu. Naime, nije svaka savjest kod svakog čovjeka jednako osjetljiva. Postoje pojedinci koji su u moralnom pogledu bešćutni, neki ne razlikuju dobro od zla i dr. Ovdje je ključno ispitati koliko je osoba sama doprinijela tome da svoju savjest uguši i u toj je mjeri i odgovorna. Ono na čemu Zimmermann inzistira ispravna je savjest, a „ispravna je savjest, kad pravilno iskazuje razliku zla i dobra, tj. kad se ravna po općenitom mjerilu za sve ljude” (Zimmermann, 1941, str. 33). Uz posjedovanje ispravne savjesti potrebno je i to da je pojedinac slobodan u svojim činima (*libertas specificationis*)

<sup>6</sup> Zimmermann u djelu „Duševni život”, između ostalog, ističe kako se karakteristika etičke svijesti nalazi u „kategoričkom imperativu”, odnosno u osjećanju apsolutne obvezatnosti ili obligacije nekih čina. Ipak, etička svijest, nastavlja dalje Zimmermann, nije uvjetovana osjetilnim shvaćanjem te zaključuje: „Postanak etičke svijesti možemo sveti na sva ona *čuvstva, iz kojih izvire ljudski čini ili koji prate te čine, koliko su voljni*. A ti su čini, rekosmo, dobri ili zli” (Zimmermann, 1932, str. 283).

<sup>7</sup> Zimmermann za savjest piše: „Savjest se dakle javlja kao svijest dužnosti u nazočnom sukobu između neke moje sklonosti ili pripravnosti na voljni čin (htijenje – nehtijenje: hoću – neću) i same dužnosti, koja taj čin zabranjuje” (Zimmermann, 1941, str. 32).

jer bez te slobode nema niti moralnog odlučivanja,<sup>8</sup> pa Zimmermann zaključuje: „Redovito je on skopčan s nekim djelovanjem, jer čovjek činom hotnije upravo hoće da nešto izvede, na pr. da pazi, da piše, da hoda itd. Sve zapreke slobodnog htijenja ujedno su zapreke moralnosti” (Zimmermann, 1941, str. 35).

Sljedeći je korak u filozofskom opravdanju moralnosti pronalazak samog temelja moralnosti. Zimmermann je svjestan da izraz dobro i zlo nisu uvijek povezani uz moralni smisao: „na pr. za krojača kažemo da je načinio dobro odijelo odn. loše, prema tome, da li ono odgovara mjeri i propisima krojačkog posla” (Zimmermann, 1941, str. 50). Međutim, postoje i oni čini koji čovjeka čine čudoredno dobrim ili, pak, zlim zavisno od toga koje čine čini. Dakle, Zimmermann je mišljenja da ljude dijelimo na dobre i loše u odnosu na čudoredne čine, a mjerilo za određivanje toga što je dobro ili loše filozof Zimmermann traži u iskustvu promatrajući čine koje ljudi općenito drže lošima te promatrajući čine koje ljudi općenito drže dobrima, a na tom putu mjerilo je razum,<sup>9</sup> ali isključivo ako je taj razum ispravan. „Mjerodavan će prema tome biti razum, ukoliko je ispravan, tj. koliko nam otkriva, koja je ta *prava dobrobit* za čovjeka, – zbog kojih *ne smijemo* činiti zla, a *moramo* činiti dobro. Jer bez imperativa ‘ne smiješ - moraš’ nema moralnosti [...]” (Zimmermann, 1941, str. 51). Zimmermann nadalje snažno odbacuje stav koji zastupa mišljenje da se svijest dužnosti u čovjeku razvija iz socijalnog nagnuća jer je, prema Zimmermannu, imperativ dužnosti nazočan i kada je odsutno nagnuće prema socijalnoj pravdi. Na primjer, zločinac kao najveće dobro ili svrhu života vidi doživotno uživanje dobara, ali ubojstvo koje bi mu to omogućilo je zabranjeno. Zato je za Zimmermanna itekako jasno da zabrana postoji bezuvjetno, a ne temelji se na priznanju prednosti nesubjektivnog dobra prema subjektivnom (Macut, 2024b, str. 84).<sup>10</sup> „Time smo napokon dobili potpuno definirani pojam moralnosti: ona pripada voljnim činima, koliko su *u skladu ili u neskladu s apsolutno obligatornim razumom*” (Zimmermann, 1941, str. 52). U ovom kontekstu savjest je za Zimmermanna samo neposredno mjerodavna za moralno kvalificiranje, a razlog je taj što „svršni (finalni) red ili vrijednosni raspored dobara s obzirom na najveće dobro čini stvarnu osnovicu apsolutne obveze” te u tom kontekstu donosi i tri kriterija koji

<sup>8</sup> „No svekad čovjek ispravno ocjenjuje svoj moralni poziv, kad mu savjest ‘stavlja pred’ oči, što ne valja ili što ne smije da čini, još nije time došlo do odluke. Netko može da uviđa dobro, a nikako se ne odlučuje, jer mu manjka ‘jaka volja’, tj. nalazi se u stanju voljne nemoći” (Zimmermann, 1941, str. 34). O tome Zimmermann govori i u svojem djelu „Duševni život” (Zimmermann, 1932, str. 284–185).

<sup>9</sup> „Moralno kvalificiranje naših čina zavisu od razuma, ukoliko uviđamo, da pri odlučivanju za neki čin ima biti mjerodavna činjenica, da su zdravlje, skrb za obitelj, zajedničko društveno blagostanje... veća dobra od onih, što ih pružaju zločini: na tome se *rasporedu dobara* osniva iskaz razuma o moralnoj zloći odn. dobroti” (Zimmermann, 1941, str. 51).

<sup>10</sup> Ili Zimmermannovim riječima rečeno:

Drugim riječima: *obveza ne zavisu od nagnuća*, nije uvjetovana nagnućem; ona postoji suprotno nagnuću i utoliko je apsolutna ili bezuvjetna. Time smo napokon dobili potpuno definirani pojam moralnosti: ona pripada voljnim činima, koliko su *u skladu ili u neskladu s apsolutno obligatornim razumom*. (Zimmermann, 1941, str. 52)

su po njemu važni za moralnost čina: „1) odnos voljnog (svršnog) djelovanja prema najvišem dobru kao zadnjoj svrsi, 2) bezuvjetna obaveza oživotvorbe te svrhe, 3.) s oživotvorbom skopčana najveća sreća (blaženstvo)” (Zimmermann, 1941, str. 55).

Zimmermann je svjestan činjenice da o ovim komponentama moralnosti postoje različita filozofska mišljenja i istovremeno opravdanja tih mišljenja kao, na primjer, imoralizam (Nietzsche), etički pozitivizam, relativizam itd. Odbacujući sva ova po njemu pogrešna shvaćanja moralnosti, Zimmermann nedvojbeno zastupa teistički moral i njega filozofskim putem pokušava opravdati i pokazati ga kao jedini ispravan nazor.

Teistički moral, prema Zimmermannu, može se utemeljiti na dva načina. Prvi način utemeljenja jest onaj koji polazi od tvrdnje da postoji Bog koji svojom providnošću određuje svemu stvorenju, pa tako i čovjeku, svrhu. Bog koji je najviše dobro (*summum bonum*) najpoželjniji je predmet čovjekove razumne naravi. Čovjek svoje zadovoljstvo i sreću pronalazi u spoznajnom sjedinjenju s Bogom i s voljnim posjedovanjem Boga. (...) Drugi način utemeljenja teističkog morala polazi suprotnim putem: iz etike prema priznanju Boga, tj. ne ide se iz teodiceje u moralnost, nego se iz moralnosti uzdiže u teodiceju (dakle, obrnutim putem). (Macut, 2024b, str. 85–86)

Ukoliko je teistički moral ispravan, a Zimmermann ne pronalazi niti jedan argument protivan toj tvrdnji, onda je jasno da je Bog vrhovna norma moralnosti, a osobni moralni život u svojoj biti nije ništa drugo nego usavršavanje u Bogu, tj. osoba se sjedinjuje s Bogom koji je vrhovno mjerilo moralne dobrote. Zato je za Zimmermanna neprihvatljiva tvrdnja da bi neki čovjekov čin mogao biti protivan i razumu i moralnom redu, a istovremeno ne bi bio povreda Boga – odnosno da ga ne bismo mogli okarakterizirati kao „filozofski grijeh”. Zimmermann drži da i teorijski ateist mora uvidjeti da je njegovo moralno življenje zavisno o obavezi i najvišem dobru, inače u suprotnosti ne bi niti imao bitnog uvjeta za moralnost, a moralna obaveza i najviše dobro prema Zimmermannu svoj temelj imaju u Bogu (Zimmermann, 1941, str. 55–56).

Nakon što smo ukratko, gotovo pa shematski, skicirali Zimmermannovo izlaganje o filozofskom utemeljenju morala koji svoj izvor ili temelj ima u samom Bogu koji je svrhodavac i zakonodavac, jer je Bog odredio i način na koji će način čovjek postići svoju svrhu,<sup>11</sup> sada je potrebno vidjeti što to znači konkretno za čovjekov život. Da postoje moralno dobri i moralno zli čini, smatra Zimmermann, svi se slažu. Ipak,

<sup>11</sup> „Odrediš svrhu, Bog je ujedno *zakonodavac* glede načina, kojim će čovjek oživotvoriti svrhu. To je ‘vječni zakon’, koji se kao moralni zakon očituje u savjesti – i tako znači konačnu normu moralnosti. Bilo da kažemo svrhodavna volja Božja ili zakonodavna, smisao je utoliko isti, što je u vidu svrhe postavljen zakon: jedno je i drugo zajednički normativno za naše čine; dobri su odn. zli prema tome, dali jesu ili nijesu u skladu sa svrhodavnom i zakonodavnom voljom Božjom, s vječnim zakonom. Uzmemo li u obzir taj svršni odnos našeg života prema Bogu, i to koliko se osniva u razumskoj ili osobnoj našoj naravi, možemo reći, da je *razumna narav* mjerodavna za moralno razlikovanje. U vidu svrhe oživotvorbe reći ćemo, da je *osobno usavršenje u Bogu* konačna norma moralnosti. A to

nastavlja dalje, ne slažu se u razlogu zašto su neki čini moralno dobri odnosno moralno zli. Za filozofa Zimmermanna neprihvatljivo je društveno utemeljenje dobrote odnosno zloće moralnih čina. Zimmermann smatra da je potrebno pogledati same čine. „Ako posljedica nekog čina znači za čovjeka zlo, očito je takav čin zločest. Takovo je zlo stvarni razlog ili temelj zloći dotičnog čina” (Zimmermann, 1941, str. 57). Dakle, Zimmermann polazi od posljedica pojedinog čina te ukoliko su posljedice po čovjeka loše, takvi su čini zli. Međutim, potrebno je učiniti još jedan korak dalje, a taj se korak sastoji u sagledavanju da li je ono dobro koje smo po nekom zlom činu lišeni čovjeku nužno u odnosu na njegovu narav te, ukoliko je takvo, onda je obveza ne činjenja takvih čina nužna, odnosno bezuvjetna. Na primjer, Zimmermann nabroja zle čine: ubojstvo, krađa i kleveta. Ova su djela sama po sebi ili po svojoj naravi ona koja čovjeku nanose neko zlo. Zimmermann je uvjeren da ovi čini sami po sebi ne mogu biti indiferentni jer njihove posljedice po život čovjeka nisu indiferentne. „Njima se narušuje naravni (prirodni) zakon težnje za održanjem života” (Zimmermann, 1941, str. 58). Međutim, problem nastaje ukoliko osoba koja čini ove čine u njima vidi sredstvo za svoje osobno dobro, na primjer, ubojstvom će dobiti novac i njime životno zadovoljstvo, odnosno sreću. Iako osoba na ovakav način shvaća svoj zao čin, ipak on nije dopušten jer se njime nanosi zlo drugom čovjeku te je ta osoba lišena životne svojine koja joj po njezinoj ljudskoj naravi pripada. Stoga Zimmermann u ovom kontekstu jasno zaključuje:

Zločin je prema tome postavljen ispred sva suprotna cilja: vlastito dobro uživanja i tuđe dobro života; istim činom može on postići prvo i razoriti drugo; tj. učinivši sebi dobro stvara takvo zlo, kojim se uništava ili bar ugrožava opstanak ljudskog života. A kako je to, rekosmo, prvotno ili osnovno *dobro* svakog čovjeka, njemu je suprotni čin eo ipso *zločest*: svaki je onaj čin sam po sebi zao, koji sam po sebi (po svojoj naravi) odvodi od dobra i *privodi k zlu*, *nota bene k zlu s obzirom na ljudsku narav*. (Zimmermann, 1941, str. 58)

Zimmermann je svjestan da je čovjek biće koje živi u društvu i kao takav pojedinac je nužno upućen da živi s drugima. U suživotu s drugima javlja se i pitanje (ne)moralnog života pojedinca. Filozof Zimmermann drži da je naravni zakon da pojedinac ne smije činiti čine kojima se nekom pojedincu ili skupini oduzimaju nužna životna dobra, odnosno moralno su zli čini oni čini kojima se ruši naravni zakon društvenog opstanka. „Svačija nepovredivost životnih dobara od strane nekog drugog jest zakon za volju i njezine čine: nitko ne smije činiti ono, što se protivi naravnom životnom dobru. Zloća voljnih čina sastoji u njihovoj suprotnosti s dobrima, koja pripadaju čovjeku po njegovoj naravi” (Zimmermann, 1941, str. 59). Ovdje je važno nadodati da Zimmermann smatra kako se ovdje radi o dobrima koja pripadaju čovjeku po

---

usavršenje sastoji u spoznajno voljnom sjedinjenju ili u ljubavi pa je stoga *ljubav k Bogu* mjerilo moralne dobrote. Sukob s ovom ljubavi znači moralno zlo i ujedno povredu Boga (grijeih)” (Zimmermann, 1941, str. 55).

njegovoj naravi te kao takva ona ne zavise o nečijoj volji da ih takvima prizna ili, pak, ne prizna, nego ih svatko mora kao takve priznati. Oni čini kojima se postižu takva dobra, čovjek mora činiti, a one čine kojima se takva dobra ne postižu, odnosno čine kojima se takva dobra oduzimaju od pojedinca, čovjek ne smije činiti, pa filozof Stjepan Zimmermann u ovom kontekstu jasno zaključuje: „Dakle su čovjeku neki ciljevi po naravi postavljeni tako, da je volja u vidu tih ciljeva bezuvjetno obvezana činiti dobro, a ne činiti zlo. To je *moralni zakon života*” (Zimmermann, 1941, str. 59).

Kada je, dakle, riječ o moralnom djelovanju, pravilo koje čovjek u životu mora slijediti glasi: ukoliko neki čin vodi k naravnom dobru, onda je kao takav dobar i čovjek ga mora činiti; ukoliko neki čin vodi k oduzimanju nekoga naravnog dobra od drugoga, takav čin nije dobar i čovjek ga ne smije činiti. Zimmermann je uvjerenja da svaki čovjek zna razlikovati zle od dobrih čina te da je, na primjer, svaka nepravda zlo i posljedično zabranjena; to je znanje općenito. Ovdje Zimmermann spominje i sud savjesti. Savjest je mjerodavna prosuđivati u svakom konkretnom slučaju moralnu razliku dobrih i zlih čina. Ukoliko bismo neki čin promatrali apstraktno, odnosno odvojeno od pojedinca i njegova djelovanja, na primjer ubojstvo, onda bi taj čin moralno mogli ocijeniti u skladu s ispravnim načelima, a načela su ispravna ukoliko se ravnaju prema pravim ciljevima ili prema naravnim dobrima čovjeka. Tako zaključuje:

Na oživotvorbi odnosno neoživotvorbi tih dobara osniva se različitost čina u dobre i zle, a kao takove ih razlikujemo po ispravnim načelima, u kojima se očituje naravni zakon o tome, što je čovjeku po naravi primjereno i što nije. Ta su načela (‘ispravni razum’) putokaz ili norma ljudskoj volji za njezinu moralnu orijentaciju. (Zimmermann, 1941, str. 60)

## ZAKLJUČAK

Zimmermannova filozofska promišljanja u kontekstu filozofije morala sve do nedavno nisu naišla na posebnu pažnju istraživača njegove filozofske misli. U posljednje vrijeme i ovo je pitanje donekle osvijetljeno i njime se istraživači Zimmermannove filozofske misli sve više bave.

O čovjeku i njegovu životu, odnosno o čovjekovoj egzistenciji, filozof Stjepan Zimmermann promišlja u kontekstu filozofije života. Njegova filozofija života izrazito je teističkog usmjerenja, odnosno kršćanski teizam izvor je i uvir njegovih filozofskih promišljanja o životu. Zimmermann u svojim filozofskim promišljanjima traži odgovor na pitanje o moralnom smislu života, koji je itekako konkretna stvarnost. Osim toga, u kontekstu kršćanskog teizma nedvojbeno je da čovjek svojim životom nije isključivo vezan uz ovozemaljski život i svijet, nego postoji i nešto više, odnosno

postoji život nakon smrti. Život iza smrti uvelike ovisi o našem ovozemaljskom životu, odnosno zavisi jesmo li živjeli moralnim ili, pak, nemoralnim životom. Da bi filozofskim putem došao do ovog zaključka, Zimmermann je ponajprije u svojim filozofskim radovima spekulativne naravi morao dokazati da je metafizika moguća te da je spoznaja objektivne stvarnosti također moguća. Ukoliko to ne bi bio slučaj, čovjek se svojim razumom ne bi mogao izdignuti izvan ovoga materijalnog svijeta te bi materijalizam bio ispravan nazor na svijet. Zimmermann to odlučno odbacuje. Nakon što je obranio mogućnost metafizike i objektivne spoznaje stvarnosti, Zimmermann dokazuje da je isključivo teistički nazor na svijet istinit, a to konkretno znači da postoji Zakonodavac ovoga svijeta, a to je kršćanski Bog. Čovjekova je svrha u tom kontekstu nakon ovog života postići zajedništvo s Bogom, a da bi to postigao, čovjek mora živjeti u skladu sa zakonom koji mu je Bog dao, a čovjek ga po svojoj savjesti prepoznaje. Ipak, potreba moralnog života, odnosno neprihvatljivost nemoralnog života i čovjekovih čina nemaju reperkusije isključivo na čovjekov život iza smrti, nego i ovdje na zemlji – budući da je čovjek biće koje živi među drugim ljudima te mu nije dopušteno činiti one čine kojima nanosi štetu drugima, odnosno čine koji drugim ljudima oduzimaju neko njihovo naravno dobro. Na koncu, Zimmermann je uvjeren da je ovo znanje općenito te da svaki čovjek zna da je svaka nepravda zlo. Savjest je ona koja je čovjeku mjerodavna u konkretnome osobnom prosuđivanju moralne razlike pojedinih čovjekovih čina.

Uočava se kako je Zimmermann u svojim filozofskim promišljanjima u okviru filozofije morala izrazito praktično – životno – usmjeren, odnosno teorijski utemeljuje praksu koju čovjek treba živjeti kako bi živio moralnim životom. Nemoralan život pojedinca nema samo posljedice za pojedinca za vrijeme ovozemaljskog života, ali i nakon njegove smrti, nego i za život drugog čovjeka jer svojim zlim činima oštećuje druge ljude i uskraćuje im ono što je njihovo naravno dobro. Moralni život pojedinca vodi izgradnji društva i njegovu boljitku, dok nemoralni način života pojedinca dovodi do nereda i nemorala u društvu, a na taj način društvo nema svijetle budućnosti, smatra filozof Zimmermann.

## LITERATURA

- Bracanović, T. (2018). *Normativna etika*. Zagreb: Institut za filozofiju.
- Čehok, I. (1993). *Filozofija Stjepana Zimmermanna*. Zagreb: Hrvatsko filozofsko društvo.
- Kljajić, S. (2011). Intelektualni i društveni angažman Stjepana Zimmermanna između dva svjetska rata (1918.-1941.). *Časopis za suvremenu povijest*, 43(2), 551-576.
- Lovrić, M. (2012). Zimmermann o spoznaji istine. *Filozofska istraživanja*, 32(3-4), 487-500.
- Macut, I. (2018). *Hrvatska filozofija od obnove Zagrebačkog sveučilišta do osnutka Nezavisne Države Hrvatske*. Split: Služba Božja.

- Macut, I. (2022a). U potrazi za smislom života. Misaoni put filozofa Stjepana Zimmermanna od skepticizma do vjere. *Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine*, 48(1), 211-225.
- Macut, I. (2022b). Molitva filozofa Stjepana Zimmermanna. *Obnovljeni život*, 77(3), 313-323.
- Macut, I. (2023a). Teološke teme u djelima filozofa Stjepana Zimmermanna. I. Armanda (Ur.). *Dani su čovjekovi k'o odužena sjena. Zbornik radova u čast fra Ljudevita Antona Maračića*. (str. 359-374). Zagreb: Kršćanska sadašnjost.
- Macut, I. (2023b). Metaphysik in der Lehre des kroatischen Philosophen Stjepan Zimmermann, *Carthaginiensia*, 39(76), 537-556.
- Macut, I. (2024a). Filozof Stjepan Zimmermann o Isusu Kristu. *Obnovljeni život*, 79(3), 309-317.
- Macut, I. (2024b). Moralna filozofija u djelima Stjepana Zimmermanna: teističko utemeljenje moralnosti. *Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine*, 50(1), 77-89.
- Macut, P. (2012). Zimmermannova kritika režima Ante Pavelića – uzroci i posljedice, D. Roksandić i I. Cvijović Javorina (Ur.), *Desničini susreti 2011. Intelektualci i rat 1937.-1947.*, (str. 167-188). Zagreb: Plejada.
- Mormino, G. (2020). *Storia della filosofia morale*. Milano: Raffaello Cortina Editore.
- Relja, H. (2021). *Tomistička filozofija*. Zagreb: Leykan international.
- Zimmermann, S. (1923a). Savremeni razvitak skolastičke filozofije (s osvrtom na literaturu zadnjeg desetljeća), *Bogoslovska smotra*, 11(2), 129-150.
- Zimmermann, S. (1923b). *Temelji psihologije. Opća nauka o svijesnom životu ljudske duše*. Zagreb: Hrvatska bogoslovna akademija.
- Zimmermann, S. (1932). *Duševni život*. Zagreb: Jugoslavenska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti.
- Zimmermann, S. (1941). *Filozofija života*. Zagreb: Hrvatska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti.
- Zimmermann, S. (1944). *Smisao života*. Zagreb: Hrvatska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti.
- Zimmermann, S. (1945). *Putem života. Autoergografija*. Zagreb: Velebit.
- Zimmermann, S. (1963). Filozofija i kršćanska religija o smislu života. *Bogoslovska smotra*, 33(2), str. 44-50.
- Zimmermann, S. (2020). *Znanje i vjera*, Ivan Macut (prir.). Zagreb: Kršćanska sadašnjost.
- Škarica, D. (2004). Zimmermannova kritika skepticizma. *Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine*, 30(1-2), 149-171.
- Škarica, D. (2020). Istina u Akvinca, Merciera i Zimmermanna. *Služba Božja*, 60(1), 5-28.

## Moral philosophy of Stjepan Zimmermann: From speculative theory to lived practice

### SUMMARY

This paper, in addition to the introduction and the conclusion, is structured into three sections. The initial section presents a concise overview of the biographical and bibliographical details of the Croatian philosopher Stjepan Zimmermann (Virovitica, 24 December 1884 – Zagreb, 13 April 1963). The second section of the paper presents a detailed exposition of Zimmermann's theistic philosophical position. In his philosophical works, Zimmermann presents a distinctly

Christian theistic perspective on life. From this philosophical foundation, he then proceeds to delineate a series of practical steps for the concrete life of an individual. In his philosophical works, Zimmermann considers the nature of human existence, both as an individual and as a member of a social community. This is situated within the broader context of philosophical reflection on the nature of life itself. The third section of the paper presents Zimmermann's moral philosophy, which encompasses both theoretical and practical elements. In alignment with the theistic perspective on morality, God is regarded as the ultimate standard for moral conduct. Accordingly, an individual's moral life can be conceived of as a process of attaining perfection in God. This suggests that a person's moral development involves a unification with God, which serves as the ultimate exemplar of moral excellence. Zimmermann's philosophy leads to the conclusion that an individual's moral conduct has significant implications, both at the level of the individual and society as a whole.

**Keywords:** Stjepan Zimmermann, moral philosophy, praxis, theism, atheism.



Ante Periša\*

# Psihoterapijski učinak promjene perspektive

## SAŽETAK

Zapadni je čovjek danas postao zarobljenik jedne slike svijeta, jednoga (pre-)uskog (redukcioniističkog?) viđenja sebe, svoga života, rada, ciljeva, smisla... Posljedično, čini se da su mnogi današnji čovjekovi psiho(-fizički) problemi uzrokovani upravo time, jer biti zarobljen u jednoj uskoj (npr. strogo materijalističkoj) slici svijeta i sebe lako dovodi do određene dezorijentiranosti, besmisla, nihilizma, izgubljenosti, strahova, bez oslonca i sigurnosti... već u svakodnevnom životu, a osobito kad se susretnemo s težim egzistencijalnim situacijama. Dio tih problema manifestira se na koncu u velikom porastu tzv. „specifično ljudskih bolesti”, kao što su neki karcinomi, ateroskleroza, probavne bolesti i sl. Svega toga je, naravno, bilo i ranije, ali u novije se doba dogodilo naglo povećanje. Posvemašnje odbacivanje naslijeđenih predaja i tradicija jedan je od glavnih uzroka toga, ističe Viktor Frankl, ali i mnogi drugi filozofi, antropolozi i psiholozi. Naime, čovjek je nedovršeno i slobodno biće, pa neprestano mora sam sebe „stvarati”, odnosno oblikovati i osmišljavati. No, s obzirom na gubitak tradicija i jasnih orijentira, to mu odjednom postaje pretežak zadatak u kojem se lako izgubi, a kao posljedica toga nastaju spomenuti problemi. Stoga uvođenje novih, dobro osmišljenih slika i dubinskih koncepata u naše živote često djeluje kao najbolja terapija.

**Ključne riječi:** filozofija egzistencije, psihoterapija, slika (svijeta), kognitivna metafora.

*„Logos” je dublji od logike. (Viktor E. Frankl)*

## UVOD

Iz popisa tematskih područja čini se da bi se tematika ovogodišnjeg simpozija mogla sažeti u dvije ključne teme: filozofija (čovjek) i (psihičko) zdravlje. U tom se okviru

\* Odjel za filozofiju / Odjel za kroatistiku, Sveučilište u Zadru, Zadar, Hrvatska. ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3999-532X>.

Adresa za korespondenciju: Ante Periša, Odjel za filozofiju / Odjel za kroatistiku, Sveučilište u Zadru, Obala kralja P. Krešimira IV, br. 2, 23 000 Zadar, Hrvatska. E-pošta: [anperisa@unizd.hr](mailto:anperisa@unizd.hr).

ovo istraživanje može smjestiti u predloženu temu **egzistencijalna psihoterapija u suvremenom kontekstu**, iako će se dijelom dotaknuti i šire tematike ovog simpozija, tj. čovjeka i zdravlja uopće, jer pitanje filozofije čovjeka i njegova psihofizičkog zdravlja iziskuje izlazak u interdisciplinarno područje. Čovjekovim zdravljem se, doduše, primarno bavi medicina, a njegovim duševnim zdravljem psihijatrija, odnosno psihoterapija, međutim snažan utjecaj na njegovo fizičko (somatsko) i psihičko (duhovno, duševno) zdravlje (ili bolest) ima, među ostalima, i filozofija. Već bi, naime, i površno poznavanje povijesti filozofije bilo dovoljno za uvidjeti utjecaj filozofije na ljudski život, koliko ona može ljekovito djelovati i ponuditi utjehu u najtežim trenucima u zatvoru, u ropstvu ili pred očima smrti, ali i kako „loša filozofija” može, nažalost, stvoriti očaj, patnju i besmisao te vjerojatno potaknuti u čovjeka čak i teške bolesti i preranu smrt. Iz toga se nameće misao da bi se drukčijim načinom promatranja sebe i svijeta oko nas vjerojatno moglo utjecati i na sâmo psihičko i fizičko zdravlje, što ćemo ovdje поближе istražiti.

## EGZISTENCIJA, SEBEOBLIKOVANJE I SEBENADILAŽENJE

No, vratimo se kratko na sam pojam „egzistencijalno”, jer i tu se već vidi ova spomenuta dvojnost djelovanja filozofije na čovjeka. Treba, dakle, barem radi jasnoće napomenuti kako se u pokretu koji se s filozofskog motrišta bavi čovjekovom egzistencijom već odavno uvrijedilo razlikovanje (barem) dviju struja: egzistencijalizma, s jedne, i filozofije egzistencije, s druge strane.<sup>1</sup> Razlika između njih nije samo nominalna, nego i sadržajna. Ukratko, za „egzistencijalizam” bi se moglo reći da je usmjeren pesimistično, nihilistički i ateistički (antimetafizički), dok se pod naziv „filozofija egzistencije” smještaju oni filozofi, također pozitivnih, „optimističnih” stavova, koji uz čovjeka dopuštaju i promišljaju i metafizičku i transcendentnu zbilju kao važan element za čovjekov život. Jaspers bi to potkrijepio jednostavnom argumentacijom da „mi nismo stvorili sami sebe”, jer „svatko može zamisliti da ga je moglo biti i da ga ne bude” (Jaspers, 1953, str. 51).

I dok Nietzsche i na njega nastavljajuća pesimistično-nihilistička struja po svojoj prilici ne mogu biti prikladni za „psihoterapiju”,<sup>2</sup> ova druga struja egzistencijalističke

<sup>1</sup> Iako se ta dva pojma mogu ovako suprotstaviti, još se češće zapravo govori o „filozofiji egzistencije” kao krovnom, širem pojmu, gdje bi „egzistencijalizam” bio samo uži, podređeni pojam, samo jedan pravac unutar filozofije egzistencije. Sâm pojam „egzistencijalizam” prvi je upotrijebio Gabriel Marcel, i to podrugljivo kao etiketu kojom je označavao Sartreovo filozofiranje. No, Sartre je to ubrzo prihvatio i uskoro postao „ikona” egzistencijalizma (usp. Kampits, 2004, str. 32–33).

<sup>2</sup> Tko imalo poznaje njegov život (i/ili filozofiju), jasno mu je da on ne može biti poželjan primjer sretnog života. I Sartre, kao njegov „nasljednik” i glavno ime egzistencijalizma, zapravo se bezizlazno neprestano suočavao s apsurdom, besmislom, suvišnošću (v. npr. Kampits, 2004, str. 40–43).

filozofije može imati snažne pozitivne terapijske učinke na pojedinca i njegov stav prema životu, smrti, bolesti i raznim nedaćama s kojima se u životu susretne.

Uglavnom, razlike između filozofa egzistencije sežu čak do te mjere da, primjerice, Hirschberger (i mnogi drugi) navodi kako im se jedva može naći išta zajedničkog osim golog termina „egzistencija”, tj. zajednička im je suprotstavljenost tradicionalnom pojmu „bîti”.<sup>3</sup> Ukratko, prema tome nazoru čovjek nije biće koje ima jasno definiranu i dovršenu vlastitu „bît” prema kojoj bi djelovao, nego on svojim djelovanjem neprestano nastaje i sebe (tj. svoju „bît”) formira, odnosno samo-stvara.<sup>4</sup> Dakle, za čovjeka se ne može reći da „jest”, nego da (neprestano) „postaje” (usp. Jaspers, 1953, str. 57).

Zasigurno ima puno istine i privlačnosti (ali možda i nečega zastrašujućeg?) u tome zovu prema kojem čovjek značajno doprinosi tomu u što će se pretvoriti, što će postati. No, to bi ujedno trebao biti i poziv na odgovornost, jer se u procesu sebekreiranja uvijek može i promašiti, često još i lakše negoli sebe izgraditi prema nekim uzvišenim idealima. Frankl ukazuje kako nam je to sebe-stvaranje čovjeka stoga „utjeha i nada”, ali istodobno „opomena i podsjetnik” da to što odgovornije učinimo (usp. Frankl, 1987, str. 106).

Time zapravo dolazimo do naše teme: kao posljedica egzistencijalne slobode i čovjekove nedovršenosti (bîti), „osuđeni” smo na slobodu oblikovanja sebe i vlastita života. Taj „posao” možemo i trebali bismo odraditi dobro i biti ispunjeni i sretni, ali možemo i promašiti te završiti u raznim psihičkim, emocionalnim i drugim problemima. Onda, s obzirom na to da je uzrok tomu u području slobode i ljudske najdublje egzistencije, bilo bi prikladno upravo tu i djelovati: bilo preventivno, bilo kasnije „liječenjem duše”.

Iako se Viktor Frankl u pravilu ne navodi među filozofima egzistencije, s obzirom na tematiku kojom se cijeli život bavio (a uz to i intenzivno bavljenje filozofijom već od gimnazijskih dana nadalje) te zanimljiva rješenja egzistencijalno-filozofijskih

<sup>3</sup> „...(T)eško je, osim imena, ustanoviti nešto stvarno zajedničko između mnogih filozofa egzistencije. Možda odricanje od stare metafizike bîti(...)” (Hirschberger, 2002, str. 163; usp. Hirschberger, str. 631). Hirschberger, s obzirom na to, problematizira može li se uopće govoriti o filozofiji egzistencije ili o egzistencijalizmu kao *jednom* pojmu, ili bismo zapravo svaki put trebali samo govoriti o nekome konkretnom autoru. Slično razmišlja i Peter Kampits u svojoj knjizi o Sartreu (Kampits, 2004, str. 32).

<sup>4</sup> Tradicionalnom terminologijom moglo bi se reći: umjesto općeg stava da *agere sequitur esse* (djelovanje slijedi iz biti), kod njih bi zapravo vrijedilo da *esse sequitur agere* (bit nastaje iz djelovanja). Nije sporno da je čovjek u određenoj mjeri nedovršeno biće koje se tek s vremenom postupno formira i dovršava u određenom smjeru. To su opći stavovi u antropologiji. No, pitanje koje se ovdje neprimjetno nameće seže daleko dublje u raspravu o čovjekovoj biti i što je točno i u kojoj mjeri već unaprijed zadano, a što to možemo i trebamo sami stvarati (v. npr. Haefner, 2003, str. 19).

problema, poglavito pod vidom traženja smisla, činilo se prikladnim i njega uključiti u ovo promišljanje psihoterapijskih, ali i egzistencijalno-filozofijskih pristupa.<sup>5</sup>

Krenimo od spomenutog pitanja čovjekove biti. Uz gornji stav odmah se nameće pitanje: Ako čovjek sam sebe stvara, čini li on to dobro ili u tome može i promašiti? Frankl se u ovom sebe-stvaranju razlikuje od većine egzistencijalista, jer on smatra da ne smijemo ostati usmjereni samo na sebe, nego da se čovjek ostvaruje jedino ukoliko radi na samo-transcendenciji, tj. na sebe-nadilaženju i usmjeravanju prema nekom cilju ili prema drugim ljudima (a ne na sebe), a ovo zdravo samoostvarenje pojavljuje se jedino kao posljedica toga. „Čovjekova je egzistencija, po svojoj biti, samo-nadmašivanje (auto-transcendencija) prije negoli samo-ostvarivanje” (Frankl, 2001, str. 110). Ako ostane fokusiran samo na sebe, čovjek onda neće doseći svoj optimalan razvoj. „Zdravo oko sebe ne vidi” – piše Frankl, nego mu je cilj vani, izvan sebe. „Samoostvarivanje je nenamjeran učinak samotranscendencije, a moralo bi to i ostati; ako je ono cilj naših namjera, onda je štetno i samouništavajuće. Ono što vrijedi za samoostvarivanje, vrijedi i za identitet i za sreću” (Frankl, 1987, str. 34). Na drugom mjestu čak tvrdi da se samoostvarivanje nikako „ne može postići ako ono postane sebi svrhom, nego se jedino može ostvariti kao popratni učinak samonadmašivanja” (Frankl, 2001, str. 110).

## NEUROZE I GUBITAK TRADICIJA

Promašaji u vlastitom samoostvarenju vode u neuroze i razne psihičke (i fizičke) probleme, a vjerojatnost za to danas je značajno povećana, kako to Frankl, prvenstveno u kontekstu traženja ciljeva i smisla u životu (logoterapija), dobro primjećuje.<sup>6</sup> Današnji čovjek puno lakše dolazi u stanje egzistencijalnog vakuuma („noogena neuroza”). Uzrok tomu Frankl vidi u činjenici što je današnji čovjek izgubljen, dezorijentiran i jednostavno ne zna kako bi se trebao ponašati, ponajviše zbog masovnog odbacivanja tradicije koja je oduvijek davala orijentire za skladan život. Naime, životinje imaju snažne instinkte koji ih nepogrešivo usmjeravaju na to što trebaju činiti i kako se ponašati. Za razliku od njih čovjek nema tako snažne nagone, nego je – kako antropolozi vole reći – „nedovršeno biće”, odnosno slobodno biće kojem je stoga potrebno učenje od najranijih dana, tako da mu snažna predaja (tradicija) unosi sve važne orijentire i omogućuje razvoj i prilagodbu određenom društvu i okolnostima u kojima se rodi i odrasta. No, zanemarivanjem

<sup>5</sup> Teško je, vjerojatno i nemoguće, u svemu povući preciznu granicu do kud se točno proteže psihologija, a koja rečenica ili misao spada u filozofiju; poglavito je kod Frankla to isprepletano (što se vidi već na primjeru njegova maturalnog rada pod naslovom „Psihologija filozofskog mišljenja”).

<sup>6</sup> O utjecaju pitanja „smisla” života, u cjelini ili njegovih određenih manjih etapa, na ljudski život i psihofizičko zdravlje zorno su prikazana novija istraživanja u uvodnom dijelu rada Bijelić i Macuka (2018, str. 159–176)

i odbacivanjem tradicija danas nestale su i orijentacijske točke, pa je čovjek sve više dezorijentiran, zbog čega u konačnici dolazi i do pogoršanja njegova psihofizičkog stanja.

Za razliku od drugih životinja čovjeku nije dano da pomoću poriva i nagona zna što mu je činiti, a za razliku od čovjeka iz prijašnjih vremena, tradicije i tradicionalne vrijednosti više mu ne govore što bi trebao činiti. Tako on sada, budući da nema pred sobom takvo što da ga vodi, ponekad niti ne zna što želi učiniti. Posljedica? On čini ono što i drugi ljudi čine – što je konformizam – ili čini ono što drugi ljudi žele da on čini – što je totalitarizam. (Frankl, 1987, str. 23; usp. Frankl, 2001, str. 105)

A i jedno i drugo na koncu dovode do dubinskoga egzistencijalnog nezadovoljstva, neuroza i bolesti.

Kao posljedicu toga stanja današnjeg čovjeka Frankl prepoznaje „osjećaj besmisla” i „egzistencijsku prazninu”. Na više mjesta on pokazuje kako je upravo nestanak tradicija najčešći uzrok ovom besmislu,<sup>7</sup> odnosno „egzistencijskom vakuumu”. I onda kao posljedice, odnosno simptome te egzistencijske praznine navodi glavnu „neurotičnu trijadu – potištenost, agresivnost i ovisnost” (Frankl, 1987, str. 24) – ili, kako se ponegdje izdvaja, „tragičnu trijadu” koja čovjeka pritišće sve do nastanka mnogih neuroza – patnju, smrt i krivnju (ne čudi da su to upravo tri glavne „granične situacije” kako ih je već puno ranije istaknuo K. Jaspers). Tako dolazimo u područje onoga čemu je očito potrebna (psiho-)terapija. No, prije toga čini se potrebnim dodati i nešto o utjecaju ovih psiholoških stanja na nastanak mnogih bolesti.

## **PSIHIČKA UVJETOVANOST SPECIFIČNO LJUDSKIH (FIZIČKIH) BOLESTI**

O utjecaju psiho-emocionalnih stanja na razvoj teških bolesti, kao i o velikoj opasnosti zbog gubljenja tradicija, slično kao i Frankl, u svojoj knjizi „Čovjek i njegova bolest: Osnove antropološke medicine” govori ugledni njemački liječnik, specijalist za antropološku (psihosomatsku) medicinu, Artur Jores (Jores, 1998). On se prije svega posvećuje onim specifično ljudskim (fizičkim) bolestima, a psiho-emocionalne uzroke promatra kao „predstadij” takvim fizičkim bolestima, koje onda predstavljaju samo završni čin, primjerice kad netko na kraju dođe liječniku zbog čira na želudcu, infarkta i sl. (Jores, 1998, str. 151), tj. istražuje one bolesti koje se nikad ili iznimno rijetko pojavljuju kod životinja, a kod čovjeka su, osobito u

<sup>7</sup> Za dokazivanje te postavke osobito se poziva na istraživanje D. Young gdje je testovima i statističkim istraživanjima dokazano kako je upravo gubitak tradicija najveći uzrok tomu (v. Frankl, 1987, str. 23–24).

novije vrijeme, čak došle na vrh popisa najčešćih bolesti od kojih ljudi pate i umiru.<sup>8</sup> Pomnim razlučivanjem Jores pokazuje kako se uzroci takvih bolesti mogu pripisati prije svega psihoemocionalnom stanju čovjeka. U mnogočemu se slaže s Franklovim konstatacijama,<sup>9</sup> a polazi od općeprihvaćenih stavova iz antropologije. Tako i on poput Frankla konstatira kako čovjek nema snažne nagone poput životinje, nego je „nedovršeno”, „otvoreno”,<sup>10</sup> tj. „slobodno biće”. Ta je razlika puno veća nego što se na prvi pogled može činiti. Ona, doduše, oslobađa čovjeka od elementarnih nagona za razmnožavanjem i preživljavanjem, ali mu ujedno „nameće” slobodu u kojoj se može i mora sam ostvariti. Čovjekovo slobodno stvaranje onda označavamo općim širim nazivom „kultura”, a ono mu omogućuje osmišljen i dug život, daleko preko granica biološke mogućnosti prokreacije.<sup>11</sup> Jores pri tom napominje kako su ona živa bića koja su na nižoj razini svijesti jače vezana uz svoje nagone, a mnoga od njih zapravo i umiru istog trena čim ostvare prokreaciju, produžetak vlastite vrste (ili gena, danas bi se vjerojatno dodalo).<sup>12</sup> No, čovjekov život nije ograničen nagonima, pa mu se nameće i imperativ samoostvarenja u što kvalitetnijem obliku i opsegu. Štoviše, za razliku od Freuda, Jores, navodeći brojna istraživanja, pokazuje kako je temeljni čovjekov „nagon” zapravo težnja „za potvrđivanjem i razvijanjem sebe i svojih mogućnosti” (Jores, 1998, str. 28). On tu težnju naziva također „tendencija za obiljem, raznolikošću i bogatstvom oblika” ili tendencija „prema višem razvoju života” (Jores, 1998, str. 43), a temeljno usmjerenje života na zemlji je „postizanje što većega funkcionalnog bogatstva života” (Jores, 1998, str. 45).<sup>13</sup> Ako se ta tendencija u čovjeku na duže vrijeme blokira, u njemu se počnu aktivirati mehanizmi samouništenja, tj. nastaju upravo ove specifično ljudske bolesti.

<sup>8</sup> Jores razlikuje opće bolesti uzrokovane parazitima i raznim infekcijama, od kojih također obolijevaju i životinje, od specifično ljudskih bolesti, koje nemaju tako jasne uzročnike i od kojih obolijevaju gotovo isključivo ljudi, a životinje nikada ili samo u rijetkim okolnostima. Kao specifično ljudske bolesti on prije svega navodi srčani i moždani udar, aterosklerozu, čir na želudcu, jedan dio karcinomâ, razne bolesti probavnog trakta...

<sup>9</sup> Nažalost, Frankl mu u vrijeme pisanja ove knjige očito još nije bio poznat (knjiga je izvorno objavljena još 1955. godine). Nigdje ga ne citira, niti ga navodi u popisu literature, iako bi mu se na puno mjesta izvrsno uklopio u njegovu argumentaciju, pa se s određenom sigurnošću može pretpostaviti da bi ga rado citirao da mu je tada bio poznat.

<sup>10</sup> Već dugo poznati i prihvaćeni stavovi u filozofskoj antropologiji, koje je ponajprije formulirao još mladi Herder u svojoj raspravi o podrijetlu jezika, a podrobno su ih razradili antropolozi u 20. st.

<sup>11</sup> U tom kontekstu zanimljivo je spomenuti kako se poznatoga hrvatskog biologa, akademika Miroslava Radmana, zadnjih godina moglo u medijima čuti da govori upravo o tzv. „kulturnoj evoluciji”, koja može biti dovoljan razlog da čovjek živi znatno duže nego što bi to biološki bilo predviđivo bez tog elementa „viših” ciljeva i ostvarenja u području duha (kulture, znanosti, duhovnosti...), jer ciljevi i ostvarenja na tom području daju mu određeni novi poticaj i smisao života pored (mogućnosti) same biološke prokreacije.

<sup>12</sup> „Povezanost rasplodivanja i smrti osobito je jasno ostvarena kod insekata, gdje razmnožavanje često za posljedicu ima smrt” (Jores, 1998, str. 115).

<sup>13</sup> Zanimljivo bi bilo usporediti ove njegove stavove s Franklovima kako neki ljudi određeno vrijeme mogu „živjeti iznad svojih bioloških mogućnosti” ako imaju vrlo snažne ciljeve koje žele postići. Tako Frankl navodi nekoliko primjera (npr. Goetheovo pisanje Fausta) kad su ljudi radili i živjeli neko vrijeme preko vlastitih snaga i mogućnosti, samo zahvaljujući snažnoj motivaciji i želji da nešto ostvare (usp. Frankl, 2007, str. 39–40).

Ispravnost ovog cilja i svrhe ljudskog života, osim navođenja nekih pokusa, Jores argumentira i time što:

Mi ljudi doživljavamo sreću – taj cilj za kojim svi ljudi misle da teže – jedino onda kad smo u skladu s tim navedenim temeljnim zakonom života. To nam se dogodi onda kad ostvarimo nešto poradi samog ostvarenja, a ne poradi slave i časti. A to se događa i onda kad drugom životu – bilo životu biljke i životinje ili životu našeg bližnjega – pomognemo da se razvije i dosegne svoju puninu. To se događa i u rađanju novog života. No sreću čovjek doživljava i u kontemplativnom stavu kad se – promatrajući neki krajolik, umjetničko djelo ili slušajući kakav glazbeni komad – poistovjećujemo sa životnim zbivanjem. A najveći se oblik sreće doživljava u mističkome religioznom poniranju, u doživljaju poistovjećenja s temeljem i tvorcem svega života. (Jores, 1998, str. 44–45)

Upadljiva je sličnost s već spomenutim Franklovim stavom kako se pravo čovjekovo samoostvarenje događa jedino usmjerenjem prema van „na nešto ili nekog drugog”, „samozaboravom, predanjem, dižući se izvan sebe i usredotočujući se na vanjski svijet” (Frankl, 1987, str. 33). Određeni samozaborav i usmjerenost na drugoga preduvjet je prave sreće, ali i osobne izgradnje, čiji je spontani rezultat upravo sreća.

Jores razlikuje tri načina liječenja – pragmatički, magički i psihoterapeutski – a za ovu skupinu specifično ljudskih bolesti učinkovit je (u ranoj fazi, tj. prije nego se razviju fizičke bolesti) jedino psihoterapeutski pristup (usp. Jores, 1998, str. 97–111).

Slično kao i Frankl, Jores također prepoznaje veliku važnost tradicije za čovjeka te smatra da zapravo „sav razvoj što ga je čovječanstvo prevalilo od kamenog doba do danas” počiva na „predaji” (tradiciji). Stoga ističe kako za čovjeka silnu vrijednost ima „predanje kulturnog dobra u ranom djetinjstvu, i to – što treba izričito naglasiti – ne samo predanje znanja, nego i čitavog svijeta predodžaba i vjerovanja” (Jores, 1998, str. 34). Odbacivanje tradicije za posljedicu ima, među ostalim, i razne zdravstvene probleme za današnjeg čovjeka.

## TRAŽENJE METODE

Iako može izgledati da smo se udaljili od glavne teme, ovaj „izlet” u područje specifično ljudskih bolesti čini se svrhovitim za postizanje osnovnog cilja ovog rada: ukazati na ulogu psihe (duha i duše) za naše opće zdravlje, a (time) onda i na moguće puteve liječenja.

Nažalost, zbog ograničenosti prostora ne možemo ulaziti u razne načine, koji se polako sami ocrtavaju, filozofske i psihoterapijske pomoći u liječenju specifično ljudskih bolesti i problema, ali vjerujem da se smjer već pomalo može barem nazrijeti

iz ovdje istaknute uzročno-posljedične veze, odnosno kako i zbog čega zapravo do toga dolazi. Terapija bi onda očekivano trebala ići u smjeru kojim su nastupili uzroci.

Ipak, u nastavku ćemo se usmjeriti na jednu „metodu” koja bi, uz one već ovdje spomenute ili tek naslućene, trebala biti korisna za naše svrhe filozofske psihoterapije.

Dakle, težnja je ovog izlaganja ponuditi barem jednu metodu koja bi bila prikladna za razna psihička oboljenja, odnosno stanja koja na razne načine pritišću čovjekovu dušu (*psyche*), bilo da ih se promatra kao krizne točke s filozofskog ili sa psihološkog stajališta, a koja može biti prikladna i za filozofsko i za psihoterapijsko „liječenje”.

U traženju takve metode moglo bi se, primjerice, krenuti već od jednostavnog istraživanja raznih filozofskih knjiga i tekstova koji tematiziraju upravo terapijsku stranu filozofije, koja se obrađuje u naslovima poput slavne Boecijeve Utjehe filozofije i sličnima. Kad bi se krenulo pažljivo istraživati u čemu se zapravo sastoji „novost”, odnosno „doprinos” takvih tekstova, došli bismo do onoga što ćemo ovdje sažeto iznijeti, a polazeći od ranije iznesenih stavova.

### **Promjena perspektive kao terapija**

Dakle, ako bismo morali što kraće sažeti metodu koja bi vjerojatno bila najkorisnija kao „krovna” metoda i (egzistencijalno-)filozofijskoga i psihoterapijskoga liječenja, nameće se zapravo metoda „promjene perspektive”. Čini se da upravo to stoji u podlozi većine terapijskih „metoda”, kako filozofskih tako i psiholoških (psihoterapijskih). Ta se misao zapravo implicitno pojavljuje na mnogo mjesta, a osobit poticaj za to došao nam je od jedne definicije „ludila” u knjizi Manfreda Lütza „LUDILO” (Lütz, 2011, str. 49). On tu na jednom mjestu navodi da bi najkraća definicija „ludila” bila da je ono „nesposobnost promjene perspektive”: tako netko stalno vidi svemirce oko sebe, drugi je uvjeren da je on Napoleon ili Cezar, treći je siguran kako ga susjed zlokobno gleda, ili ga netko uvijek posvuda prati i sl. Ukoliko ostanu zarobljeni u tome, te ne mogu nikako izići iz te ili neke druge slične perspektive, ljudi s vremenom upadnu u „začarani krug”, odnosno u stanje „ludila”, mentalnog poremećaja. Slično je i s mnogim perspektivama i strahovima koji nas mogu paralizirati sve do nastanka bolesti, poput iracionalnih strahova od smrti, od patnje, od kometa, crnih mačaka..., kao i s raznim fobijama i mnogim teškoćama do kojih dolazi ako ostanemo zarobljeni u nekome ružnom konceptu ili slici života, u „uskoj” perspektivi iz koje sve promatramo samo pod jednim kutom, što nas s vremenom sve više pritišće i zatvara u naš vlastiti svijet. Često ostajemo zatočeni samo u toj jednoj perspektivi koja sputava i guši, iako istu stvar možemo zapravo uvijek gledati i iz drugih perspektiva, odakle može sve izgledati posve drukčije.

Dakle, ako se „ludilo”, odnosno neki psihijatrijski poremećaj može definirati kao zarobljenost u jednoj jedinoj perspektivi, onda bi uvođenje nove, ljepše, „zdravije” i obuhvatnije perspektive pod kojom bi netko sagledao dotičnu pojavu, konkretni problem ili pak čitav svoj život, zapravo djelovalo terapijski kao „izlječenje” od tog „ludila”. A to je upravo ono što može učiniti filozofija, odnosno dobra psihoterapija: otvoriti čovjeku novu perspektivu i različita gledišta; pokazati mu kako se stvari ne moraju gledati uvijek iz istog kuta, nego da ima i drugih perspektiva, koje mogu izvršiti snažan terapijski učinak. To se u životu neprestano čini, ali se rijetko kada eksplicitno tematizira.

Zanimljivo je u tom kontekstu barem spomenuti naslov knjige u kojoj se čitanje Platona (i još nekih filozofskih tekstova) uspoređuje s djelovanjem jednog lijeka: „Umjesto Prozaka – Platon”.<sup>14</sup> Može li se zaista čitanje nekoga filozofskog djela usporediti s djelovanjem tablete? Čini se da može.<sup>15</sup>

Psihoterapija, filozofija, ali i književnost, vrsna književna djela, veća i manja, stavljaju nas u drugu perspektivu, iako svaka na svoj način. Kod književnosti se danas u tom kontekstu sve češće govori o tzv. „biblioterapiji” (liječenje knjigom, odnosno čitanjem). A treba napomenuti i kako je pripovijedanje priča, očito s dobrim razlozima (!), oduvijek bilo važan dio ljudske kulture i tradicije. Usto, još je Aristotel ukazao na važan „terapijski” aspekt književnosti govoreći o „katarzi” (pročišćenju) (Aristotel, 1449b) kroz koju prolazi publika (čitateljstvo) prateći život nekog čovjeka, junaka u tragedijama, gdje se suosjećanjem (i identificiranjem) s njim i sami suočavamo s velikim životnim izazovima, strahovima i raznim nedaćama.

I dok se to u književnosti odvija tako što se nesvjesno identificiramo s određenim likom i s njim suživljeni prolazimo njegove izazove, pri čemu i sami doživljavamo novo, posve drukčije „ljekovito” životno iskustvo i novo gledište naših problema, u psihoterapiji se svjesno razrađuje određena perspektiva/slika koja nam se nameće te se povlači što više poveznica i analogija koje su iz toga primjenjive na konkretnu situaciju čovjeka kojem se želi pomoći.<sup>16</sup> U „čistoj” filozofiji čini se da se više ide srednjim putem, pa se uglavnom pomoću argumenata i pojmova<sup>17</sup> pokušava čovjeku nešto sugerirati i uvjeriti ga u neko drukčije viđenje određenog problema, a koje će

<sup>14</sup> Marinoff (2000). (Prozak je naziv poznatog lijeka protiv depresije.)

<sup>15</sup> Dapače, terapijski učinak nekog lijeka traje samo kratko vrijeme, a uvođenje novog pogleda na život i na određene nedaće djeluje na nas trajno.

<sup>16</sup> Zanimljiv primjer kako to može izgledati prikazan je u našem članku o konceptualnoj metafori, a uzet je iz jednog predavanja s Youtubea. Tu psihoterapeutkinja Judy nudi nekoliko perspektiva života svojem klijentu, propitujući koja bi od njih najbolje odgovarala njegovu shvaćanju vlastita života (v. Periša & Hajdarević, 2016, str. 285–309; primjer na str. 291–292).

<sup>17</sup> Zanimljivo je ovdje uočiti kako se zapravo dobar dio egzistencijalističkih filozofa služi više književnim formama za prenošenje svojih ideja i gledišta negoli logičkom argumentacijom i strogo (filozofskim) pojmovima, npr. Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Camus, Sartre...

baciti novo svjetlo i time na nj terapijski djelovati.<sup>18</sup> Raspon tih slika u filozofiji ide od perspektiva pogodnih za promatranje određenog problema, pa do paradigma u najširem smislu koje u potpunosti određuju naše viđenje i spoznaju svijeta i nas samih.<sup>19</sup> Jedna prilično obuhvatna razina proteže se i na područje tzv. „konceptualnih metafora“, koje su postale glavna tema kognitivne lingvistike zadnjih desetljeća, što bi se također moglo primijeniti i na ovu problematiku.

## Slike u kojima živimo

Funkcioniranje ove vrste „terapije“ usko je povezano i s onim što se odnedavno spoznalo u pogledu nesvjesnih spoznajno-jezičnih struktura prema kojima funkcionira naš um, odnosno „otkrće“ i istraživanja tzv. „konceptualnih metafora“ i njihova uloga u kognitivnoj lingvistici pred kraj 20. st. Zanimljiva je činjenica da su glavni doprinosi tomu fenomenu došli od lingvistike, ali su se razrađivali i produbljivali upravo u području filozofije i psihologije, gdje se pokazalo da rasvjetljuju još dublje dimenzije mišljenja i funkcioniranja ljudskog uma.<sup>20</sup>

Srž učenja o konceptualnim metaforama bila bi da u našem konceptualnom (pojmovnom, idejnom, misaonom...) sustavu postoje neke metafore (nesvjesne slike) koje dubinski utječu na naše iskustvo, doživljaj, spoznaju i kategorizaciju sebe i svijeta oko nas. Takve dubinske metafore uglavnom nikad ne nalazimo eksplicitno izrečene u jeziku, nego o njima možemo zaključiti na temelju mnogih eksplicitnih izričaja koje svakodnevno rabimo, a koji su upravo moguć i razumljivi tek na podlozi te dubinske konceptualne metafore, neke bazične slike koju svi (kao članovi određene jezične zajednice, a često i puno šire) dijelimo. Primjera za to ima bezbroj, a u ovom bi kontekstu trebalo barem kratko spomenuti općeraširenu konceptualnu metaforu ŽIVOT JE PUTOVANJE.<sup>21</sup> Na podlozi te slike mi život doživljavamo, promatramo i opisujemo kao putovanje, pa onda uobičajene elemente koje ima neko putovanje prenosimo na život: polazište, cilj, prijevozna sredstva, medij putovanja (kopno, more, zrak), vođači, raskrižja, zaprjeke, rješenja... Većina elemenata putovanja može se preslikati na ljudski život, i to se u govoru i mišljenju redovito i čini (više

<sup>18</sup> Možda je najsnažniji primjer nove perspektive, koja baca posve drugo i „ljejkovito“ svjetlo na naš život, promatranje stvari *sub specie aeterni/-tatis* (pod vidom vječnosti), što osobito često rabi rani Wittgenstein u vrijeme svojih velikih egzistencijalnih problema (frazu se javlja u Traktatu i osobito u Dnevnicima pisanim na bojištu u vrijeme Prvoga svjetskog rata), te je očito kako mu je to motrište bilo vrlo ljejkovito u teškim okolnostima koje je tada proživljavao.

<sup>19</sup> Više o ovim najobuhvatnijim paradigmatima i njihovu utjecaju na našu spoznaju v. Periša (2021, str. 143–159).

<sup>20</sup> Najslavnije je svakako prvo veliko djelo o konceptualnoj metafori, čiji su autori upravo jedan lingvist i jedan filozof: G. Lakoff i M. Johnson, *Metaphors we live by*, 1980. Ovdje valja istaknuti još barem: Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr. (Ur.), *The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought*, 2008. Za psihoterapiju je osobito zanimljiva knjiga Ellen Y. Siegelmann, *Metaphor & Meaning in Psychotherapy*, 1990. S obzirom na intenzitet istraživanja iz ovog područja, danas postoji nebrojeno mnoštvo radova i knjiga o primjeni ovoga u raznim znanstvenim područjima.

<sup>21</sup> Praksa je i pravilo da se konceptualne metafore (za razliku od metaforičkih *izraza*) pišu velikim slovima.

u Periša i Hajdarević, 2016, str. 294). U kontekstu ovog rada lako se onda može u razgovoru ponuditi i zajednički prepoznavati pojedine etape puta, zaprjeke na koje je netko naišao, moguća rješenja (puteve, prijevozna sredstva), drukčija gledišta, kao primjerice sagledavanje toga dijela pod vidom cjeline putovanja, odnosno života.

Dakle, bit terapijskoga djelovanja sastojala bi se onda u tome da se nekome „nametne” neka druga slika, odnosno koncept pod kojim će čovjek promatrati svoj život i dotične okolnosti. Zamjenom jedne slike nekom prikladnijom ujedno se postiže terapijski učinak, koji onda prakticiranjem ulazi sve dublje u (nesvjesne) kognitivne strukture i tu mijenja čovjekov doživljaj sebe, svog života i svijeta oko sebe.

## PRIMJERI PSIHOTERAPEUTSKE LJEKOVITE SLIKE

Dakle, psihoterapeut, odnosno filozof bi se morao ponajprije usredotočiti na to koje perspektive bi za pojedini problem konkretnog čovjeka mogle biti oslobađajuće i ponuditi mu onda jedan drukčiji pogled na stvari koji bi ga nosio i dao mu novu snagu, prožeo mu toliko duboko život da bi on time zapravo bio „izliječen”.

Da bi bilo jasnije kako to izgleda, navest ćemo kratko nekoliko ilustrativnih primjera Viktora Frankla, koji obilato koristi takve slike, i to upravo svjesno kao terapijska sredstva.

Čovjeku pritisnutom dubokim strahom od smrti i prolaznosti Frankl nudi nekoliko posve nesvakidašnjih pogleda na život i prolaznost, a u obliku konkretnih slika. Jedna vrlo korisna ona je da život promatramo poput **pješčanog sata**.

Neka gornji dio pješčanog sata predstavlja budućnost koja tek treba nastupiti, kao što i pijesak iz gornjeg dijela mora proći kroz uzak prolaz, koji će za nas predstavljati sadašnjost, u donji dio pješčanog sata, koji će predstavljati prošlost, dakle pijesak koji je već prošao kroz njemu namijenjen uzak prolaz. Egzistencijalizam vidi samo onaj uski prolaz sadašnjosti, dok gornje i donje dijelove – budućnost i prošlost – zanemaruje. Logoterapija će reći da je točno da budućnosti doista još „nema”, ali je zato prošlost nešto što je istinski stvarno. Prošlost se tu promatra kao nešto zbiljsko i neprolazno. Ostanemo li vjerni primjeru pješčanog sata, to bi bilo kao da se pijesak, onog časa kada je prošao kroz uski otvor sadašnjosti, pretvorio u krutu i nesalomljivu masu. U prošlosti je sve pohranjeno, i to pohranjeno zauvijek (usp. Frankl, 1987, str. 99–100).

Tako je i s neosporivom prolaznošću života. Kad izaberemo i neke se mogućnosti ostvare:

one više nisu prolazne – istina je da su one prošle, da **jesu** prošlost, ali to znači da još uvijek na neki način postoje, naime, postoje kao dio prošlosti. Ništa ih ne može

izmijeniti, ništa uništiti. Kada se jednom mogućnost pretvori u stvarnost, onda je to učinjeno 'jednom zauvijek', za čitavu vječnost. (Frankl, 2001, str. 118)

Tako se ono što je prošlo može promatrati kao vrijedno blago našega života, sačuvano i pohranjeno u prošlosti, a ne kao uzrok žalosti za proteklim vremenom.

Još jedan koristan Franklov primjer toga kako se može optimistično gledati na prolaznost života, te da ono što je prošlo itekako ima svoju vrijednost, metafora je **kalendara**.

Tako on nudi sliku života kao kalendara od kojeg svaki dan otkidamo po jedan list (za dan koji je prošao). Pesimist u tom slučaju nalikuje čovjeku koji sa strahom i žaljenjem primjećuje kako je njegov kalendar svakim danom sve tanji i tanji. S druge strane, osoba koja odgovorno odrađuje i prihvaća životne izazove nalikuje čovjeku koji oprezno skida svaki protekli list sa svog kalendara te ga uredno i pažljivo slaže sa strane na gomilu već ranije otrgnutih listova, nakon što prethodno na poledini lista zapiše što mu se tog dana dogodilo.

Takav čovjek može biti ponosan i sretan zbog čitavog bogatstva koje je sadržano u takvim zabilješkama, zbog čitavog svog života koji je tako ispunjeno proživio. Hoće li njega pogoditi činjenica da postaje sve stariji? Treba li on zavidjeti mladim ljudima oko sebe i plakati zbog svoje izgubljene mladosti? Ima li uopće razloga da zavidi mladom čovjeku; da mu zavidi na svim mogućnostima koje su otvorene pred njim, na budućnosti koja pred njim stoji? 'Ne, hvala', pomislić će. 'Umjesto svih tih mogućnosti ja iza sebe, u svojoj prošlosti, imam stvarnost; stvarnost koja je satkana od svih poslova što sam ih obavio, od svih ljubavi što sam ih volio i, napose, od svih patnji što sam ih hrabro prepatio. Najviše sam ponosan upravo na te patnje, iako one nisu nešto na čemu mi se može zavidjeti.' (Frankl, 1987, str. 100)

Život i svakodnevni problemi sagledani iz ove perspektive sad vrlo lako mogu čovjeka osloboditi od grča i tjeskobe, strahova... A na koncu tako dobra slika, kad uđe duboko u čovjekovu nutrinu i iznutra ga prožme, može i posve eliminirati tjeskobu što se naš „kalendar”, eto, približio svom kraju, što mu je preostalo još samo malo „listova”.

Time Frankl i smrti daje jedan drukčiji smisao, jer ona postaje trenutak dovršenja kojim zaokružujemo i fiksiramo svoj život. „Čovjek ne postaje stvarnost rođenjem, već prije smrti; on tek u trenutku smrti 'ostvaruje' sebe. Njegovo sebstvo nije nešto što 'jest', već nešto što postaje i stoga postaje potpuno tek kad se smrti život zaokruži u cjelinu” (Frankl, 1987, str. 108). Ono što prijede u prošlost, to je prava, fiksirana stvarnost. „U prošlosti ništa ne propada, nego je u njoj sve uskladišteno” (Frankl, 2001, str. 118).

Može biti korisno barem kratko spomenuti i primjer kad Frankl razgovara s mladom ženom od tridesetak godina, majkom kojoj je jedno dijete umrlo, a drugo boluje

od teške paralize. Pokušala je počiniti samoubojstvo jer joj život više „nema smisla”. Nakon uvodnog razgovora, Frankl je odjednom postavi u posve drugu perspektivu: navodi je da zamisli sebe kao staricu koja upravo leži na samrtnoj postelji i promatra svoj život. Nudi joj različite verzije života, pa da vidi koja bi joj imala više smisla gledano iz te pozicije. Nakon zamišljanja raznih situacija i mogućih životnih puteva, na kraju zadovoljna posve jasno shvati smisao svoga sadašnjeg života (usp. Frankl, 2001, str. 115).

## ZAKLJUČAK

S jedne strane, dakle, čovjek je kao „nedovršeno” biće „osuđen” na slobodu i samoformiranje, a s druge je izgubio uporišne točke koje mu je davala čvrsta stoljetna tradicija (predaja) po kojoj je „znao” kako to najbolje odraditi, pa se bez toga danas često dogodi da se u tome samooblikovanju izgubi i dođe u razne krize, uključujući i psihosomatske zdravstvene poremećaje. Pomoć u izlaženju iz toga može mu pružiti i filozofija, a u ovom smo radu – osvjetljujući nekoliko različitih pristupa – pokazali da je promjena perspektive, gledišta na sebe i svijet vjerojatno ponajbolja metoda za to.

S obzirom na posljedice dubinske promjene svijesti koju sa sobom nosi promjena važnih perspektiva gledanja na stvari, ovo otvaranje i ponuda nove perspektive čini se kao zajednička točka i najplodnija metoda za psihoterapijsko liječenje, a koju današnjem čovjeku i vremenu mogu ponuditi filozofija (egzistencije) i psihoterapija, kao i književnost. Naravno, svaka na svoj način.

## LITERATURA

- Aristotel. (n.d.). *O pjesničkom umijeću* (1449b).
- Bijelić, L., i Macuka, I. (2018). Smisao života: Uloga religioznosti i stavova prema smrti. *Psihologijske teme*, 27, 159–176.
- Blumenberg, H. (1960). Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie. U E. Rothacker (Ur.), *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte*, 6. Goettingen.
- Frankl, V. E. (1987). *Nečujan vapaj za smislom* (R. Berghofer, prev.). Zagreb: Naprijed.
- Frankl, V. E. (2001). *Život uvijek ima smisla* (K. Prendivoj, prev., 6. izd.). Zagreb: Biblioteka „Oko tri ujutro”.
- Frankl, V. E. (2007). *Vremena odluke* (M. Cifra i I. Zirdum, prev., 2. izd.). Đakovo: UPT.
- Gibbs, R. W., Jr. (Ur.). (2008). *The Cambridge handbook of metaphor and thought*. Cambridge University Press.
- Haefner, G. (2003). *Filozofska antropologija* (D. Škarica, prev.). Zagreb: Breza.
- Hirschberger, J. (n.d.). *Geschichte der Philosophie*. Bd II: Neuzeit und Gegenwart (11. izd.). Herder.
- Hirschberger, J. (2002). *Mala povijest filozofije* (I. Čehok i P. Crnjac, prev.). Zagreb: Školska knjiga.
- Jaspers, K. (1973). *Einführung in die Philosophie* (15. izd.). München: Piper.

- Jores, A. (1998). *Čovjek i njegova bolest: Osnove antropološke medicine* (K. Prendivoj, prev.). Zagreb: Biblioteka „Oko tri ujutro“.
- Kampits, P. (2004). *Jean-Paul Sartre*. München: Verlag C. H. Beck.
- Lakoff, G., i Johnson, M. (1980). *Metaphors we live by*. The University of Chicago Press.
- Lütz, M. (2011). *Ludilo. Liječimo pogrešne – pravi problem su normalni ljudi: Psihijatrija s daškom vedrine* (M. Šešok, prev.). Zagreb: Znanje.
- Marinoff, L. (2000). *Umjesto prozaka – Platon! Filozofija kao psihološka pomoć* (D. Borković, prev.). Zagreb: V.B.Z.
- Periša, A., i Hajdarević, D. (2016). Znanje i gledanje u konceptualnoj metafori. *Croatica et Slavica Iadertina*, 11(2), 285–309.
- Periša, A. (2021). Urteil und Metapher: Zur Wirkungsgeschichte der überkommenen konzeptuellen und absoluten Metaphern in der Urteilsbildung. U J. Zovko i H. Lenk (Ur.), *Hermeneutische Relevanz der Urteilskraft / Relevance of Hermeneutical Judgment*. Zürich: LIT Verlag.
- Siegelman, E. Y. (1990). *Metaphor & meaning in psychotherapy*. New York, London: The Guilford Press.
- Weiberg, A. (2004). „Ein Bild hielt uns gefangen.“ Die Kraft der Metapher. U. Arnswald, J. Kertscher & M. Kross (Ur.), *Wittgenstein und die Metapher* (str. 115–135). Berlin: ParErga.

## Psycho-therapeutic effect of change in perspective

### SUMMARY

Today, Western man has become a prisoner of a single worldview, of the one (too) narrow (reductionist?) view of oneself, of one's life, work, life goals, meaning... Consequently, many of today's psycho(-physical) problems seem to be caused precisely by this, because being trapped in a narrow (for example, strictly materialistic) worldview easily leads to a certain sense of disorientation, nihilism, being lost, afraid, without footing and safety... even in everyday life, but especially when we encounter difficult existential situations. Some of these problems are manifested through a large increase in the so-called “specific human diseases”, such as certain types of cancer, atherosclerosis, digestive diseases, etc. Of course, all of this was present before, but in recent times it has greatly increased. The total rejection of tradition is one of the main causes of this, according to Viktor Frankl, as well as many other philosophers, anthropologists and psychologists. Namely, man is an unfinished and free being, which constantly has to “create”, or shape and form oneself. But in view of the loss of traditions and clear orientations, this suddenly becomes too difficult a task in which man easily gets lost, which, as a result, gives rise to the problems mentioned above. Therefore, the introduction of some new, well-designed images and deep concepts into our lives seems to be the best kind of therapy.

**Keywords:** existential philosophy, psychotherapy, worldview, cognitive metaphor.

Štefanija Kožić\*, Ana Kralj Duka\*\*, Luka Janeš\*\*\*

## Smisao života – od antike do egzistencijalizma i logoterapije

### SAŽETAK

Smisao i svrha života u ovome radu dovode se u povezanost sa življenjem dobroga i sretnoga života, kao i s nadilaženjem potreba i pronalaskom „viših svrha”. Od pripadnika antičke filozofije istaknuti su Platon, Aristotel, Epiktet i Epikur, usuglašeni u tome da je za dobar i smislen život potrebna duhovna kultura samoga sebe. Potom se osvrćemo na filozofiju egzistencije i njezine temeljne pojmove kao što su sloboda i odgovornost, s naglaskom na individualnu pronalasku smisla osobe.

Radom se nastoji: 1) objasniti ulogu i značaj smisla života; 2) prikazati neke od ključnih točaka u poimanju smisla života u antičkoj filozofiji i egzistencijalizmu te njihovim sličnostima i razlikama; 3) prikazati logoterapiju – psihoterapijski pravac predmetno usredotočen na smisao; i 4) ukazati na nezaobilaznu ulogu filozofije u potrazi za smislom.

Nastoji se i evaluirati te pokazati da je pitanje smisla te njegova zahvaćanja i raskrivanja čovjeku univerzalno svojstveno, kao i da je to pitanje na koje se kroz povijest nastojalo odgovoriti na razne načine. Zaključuje se da se smisao može pronaći uz pomoć Drugoga i da do smisla svaki pojedinac dolazi svojim vlastitim individualnim putem i načinom.

**Ključne riječi:** svrha života, smisao života, logoterapija, Viktor E. Frankl, egzistencijalizam.

### UVOD

Čovjek je određen na brojne načine – biološki/genetski, socijalno/društveno, kulturološki, vremenski i geografski. Čovjek ne može birati kada ili gdje je rođen, tko će mu biti roditelji itd., odnosno određen je samim kontekstom svojega postojanja. Dakle, egzistencija čovjeka uvjetovana je na brojne načine. Međutim, čovjeka

\* Filozofski fakultet, Sveučilište u Zagrebu, Hrvatska.

\*\* Fakultet filozofije i religijskih znanosti, Sveučilište u Zagrebu, Hrvatska.

Adresa za korespondenciju: Luka Janeš, Fakultet filozofije i religijskih znanosti, Sveučilište u Zagrebu, Jordanovac 110, Zagreb, Hrvatska. E-pošta: luka.janes@ffrz.unizg.hr.

neminovno zahvaćaju i filozofska, odnosno egzistencijalna određenja – smrtnost, moral, sloboda i odgovornost te odnosi s drugim ljudima, kao i pojam smisla, čiji je pronalazak i raskrivanje bitna egzistencijalna potreba svakoga čovjeka. Kao što to slikovito opisuje Maslowljeva piramida potreba (Maslow, 1943), potreba za smislom nalazi se na samome vrhu, odnosno predstavlja potrebu koja je inherentna jedino i isključivo čovjeku. Naime – jedino je čovjek biće orijentirano na svrhu i vrijednost, pa je stoga i smisao nešto što je inherentno samo čovjeku. No što li je to što čovjeka usmjerava da svijet i svoj život promatra kroz naočale smisla?

Pitanje smisla oduvijek je prisutno u filozofiji, religiji i u svakodnevnome promišljanju, a u ovome će se radu objasniti kroz povijesni pregled od antičke filozofije preko filozofije egzistencije, pa do logoterapije i egzistencijalne analize, nastojavši istraživački ukazati na temeljne misli i pojmove povezane sa smislom – sreću, vrlinu, dobra i svrhu. Na samom početku zapadne filozofske misli postavlja se pitanje o smislu, a u fokus ono ponovno na velika vrata dolazi kroz filozofiju egzistencije i egzistencijalizam, iz čijeg je predmetnog okrilja nastala upravo i logoterapija. S obzirom na to da je logoterapija psihoterapijski pravac prvenstveno fokusiran na pronalaženje smisla, tvrdimo da kao takav može poslužiti kao jasan primjer koji ilustrira značaj i ulogu psihoterapijskih tehnika usmjerenih na poticanje empatije i povezanosti s drugima te ponuditi valjane načine i modalitete traganja za smislom.

## ZAŠTO UOPĆE SMISAO ŽIVOTA?

Pitanje smisla života oduvijek je bilo povezano s poimanjem onoga što se smatra dobrim životom, odnosno dobro je približno jednako smislenome, odnosno onome što treba činiti. Pritom je kroz povijest ono što se smatralo dobrim bilo određeno na razne načine. Povijest zapadne civilizacije, koja je kao obrazac procesom globalizacije postala dominantna, određena je svojom prepoznatljivom izvornom (grčkom) filozofijom i religijom, odnosno kršćanstvom. Filozofija i religija bile su preskripcija onoga što je dobro. Međutim, u 20. stoljeću preskriptivnost gubi na snazi jer više se ne zna što je to dobar život, a posljedično i što je to smisleno – što Viktor E. Frankl naziva „egzistencijalnim vakuumom” (Frankl, 1962). Kada se nastoji propisati što treba činiti, tada smo na polju etike i etičkoga, pritom analizirajući što je to dobro i prema kojim se kriterijima treba procjenjivati i odlučivati što je dobro.

Nedostatak znanja o tome što je dobar i smislen život u današnjici posljedica je složenih društvenih, kulturnih i povijesnih promjena.<sup>1</sup> Nakon Drugoga svjetskog rata

<sup>1</sup> Dakako, pritom ne treba idealizirati prošlost i smatrati kako pojedinac današnjice teže pronalazi smisao ili da je nesretniji, kao ni suprotno. S obzirom na to da ne možemo napraviti sociološko ili psihološko istraživanje o ljudima iz prošlosti, to je epistemološka granica koju ne možemo prijeći.

započelo je doba tzv. postmodernizma, razdoblje promjena i raspada tradicionalnih vrijednosti. U tome su razdoblju ustaljene norme i uvjerenja, koje su pružale sigurnost i smjernice, zbog strahota i neizvjesnosti koje je donijelo 20. stoljeće počele gubiti svoj smisao. Kao rezultat mnogi su se osjećali izgubljeno, bez jasne orijentacije i svrhe. U potrazi za srećom i smislom dogodio se zaokret k materijalnim stvarima – nastojanju za osjećajem (kratkotrajnoga) zadovoljstva, što je zapravo bijeg od vlastita identiteta i stvarnoga života. To je poput bijega u iluziju koja na kraju samo zamagljuje stvarne probleme i postaje prepreka u pronalasku istinskoga smisla.

Lukas, orijentacijski napominjući, rasvjetljava:

Jedan od najvećih problema nove nastajuće epohe u ljudskoj povijesti jest upravo to da predvidljivost opada u mnogim područjima života i znanosti. S porastom izvedivosti postaje sve kompliciranije procijeniti posljedice djelovanja. Može se manipulirati genima i atomima, može se robote opremiti inteligencijom i potencijalom za učenje, sile prirode mogu se okrenuti naopačke... ali ne može se točno znati kamo će ovo ili ono dovesti. *Smanjivanje predvidljivosti otežava potragu za smislom*, i to ne samo u životu pojedinca. Sljedeći će naraštaji morati marljivo raditi na dodatnoj senzibilizaciji svog „organa za smisao” – savjesti – (Frankl) da bi udovoljili zahtjevima svoga vremena. (Lukas, 2022, str. 48)

Međutim, na početku rasprave o smislu potrebno je definirati značenje toga pojma. Kada u svakodnevnome govoru upotrebljavamo riječ smisao, njezino je značenje jasno. Ono je u hrvatskome jeziku definirano na sljedeći način:

1. **a.** značenje čega [*smisao riječi; u punom (pravom) smislu (riječi)*] upravo ono što znači riječ kojom će se što nazvati ili koja slijedi] **b.** ukupnost vrijednosti i svrhe čega [*smisao života; nema smisla* **a.** besmisleno je, nema sadržaja **b.** razg. nema svrhe, neće koristiti]
2. (za što) sklonost prema čemu [*smisao za šah; imati smisla (za što)*] imati sklonosti prema čemu]. (Hrvatski jezični portal, 2025).

Za raspravu o smislu života najrelevantnija je definicija vezana uz ukupnu vrijednost i svrhu čega. Već ovdje nazire se poteškoća u definiranju smisla – istraživački nas navodeći do drugih filozofskih pojmova.

Tako dolazimo do distinkcije svrhe i smisla. Svrha jest određena vrsta cilja, odnosno nečega prema čemu se stremlji, a smisao je značenje koje određena kratkotrajna ili dugotrajna situacija ima za pojedinca. Međutim, kada se govori o smislu života kao značenju, ne traži se značenje u smislu informacije ili informiranosti, već se traži svrhoviti smisao. Štoviše, odgovor na pitanje o smislu života ne može biti činjenično znanje ili se kao takvo može prenijeti drugima. (Brown, 1971; Dilman, 1965) Drugim riječima, želi se odgovoriti na temeljno filozofsko pitanje, a ono glasi: „Zašto?” Međutim, čemu se uopće pita: „Zašto?” Zato što se nastoji pronaći razlog koji će biti motivacija, ono što će biti točka koja će biti oslonac i temelj za daljnje

djelovanje. Ono što čovjeka prvenstveno pokreće u životu razne su vrste ugone, od materijalnih, preko tjelesnih, sve do emocionalnih i intelektualnih. Drugim riječima – zadovoljenje različitih potreba. Međutim, kao što to pronicljivo utvrđuje Sigmund Freud, čovjek ne može težiti direktnom zadovoljenju potreba, već svoje zadovoljstvo odgađa u svrhu onih potreba za koje smatra da su mu u najvećoj mjeri neophodne, kao što je to preživljavanje (Freud, 1988). Međutim, događa se i obrnuto, čovjek nadilazi svoje potrebe i pronalazi načine „više svrhe” koje služe kao motivacija, odnosno način postizanja svojevrsne besmrtnosti. Neki od njih su sljedeći:

[...] (1) biološki način – nastavak življenja kroz svoje potomstvo, kroz beskrajni lanac bioloških veza; (2) teološki način – nastavak življenja na drugačijoj, višoj razini postojanja; (3) kreativni način – nastavak življenja kroz vlastita djela, kroz trajni utjecaj vlastite osobne kreacije ili utjecaj na druge [...]; (4) tema vječne prirode – čovjek preživljava kroz ponovno spajanje s kovitlajućim životnim silama prirode; (5) iskustveni transcendentni način – kroz „gubljenje sebe” u stanju koje je toliko intenzivno da vrijeme i smrt nestaju i čovjek živi u „kontinuiranoj sadašnjosti”. (Yalom, 1980, str. 41–42)

Navedeno jasno ilustrira kako ti načini postaju svrhe i ciljevi, a posljedično daju i smisao i značajnost životu. Smisao i svrha života, kao i zadovoljenje potreba, u direktnoj su povezanosti s time da se vodi „život vrijedan življenja”, kao i sa srećom u životu, odnosno onim što znači „biti sretan u životu” (Brown, 1971; Dilman, 1965). Filozofi jasno upućuju na to da sreća nije naprosto jednostavno stanje ugone, odnosno odsutnosti patnje, već je „biti sretan” vrlo neodređena kategorija koja može uključivati vlastito samoostvarenje, stanje uma i subjektivno zadovoljstvo, ili pak suočavanje sa samim životom (vidi u Aristotel, 1988; Epikur, 2005; Frankl, 1987; Platon, 2009; Sartre, 1981).

## SMISAO ŽIVOTA U ANTICI

U razmatranju kojega god filozofskoga fenomena svakako je nezaobilazan Platon. On, naime, smatra kako je upravo filozofija način na koji se može ostvariti sreća i smisao života, pri čemu filozofija nije samo znanost, nauk ili znanje, već je i način života, vrijednosti i kreposti (Platon, 1996; 2009). Sve se navedeno pritom može naučiti te se stječe tijekom života. Prema Platonu, ono što filozofija nudi svojevrsni je intelektualni život i uživanje u njemu, tj. spoznavanje samih ideja. Onoga metafizičkoga, a sa svrhom nadilaženja onoga materijalnoga i svjetovnoga. Kao suprotnost tome navodi primjer života koji je nesretan,<sup>2</sup> a to je svakako život tiranina. Naime, tiranin nema

<sup>2</sup> Naime, tiranin je 729 puta nesretniji od filozofa. Riječima samoga Platona: „Nije li nužno duša njegova puna mnogoga ropstva i neslobode, ne robuju li oni dijelovi njezini, koji su bili najčestitiji, a ne gospoduje li najopakiji i najmahnitiji? – Nužno“ (Platon, 2009, str. 344, 577 d), a one koji nemaju kreposti opisuje sljedećim riječima:

četiri kardinalne vrline, odnosno umjerenost, hrabrost, mudrost i pravednost, i zbog toga ne može biti sretan jer je, prema Platonu, sreća proizvod unutarnje harmonije. S druge strane, oni koji teže idejama te njihovom spoznavanju i krepostima vodit će sretan i smislen život.

Svrha (grč. *telos*) je pojam koji se koristi i istražuje sve od antičke grčke filozofije, a u središte po prvi put dolazi kod Aristotela. Naime, Aristotel upravo nastoji odgovoriti na pitanje zašto (Aristotel, 2001, 980a), i to zašto uopće nešto i sve postoji. Svrhu definira kao jedan od četiriju uzroka (Aristotel, 2001, 1013a, str. 30–35) (lat. *causa finalis*) i pozicionira je kao već inherentno prisutnu u svemu kao uzrok, a ujedno i kao cilj. Prema Aristotelu, za čovjeka je svrha blaženstvo (grč. *eudaimonia*):<sup>3</sup> „S tom se odredbom slaže i nazor da blažen čovjek i živi blaženo i blaženo čini; jer već rekosmo da je blaženstvo dobro življenje i dobro činjenje” (Aristotel, 1988, 1098a, str. 19–22). Dakle, svrha je čovjeka postići blaženstvo, a ono je djelovanje prema razumu – činjenje dobra i postizanje vrline. Suvremenim rječnikom rečeno – usavršavanje samoga sebe. Već je kod Aristotela svrha čovjeka orijentirana prema onome što čovjeka čini različitim od drugih bića, a to je razum. Također i prema drugim ljudima, odnosno činjenju dobra.

Stoici i epikurejci kao primarni cilj duhovnoga stanja prema kojemu treba težiti postavljaju ataraksiju (grč. *ἀταραξία*), odnosno riječima samoga Epikura:

Ne može se ugodno živjeti, a da se ne živi razborito i lijepo i pravedno, a ni razborito i lijepo i pravedno, a da se ne živi ugodno. Tko ne može tako živjeti (tj. razborito i lijepo i pravedno), ne može živjeti ugodno. (Epikur, 2005, str. 39)

Stoici pak naglašavaju neovisnost pojedinca o djelovanju i mišljenju drugih i onoga izvanjskoga. Glavna je zadaća čovjeka prepoznati ono što je izvan prostora njegova vlastitoga utjecaja i to prihvatiti takvim kakvo jest. Te prepoznati ono što može mijenjati i to pokušati promijeniti da bude u skladu s njegovim uvjerenjima (Epiktet, 2002).

Već se modus antičkoga mišljenja zapravo dotaknuo smisla i svrhe kako na njih i danas gledamo. Međutim, prostor ljudskoga uma i njegova traženja smisla ostao je filozofski neistražen sve do pojave filozofije egzistencije. Dok je u antičkoj Grčkoj

„Koji su dakle bez razumnosti i kreposti, a uvijek su na gozbama i u sličnim užiticima, oni, kako se čini, lete dolje i natrag prema sredini i tu se motaju za života. To ne prekoračuju, nikada doista gore ne pogledaju niti uzlete, ne napune se pravoga bitka, ne okuse stalne i čiste naslade. Kao blago gledaju uvijek dolje, sagnuti su na zemlju i na stolove, hrane se krmom i pare se, i radi te lakomosti udaraju i bodu jedni druge željeznim rogovima i kopitima, te se iz nesitosti ubijaju, budući da bitka svojega i posude svoje ne pune pravom hranom.” (Platon, 2009, str. 356, 586 b)

<sup>3</sup> U hrvatskome jeziku pojam *eudaimonia* prevodi se kao blaženstvo, a u engleskome kao *happiness*. U hrvatskome jeziku pojam „sreća” ima više značenja, pa utoliko nije najsretnije rješenje. Međutim, jasne su konotacije koje pojam sreće ima s blaženstvom. Također se radi o tome da čovjek postigne život u kojem je sretan.

smisao bio zadan u pogledu društvenih uloga i očekivanja, razvitkom civilizacije i dobivanjem sloboda u društvenome kontekstu dolazi do izostanka i gubitka smisla, ali također i pokušaja traganja za smislom.

## SMISAO ŽIVOTA U EGZISTENCIJALIZMU

Filozofija egzistencije<sup>4</sup> javlja se kao odgovor na njemački idealizam, filozofiju koja naglašava ljudsku slobodu. U filozofiji egzistencije po prvi put u središte dolazi pojedinac i njegov unutarnji svijet (emocija), a čovjek postaje konkretno biće koje napušta metafizičke zadanosti. Upravo pomoću smještanja filozofije u kontekst doživljenog iskustva radi se iskorak u odnosu na ranije, objektivistički orijentirane (Aho, 2023). Egzistencijalizam<sup>5</sup> se pak javlja u drugoj polovici 20. stoljeća kao odgovor na stradanja i strah koji su se događali tijekom prve polovice 20. stoljeća (Aho, 2023) i koji su proizveli nedostatak smisla, uz izraženo beznade i tjeskobu. Upravo na njih mnogim linijama elaboracije odgovara egzistencijalizam. Drugim riječima:

[...] pod egzistencijalizmom razumijemo nauku koja ljudski život čini mogućim i, osim toga, objavljuje da svaka istina i svaka akcija uključuju sredinu i ljudsku subjektivnost. (Sartre, 1964, str. 6)

Dakle, radi se o premještanju pozicije središta istine i vrijednosti. Umjesto jednoga objektivnog, metafizičkog i transhistorijskog – središte postaje svaki čovjek pojedinačno, smješten u svoj individualni kontekst, situaciju i iskustvo. Stoga, svaki je čovjek na svoj način definiran svojom egzistencijom, a smisao je nešto što se traži. Naime, put filozofije od Heideggerove bačenosti u egzistenciju prije Drugoga svjetskog rata (Heidegger, 1985) vodi do bačenosti u svijet u kojemu je potrebno iskoristiti slobodu (na koju smo također osuđeni) i biti odgovoran te pronaći smisao. Kao što to govori čuvena Sartreova poslovice: „Egzistencijalizam je humanizam.” Dakle, riječ je o tome da smisao nije nešto unaprijed zadano, nešto što naprosto

<sup>4</sup> U hrvatskome jeziku i nazivlju, za razliku od, npr. engleskog, postoji distinkcija između filozofije egzistencije, čiji su predstavnici Søren Kierkegaard, Friedrich Nietzsche i Karl Jaspers, te egzistencijalizma, čiji su glavni autori Jean-Paul Sartre i Albert Camus. Sartre razliku pronalazi u tome što su prvi bili kršćansko orijentirani, a potomji ateistički (Sartre, 1964, str. 8), dok se druga ključna razlika nalazi u tome što egzistencijalizam naglasak stavlja na odnose s drugim ljudima (Hrvatska enciklopedija). Kao kritičko proširenje Sartreovoj misli iznosimo primjer logoterapije i egzistencijalne analize Viktora Frankla, usmjerene spram duhovnoj dimenziji bivstvjućih, unutar koje on promatra „zavičaj smisla”. U narednome poglavlju članka to nadalje proširujemo mišlju E. Cohena, predstavnika filozofske prakse i utemeljitelja metode LBT (*Logic-based Therapy*), koja objedinjuje egzistencijalni, antički i psihoterapijski horizont u vidu filozofskoga savjetovanja.

<sup>5</sup> Egzistencijalizam je mnogo širega radijusa od isključivo filozofskoga pravca. Naime, radi se i o umjetničkome pravcu koji prvenstveno uključuje književnost, ali i druge vrste umjetnosti poput filma i slikarstva (Aho, 2023). Dakle, egzistencijalizam je i društveni i umjetnički pokret.

inherentno posjedujemo, već sam čin postojanja i bivanja čovjekom uključuje potragu za smislom.

Sloboda na koju smo osuđeni može se činiti ispraznom, hladnom i otuđujućom, čak do te mjere da izaziva osjećaj mučnine, koji Sartre opisuje sljedećim riječima:

Postojim po onome, što ja mislim... a ja ne mogu da prestanem misliti. U ovome istome času – to je grozno – ako postojim, *to je zato, jer se užasavam* što postojim. To sam ja *to sam ja* koji se izvlačim iz ništavila za kojim težim; mržnja, odvratnost na postojanje, to su samo mnogi načini *koji me potiču* na postojanje, na zagnjurivanje u opstanak. Misli se rađaju iza mene kao vrtoglavica, osjećam ih gdje se rađaju iza moje glave... Ako popustim, one će izbiti naprijed, među moje oči – a ja popuštam uvijek, misao deblja, deblja, eto nje, beskonačno, gdje me ispunja cijeloga i obnavlja moj opstanak. (Sartre, 1981, str. 100)

Upravo je sloboda u kombinaciji s odgovornošću ono što može dovesti do pronalaska smisla. U egzistencijalističkoj tradiciji pronalazak smisla za svakoga je individualan. On može biti trenutak u kojemu umjetnost dodiruje čovjeka (Sartre, 1981), a može biti i trenutak pomirenja s besmisлом, što je također pronalazak smisla (Camus, 1998).<sup>6</sup>

[...] čovjek najprije egzistira, da sebe susreće, iskršava u svijetu i da zatim sebe definira. Ako se čovjek, kakvog ga poima egzistencijalist, ne može definirati, to je zato što on najprije nije ništa. On će tek poslije biti, i bit će takav kakvim će sebe učiniti. Tako nema ljudske prirode, jer nema boga da je pojmi. Čovjek je ne samo takav kakvim sebe pojmi nego i takav kakav sebe hoće, i kako sebe pojmi nakon egzistencije, kako sebe hoće nakon tog poleta spram egzistencije; čovjek nije ništa drugo nego ono što od sebe čini. Takvo je prvo načelo egzistencijalizma. (Sartre, 1964, str. 10–11)

Odgovornost je ključna zato što smo sami odgovorni uopće stupiti na put potrage za smislom. Jednako je tako moguće odustati od potrage za smislom, ali na taj način ne postizemo životnu zadaću koju imamo – jer smisao nije unaprijed dan. U nastavku će logoterapija poslužiti kao konkretan primjer kako se smisao može tražiti i pronaći.

## PRIMJER LOGOTERAPIJE

Logoterapija, odnosno njezin tvorac Viktor E. Frankl, također je dio egzistencijalističkoga nasljeđa (Aho, 2023). Logoterapija dolazi od grčke riječi *logos*, čije je jedno od značenja smisao, pa već etimološki ima značenje terapije smislom. Ona nudi tehnike kojima logoterapeuti pomažu klijentima/osobama osvijetliti

<sup>6</sup> Upravo je navedeno nešto čemu su upućene najveće kritike egzistencijalizma. Naime, kritika se sastoji u tome što tvrdi da je egzistencijalizam fatalizam, pesimizam i beznađe. Međutim, upravo kroz odgovornost za druge nazire se optimizam i humanizam, koji je u njemu inherentno sadržan.

smisao vlastita života, a posebno je zanimljiva u okviru filozofije zato što je iz nje i potekla. Ona, najjednostavnije rečeno, proučavajući suštinu ljudske egzistencije, u centar stavlja ljudsku potrebu za smislom koji svaki čovjek ostvaruje kroz život, a koji je jedinstven i neponovljiv za svaku osobu (Dilman, 1965; Huang, 2024). Pronaći smisao, smatra Frankl, zadaća je svakoga pojedinca jer: „Ljudsko biće nestaje ako se ne posveti nekom slobodno odabranom smislu. Naglasak je na slobodnom izboru” (Frankl, 1962, str. 100). Naglasak je stavljen na egzistencijalističko poimanje slobode, ali i kao što ćemo vidjeti u nastavku – prvenstveno na odgovornosti. Štoviše, kao što je to običaj s egzistencijalizmom, naglasak je stavljen na pojedinca, na njegovu konkretnost.

Svaki je čovjek jedinstven i neponovljiv. Kao što je to i čovjek kojem pripada, svaki smisao je jedinstven i neponovljiv, namijenjen isključivo toj osobi. Budući da je smisao jedinstven, stvar je osobnoga otkrivenja. Svatko ga mora naći sam, otkriti ga sam, a takvo otkriće ima jedinstveni smisao (Frankl, 1987, str. 36). Međutim, bez obzira na to što je svaki smisao jedinstven, smisao se ipak pronalazi na slične načine – jedan od njih, onaj koji je ključan je Drugi.<sup>7</sup>

Čovjeku su potrebni Drugi kako bi mogao preživjeti. Međutim, za čovjeka Drugi nisu naprosto način preživljavanja, već mnogo više. Svrhu i smisao otkrivamo i postižemo u povezivanju s Drugima, odnosno u ulogama koje obnašamo, u međusobnim odnosima, u zajednici.<sup>8</sup> Međutim, naglasak je na ljubavi, međusobnom poštovanju i brizi za Druge. Moralno je djelovanje vid potonjega i može pridonijeti osjećaju samoostvarenja, osjećaju svrhe i smisla.

Elliot D. Cohen znakovito navodi:

Ovaj splet vrlina temelji se na poštovanju prema sebi i prema drugima. Psiholog Albert Ellis to poštovanje definira kao bezuvjetno prihvaćanje sebe i drugih (Ellis, 2001, str. 84). To znači da ni sebe, a ni druge ne procjenjujemo prema ponašanju, uspjehu ili učinku, već da ih prihvaćamo kao vrijedna ljudska bića – neovisno o tome koliko je neka njihova (ili naša) izvedba bila dobra. To ne znači da moramo prihvatiti sve što netko kaže ili učini. Naprotiv, ključna je razlika između prihvaćanja osobe i prihvaćanja

<sup>7</sup> Kada je riječ o Drugome, neophodno je spomenuti Emmanuela Lévinasa i Martina Bubera. Naime, radi se o odnosu čovjeka prema čovjeku. Lévinas naglašava kako se čovjek nikada ne smije reducirati na objekt jer se na polju etike odvija susret s Drugim koji poziva na odgovornost, odgovornost koja je asimetrična, koja nije određena nikakvim prethodnim ni budućim radnjama Drugoga, već je bezuvjetna (Lévinas, 1976). Buberova filozofija dijaloga pak naglašava razliku između Ja-Ti odnosa i Ja-Ono odnosa. Ja-Ti odnos neposredan je, autentičan i istinski odnos s Drugim koji je potrebno kultivirati, za razliku od Ja-Ono odnosa koji Drugoga pokušava opisati, definirati i svesti na objekt (Buber, 2020).

<sup>8</sup> Na ovome mjestu ponovno je vidljiva poveznica s antikom. Također je riječ o naglasku na povezanost s Drugima. Već Aristotel (1988, str. 1252) navodi kako je zajedništvo najveće dobro, a Epikur to formulira na sljedeći način: „Od svega što mudrost sprema za blaženstvo cijelog života kudikamo je najvažnije sticanje prijateljstva.” (Epikur, 2005, str. 42)

njezinih riječi i dijela. Mogu u cijelosti odbaciti ono što si rekao kao netočno ili pogrešno, a da pritom ne odbacim tebe kao osobu. (Cohen, 2025, str. 100)

Upravo u prihvaćanju osoba u horizontu društvene univerzalnosti vrlina, upravo u zajedništvu pojedinac može spoznati svoju jedinstvenost i neponovljivost, a samim time i svoj smisao. Upravo usmjerenošću na Druge raskriva cjelovitost smjera vlastitoga bivstvovanja.

Postoji također recipročna veza između bezuvjetnog prihvaćanja sebe i drugih. Kako Ellis (2001) oštroumno primjećuje, kada ljudi u potpunosti prihvate sami sebe, tada su skloni potpuno prihvaćati i druge, i vice versa. Takvi su pojedinci izvanredni u postizanju osobnih ciljeva, kao i u međuljudskim odnosima. (Cohen, 2025, str. 101)

Nadalje, unutarnja ograničenja i nesavršenosti svakoga pojedinca imaju ključnu ulogu u oblikovanju njegove jedinstvenosti i nezamjenjivosti unutar društvenoga konteksta. Kada bi svi ljudi bili savršeni i potpuno jednaki, svaki bi pojedinac postao zamjenjiv, što bi dovelo do gubitka osobne važnosti. Upravo nesavršenosti pojedinca omogućuju njegovo jedinstveno mjesto u društvu. Te nesavršenosti čine ga nezamjenjivim u cjelini, jer svaka osoba doprinosi zajednici na specifičan i jedinstven način. Ovaj se odnos može usporediti s mozaikom u kojem svaki djelić, promatran izolirano, djeluje nesavršen i nepotpun, ali unutar cjeline pridonosi stvaranju harmonične slike. Pojedinac ima vrijednost ne samo kroz vlastitu egzistenciju, već i kroz odnos prema cjelini – prema zajednici u kojoj živi i djeluje. Na taj način jedinstvenost pojedinca dobiva dublji smisao u širem društvenom kontekstu.

Važno je naglasiti da ovaj odnos nije jednosmjernan. Dok individualna egzistencija dobiva smisao kroz zajednicu, zajednica također treba pojedince kako bi sama ostvarila svoj puni potencijal. Zajednica kao cjelina crpi svoj identitet i svrhu iz različitosti i doprinosa svojih članova. Smisao individualnosti i jedinstvenosti pojedinca u potpunosti se ostvaruje kroz sudjelovanje u zajedništvu, a zajednica svoju svrhu nalazi upravo u raznolikim i nezamjenjivim doprinosima svakoga pojedinca. Upravo ta individualnost pojedinca zajednicu razlikuje od mase jer masa ne trpi nikakvu individualnost, a kamoli da bi individualna egzistencija u njoj mogla pronaći ispunjenje smisla (Frankl, 1993, str. 119).<sup>9</sup>

Uz pomoć jedne od psihoterapijskih tehnika u logoterapiji ilustrirat ćemo praktičan način na koji se može osvijestiti važnost i značenje Drugih, a posljedično i smisla. Autotranscendencija (samonadranje) u logoterapiji smatra se najvećim stupnjem razvoja ljudskog postojanja. Ona je specifično ljudski potencijal – djelovati i misliti

<sup>9</sup> Kada je riječ o odnosu pojedinca i zajednice, ne radi se o idealiziranome odnosu ili funkcionalističkome pristupu. Naime, sam je Frankl kao zatočenik u Auschwitzu živopisan primjer toga. Postoje pojedinci koji tvore svoj identitet i pronalaze smisao nasuprot, usprkos ili čak baš kroz suprotstavljanje zajednici, ali ono što je ključno jest odnos s Drugim. Bez obzira na pozicioniranje u društvu, nijedan čovjek nije otok sam za sebe.

izvan sebe samoga u postojanju za nešto ili za nekoga, u predanosti nekome zadatku ili prema Drugima (Lukas, 2022, str. 46). Autotranscendencija je usmjerenost na nekoga ili nešto, a njezina je srž zaboraviti na sebe i usmjeriti se na nekoga ili nešto drugo.

Stoga i shvaćam temeljnu antropološku činjenicu da biti čovjek znači uvijek biti nekako usmjeren, biti upravljen na nešto ili nekog drugog: na smisao koji valja ispuniti ili na susret s drugim čovjekom, na neki razlog koji treba udovoljiti ili na voljenu osobu. Postiže li čovjek istinsku ljudskost i svoje pravo sebstvo, tek utoliko što živi po pravilima samotranscendencije. Postiže, ali ne brigom o ostvarivanju svoga sebstva, već samozaboravom, predavanjem, dižući se iznad sebe i usredotočujući se na vanjski svijet. (Frankl, 1987, str. 33)

Autotranscendencija omogućuje pojedincu da se usmjeri izvan vlastitih potreba i uskladi svoje djelovanje s potrebama Drugih – nadilazi se vlastiti ego i otvara prostor za prepoznavanje tuđe patnje, radosti i stvarnosti, čime se razvija dublji osjećaj povezanosti s Drugima. Također, ima terapijski učinak za pojedinca jer pomaže da se vlastiti smisao pronađe kroz angažman za Druge; osoba pronalazi svrhu koja nadilazi vlastiti interes, fokusirajući se na doprinos zajednici, voljenim osobama ili zadatku koji je veći od nje same.

Elisabeth Lukas u djelu „Konkretna logoterapija“ (2023) kazuje:

Ono, što nama ljudima omogućuje da različito reagiramo na postojeće okolnosti jest naša sposobnost distanciranja (Frankl). Možemo se malo mentalno odmaknuti od samih sebe i s dobivenog odmaka osvrnuti se na same sebe. Prema tomu, svi emocionalni valovi u nama mogu se promatrati kao izvana; i mogu se kontrolirati samo u stanju tog izvanjskog promatranja. Ponekad dijalog sa samim sobom može pomoći razjašnjenju. [...] Sjajne savjete koje lako i rado imamo spremne za druge ljude možemo mirno davati samima sebi i uzimati ih k srcu. (Lukas, 2023, str. 46)

Empatiju bismo pojmovno mogli zahvatiti kao osnovu toga procesa jer pojedincu omogućava vidjeti vrijednost i smisao u djelovanju za Druge. Kako Frankl naglašava, život dobiva smisao u susretu s drugim ljudima i u posvećenosti nekome ili nečemu većem od vlastita postojanja. Tako empatija postaje sredstvo kroz koje pojedinac ne samo da doprinosi zajednici, nego i ostvaruje vlastitu svrhu, što je nužno za ispunjenje smisla života. Kao i zdravo oko koje samo sebe ne vidi, čovjek najbolje ispunjava sam sebe kada zaboravlja i ne misli na sebe, kada se jednostavno daje Drugima. Zaboravljajući sebe postaje osjećajniiji, a dajući sebe kreativniji (Frankl, 1987, str. 85).

Praktična primjena autotranscendencije i pronalaska smisla u suvremenome društvu može donijeti značajne koristi na različitim razinama – osobnoj, društvenoj i globalnoj – kroz usmjerenost na Druge omogućavajući djelovanje izvan vlastitih interesa i rad

na promicanju jednakosti i pravednosti. Primjenom autotranscendencije u ovim suvremenim izazovima, pojedinci i zajednice mogu ostvariti veći stupanj harmonije, solidarnosti i održivosti. Kroz empatiju prema Drugima i usmjerenost na opće dobro, ljudi ne samo da pronalaze smisao i ispunjenje u vlastitu životu, već i doprinose stvaranju boljšeg svijeta za sve. Pritom valja napomenuti da ovdje nipošto ne treba izgubiti iz vida empatiju prema sebi. Naime – zakidanjem vlastitih mogućnosti i kapaciteta altruističkim „preuzimanjem” tuđih problema i boli, ne uspijeva se dobiti harmoničnost društvenoga slijeda i poretka, već se otvara težina tereta samonametnute žrtve. Na taj način, čvrsto određujući vlastitu ulogu kao patničku, onemogućuje se vlastiti rast na krilima autotranscendencije usmjerene spram društvenoga kolektiviteta etičkih vrлина.

Kako smo ranije spomenuli, ljudi koji osuđuju sebe, često osuđuju i druge (stalno tražeći nedostatke) kako bi se oni osjećali bolje. S druge strane, bezuvjetno prihvaćajući sebe možeš uvidjeti, i to ispravno, kako je vrijednost svakog ljudskog bića neovisna o njegovim nedostacima koje primjećuješ. Tako, prigrlivši vlastito samopouzdanje, sposoban si bezuvjetno poštivati i druge te nadvladati možda i najveću prepreku na putu prema iskrenoj i trajnoj romantičnoj ljubavi. (Cohen, 2025, str. 101)

## ZAKLJUČAK

Prikazom triju poimanja smisla čovjeka – antičkoga, egzistencijalističkoga i logoterapijskoga – u ovome smo radu nastojali prikazati sljedeće: 1) kako je čovjek oduvijek, odnosno barem u proteklih dvije i pol’ tisuće godina, u trajnoj potrazi za smislom; 2) da je poimanje smisla života kroz povijest poprilično sličnog biljšega; 3) da logoterapija pokazuje snažan iscjeliteljski karakter potrage za smislom; i 4) da je filozofija u temelju pronalaska smisla.

Možda je upravo svrha filozofije neprestani pokušaj odgovaranja na pitanje o smislu čovjeka (Tartaglia, 2016). S obzirom na nepovoljan položaj u kojem se filozofija u suvremeno doba nalazi, akademski i tržišno, možda svoje mjesto može pronaći upravo u tome da bude učiteljica koja čovjeka vodi kroz putovanje prema smislu. Na taj bi način filozofija mogla ispuniti prazan prostor za čijim popunjavanjem postoji značajna potreba na mnogim planovima pojedinačne ljudske i opće društvene pojavnosti.

Antički filozofi smisao života doveli su u odnos s vrlinom, razboritošću, unutarnjom harmonijom i blaženstvom. S druge strane, egzistencijalizam naglašava slobodu i odgovornost svakoga pojedinca ponaosob, pri čemu je smisao nešto što svatko mora pronaći sam, kroz osobno iskustvo i djelovanje. Logoterapija kao temeljno egzistencijalistički pristup nudi put do smisla pomoću Drugoga. Umjesto hiper-

fokusiranosti na sebe i svoje probleme, umjesto egoizma, pomoću empatije čovjek je sposoban usmjeriti se na Drugoga, otvoriti se altruizmu. Empatija nam omogućava lakše usmjeravanje jer je ona jedan od načina na koji Drugoga možemo razumjeti, staviti se u „tude cipele” i prepoznati njegove potrebe. Na taj način, društvenim djelovanjem, djelovanjem za Drugoga, ostvarujemo svoj dublji smisao, pronalazimo svoju svrhu te naše djelovanje postaje smisljeno (Janeš, 2019).

U konačnici, čovjek o vlastitoj egzistenciji i smislu života postavlja razna pitanja – na neka od njih pokušava odgovoriti znanost, na neka religija, na neka pak filozofija – a u konačnici, iako može dobiti različite vidove pomoći, na njih mora odgovoriti on sam, na svoj autentičan individualan način.

## LITERATURA

- Aho, K. (2023). »Existentialism«, u: *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.
- Aristotel. (1988). *Nikomahova etika*. Zagreb: Globus.
- Aristotel. (2001). *Metafizika*. Zagreb: Medicinska naklada.
- Brown, D. (1971). Process Philosophy and the Question of Life's Meaning. *Religious Studies*, 7(1), 13–29.
- Buber, M. (2020). *Ja i ti*. Beograd: Factum izdavaštvo.
- Camus, A. (1998). *Mit o Sizifu*. Zagreb: Matica hrvatska, Zagreb.
- Cohen, E. (2025). *Vodite li ljubav ili se samo seksate?* Rijeka: Naklada Uliks.
- Dilman, I. (1965). Life and Meaning. *Philosophy*, 40(154), 320–333.
- Epiktet. (2002). *Knjižica o moralu; Razgovori*. Zagreb: CID-NOVA.
- Epikur. (2005). *Osnovne misli; Poslanice Herodotu i Poslanica Menekeju*. Beograd: Dereta.
- Frankl, V. E. (1962). Psychiatry and Man's Quest for Meaning. *Journal of Religion and Health*, 1(2), 93–103.
- Frankl, V. E. (1993). *Liječnik i duša*. Zagreb: Kršćanska sadašnjost.
- Frankl, V. E. (1987). *Nečujan vapaj za smislom*. Zagreb: Naprijed.
- Freud, S. (1988). *Nelagodnost u kulturi*. Beograd: Rad.
- Heidegger, M. (1985) *Bitak i vrijeme*. Zagreb: Naprijed.
- Huang, W. (2024) An Exploration of Needs within Maslow's Hierarchy of Motivation *Advances in Social Behavior Research*, 14, 41–44.
- „Filozofija egzistencije“. *Hrvatska enciklopedija, mrežno izdanje*. Leksikografski zavod Miroslav Krleža, 2013.–2025. Pristupljeno 10. 1. 2025. <https://www.enciklopedija.hr/clanak/filozofija-egzistencije>.
- „Smisao“. *Hrvatski jezični portal*. Pristupljeno 10. 1. 2025. <https://hjp.znanje.hr/index.php?show=search>
- Janeš, L. (2019). Tangente narcizma i psihoze u kontekstu aktualne ekološke krize, *Jabr – European Journal of Bioethics*, 10(1), 49–74.
- Lévinas, E. (1976). *Totalitet i beskonačno: ogled o izvanjskosti*. Sarajevo: Veselin Masleša.
- Lukas, E. i Schonfeld, H. (2023). *Konkretna logoterapija*. Zagreb: Oko tri ujutro.
- Lukas, E. (2022). *Osnove logoterapije*. Zagreb: Logos – Hrvatska udruga za logoterapiju.
- Maslow, A. (1943). A Theory of Human Motivation. *Psychological Review*, 50, 370–396.
- Platon. (2009). *Država*. Zagreb: Naklada Jurčić.
- Platon. (1996). *Eros i Filia*. Zagreb: Demetra.

- Sartre, J.-P. (1964). *Egzistencijalizam je humanizam*. Sarajevo: Veselin Masleša.
- Sartre, J.-P. (1981). *Mučnina, Reči; Zid*. Beograd: Nolit.
- Tartaglia, J. (2016). Is Philosophy All About Meaning of Life?. *Metaphilosophy*, 47(2), 283–303.
- Yalom, I. D. (1980). *Existential Psychotherapy*. Basic Books/Hachette Book Group.

## The meaning of life – from ancient Greek philosophy to existentialism and logotherapy

### SUMMARY

---

The meaning and purpose of life are connected with living a good and happy life, as well as with transcending needs and finding “higher purposes”. Prominent representatives of ancient philosophy include Plato, Aristotle, Epictetus, and Epicurus, who agree that spiritual cultivation of the self is necessary for a good and meaningful life. The paper then turns to existentialism and its fundamental concepts, such as freedom and responsibility, with an emphasis on the individual’s search for meaning. The paper aims to: 1) explain the role and significance of the meaning of life; 2) present some key points in the understanding of the meaning of life in ancient philosophy and existentialism, as well as their similarities and differences; 3) present logotherapy—a psychotherapeutic approach focused on meaning; and 4) highlight the role of philosophy in the search for meaning. It is shown that the question of meaning is universal to humans and that it is a question that has been attempted to be answered throughout history. It is concluded that meaning can be found with the help of the Other, and that each individual finds meaning in their own unique way.

**Keywords:** purpose of life, meaning of life, logotherapy, Viktor E. Frankl, existentialism.



Bojana Brajkov\*, Koshy Tharakan\*\*

## A 'Pathless Land' of compassion: An ethical perspective of Jiddu Krishnamurti and Zen Kōans

### SUMMARY

The connection between the metaphysics of the self and ethics is often relegated to the margins in the mainstream philosophies. Be it the empiricists following Hume concerning the gulf between the “is-ought” judgments or contemporary analytic philosophers who agree with G. E. Moore’s notion of the “naturalistic fallacy.” In this article, we focus on the relationship between the metaphysics of the self and its implications for ethics, particularly a bioethical perspective on the mental well-being of human beings in terms of compassion, empathy and love. Such a perspective has the potential of self-transformation by using the tools of Philosophical Counselling in tune with Krishnamurti’s insights and dialogues of Zen Kōans. Can we speak about empathy as a path or empathy as a goal? Also, can we speak about self-compassion and compassion for others as being separated or divided? The response lies beyond dualism, beyond categories that we are used to, that we are trained to see. Through the exploration of Krishnamurti’s insights on thought, memory, knowledge and experience, which show that these are always limited and therefore bring division and conflict, and then Zen Kōans as a dialogue between the master and a disciple(s), where disciple(s) should get freed from the ideas, forms, and all that is created by thought, we arrive at the place where duality ends. And where duality ends, there dwells empathy, love and compassion opening up possibilities for self-transformation through philosophising.

**Keywords:** compassion, empathy, love, thought, metaphysics of the self, well-being, Jiddu Krishnamurti, Zen Kōans.

\* Research Scholar in Philosophy, School of Sanskrit, Philosophy and Indic Studies, Goa University.

\*\* Professor of Philosophy, School of Sanskrit, Philosophy and Indic Studies, Goa University, India. ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9981-5984>.

*Correspondence Address:* Bojana Brajkov, School of Sanskrit, Philosophy and Indic Studies, Goa University, Taleigao Plateau, Goa - 403206, India. E-mail: [philosophy.bojana@unigoa.ac.in](mailto:philosophy.bojana@unigoa.ac.in)

As requested by the authors, this paper has not undergone any linguistic edits by the Editorial Board.

## INTRODUCTION

The connection between the metaphysics of the self and ethics is often relegated to the margins in the mainstream philosophies. Be it the empiricists following Hume about the gulf between the “is-ought” judgments or contemporary analytic philosophers who agree with G. E. Moore’s notion of the “naturalistic fallacy.” For Hume, the very notion of a ‘self’ is a chimaera (Penelhum, 1976, pp. 9-10). Moreover, according to Hume, one cannot legitimately derive an ‘ought’ judgment concerning values from a judgment solely about ‘facts.’ In other words, some values must be presupposed before making value judgments. G. E. Moore, elaborating on the naturalistic fallacy, poses the ‘open question’ argument and points out that ethical judgments like “X is good” cannot be about any natural properties that X possesses as the notion of ‘good’ is an unanalysable simple notion (Moore, 1903, pp. 6-10). Both these views made the relation between facts and values problematic and resulted in metaethical theories that dispense with the very notion of a cogent self as the source of our moral concerns. A contemporary philosopher, Sam Harris, understands the human brain as “an engine of belief” and argues that the gap between facts and values is bridgeable through beliefs (Harris, 2010, p. 14). Many recent studies defend a neurobiological basis of values (see Kavanagh et al., 2024).

The above philosophical positions necessitate a transcendental inquiry of the self. As pointed out by Sami Pihlström, human subjectivity must reflexively turn towards itself in order to examine its own capacities and limits. “We pragmatically need the notion of the transcendental self in order to understand ourselves as human beings” (Pihlström, 2016, p. 217). The notion of self for Krishnamurti and Zen Kōans are not to be understood in the sense of an enduring substance, but one that is reflective and as a transcendental source of our values such as love and compassion thereby making an integral connection between the metaphysics of self and ethics.

In this article, we wish to emphasize the relation between the metaphysics of the self and its implications for ethics, particularly a bioethical perspective on the mental well-being of human beings in terms of “compassion,” “empathy,” and “love” as enunciated by the philosopher Jiddu Krishnamurti as well as the wisdom embodied in the Zen Kōans. The recent Human Development Report by the United Nations Development Programme points out the paradox that at a time when humankind has achieved greater progress in technology and higher human development resulting in material well-being, the mental well-being of individuals has been on a steady course of decline over the last decade (United Nations Development Programme, 2024, p. 41). We believe Philosophical Counselling based on the insights of Krishnamurti and Zen Buddhism can bring personal transformation conducive to mental well-being.

According to Achim Steiner, “We face “a global gridlock,” exacerbated by a growing polarization within our countries, which translates into barriers to international cooperation” (United Nations Development Programme, 2024, p. v). Of course, to address this problem, we have to pay attention to both the material resources of nations and individuals, as well as the mental well-being of humans. How do we break the “global gridlock” that we are stuck with at the level of individuals? Can we speak about empathy as a path or empathy as a goal? Also, can we speak about self-compassion and compassion for others as being separated, or divided? The response lies beyond dualism, beyond categories that we are used to and trained to see. Through the exploration of Krishnamurti’s insights on thought, memory, knowledge and experience, which shows that these are always limited and therefore brings division and conflict, and then Zen Kōans as a dialogue between the master and a disciple(s), where disciple(s) should get freed from the ideas, forms, and all that is created by thought, we reach to the place where duality ends. And where duality ends, there dwells compassion, empathy and love which are the prerequisites to break the grid-lock at the level of the individuals.

Jiddu Krishnamurti’s insights are very important because of his profound understanding of what is ‘thought’ on the one hand and what is love, compassion, and meditation on the other hand. This can give a wonderful window to the topics we are currently exploring. We have also chosen Zen Kōans or Zen stories, which are in the form of a dialogue between a master and a disciple(s) - *mondo* (question and answer), where disciple(s) should get freed from the ideas, forms, and all that is created by thought. Both Krishnamurti and Zen Buddhism find representational thinking in terms of concepts/words inadequate to capture the reality. Rather, what they point out is an experiential way of understanding that results in self-awareness through meditation, compassion and empathy<sup>1</sup>.

## **JIDDU KRISHNAMURTI ON THOUGHT AND LOVE**

We shall first dwell on Jiddu Krishnamurti’s exploration of thought. “Thought is a response to memory” (Moffatt, 1976, p. 13). Memory is based on knowledge, and knowledge is based on experience - experiencing something, recollecting, remembering, and holding. We cannot have all the knowledge of the world. The experience is also limited, as we can never experience all there is. Therefore, all must always be “limited” - experience, knowledge, memory, and thought.

---

<sup>1</sup> In Continental Philosophy, Nietzsche and Heidegger have drawn our attention to the limitations of conceptual thinking and point out the possibilities of a ‘poetical thinking.’ Deleuze while agreeing with Heidegger, nonetheless explores alternate ways of thinking attuned to imagination and intuition. See in this regard, “The Limits of Conceptual Thinking” (Bernet, 2014, pp. 219-241).

Thought always operates from the past, experience has already passed; thought recollect experience and then project the idea of the future, of what might happen. And from there, we react. We are always in the past or in the future, never in the now. And in that lies division - as one can have an idea of another, not actually seeing what is. Projection of the future, which is never now, is something based on the past and, therefore, not real. Let's take an example from the book *Krishnamurti and Psychotherapy: Beyond East and West*:

If I have an image about you and you have an image about me, naturally we do not see each other at all as we actually are. What we see are the images we have formed about each other which prevents us from being in contact, which keeps us separate. (Moffatt, 1976, p. 11)

We can never have complete knowledge about something that is alive, moving, and changing. We can have it when the change is done. That implies we are always approaching from the past, which is no more; it is dead. In that lies division. And the division is a conflict. If thought is in itself limited, if it is always in the past, projecting the future, it is always bringing a division. The thought had created religious, national, and all other divisions. Divided us into Germans, Hindus, Americans, Koreans, and so on. Thought can never see the whole.

One should observe this inwardly and psychologically. To observe the rise of the thought, to give its total attention, without the movement, without judging, liking, disliking, trying to change what is, just to stay with it. Krishnamurti compares the arising of thought with the blossoming of the flower that flourishes and then naturally fades and withers. Same with the thought. If one observes, without movement, without escaping it, or without imposing another idea on it, one will see this truth about how thought arises, its origin, and how it creates conflict.

By being alert, "choicelessly aware,"<sup>2</sup> transformation happens, and it is in the now; it is instant. And one is therefore free. "Freedom comes when I see and act immediately; the seeing is the acting. Freedom is not revolt because when I revolt it is a reaction, and that reaction sets up its own pattern and then I get caught in that pattern" (Moffatt, 1976, p. 14). In this awareness, there is no recollection, no 'scar' which will be in some other situation that same past from where we react. This is meditation for Krishnamurti. Meditation means to ponder over, to stay, and to observe. "To observe, not correct, not transcend, not run away from or suppress, but observe" (Krishnamurti, 1984, p. 57). That observation is in now, fresh, ever new. "The observer

---

<sup>2</sup> 'Choiceless awareness' is a syntagm that Krishnamurti often uses. "Choice implied direction, the action of the will. What K [Krishnamurti] was talking about was awareness from moment to moment of all that was taking place inside oneself without any effort to direct or change it—a matter of pure observation, perception, which would result in change without effort" (Lutyens, 1983, p. 34).

is the observed” (Krishnamurti, 1999, p. 23). Meditation is not sitting in some special position, breathing, or any kind of exercise, but it is this awareness and watchfulness of what is. “Meditation is to be aware of every thought and feeling, never to say it is right or wrong, but just to watch it and move with it. In that watching I can see the totality of myself in an instant” (Moffatt, 1976, p. 19). When that awareness is there, inwardly and outwardly are no longer separated. The dualism stops. And in that, one can be totally aware of the whole field of consciousness, not just about a fragment or some intellectualization, some part created by the mind.

Is there something that is beyond thought, beyond the structure of thought? Does love lie beyond thought? What is compassion and empathy in relation to thought and love? What is love? Krishnamurti is taking us through what is not love.<sup>3</sup> Love is not pleasure; it is not mere sensation, fulfilment, attachment, dependence, calculation, or any kind of self-interest. Love has nothing to do with the thought. Where there is thought, there is no love. Love is completely different from thought. When one is in constant struggle, when one is seeking pleasure through sensation, or when there is self-interest, there cannot be love.

One cannot explore what love is from the idea of what thought has been made of it, be it “love,” “compassion,” or “empathy.” Because then it becomes just another projection of the thought. It is an observation that will by itself bring the answer. When one sees this, through meditation, there is a release of the tremendous energy, which was once used in conflict.<sup>4</sup> When it is released, that energy becomes passion. That passion is the base for compassion. It is the base for discovering what is. Krishnamurti states that love is the highest form of compassion. Empathy is the outcome of love. Love, compassion or empathy are all in the same realm, but as language creates duality, we talk about them as seemingly separate. This insight is fresh, new; therefore, it is pathless and patternless. It is organic. There is no mechanism. As it cannot be done by repetition, there is no authority, and it has to be done by oneself. Awareness is always fresh.

## ZEN KŌANS AND THE GREAT COMPASSION

Zen Sect of Buddhism does not have a doctrine to believe in, nor has it a formulated philosophy, as it does not have anything to say. And it does not have anything to say

---

<sup>3</sup> This can be compared and captured in the idea of the *Vedic* analysis of negation, which Sankaracharya (the well-known *Advaitin*) uses - *Neti, neti* (Not this, not this). Through this method one who is inquiring - *Jnani* - is negating all that is not Self (*Atman*) and therefore all that is not *Brahman*, as for *Advaitins* (those who follow *Advaita Vedanta*) *Atman* is *Brahman*. Krishnamurti does not use it as an idea, but as the actuality he is having insight into, an alive inquiry.

<sup>4</sup> Conflict is using a lot of our energy and strength. It is the identities we sustain that result in conflict, the past thus interrupts the present. When there is the observation of it, conflict ends and in ending conflict, all energy is.

because the one who reached *Satori* – “seeing into one’s self-nature” (Abe, 1967, p. 60), instant awakening, or a brief moment of enlightenment - knows there is nothing to teach, everything is already there, it is obvious and there is nothing to be given as the teaching. Zen in Japanese or *Ch’an* in the Chinese language, can open and transform mountains (Heine, 2002, p. xiii). To do this inquiry is not easy, especially with words, what we are doing now, so one has to be careful, alert and aware of the duality of the words because we can easily slip into the frame of what is already known.

Zen Kōan is a story written as a dialogue between the master and a disciple(s) called *mondo* which is a form of question and answer. But very different dialogue than we are used to. They are part of the process where disciple(s) should get freed from the ideas, forms, and all that is created by thought, and it is there to shake their world so one can see the reality as it is, not through concepts and ideas. “The interplay enables the exchange partner to immediately discern and uproot the causes of his ignorance and to spontaneously gain insight into the true nature of reality beyond ordinary logic or language” (Heine, 2014, p. 1). Kōans, clear, sharp as a diamond, can trigger an instant awakening “...that is like the sun bursting through the clouds on a dreary day or a hammer smashing through solid rock” (Heine, 2014, p. 2). That is enlightenment. It is an extraordinary way; it is extraordinary dialogue, where the point is not reaching a conclusion, but the opposite, dissolving the idea of a conclusion, reaching the silence, where the realization that all is already here. Zen is “like a red-hot iron ball which you have gulped down and which you try to vomit, but cannot” (Blyth, 1966, p. 22).

One of the most known collections of Kōans is *The Gateless Gate*, also called *The Gateless Barrier*, a collection of 48 Zen Kōans, (there is one more added at the end, composed by Anwan, which makes it 49 in the classical edition) collected in the 13th century by Wumen (Mumonkan), with his comments and poems after every story - all this goes together, it is not separated, and the comment and poem is in itself a new Kōan. Disciples are asking questions and the master is responding: “A monk once asked Jōshū, “Has a dog the Buddha-Nature?” Jōshū answered, “*Mu!*” (No)” (Blyth, 1966, p. 22). *Mu* means No or Nothing, but in this case, it is just a sound.

Zen Kōans make the readers or explorers of Zen ultimately confused, when they understand that all gathered knowledge and logic on which they function in regular everydayness, they cannot use to understand the words in Zen Kōan. Those words look like some unfamiliar language or almost like being just thrown there. “Zen is properly concerned with the very origin before duality takes place” (Abe, 1967, p. 60). And words create duality. Thus, *The Gateless Gate* should leave the reader with no thought, because no thought can ever understand the nature of Buddha, the Buddhahood. Only in silence can that happen. This dialogue of master and

disciple(s) shows us the absurdity of thought, and it is why this dialogue takes us to thoughtlessness, which is silence in its origin.

At the beginning of *The Gateless Gate*, Mumonkan wrote a comment:

For the practical study of Zen, you must pass the barriers set up by the masters of Zen. The attainment of this mysterious illumination means cutting off the workings of the ordinary mind completely. ... Now what is this barrier? It is simply “Mu,” the Barrier of the Gate of Zen ... Those who have passed the barrier are able not only to have an intimate understanding of Jōshū, but also of the whole historic line of Zen Masters, to walk hand in hand with them, and to enter into the closest relation with them. You see everything with the same eye that they saw with, hear everything with the same ear. Is not this a blessed condition? Wouldn't you like to pass this barrier? Then concentrate your whole body, ... into this Question; ... hold it before you. But do not take it as nothingness, nor as the relative “not,” of “is” and “is not.” ... All the useless knowledge, ... throw them away! After a certain period of time, this striving will come to fruition naturally, in a state of internal and external unity. As with a dumb man who has had a dream, you will know it yourself, and for yourself only. Suddenly your whole activity is put into motion and you can astonish the heavens above and shake the earth beneath. ... You meet a Buddha? You kill him! A master of Zen? You kill him! Though you stand on the brink of life and death, you have the Great Freedom. (Blyth, 1966, pp. 31-32)

In this comment on the first Kōan, the Great Compassion (*Karuṇā*) and the Great Wisdom (*Prajña*) are given to us. “What makes Zen as such is that various *upāya* (good devices for salvation) naturally come out of the Great Compassion with the quickness of the echo following a sound. In Zen, properly speaking, *prajña* and *karuṇā* are not two but one” (Abe, 1967, p. 66). This brings us to the other aspect of Kōans and thoughtlessness, except being freed from ideas and concepts. It is related to the cause of action or/and reaction. We are mostly in the realm of thoughts, where we discuss actions - are they good or not, should we do something or not, but rarely we understand and consider the cause, from where the action is coming. Is it coming as a reaction to our past experiences which we carry with us unsolved? Can it be fresh, in now, coming from the silence of the mind? When Kōan breaks the known, ideas and concepts from the past which dictate our action or/and reaction, in that silence, rises the Great Compassion and Great Wisdom as not being separated.

Zen Buddhism is a school of Mahayana Buddhism, where the greatest importance is given to the achievement of Buddha's wisdom and powers to help all beings, which means liberation of all beings. In that itself lies the Great Compassion and empathy. “One can be rightly called “The true Man of no rank” when in him the Great Wisdom is backed up by the Great Compassion and the Great Compassion is backed up by the Great Wisdom” (Abe, 1967, p. 66).

## KRISHNAMURTI, ZEN AND PHILOSOPHICAL COUNSELLING

Seeing the insights of Krishnamurti and the wisdom of Zen Kōans, not merely intellectually, but actually,<sup>5</sup> we can approach the question of philosophical counselling and the role of one who is engaged in it. We can help another to understand and realize that this total revolution that Krishnamurti is speaking about is possible. Counsellors cannot bring that revolution to another, but it can be there as a mirror. “Serving as a mirror implies two things: first, the therapist has what Maslow calls Taoistic objectivity; second, the therapist is in some form of a transcending state” (Moffatt, 1976, p. 44). Zen Kōans or Krishnamurti’s words also serve as a mirror. And that mirror allows us choiceless awareness of thoughts, of the rise of thoughts, the origin, and its implications, without judging it or imposing the opposite to it. The self-transformative potential of Krishnamurti’s philosophy resonates with the idea of philosophical counselling as championed by Ran Lahav among others (Baniwal & Chaudhary, 2021, p. 2645).

As there are counsellors who are helping people with problems, frustrations and other unmet needs, there is a great need for “...meta-counselors to help with the soul-sickness that grows from unfulfilled meta-needs” (Moffatt, 1976, p. 42). Karl Jung calls for the awakening of one’s inner spirit.

To interfere with the life of things means to harm both them and one’s self. He who imposes himself has the small manifest might; he who does not impose himself has the great secret might... The perfected man does not interfere in the life of beings, he does not impose himself on them, but he helps all beings to their freedom. (Moffatt, 1976, p. 36)

From this, we may note that although both traditional counselling and what Tillmanns calls ‘philosophical counselling’ are grounded in a dialogical quest, philosophical counselling differs from traditional counselling.

...[In] traditional counselling [...] counsellors will listen to their clients through relatively fixed structures of thought such as DSM IV, for instance. Philosophers are more interested in the whole story, as a story, as an eyewitness account of life. What does this person’s account tell us about life? For the philosophical counsellor, the emphasis is on life as lived as opposed to the self. (Tillmanns, 2005, p. 4)

In other words, as the later Wittgenstein points out, philosophy is “therapeutic.” Philosophy simply puts everything before us as it is, and then there is nothing more to explain. It is like releasing us from the conceptual maze that we got into through the “bewitchment of our intellect by means of language” (Wittgenstein, 1958, p.

---

<sup>5</sup> Krishnamurti is often bringing us to the actuality of what is, away from mere intellectual concepts.

47<sup>c</sup>). The purpose of philosophy, according to Wittgenstein's later philosophy, is "To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle" (Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 103<sup>^</sup>).

More specifically,

Philosophy and Philosophical counselling start with everyday experiences that engender puzzlement, surprise, and wonder. Puzzlement, surprise and wonder speak to the person as a whole being and not just to her intellect. Philosophical counseling tries to bring back together mind and body which have been severed during the time of modernity. (Tillmanns, 2005, p. 7)

Thus, we may see that Krishnamurti, in his dialogical encounters as well as the Zen masters through the Kōans, are engaged with philosophizing as counselling, a process that touches the whole being of us.

## CONCLUSION

This paper explores 'thought' as obstacle to "passing" through the Gateless Gate. If we start exploring love, compassion, and empathy with thought, we will just invent new concepts, new patterns, and new ideals, which we project but do not actually investigate as what is. Thought is projecting; therefore, it will also find what it is projecting and declare it as truth. But for the truth, one has to ask open questions. To allow not to know the response "one should adopt a questioning mind, not a limited activity but a resolute inner position" (Tubali, 2023, p. 208). The dialogue that Krishnamurti has with the audience or with just one person "...seems strikingly similar to Socrates' and the Zen masters' stance that *aporía* is the necessary starting point of the true quest for wisdom" (Tubali, 2023, p. 209). The response cannot come from the gathered knowledge, memory, or thought that is in the past. It can only come through observation, and awareness first of what is. Raising questions, without the movement to answer them, as open questions, is the highest form of intelligence. It is like a child who sees a toy for the first time, observes it from all angles, and wonders about it.

Often, we talk about love in our age as self-love, i.e., love for oneself and love for another, being separate and distinct. As if they are exclusive, or as if they can exist separately. That is in the realm of the thought, which is again making a division between self-love and love for others. Rather, love just is. For example, there is no helping others or helping oneself; there is just an act of helping. Miro Jakovljević (2024) points out that there is no mental health without physical health and vice

versa.<sup>6</sup> We should start seeing things holistically, that there is no division between mental or physical health. Man/Woman is a whole Being. There is just health. Seeing what is, the reality of what is, first of all about oneself, having a look at oneself, brings the most sane, healthy life, as its natural outcome. Thus, the metaphysics of self as an undivided, not fragmented being, that is organic, as pointed out by Krishnamurti or as the Zen Kōans, show us that by extinguishing all thoughts of the ordinary minds, we can lead a life embodying the great compassion and love. From this perspective our whole ethical beingness is grounded in empathy, love and compassion. Here we may emphasise that our ethical values derive its source from the “transcendental self” as espoused at the beginning of this article. We also point out that one must go beyond the mind, for which no examples will ever be sufficient because all examples and language will lead to duality. Philosophical Counselling after Krishnamurti and Zen Buddhism is to realize our lives experientially, not conceptually, in terms of love and compassion. Such a life will be an appropriate response to foster the well-being of humanity even when we engage in the daily chores of our lives.

## REFERENCES

- Abe, M. (1967). Zen and Compassion. *The Eastern Buddhist*, 2(1), 54-68.
- Baniwal, V. & Chaudhary, A. (2021). Beyond Images: Implications of Krishnamurti's Ideas for Philosophical Counselling. *International Journal of Philosophical Practice*, 16(1), 2644-2654.
- Bernet, R. (2014). The Limits of Conceptual Thinking. *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, 28(3), 219-241.
- Blyth, R. H. (1966). *Zen and Zen Classics* (Vol. 4: Mumonkan). Tokyo: Hokuseido Press.
- Harris, S. (2010). *The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values*. New York: Free Press.
- Heine, S. (2002). *Opening a Mountain: Koans of the Zen Masters*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Heine, S. (2014). *Zen Koans*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.
- Jakovljević, M. (2024). Culture of Empathy and Promotion of Mental Health (Plenary Lecture). *Bioethics and Aporia of Psyche*, 8th International Transdisciplinary Symposium (9-10 May 2024). Centre for Bioethics, Faculty of Philosophy and Religious Studies, University of Zagreb, Croatia.
- Kavanagh, N., Prioleau, C., & Miller, B. (2024). Editorial: The Neurobiology of Values. *Frontiers in Neurology*, 15, 1-3. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fneur.2024.1377129>
- Krishnamurti, J. (1984). *The Flame of Attention*. San Francisco: Harper & Row Publishers.
- Krishnamurti, J. (1999). *Understanding Ourselves*. Hampshire: Krishnamurti Foundation Trust Ltd.
- Lutyens, M. (1983). *Krishnamurti: The Years of Fulfilment*. London: John Murray.
- Moffatt, R. (1976). *Krishnamurti and Psychotherapy: Beyond East and West* (M.Ed. Thesis). University of Delaware.
- Moore, G. E. (1903). *Principia Ethica*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Penelhum, Terence M. (1976). The Self in Hume's Philosophy. *The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy*, 7(2), 9-23.

<sup>6</sup> Plenary Lecture at the 8th International Transdisciplinary Symposium on *Bioethics and Aporia of Psyche*, Centre for Bioethics, Faculty of Philosophy and Religious Studies, University of Zagreb, Croatia, 09 May 2024.

- Pihlström, S. (2016). Subjectivity as Negativity and as a Limit: On the Metaphysics and Ethics of the Transcendental Self, Pragmatically Naturalized. In G. Gava & R. Stern (Eds.), *Pragmatism, Kant, and Transcendental Philosophy* (pp. 217–238). New York: Routledge
- Tillmanns, M. V. (2005). Philosophical Counseling: Understanding the Unique Self and Other through Dialogue. *International Journal of Philosophical Practice*, 2(4), 1–9.
- Tubali, S. (2023). *The Transformative Philosophical Dialogue: From Classical Dialogues to Jiddu Krishnamurti's Method*. Cham, Switzerland: Springer Nature <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-40074-2>
- United Nations Development Programme. (2024). *Human Development Report 2023–2024: Breaking the Gridlock: Reimagining Cooperation in a Polarized World*. Retrieved from: [https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2024-03/hdr2023-24reporten\\_2.pdf](https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2024-03/hdr2023-24reporten_2.pdf)
- Wittgenstein, L. (1958). *Philosophical Investigations* (G. E. M. Anscombe, Trans.). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

## Suosjećanje kao 'zemlja bez staza': Etički osvrt na Jiddua Krishnamurtija i Zen Koane

### SAŽETAK

---

Povezanost između metafizike sebstva i etike često se marginalizira u dominantnim filozofskim pravcima, bilo da je riječ o empiristima koji slijede Humea i njegovo viđenje jaza između činjeničnih i vrijednosnih sudova ("is-ought"), ili suvremenim analitičkim filozofima koji prihvaćaju Mooreovu ideju "naturalističke pogreške." U ovom radu usredotočujemo se na odnos između metafizike sebstva i njezinih implikacija za etiku, posebice bioetičku perspektivu mentalnog blagostanja ljudskih bića u terminima suosjećanja, empatije i ljubavi. Takva perspektiva otvara mogućnost samotransformacije pomoću alata filozofskog savjetovanja, usklađenog s uvidima Krishnamurtija i dijalozima prisutnima u Zen koanima. Možemo li govoriti o empatiji kao putu ili kao cilju? Također, možemo li govoriti o samosuosjećanju i suosjećanju prema drugima kao nečemu odvojenom ili podijeljenom? Odgovor leži izvan granica dualizma, izvan kategorija koje poznajemo i unutar kojih smo naučeni razmišljati. Kroz istraživanje Krishnamurtijevih uvida o misli, sjećanju, znanju i iskustvu, koji otkrivaju da su svi ti aspekti uvijek ograničeni i da stoga rezultiraju podjelom i sukobom, te kroz ispitivanje Zen koanima kao dijaloga između učitelja i učenika, u kojem je učenik vođen ka oslobođanju od ideja, oblika i svega što je stvoreno mišlju, dolazimo do točke u kojoj dualnost iščezava. A gdje dualnost prestaje, ondje se otkriva prisutnost empatije, ljubavi i suosjećanja. čime se otvara put prema samotransformaciji kroz filozofsko promišljanje.

**Ključne riječi:** suosjećanje, empatija, ljubav, misao, metafizika sebstva, blagostanje, Jiddu Krishnamurti, Zen koani.



Jadranka Pavić\*, Mateja Krznar\*\*, Irena Kovačević\*\*\*

## Poteškoće i podrška obitelji djece oboljele od rijetkih bolesti

### SAŽETAK

Djeca oboljela od rijetkih bolesti imaju zdravstvene probleme koji zahtijevaju složenu zdravstvenu i roditeljsku skrb, a često se nalaze u životno ugrožavajućim stanjima. Zbog toga što su rijetke, kod ovih bolesti postoje brojni problemi vezani uz nedovoljna empirijska iskustva. Složena i dugotrajna dijagnostika, neizvjestan tijek i učinkovitost liječenja dovodi do psihofizičke iscrpljenosti roditelja te brojnih problema unutar obitelji. Obitelji djece susreću se s emocionalnim, socijalnim, ekonomskim, organizacijskim, etičkim i drugim teškoćama. Dok neke obitelji pokazuju pozitivan obrazac suočavanja s bolešću kroz traženje načina za ostvarenje što bolje kvalitete života, druge ostaju u fazi „sagorijevanja u bolesti”, što dovodi do psihosomatskih bolesti i narušavanja stabilnosti u funkcioniranju obitelji. Cilj je rada prikazati poteškoće obitelji djece oboljele od rijetkih bolesti, refleksiju bolesti djeteta na kvalitetu života obitelji te detektirane potrebne oblike podrške obiteljima.

**Ključne riječi:** rijetke bolesti, djeca, roditeljska skrb, podrška roditeljima.

### UVOD

Rijetke su bolesti kronična, po život opasna medicinska stanja koja pogađaju mali postotak stanovništva u usporedbi s drugim bolestima. One su kronične i progresivne, s neizvjesnim tijekom i često sa skraćenim životnim vijekom (Abozaid, Kerr, McKnight i Al-Omar, 2022). Podaci o prevalenciji ovih bolesti nisu dosljedni iz različitih razloga, poput nedostatka suglasnosti oko definicije i poteškoća u

\* Zdravstveno veleučilište, Zagreb; Sveučilište u Rijeci, Fakultet zdravstvenih studija, Rijeka. ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0009-0006-9952-6505>.

\*\* DEBRA, Društvo oboljelih od bulozne epidermolize, Hrvatska, <https://orcid.org/0009-0006-4402-6263>.

\*\*\* Zdravstveno veleučilište, Zagreb; Sveučilište u Rijeci, Fakultet zdravstvenih studija, Rijeka, ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5673-9515>.

Adresa za korespondenciju: Jadranka Pavić, Zdravstveno veleučilište, Mlinarska 38. 10000, Zagreb, Hrvatska. E-pošta: [jadranka.pavic@zvuh.hr](mailto:jadranka.pavic@zvuh.hr).

otkrivanju i registriranju ovih patologija. Prema Svjetskoj zdravstvenoj organizaciji (WHO), rijetka se bolest definira kao stanje koje pogađa manje od 65 od 100 000 ljudi (Regulation EC, 2000). Prema definiciji koja je prihvaćena u EU, rijetke su bolesti one bolesti koje zahvaćaju manje od 5 osoba na 10 000 stanovnika (Regulation EC, 2000). Uglavnom, procjenjuje se da postoji oko 7.000 do 8.000 rijetkih bolesti (Orphanet, 2012). Rijetke se bolesti najčešće javljaju u dječjoj dobi jer je značajan dio njih genetskog porijekla. Među rijetke bolesti ubrajaju se i neke kongenitalne malformacije, autoimune bolesti te neke vrste rijetkih karcinoma (EURORDIS, 2009). Rijetke se bolesti teško dijagnosticiraju, jer su klinički heterogene, a mnoge imaju nespecifične simptome uobičajene za mnoge bolesti (Faye i sur., 2024). Osobe s rijetkom bolešću obično imaju duga kašnjenja od pojave simptoma do dijagnoze. Prosječno trajanje procesa od simptoma do dijagnoze je 4 – 5 godina, ali često i mnogo duže (Faye i sur., 2024). Ovakav problematičan proces dijagnostike i liječenja može značajno opteretiti oboljele i njihove obitelji (Wetterauer i Schuster, 2008).

Mnoge od emocionalnih poteškoća koje doživljavaju roditelji djece s rijetkim bolestima povezane su s poteškoćama dobivanja ispravne dijagnoze i pronalaženja informacija o bolesti. Briga o djetetu uključuje potrebu reorganizacije i uloge članova obitelji, a neophodno je ponuditi odgovor na fizičke, afektivne i psihičke potrebe djeteta. Neočekivana pojava rijetke bolesti djeteta može kod roditelja potaknuti proces tuge zbog idealiziranog djeteta, razvijajući osjećaj tjeskobe, beznađa i sumnje u budućnost dinamike obitelji (Kole i Faurisson, 2009). Strukturirani pregled 34 studije koje su istraživale iskustva i percepcije roditelja o životu s djetetom koje boluje od teške, dugotrajne i neizlječive bolesti pokazuju da su roditelji doživjeli niz emocija nakon postavljene dijagnoze njihova djeteta, kao što su zbunjenost, nevjerica, tjeskoba, nemir i gubitak identiteta. Te su se emocije smirivale kad su roditelji prihvatili realnost situacije te se usmjerili na zadovoljavanje djetetovih potreba. Kod nekih roditelja razvila se dugotrajnija tuga, koja se obično naziva „kronična tuga”. Kronična tuga rezultirala je stalnim traženjem razloga dugotrajnoga teškog stanja njihova djeteta i osjećaja samooptuživanja (Smith, Cheater i Bekker, 2015). Nadalje, analizom studija utvrđeno je da su majke iskusile najveću promjenu uloge jer je vjerojatnije da će preuzeti ulogu glavnog negovatelja, što je utjecalo na njihove karijerne težnje. S druge strane, očevi su naglasili obavezu svoje uloge hranitelja i zaštitnika obitelji te pritisak zbog osiguravanja financijskih potreba obitelji (Smith i sur., 2015).

U pregledu studija istaknule su se značajke života s djetetom s dugotrajnim i kroničnim bolestima koje se odnose na pružanje medicinskih i negovateljskih intervencija. Kako bi preuzeli kontrolu nad stanjem svojeg djeteta, roditeljima je bilo potrebno: poznavati stanja i liječenja, učiti iz epizoda bolesti i koristiti ta iskustva za prepoznavanje i odgovor na naknadne simptome bolesti kod svojeg djeteta, razviti učinkovite odnose sa zdravstvenim radnicima (Smith i sur., 2015). Nadalje, roditelji su

opisali poteškoće u dobivanju informacija i mnogi su bili nezadovoljni informacijama koje su pružili zdravstveni radnici, osobito u vrijeme početne dijagnoze. Prepreke učinkovitim pružanju informacija uključivale su: pretjeranu uporabu medicinskog žargona, nedostatne, netočne i nejasne informacije, informacije koje se daju brzo s malo prilika za raspravu te neprikladno vrijeme informacija (Smith i sur., 2015). Strah od neizvjesne ili dugotrajne dijagnoze, suočavanje s patnjama i frustracijama djeteta, ograničen pristup zdravstvenim informacijama i resursima te složenost pristupa grupama podrške istaknuti su kao glavne poteškoće roditelja djece s rijetkim bolestima (Pelentsov, Fielder, Laws i Esterman, 2016).

## **REFLEKSIJA BOLESTI DJETETA NA KVALITETU ŽIVOTA RODITELJA**

Nadalje, posljedice bolesti i ograničenosti u svakodnevnom funkcioniranju odražavaju se i na oboljelu djecu, i to ne samo kroz fizičke poteškoće. Studije pokazuju da djeca s rijetkim bolestima pokazuju lošije mentalno zdravlje od svojih zdravih vršnjaka (Jonsson i sur., 2017; Pinquart, 2018). Djeca i adolescenti s rijetkim bolestima češće pokazuju simptome depresije, anksioznosti i probleme u ponašanju u odnosu na zdrave vršnjake. Osim toga, javljaju se i psihološki komorbiditeti koji se razvijaju kao posljedica traumatskih iskustava povezanih s bolešću i njezinim liječenjem (Sarvey, 2008). Rijetke bolesti često imaju nepredvidiv tijek, pa su zbog toga djeca i mladi opterećeni brigama i strahovima o svojoj budućnosti (Sarvey, 2008). Budući da postoje česta tjelesna, socijalna i psihološka ograničenja, djeca su ovisna o pomoći drugih osoba, što ograničava njihovu samostalnost.

Bolest i nezadovoljstvo djeteta te zahtjevnost roditeljske brige o djetetu mogu ograničiti kvalitetu života roditelja i negativno utjecati na odnos roditelj-dijete. Sukladno tome, roditelji djece s rijetkom bolešću prijavljuju niži HRQOL (Health-related quality of life) zbog posttraumatskoga stresnog poremećaja, usamljenosti i većeg stresa nego roditelji djece bez bolesti (Witt, 2019). Kvantitativne studije o kvaliteti života roditelja koji skrbe o djeci i adolescentima s rijetkim bolestima, koje su provedene pretraživanjem literature u pet objavljenih baza podataka (APA PsycArticles, APA PsycInfo, MEDLINE, PSYNDEXplus i PubMed) između 2000. i 2020. na ukupno 31 studiji, pokazale su da je kvaliteta života roditelja djece s rijetkim bolestima niža u usporedbi s normativnim uzorcima, roditeljima zdrave djece ili djece s drugim kroničnim bolestima (Boettcher, Wiegand-Grefe i Zapf, 2021).

Brojna istraživanja potvrđuju da ozbiljnost bolesti djeteta i ovisnost o pomoći njegovatelja utječu na funkcioniranje obitelji i na njihovo zadovoljstvo životom. Istražujući status mentalnog zdravlja majki koje njeguju djecu ovisnu o respiratoru,

Kuster i Badr (2006) pokazale su da je polovica majki doživjela simptome depresivnog raspoloženja te da visoki zahtjevi povezani s njegom djece uz pomoć respiratora mogu biti značajan čimbenik rizika za loše ishode mentalnog zdravlja onih majki koje pružaju skrb kod kuće. U istraživanju ishoda fizičkog i mentalnog zdravlja njegovatelja djece (roditelji/skrbnici) koja imaju medicinski složene potrebe ovisne o tehnologiji (Caicedo, 2015) utvrđeno je da je njegovateljima narušeno mentalno i tjelesno zdravlje. Njegovatelji su najčešće isticali umor tijekom dana, nemogućnost obavljanja aktivnosti koje vole zbog premorenosti, osjećaj fizičke slabosti ili mučninu i kognitivne poteškoće, brigu, poteškoće u komunikaciji s drugim osobama i općenito poteškoće u obavljanju svakodnevnih aktivnosti. Istraživanje provedeno metodom dubinskog intervjua kod roditelja koji provode specijalističke medicinske postupke za svoju djecu kod kuće (npr. enteralno hranjenje, ispiranje crijeva, skrb o traheostomi i slično) pokazalo je da roditelji imaju značajne stresove u svakodnevici. Oni uključuju veliku odgovornost u provođenju složenih medicinskih postupaka u domu, suočavanje s hitnim stanjima (ponekad opasnim po život) kod njihova djeteta, koordinaciju skrbi s različitim pružateljima usluga i zastupanje djeteta. Takve situacije imaju golem utjecaj na svakodnevno funkcioniranje obitelji; roditelji su neispavani, što se negativno reflektira na njihovo svakodnevno funkcioniranje, kao i na zdravu braću i sestre (Pagei sur., 2020).

Društvena izolacija, usamljenost i osjećaj nepovezanosti zbog djetetove bolesti i rutine skrbi česti su problemi koje navode roditelji (Aytch, Hammond i White, 2001; Coffey, 2006; Goble, 2004; Kerr i McIntosh, 2000). Roditelji navode da su svakodnevni teret brige i propuštene prilike da provedu kvalitetno vrijeme jedno s drugim i u druženju s drugima negativno utjecali na partnerske odnose (Gable, 2004; Pelentsov i sur., 2014; van Scheppingen, 2008). Značajan su problem roditelja djece s teškim bolestima financijske poteškoće povezane s djetetovom bolešću i dodatnim potrebama za pokrivanje njege i medicinskih troškova (Pelentsov, 2014).

No, učinkovita prilagodba i suočavanje s realnošću identificirani su kao važna značajka života s djetetom s kroničnim, teškim bolestima. Roditelji koji su stekli kontrolu nad situacijom usredotočujući se na djetetova postignuća, ojačali su privrženost odnosa roditelj-dijete te postali fleksibilniji u odnosu na režime skrbi i liječenja (Smith, Cheater i Bekker, 2014).

Pronalaženje dobrobiti i posttraumatski rast roditelja nakon suočavanja s dijagnozom i svakodnevicom značajno doprinosi kvaliteti života obitelji. Sve je više dokaza u literaturi koja istražuje život nakon gubitka i traume da pronalaženje dobrobiti može imati pozitivan učinak na emocionalno i na fizičko zdravlje (Bonanno, Wortman i Nesse, 2004; Brown i Ryan, 2003; Saloviita, Itaelinna i Leinonen, 2003). Nakon negativnih, traumatskih iskustava moguća su pozitivna iskustva nazvana

posttraumatski rast. Ona uključuju reinterpetaciju traume u novom obliku, što dovodi do obogaćivanja života i poboljšanja u domenama: odnosa s drugima, jačanja osobnih snaga, otkrivanja novih mogućnosti u svakodnevnom životu, promjena životnih vrijednosti i duhovnih promjena (Hungerbuehler, Vollrath i Landolt, 2011; Negri-Schwartz i sur., 2024; Yagiela i sur., 2022).

No, neke studije pokazuju da su roditelji koji ne ističu bolest djeteta kao problem često patologizirani kao nerealni jer negiraju svoje „tragične” okolnosti ili „nijeću” probleme svoje djece (Barnett i sur. 2003; McKeever i Miller, 2004). Patologiziranje, a time i obeshrabrivanje roditeljske sposobnosti da pronađu dobrobiti u tome što imaju dijete s teškoćama u razvoju, otežava roditeljima posttraumatski rast. Ako se roditelje bolesne djece stalno obeshrabruje da pronađu i priznaju pozitivne aspekte skrbi, mogu im se uskratiti potencijalno pozitivne posljedice toga.

## **PODRŠKA OBITELJIMA OBOLJELE DJECE**

Za kvalitetu života roditelja djece s rijetkim bolestima i općenito teškim kroničnim bolestima važna je podrška koja uključuje pružanje potrebnih usluga kako bi se zadovoljile njihove potrebe tijekom preddijagnostičkih i dijagnostičkih faza, faza liječenja i praćenja, te pitanja teškoća svakodnevnog života i ublažavanja žalosti. Ova vrsta podrške definira se i kao suportivna njega. Ona obuhvaća sedam domena potreba za potpornom njegom i uključuje: praktične, duhovne, socijalne, psihološke, informacijske, emocionalne i fizičke potrebe. U preglednim studijama koje su obuhvatile istraživačku literaturu koja se odnosi na potrebe roditelja za potpornom skrbi najčešće navedene potrebe bile su socijalne potrebe (72 % radova), zatim informacijske potrebe (65 % radova) i emocionalne potrebe (62 % radova) (Pelentsov i sur., 2015).

Nadalje, najčešća navedena potreba u analiziranim studijama potrebe roditelja za potpornom skrbi, osim podrške obitelji i prijatelja, komunikacija je s drugim roditeljima. Roditelji su smatrali da ih mogu najbolje razumjeti samo drugi roditelji koji dijele slična iskustva (Kerr, i McIntosh, 2000; Pelentsov i sur., 2015). Mnogi roditelji i obitelji prolaze društvenu izolaciju, financijske poteškoće i velike žrtve da bi omogućili visoku razinu skrbi za svoje bolesno dijete. Društvena podrška vršnjačkih roditelja ili „roditeljski mentori” značajno poboljšavaju prilagodbu roditelja na suočavanje s dijagnozom rijetke bolesti nudeći emocionalnu podršku, specifične informacije i razinu suosjećanja koju može ponuditi samo roditelj sa sličnim iskustvima (Hilliard, Tully, Monaghan i sur., 2017) .

Socijalna potpora značajna je za kvalitetu života i zadovoljstvo životom kod obitelji sa zdravom i bolesnom djecom. Ona uključuje emocionalnu, informacijsku, materijalnu podršku te druženje (Bryson i Bogart, 2020). U strukturiranom intervjuu provedenom

s 88 roditelja koji su njegovatelji bolesne djece ovisne o tehnologiji pokazano je da imaju visoke razine depresivnih simptoma i relativno loš HRQOL i obiteljsko funkcioniranje. No, percipirana socijalna podrška njegovateljima moderirala je ovu povezanost. Utvrđeno je da snažnija socijalna podrška doprinosi njihovoj dobrobiti (Chan, Lim i Bautista, 2019). Slične rezultate pokazalo je istraživanje čimbenika povezanih sa stresom, depresijom i zadovoljstvom života njegovatelja djece s rijetkim bolestima, koje je potvrdilo da socijalna podrška dovodi do smanjenja stresa kod njegovatelja te da je pozitivno povezana sa životnim zadovoljstvom bez obzira na to koliko je ovisno dijete o kojem njegovatelji brinu (Pavić i sur., 2024).

Nadalje, rezultati istog istraživanja pokazali su da je roditeljima djece s rijetkim bolestima za zadovoljstvo životom i smanjenje stresa značajnije zadovoljstvo socijalnom podrškom nego zdravstvenom zaštitom (Pavić i sur., 2024). Roditelji i obitelji ističu nezadovoljstvo nedostatkom znanja, informacija i putokaza do relevantnih službi podrške, što dodatno povećava neizvjesnost i otežava sposobnost da upravljaju stanjem svojeg djeteta i nose se s njime (Glenn, 2015). Ističući potrebe za podrškom, roditelji ističu potrebu specifičnih informacija o pravima, financijskoj pomoći i mogućnostima dostupne podrške u zajednici (Pelentsov i sur., 2015).

## ZAKLJUČAK

Znanstvene studije koje propituju potrebe i iskustva roditelja djece oboljele od teških i neizlječivih bolesti pokazuju potrebu za sustavnom podrškom obitelji u fizičkom, mentalnom, duhovnom i socijalnom području. Izjave roditelja upućuju na to da nisu uvijek podržani u svojoj ulozi njegovatelja teške i neizvjesne bolesti svojeg djeteta. Postoje utvrđene činjenice da roditelji djece s teškim kroničnim bolestima trebaju profesionalno anticipativno usmjeravanje, širenje informacija i pomoć u osiguravanju i korištenju neformalnih sustava podrške.

## PREPORUKE ZA BUDUĆA ISTRAŽIVANJA

Buduća bi se istraživanja mogla usmjeriti na komparativne analize iskustava obitelji koje se suočavaju s rijetkim bolestima u različitim kulturnim i socioekonomskim kontekstima. Takva bi istraživanja omogućila dublje razumijevanje načina na koje društveni, kulturni i ekonomski čimbenici oblikuju izazove, strategije suočavanja i pristup podršci. Nadalje, korisno bi bilo ispitati učinkovitost konkretnih modela sustavne podrške (npr. obiteljski navigatori, multidisciplinarni timovi) u različitim zdravstvenim sustavima, a kako bi se formirale adekvatnije preporuke za zdravstvenu politiku i praksu.

## LITERATURA

- Abozaid, G. M., Kerr, K., McKnight, A., i Al-Omar, H. A. (2022). Criteria to define rare diseases and orphan drugs: A systematic review protocol. *BMJ Open*, 12(7), e062126. <https://doi.org/10.1136/bmjopen-2022-062126>
- Aytech, L. S., Hammond, R., i White, C. (2001). Seizures in infants and young children: An exploratory study of family experiences and needs for information and support. *Journal of Neuroscience Nursing*, 33(5), 278–285.
- Barnett, D., Clements, M., Kaplan-Estrin, M., i Fialka, J. (2003). Building New Dreams: Supporting Parents' Adaptation to Their Child with Special Needs. *Infants & Young Children*, 16(3), 184–200.
- Boettcher, J., Boettcher, M., Wiegand-Grefe, S., i Zapf, H. (2021). Being the pillar for children with rare diseases: A systematic review on parental quality of life. *International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health*, 18(9), 4916. <https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph18094916>
- Bonanno, G. A., Wortman, C. B., i Nesse, R. M. (2004). Prospective Patterns of Resilience and Maladjustment During Widowhood. *Psychology and Aging*, 19(2), 260–271. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0882-7974.19.2.260>
- Brown, K. W., i Ryan, R. M. (2003). The Benefits of Being Present: Mindfulness and Its Role in Psychological Well-Being. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 84(4), 822–48.
- Bryson, B. A. i Bogart, K. R. (2020). Social support, stress, and life satisfaction among adults with rare diseases. *Health Psychology*, 39(10), 912–920. <https://doi.org/10.1037/hea0000905>
- Caicedo, C. (2015). Health and functioning of families of children with special health care needs cared for in home care, long-term care, and medical day care settings. *Journal of Developmental & Behavioral Pediatrics*, 36(5), 352–361. <https://doi.org/10.1097/DBP.0000000000000167>
- Chan, Y. H., Lim, C. Z., Bautista, D., Malhotra, R., i Østbye, T. (2019). The health and well-being of caregivers of technologically dependent children. *Global Pediatric Health*, 6, 2333794X18823000. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2333794X18823000>
- Coffey, J. (2006). Parenting a child with chronic illness: a metasynthesis. *Pediatr Nurs*, 32(1), 51–60.
- EURORDIS (2009). Rare Diseases: Understanding this Public Health Priority. Pristup preko: [https://www.eurordis.org/wp/content/uploads/2009/12/princeps\\_document-EN.pdf](https://www.eurordis.org/wp/content/uploads/2009/12/princeps_document-EN.pdf). [(pristupljeno 8 lipanj, 2024)]
- Faye, F., Crocione, C., Anido de Peña, R., Bellagambi, S., Escati Peñaloza, L., Hunter, A., Jensen, L., Oosterwijk, C., Schoeters, E., de Vicente, D., Faivre, L., Wilbur, M., Le Cam, Y., i Dubief, J. (2024). Time to diagnosis and determinants of diagnostic delays of people living with a rare disease: results of a Rare Barometer retrospective patient survey. *Eur J Hum Genet*, 32, 1116–1126. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41431-024-01604-z>
- Gibson, F., Aldiss, S., Horstman, M., Kumpunen, S., & Richardson, A. (2010). Children and young people's experiences of cancer care: A qualitative research study using participatory methods. *International Journal of Nursing Studies*, 47(11), 1397–1407.
- Glenn, A. D. (2015). Using online health communication to manage chronic sorrow: Mothers of children with rare diseases speak. *Journal of Pediatric Nursing*, 30, 17–24.
- Goble, L. (2004). The impact of a child's chronic illness on fathers. *Issues Compr Pediatr Nurs*, 27(3), 153–162.
- Hilliard, M. E., Tully, C., Monaghan, M., Wang, J., i Streisand, R. (2017). Design and development of a stepped-care behavioral intervention to support parents of young children newly diagnosed with type 1 diabetes. *Contemporary Clinical Trials*, 62, 1–10.
- Hungerbuehler, I., Vollrath, M. E., i Landolt, M. A. (2011). Posttraumatic growth in mothers and fathers of children with severe illnesses. *Journal of Health Psychology*, 16(8), 1259–1267. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1359105311405872>

- Jonsson, U., Alaie, I., Löfgren Wiltens, A., Zander, E., Marschik, P. B., Coghill, D., Bölte, S., i Lindholm Carlström, E. (2017). Annual research review: Quality of life and childhood mental and behavioural disorders – A critical review of the research. *Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry*, 58(4), 439–469.
- Kole, A. i Faurisson, F. (2009). *The Voice of 12,000 Patients: Experiences and expectations of rare disease patients on diagnosis and care in Europe*.
- Kerr, L., Harrison, M. B., Medves, J., i Tranmer, J. E. (2007). Understanding the supportive care needs of parents of children with cancer: An approach to local needs assessment. *Journal of Pediatric Oncology Nursing*, 24(5), 279–289.
- Kerr, S. i McIntosh, J. (2000). Coping when a child has a disability: exploring the impact of parent-to-parent support. *Child Care Health Dev*, 26(4), 309–322.
- Kuster, P. A., i Badr, L. K. (2006). Mental health of mothers caring for ventilator-assisted children at home. *Issues in Mental Health Nursing*, 27(8), 817–835.
- McIntosh, J. B., i Kerr, S. M. (2000). Coping when a child has a disability: Exploring the impact of parent-to-parent support. *Child: Care, Health and Development*, 26(4), 309–322.
- McKeever, P. i Miller, K.L. (2004) Mothering children who have disabilities: a Bourdieusian interpretation of maternal practices. *Social Science and Medicine*, 59, 1177–1191.
- Negri-Schwartz, O., Lavidor, M., Shilton, T., Gothelf, D., i Hasson-Ohayon, I. (2024). Post-traumatic growth correlates among parents of children with chronic illnesses: A systematic review and meta-analysis. *Clinical Psychology Review*, 109, 102409. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2024.102409>
- Orphanet. (2012). The Portal for Rare Diseases and Orphan Drugs 2012. Dostupno preko: [https://www.orpha.net/consor/cgi-bin/Education\\_AboutRareDiseases.php?lng=EN](https://www.orpha.net/consor/cgi-bin/Education_AboutRareDiseases.php?lng=EN) [ (pristupljeno 8 lipanj, 2024)].
- Page, B. F., Hinton, L., Harrop, E., i Vincent, C. (2020). The challenges of caring for children who require complex medical care at home: “The go between for everyone is the parent and as the parent that’s an awful lot of responsibility.” *Health Expectations*, 23(5), 1144–1154. <https://doi.org/10.1111/hex.13092>
- Pavić, J., Krznar, M., Čukljek, S., Sedić, B., Ozimec Vulinec, Š., i Kovačević, I. (2024). The association between healthcare satisfaction and social support and stress, depression, and life satisfaction in female caregivers: The moderating role of dependence of a sick child. *International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health*, 21(9), 1245. <https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph21091245>
- Pelentsov, L. J., Fielder, A. L., Laws, T. A., i Esterman, A. J. (2016). The supportive care needs of parents with a child with a rare disease: Results of an online survey. *BMC Family Practice*, 17, 88. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s12875-016-0488-x>.
- Pinquart, M. (2018). Posttraumatic stress symptoms and disorders in children and adolescents with chronic physical illnesses: A meta-analysis. *Journal of Child & Adolescent Trauma*, 13(1), 1–10.
- Regulation (EC) No 141/2000 of the European parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1999 on orphan medicinal products, 1999. (2000). *Official Journal of the European Communities*, L 18, 1–5. Dostupno preko: [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga\\_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=32000R0141&model=guichett](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=32000R0141&model=guichett) [(pristupljeno 8 lipnja 2024.)].
- Saloviita, T., Italinna, M., i Leinonen, E. (2003). Explaining the parental stress of fathers and mothers caring for a child with intellectual disability: A Double ABCX Model. *Journal of Intellectual Disability Research*, 47, 300–312. <https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1365-2788.2003.00492.x>
- Sarvey, S. I. (2008). Living with a machine: The experience of the child who is ventilator dependent. *Issues in Mental Health Nursing*, 29(2), 179–196.
- Smith, J., Cheater, F., i Bekker, H. (2015). Parents’ experiences of living with a child with a long-term condition: A rapid structured review of the literature. *Health Expectations*, 18(4), 452–474. <https://doi.org/10.1111/hex.12040>.

- van Scheppingen, C., Lettinga, A. T., Duipmans, J. C., Maathuis, K. G. B., & Jonkman, M. F. (2008). The main problems of parents of a child with epidermolysis bullosa. *Qualitative Health Research*, 18(4), 545–556.
- Wetterauer, B., i Schuster, R. (2008). Seltene Krankheiten: Probleme, Stand und Entwicklung der nationalen und europäischen Forschungsförderung. *Bundesgesundheitsblatt – Gesundheitsforschung – Gesundheitsschutz*, 51(5), 519–528.
- Witt, S., Kolb, B., Bloemeke, J., Mohnike, K., Bullinger, M., i Quitmann, J. (2019). Quality of life of children with achondroplasia and their parents: A German cross-sectional study. *Orphanet Journal of Rare Diseases*, 14(1), 76. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s13023-019-1065-6>
- Yagiela, L. M., Edgar, C. M., Harper, F. W. K., i Meert, K. L. (2022). Parent post-traumatic growth after a child's critical illness. *Frontiers in Pediatrics*, 10, 989053. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fped.2022.989053>

## Difficulties and support for families of children suffering from rare diseases

### SUMMARY

---

Children suffering from rare diseases face health problems that require complex medical and parental care, and they are often in life-threatening conditions. Due to the rarity of these diseases, numerous issues arise from insufficient empirical experience. Complex and prolonged diagnostics, uncertain progression, and treatment effectiveness lead to the physical and mental exhaustion of parents, as well as many problems within the family. Families of these children encounter emotional, social, economic, organizational, ethical, and other difficulties. While some families show a positive coping pattern by seeking ways to achieve the best possible quality of life, others remain in a state of “burnout in illness”, which leads to psychosomatic disorders and instability in family functioning. The aim of this paper is to present the difficulties faced by families of children with rare diseases, the reflection of the child's illness on the family's quality of life, and the identified support needed for these families.

**Keywords:** rare diseases, children, parental care, parental support.



Filip Martin Svibovec\*

## *Homo absconditus* u duhu filozofske prakse

### SAŽETAK

„Čovjek više treba psiho-sintezu nego psiho-analizu”, piše ruski filozof Nikolaj Berdjajev, na čijem tragu ovaj rad želi istražiti sakrivenog čovjeka, u vidu psiho-sinteze koju može ponuditi filozofska praksa, jer čovjek je prema istom filozofu „zagonetka u ovom svijetu, možebitno i najveća zagonetka”. Odgonetanje te zagonetke, tog *Homo absconditus*a objelodaniti će čovjeka drugačijeg od onog kojem je potrebna psihoterapija, kao oblik njege njegove duševne sastavine da se nosi s društvom, društveno-socijalnim, društveno-tehničko-ustrojstvenim stvarnostima vlastite neposredne realnosti. U duhu dobre filozofske prakse, usmjerene na liječenje čovjeka pod vidom psiho-sinteze mora se skrenuti pozornost na lučenje onoga sakrivenog u čovjeku, onoga što postoji pod maskom njegove društvene persone kao „stvaran čovjek”, a koji je u vidu psihoanalize „sjena” ili sakriveni, onaj do kojeg se mora doprijeti kako bi se uopće pristupilo putu njegova izlječenja.

**Ključne riječi:** *Homo absconditus*, filozofska praksa, psiho-sinteza, Berdjajev.

### UVOD

Prilikom rada u filozofskoj praksi filozof je nedvojbeno usmjeren na kontakt s drugim, klijentom ili osobom koja od njega traži savjet i pomoć. On je u praktičnom smislu upućen na susret s drugim i taj mu se drugi, isprva sakriven (lat. *absconditus*), postupno otkriva izgledom, gestama, riječima i djelovanjem. Pred filozofa je, kao onoga koji ljubi mudrost i traži je, u općem smislu svijet fenomena pretpostavljen sakriveno. Svijet i drugi u njemu otkrivaju se u onoj mjeri u kojoj osjetila doživljavaju otkrivenje, a samo u činu otkrivanja onoga što se sakriva moguće ih je spoznati u onoj mjeri u kojoj ih je moguće istražiti. Čin samoobjave sakrivena fenomena

\* Nezavisni istraživač, Zagreb, Hrvatska. ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0178-042X>

Adresa za korespondenciju: Filip Martin Svibovec, Mali Sruki 64, 10040 Zagreb, Hrvatska. E-pošta: [fmsviby@gmail.com](mailto:fmsviby@gmail.com).

uvjetom je razumijevanja koji filozofa pri radu s ljudima upućuje na otkrivanje. Onaj koji spoznaje, ako zanemari spomenuti uvjet otkrivanja, podložan je tome da svijet i ljude u njemu vidi na način matrica. Uspostavljanje matrica ne dopušta stvarnosti da se otkriva, da se samoočituje u onome koji je želi spoznati. One su fiksirane predodžbe utemeljene na mnijenju, teoriji ili obrascu ponašanja, zbog čega se u vidu filozofske prakse nerijetko događa da se na čovjeka koji dolazi po savjet gleda kao na nekoga tko dolazi sa specifičnim, već unaprijed definiranim skupom problema koji se rješavaju na određen način i za koje postoje škole, metode i terapije pomoću kojih se problem otklanja. Naravno, da takvi obrasci pomoću kojih se problemi rješavaju ne postoje, valjalo bi ih stvoriti zbog olakšavanja filozofsko-terapijskog rada, no samo postojanje određenih forma i pristupa ne isključuje to da je čovjek pred nama zapravo nepoznanica.

Stavljajući tu nepoznanicu, tog *Homo absconditusa* u duh filozofske prakse, ovim se radom želi ukazati na bitan aspekt odnosa koji filozof ima pri pristupanju ljudima, a koji od njega zahtijeva neznanje, odnosno uvjet mogućnosti spoznaje drugoga koji pred njega dolazi po pomoć, podršku i savjetovanje. Nespoznatljivi, sakriveni čovjek koji drugome dolazi ususret enigma je koja se sama polagano, u onoj mjeri u kojoj to želi, otkriva. Zadaća filozofa, a pogotovo onoga koji u bilo kojem kapacitetu radi s ljudima, prvenstveno uključuje istraživačku fascinaciju sa svijetom i bićima koja se u njemu pojavljuju, a to znači dozvoljavanje biću da se otkriva, da se samo predstavi, da se u svom tempu i na svoj način objavi i tako razotkrije vlastitu bit. Filozof se, vođen željom za znanjem (grč. *sofia*), u smislu filozofsko-praktične djelatnosti prema čovjeku mora odnositi tako da njime bude očaran, jer će svako rušenje njegove predodžbe o bližnjemu samo pojačati već postojeća pogrešna uvjerenja koja ima o osobi koja mu dolazi ususret. Filozof bi u praktičnom smislu trebao razviti takav pogled na stvarnost u čijem bi temelju bilo čuđenje. On bi se trebao čuditi drugome i dopustiti drugome njegovu sakrivenost, a ne drugoga prema već prema provjerenim matricama odrediti ili o njemu imati već gotovo mišljenje.

## **HOMO ABSCONDITUS STAVLJEN U KONTEKST FILOZOFSE PRAKSE**

U pokušaju opravdanja teme *Homo absconditus* u duhu filozofske prakse primarno je određenje problema. Odrediti ono što je bit *Homo absconditusa* kako bi se razumjelo zašto je čovjek u duhu filozofske prakse onaj koji je sakriven ili se sakriva. Nije samo bitno da se čovjek sakriva, nego da se i otkriva, da se njegova sakrivenost (lat. *abscondeo*) postupno objelodanjuje i da je to otkrivanje objava (lat. *revelatio*) onoga što leži iza čovjekova naličja. Objava koja se ovdje događa ima dva momenta: moment objave i moment samoobjave. Prvo je objavljivanje drugome, promatraču,

sugovorniku, filozofu ili psihologu, i ono ima elemente predstavljanja. Drugi je moment samootkrivanja, samoobjave kao selektivna otkrivanja onoga što „Ja” želi otkriti drugome. Ono što je sakriveno drugome, a što onaj koji se drugome predstavlja otkriva kao dio sebe i tako drugome dozvoljava otkriti ono što mu je dopušteno otkriti.

Razumjeti pojam *Homo absconditus* stoga znači pravilno shvatiti teološke i filozofske implikacije objave, odnosno onoga što se u teologiji tumači pod terminima *deus absconditus* i *deus revelatus*.

Termin *deus absconditus* označava sakriveni aspekt bogospoznaje, odnosno to da je spoznajni pristup čovjeka k Bogu obavljen misterijem gdje se Bog pokazuje kao onaj koji se krije iza vela opskuriteta iz razloga što je njegovo biće u konačnici u potpunosti nespoznatljivo, i to zato što Bog opsegom nadilazi ljudske pojmovne kapacitete (Köhler, 1955, str. 46–58). Takav bogspoznajni princip teologijsko promišljanje dijeli u dva smjera: u smjer apofatičke teologije ili negativna puta (lat. *via negativa*) odnosno u smjer „nepoznata boga”. Apofatički put spoznajno je zaključivanje na negativan način, i to u smislu da se prilikom spoznaje bića ili fenomena polazi od negativnih formulacija. Na primjer, o Bogu se može kazati kako nije ne-dobar, ili kako nije neistinit, ili nije ne-svemoguć i na taj se način razumijevanje može odvojiti od činjenica koje nešto potvrđuju, prisiljavajući tako spoznajni aparat na promišljanje o tome zašto ili na koji način apsolutno biće može biti loše (ne-dobro), odnosno dobro ili apsolutno dobro unatoč zlu u svijetu (Kušar, 2001, str. 21–47). Formiranjem negacija oblikuje se opskurantski pristup fenomenu jer se produbljuje uvid u fenomenologiju predmeta proučavanja tako što se onome što se želi spoznati dodaje element sakrivenosti. To što se fenomen, bez obzira na to koliko ga čovjek spoznao, uvijek može sagledati pod drugim svjetlom, kroz drugu prizmu ili s drugog aspekta, predmetu proučavanja zadaje dubinu i otkriva krajnju nespoznatljivost stvari kao takvih (Kant, 1953, str. 44). Da ne možemo spoznati nešto o sebi, odnosno da se predmet ili osoba kriju iza zastora sakrivenosti, otkriva da je istinitost (grč. *aletheia*) ne-sakrivenost, odnosno uvid u ono iza zastora, u opskurno, mutno, sakriveno (Kordić, 1996, str. 9–31). Spoznaja *aletheie* može biti zamućena jer će je zastor kojim je prekrivena sakriti i jer će onoga koji je pokušava spoznati varati sama fronta zastora, odnosno varat će ga sama opskurnost kojom je ovijeno ono što se želi spoznati. To je teologija *vie negative* ili apofatička teologija u kojoj do izražaja dolaze upravo problemi vezani uz skepsu, odnosno činjenice da se primjerice Bog (ili bilo koji drugi fenomen ili biće) ne može potpuno spoznati i da drugi uvijek (beskonačno) izmiče tome da ga se potpuno spozna, štoviše, da se taj isti drugi može u nedogled otkrivati jer njegova spoznaja varira od perspektive i alata kojima ga se pokušava spoznati.

Termin i pristup teologiji na način „sakrivena boga”, odnosno drugoga koji je sakriven, koji se otkriva kao onaj kojeg se otkriva (naviješta), a koji odgovara onome što si spoznavalac zamišlja, misli da zna ili očekuje. Tragovima Djela apostolskih dobar primjer pruža sv. Pavao obraćajući se građanima Atene: „Tada Pavao stade posred Areopaga i reče: *Atenjani! U svemu ste, vidim, nekako veoma bogoljubni. Doista, prolazeći i promatrajući vaše svetinje, nađoh i žrtvenik s natpisom: Nepoznatom Bogu. Što dakle ne poznajete, a štujete, to vam ja navješćujem*” (Dj 17, 22–23). Nepoznatog Boga, još ne-očitovana, a prisutnog u sakrivenosti, štuju narodi Grčke, ali i drugi narodi upravo zbog njegove tajnosti i sakrivenosti u neznano. On se otkriva tako što se sakriva, odnosno baš zato što je nepoznat, ljudski ga duh želi upoznati i otkriti. Za neutaživi ljudski duh, uvijek željan spoznaje, takav Bog, takva pojava, što se više sakriva, to je se više želi otkriti. Problem postoji, međutim, u tome što se o tom fenomenu zapravo ne zna ništa, nego se agnostički (neznalački) tvrđi da je Bog istovremeno i imanencija i transcendencija (Jurečević, 2000, str. 129–150). Time se otežava istinska spoznaja naravi stvari jer narav stvari beskonačno izmiče, odnosno stvar po sebi je nespoznatljiva (Kant, 1984, str. 187), pa se na način neznanja ljudski um donekle zadovoljava mrvicama onoga što se o nečemu otkrilo, a veći dio bilo kojeg fenomena ili istinskog predmeta proučavanja ostaje obavijen tajnom.

Teologija i filozofija se, međutim, temelje na drugoj bitnoj istini, na objavi, biću koje se objavilo, Bogu koji se otkrio i očitovao, drugome koji nam je rekao nešto o sebi i tako nam dao do znanja o onome što se krije u njegovoj nutрини. To je načelo *Deus revelatus* i afirmativan pristup spoznaji božanskog (lat. *via positiva*) u kojem se polazi od onoga što se može reći o nekome, nečemu na temelju onoga kakvo jest, onako kako je onome koji spoznaje poznato o onome što je očitovano. Ovdje do izražaja dolazi samoobjava, čin otkrivenja na način da fenomen ili biće očituje samo sebe i na taj način o samom sebi izriče ili ustupa ono što jest u mjeri u kojoj ono to želi. Ono što je sakriveno otkriva svoju bit tako što dozira informaciju i očituje o sebi ono što želi očitovati na način na koji to želi da se očituje, bilo usmeno, pisano, djelovanjem i tako daje do znanja drugome o svojoj biti. Teološki gledano, Bog se čovjeku očitovao najprije putem starozavjetne objave, a potom po utjelovljenju (Novi zavjet) i na taj način pokazao i definirao kako se prema njemu mora odnositi i kako ga treba shvatiti. Na vlastitu je inicijativu objavio svoje ime i dao pravila i propise kako bi njegova bit bila očitovana drugome u svrhu da ga drugi razumije onako kako on sebe shvaća po tome što je dopustio da se o njemu sazna. S obzirom na teološku objavu, gledano očima filozofa, čovjek se čovjeku objelodanjuje i na taj način drugi ima povratnu informaciju o tome kakav je njegov sugovornik, njegov bližnji. Općenito prilikom otkrivanja, a posebice prilikom otkrivanja drugog, ljudska je želja za otkrivanjem neutaživa i ona ispunjava rupe u postupku otkrivanja tako što nedostatke u spoznajnom otkrivanju drugoga nadomješta putem mašte i teorema,

stvarajući na taj način koherentnu spoznajnu predodžbu o tome kakav drugi jest. Drugi se želi spoznati, njegova sakrivena bit u očima promatrača, čak i ako je drugi sam objavi, želi biti dohvaćena u potpunosti, bez obzira na doziranu informaciju koju je netko primio od sugovornika – jer sugovornik je osoba, a osoba je maska (lat. *persona*), a iza maske stoji ono što je maska sakrila (Berdajev, 1984, str. 125–127). U igri skrivača između onoga tko otkriva i onoga koji pokušava otkriti termin *Homo absconditus* u filozofskoj praksi imat će utemeljenje u gnozi (znanju) objave, u tome da filozof ne može spoznati ono što mu nije otkriveno, odnosno da se biće i fenomen moraju najprije objaviti (postojati) kako bi se o njima moglo filozofski dvojiti, i to u tančine agnoze, neznanja je li biće jest ili nije. U praksi filozofije osoba pred filozofa dolazi uvijek kao pola-pola, istovremeno imanentna, prisutna, pred-postavljena i transcendentna, misteriozna, pod maskom (lat. *personom*) sakrivena.

## FILOZOFSKA PRAKSA: PSIHO-SINTEZA, A NE PSIHOANALIZA

„Čovjek više treba psiho-sintezu nego psiho-analizu” (Berdajev, 1949, str. 134), zamjećuje i piše Nikolaj Berdjajev određujući srž filozofske prakse. Na filozofu nije da vrši psihoanalizu na drugome (klijentu), već da onome tko kod njega u praktičnom smislu dolazi po pomoć i savjet ponudi ono što možda nijedna druga humanistička znanost nije posve u mogućnosti – sintezu duševne nutrine. Na tom tragu s Berdjajevom se možemo složiti kada piše: „Filozof je prije svega spoznavalac, ali njegova je spoznaja totalitarna, ona obuhvaća sve strane čovječjeg bića i čovječjeg postojanja, ona neminovno uči o putovima ostvarenja Smisla” (Berdajev, 1984, str. 13). Filozofsko-praktična intervencija u život drugoga ponovna je uspostava reda unutar cjelovitosti koja je povrijeđena u čovjeku. Filozof je terapeut drugome, onaj koji na temelju zapažanja, razgovora ili djelovanja luči i uspostavlja harmoniju između onoga što je psiha, mentalno, duševno, duh i tjelesno, i to prenosi drugome kako bi mu pomogao ozdraviti (Svibovec, 2023, str. 223–240). Poimanje i razumijevanje *Homo absconditus* u praksi usmjerenoj na psiho-sintetiziranje čovjekove cjelovitosti u tome je da se objasni kako čovjek u smislu liječenja svojih problema pred drugoga dolazi kao kompleksna višeslojna enigma čiji se problemi ne mogu riješiti samo analizom, već sintezom. Kako zamjećuje Helmuth Plessner u svojoj knjizi „Stupnjevi organskoga i čovjek”:

Svako doba ima svoju spasonosnu riječ. Terminologija osamnaestog stoljeća kulminira u pojmu uma, ona devetnaestoga u pojmu razvoja, a sadašnja u pojmu života. Svako doba označuje time nešto različito; um uzdiže ono bezvremeno i opće obvezatno, razvoj neprekidno postajuće i rastuće, život demonski igrajuće, nesvjesno stvaralačko. (Plessner, 2004, str. 31)

Analiza je spasonosna riječ znanosti općenito, medicine, dijelova humanističkih znanosti, a posebice još ekonomije, psihologije, sociologije, antropologije. Čovjeka se raščlanilo u tančine, a aspekte njegova života u materijalne, proceduralne ili operativne pojmove, sve u ime ljubavi prema čovjeku (Dostojevski, 2004, str. 66). Od obilja ljubavi prema bližnjemu, ono što su bile humanističke nauke postale su znanstvene analize, a cjelovitost onoga što se obuhvaćalo pod filozofijom osamostalilo se pod izlikom detaljnijih analiza određenih aspekata ispod predmeta proučavanja – čovjeka. Zbog takve je raščlambe Plessner u pravu kad piše o stupnjevima organskoga i čovjeka i kad unutar razvitka ukazuje na *Homo absconditus* (Plessner, 2004, str. 345; 263–310). U pravu je iz razloga što je čovjek za stupnjeve razvitka oduvijek bio nepoznanica, što je bio odvojen i što se je sam odvojio, postao ekscentričan, s punim pravom odvojen od prirode kao natprirodan jer „u svojoj esenciji, čovjek je prekid u svijetu prirode, on se ne može sadržati unutar nje” (Berdjaev, 1962, str. 60). Kako je čovjek kao biće čija je „priroda” da bude ne-prirodan, natprirodan dao vlastitu esenciju analizirati do te mjere da je samog sebe osudio na zatvor unutar sustava analize, da se zatvoren u krug raščlambe kompartmentalizirao s obzirom na tvorevine vlastita uma? Čovjekov je svijet umjetna, natprirodna kreacija, on je svoj svijet stvorio, počevši od najbanalnijeg: alata, jezika, pisma, prijevoza itd., pa do onoga što je kompleksnije: znanost, društvena uređenja i strukture. Izvan serije prirodnoga i organsko-evolucijskoga izgradio je sustave kojima je sam sebe podredio. Njegov je svijet unutar tih sustava postao opterećen ponavljajućim, ritualnim, objektnim i mašinskim (Berdjajev, 1985, str. 50–70) u kojem on više ne vidi cijeli svijet pred sobom, već samo dijelove jednog svijeta, komadić ili komadiće koje mu je dopušteno vidjeti u sklopu izučavanja i analiziranja. Čovječjem duhu manjka sinteze, jer ga je razlomljenost svijeta odvela u „tekuću modernost” (Bauman, 2011, str. 9–21) gdje se njegovo poimanje vlastita mjesta u svijetu i društvu rastočilo na mjesta lokalizacije, koja fokusiraju njegove energije na pojedinačno, i on je to prešutno prihvatio, a posljedica je toga gubitak šireg svijeta, mogućnost povezivanja, izvlačenja – sintetiziranja. Da, on je ovladao svijetom, dokumentirao što se dokumentirati može i još dokumentira pojave, napredovao je u razumijevanju stvarnosti koja ga okružuje. Svoje je društvo uredio, svoje je ponašanje uskladio s propisima i uredbama, a obujam ljudskog znanja pretvorio je u znanstveni sustav. Čovjek je, međutim, od sebe odvojio bitno – osjećaj za otkrivanjem sebe, drugoga, svijeta uopće i osjećaj povezanosti, što stvari, što bića. Udaljio je od sebe sposobnost da sintetizira, da razumije povezanost između dijelova stvarnosti u kojoj živi. Postao je odvojen od toga da se bavi cjelinom, da spaja nespojivo, da istražuje svijet, da inovira. Sakrio se od svijeta u matrice, u dokučivosti u kojima se osjeća sigurno, u forme i standarde, u kult i ritual. *Homo absconditus* je bitan jer se pod terminom još uvijek čuva čovjekova transcendentna nedokučivost, ta srž koju analiza ne može proanalizirati, bit koju čak i najrazvikaniji

analizatori priznaju u obliku „nesvjesnoga”, „sakrivenoga” ili „nedokučivog”, a što postoji u čovjeku (Erić, 2018).

Za filozofsku praksu dobro je uvijek obnoviti spoznaju toga kako je „filozofija [...] svagda bila prodor iz besmislenog, empirijskog, prividnog i za nas sa svih strana nasilnog svijeta u onostrani svijet” (Berdjajev, 1984, str. 13). Napor filozofa porođajni je napor mudroljupca da nametne, kritizira, konkretizira, objasni, sasluša i dâ kritiku (Van Rosem, 2018, str. 68–82) realnosti koja u zbilji postoji samo u onostranosti ljudske komunikacije, u međuprostoru onoga što je prezentirano, izrečeno, objašnjeno i mišljeno. Filozofija, a posebice njezino praktično sprovođenje dozvoljavaju odnos s nedokučivim i sakrivenim, otkrivajući tako dublju dimenziju čovjeka, dimenziju koja se ne može ozbiljno razumjeti bez uzimanja u obzir čovjeka u cijelosti. Iz tog razloga „[n]as ne može zadovoljiti humanistička antropologija” (Berdjajev, 1991, str. 139); može nas zadovoljiti jedino humana antropologija. Humanistička antropologija i humana antropologija nisu isto jer jedna na čovjeka gleda kao na predmet koji valja analizirati, a druga se prema čovjeku odnosi na čovječan način, primjereno njegovu čovječjem statusu. Jedna je antropologija, antropologija analize, a druga je filozofsko usmjerenje. Filozofska praksa nudi mogućnost uspostave humaniteta u pristupu čovjeku iz razloga što je filozofska djelatnost ona primarna znanost, primarna *ars omnia* iz koje su protekle sve druge znanstvene grane i discipline i koja još uvijek bićima pristupa na cjelovit način, s mudroljubljem i u potpunosti amaterski, bez navezanosti na dobit, korist, vlast ili čast, i koja oslobođena navezanosti još može ponuditi drugome ono što se izgubilo analiziranjem – ptičju perspektivu. Pogled odozgo, koji ne prodire u suštine, već u širine, pod čijom pažnjom drugi ne dolazi kao subjekt s posve partikularnim problemom, već kao cjelovitost čiji se posve specifičan problem liječi tako što se tretira njegovo cijelo u svoj svojoj cijelosti. U filozofskoj praksi, a posebice filozofskom savjetovanju, na specifični problem čovjeka koji dolazi po savjet ne gleda se pojedinačno, već se njegov problem stavlja u cjelovit kontekst. Za filozofa i savjetnika problem jednog područja problem je cjeline koju taj specifičan problem pogađa kod čovjeka (Yalom, 1980) jer, kako Berdjajev zamjećuje:

Čovjek je složeno biće, jer je istovremeno duhovan, nadnaravan i psiho-tjelesan, ali i prirodan. Čovjek je točka u kojoj se sijeku dvije sfere, mjesto na kojem se susreću, i on pripada dvama različitim poredcima. Zbog toga je ljudski život beskrajno složen i težak. (Berdjaev, 1935, str. 27)

U provođenju savjetovanja filozofijom, zbog složenosti i težine ljudskog života, ali i zato što čovjek istovremeno pripada redu prirodnog i natprirodnog, ljudskog i božanskog, u pristupanju njegovu izlječenju mora se uvažiti činjenica da „uređeni svijet, nije poredak svijeta” (Buber, 1977, str. 28), da ono što čovjek kao subjekt misli da su problemi, problemski postoji samo kao umotvorina njegova pokušaja

uređivanja jedna svijeta – njegova svijeta, čije je obzorje počesto zaklonjeno namjerno postavljenim ograničenjima, bilo vlastitim ili društveno nametnutim. Poredak svijeta postoji nezavisno od toga kako čovjek uredi svijet, bilo da uređuje vlastiti svijet, svijet drugih ili svijet općenito. Izvor čovjekove frustracije u tome je što nastoji svijet urediti, što nastoji u prirodu unijeti ono neprirodno, tu božansku iskru, u tome što je ograničio svoju natprirodnost, porobivši je prema redu kozmičkoga i povijesnoga vremena vlastitim snagama, uvjerivši sama sebe da je njegov usud unutar organiziranoga, mehanicističkoga, mjerljivo-predvidljivoga. Uporabom filozofije u praktičnom se vidu čovjeka sučeljava s činjenicom njegove natprirodnosti, odnosno s jedinstvenošću njegova značaja i tako upućuje na vid liječenja njegove cjelovitosti kojoj je upravo zbog vlastite nedokučivosti potrebna sinteza nego analiza.

## ***HOMO ABSCONDITUS* U DUHU FILOZOFSE PRAKSE**

Postavljanje *Homo absconditus*a u duh filozofske prakse otvara egzistencijalno-tehničko pitanje koje postavlja Berdjajev kada piše o čovjeku i mašini (stroju): „Može li čovjek postojati jedino u starom kozmosu, fizičkom i organskom, koji se ukazivao vječnim poretom, ili on može postojati i u novom, inom, neznanom još kozmosu” (Berdjajev, 1991, str. 119)? Može li ljudski rod očuvati čovječstvo čak i onda kad vlastiti izvorni, organski, prirodni i ljudski svijet zamijeni svijetom stroja, učinka, analize? Može li čovjek postojati u novom, inom i još neznanom kozmosu umjetnih tvorevina koje od njega zahtijevaju podređivanje jednome općem, sveobuhvatnom, sveznajućem i svemogućem sistemu ili manjim sistemima specijaliziranima, a odvojenima, koji djeluju kao dio veće systemske cjeline istoga općeg sustava. Matrica koja je umjetno stvorena od čovjeka i sada živi kao zaseban mrtav, a opet živ entitet (tijelo), kojem se i sam čovjek koji ga je stvorio podredio u službu. Neznani kozmos ekstra-organska je evolucija čovjekova razvijanja u načelima organizacije, postavljanja zakona, pravila i propisa bićima koja se po prirodi ponašaju na jedan način, a po uvođenju organiziranosti na drugi način. Postavljanjem granica, čovjeka, njegovo ponašanje, djelovanje, kretanje, mišljenje i ono što zna kontrolirano se suzilo s obzirom na usko specijalizirane matrice, zbog čega se iz položaja čovjekove suvremenosti može govoriti o tome kako ljudski život poprima oblik strojnoga i, kako zamjećuje Berdjajev, u egzistencijalno-sudbinskom smislu može se ukazati na „problem sociologije i metafizike tehnike” (Berdjajev, 1991, str. 108). Uviđajući kako je problem onoga tehničkog povezan sa sociologijom, odnosno s vidom organizacije i uprave društva koja utječe na čovjekov metafizički doživljaj svijeta, vidljivo je kako je prijelaz iz organsko-organiziranog života na život stroja i strojnog usklađivanja u duševnoj-duhovnoj razini čovjeka otvorio rane. Čovjek je postao životno neusklađen sa svijetom i vremenom u kojem živi i željan uskladiti se s poretkom svijeta koji se odjednom promijenio i tako

mu oduzeo tlo pod nogama. On je postao simptomatičan, bolestan na duh i dušu, a posljedično tome i na tijelo. Dodijeljeno mu je stanje bolesnika i određene su mu bolesti, klasifikacija se zna: depresija, anksioznost, psihosomatski problemi, manjak pouzdanja, vjere u sebe, ali i u drugoga, stres, sindrom *burnouta*, nedostatak sna, opsesija, kompulzija, shizofrenija, hipohondrija, bipolarni poremećaj, manjak pažnje, egoizam, nedostatak empatije, narcisoidnost i ostalo prema *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (DSM–5, 2013, str. 31–714). Spas, naravno, treba potražiti kod stručnjaka, liječnika duše – psihologa, jer su klasični „dušobriznici”, svećenici, prema većini previše „tradicionalni” i u neskladu s vremenom. Međutim, kako humanitet u cjelini ide prema neznanom, još nedokučivom kozmosu, koji je na pomolu iza horizonta metafizike čovjeka u modernom svijetu, događa se povratak klasičnom dušobrizništvu. Pod time podrazumijevamo brigu o dušama općenito, a ne samo teološku, svećeničku brigu o dušama vjernika. Briga o dušama prvenstveno je filozofska, iz razloga što je svaka teologija, pa i religija, u suštini građena na filozofiji, na ideji duše i psihe i tijela, na promišljanju o njihovu međudjelovanju, bez čije se interakcije o čovjeku i njegovu svijetu ne može govoriti. Filozofija, a posljedično i filozofska praksa u korijenu imaju brigu oko onog rastućeg (grč. Φύσις), u što u konačnici spada i ono umsko (grč. Ψυχή), duša i duševnost čovjeka. Filozofija se još uz to brine i o stvarnostima duha, stvarnostima onoga što je metafizičko, a što u bitnoj mjeri utječe na usklađivanje čovjekove slike sebe (grč. εἶδωλον) s kozmosom u cjelini. Poželjno je razlučiti između onoga što je tjelesnost, psiha, mentalno, duhovno i duh (Svibovec, 2023, str. 223–240), jer se uvidom u različitosti i posebnosti upravo tih distinkcija uviđa kako se prilikom „liječenja” duha ne radi o liječenju jer: 1) Duh se ne može liječiti, niti se duh može povrijediti – duh ide gdje hoće. Međutim, duh se može prisiliti, privremeno „svezati” i jedan njegov dio natjerati u jednom smjeru. Duh se ne može povrijediti, on ne može primiti rane, bez obzira na privremene prisile. 2) Psihu valja razumjeti kao ono s čime se čovjek usklađuje, kao naličje onoga s čime se uspoređuje njegova svjetovna trenutnost i čemu teži njegovo ostvarenje. Psiha (duša) je u tom smislu neranjiva i ne podliježe ranjavanju. Šteta koju psiha snosi ima svoj izvor u frustracijama koje nastaju zbog nemogućnosti usklađivanja onoga što čovjek trenutačno jest s vlastitim εἶδωλον (Rohde, 1925), a što bi se Jungovim rječnikom moglo opisati kao sjena (Jung, 1959, str. 8–10). 3) Mentalno se kod čovjeka izražava u nošenju sa stvarnošću koja ga okružuje. To su procesi i postupci pomoću kojih čovjek integrira ono što se događa u njegovoj okolini u vlastiti život, čime postaje dio stvarnosti i stvarnost postaje dio njega. Unutar mentalnoga ne postoji zadavanje rana, niti je na mentalno moguće ostaviti ožiljke, međutim ono gdje su povrede mentalne sfere očite način je na koji se čovjek nosi s integracijom, s prihvatanjem stanja u svojoj nutrini, ali i stanja u svijetu oko sebe. Kako se radi o procesuiranju svijeta, ali i vlastitog „Ja” koje se nužno mora

pomiriti s činjenicama života (smrću, boli, patnjom, odnosima s drugima, gubitkom, te drugim dobrim i lošim elementima življenja), muke mentalnog tipa manifestirat će se na tijelu čovjeka, u njegovu izgledu, ponašanju, društvenom životu, odnosu prema okolini i tome slično. 4) Tijelo ili tjelesnost s obzirom na duh, psihi i mentalno dio je čovjekove cjelovitosti koja može biti povrijeđena. Na tijelu ostaju rane, u tjelesnosti se vidljivo naziru povrede i očituju posljedice izmučenosti, neusklađenosti, boli, ali i radosti, sklada, blagostanja.

Kako bi se moglo uspješnije pristupiti dinamici koja se događa unutar čovjeka koji istovremeno živi u tri različite i zasebne realnosti tijela, psihe i duše, a koje zajedno potpadaju pod utjecaj duhovnoga, o *Homo absconditusu* se može govoriti u okvirima filozofske prakse, jer će filozofovo usmjerenje na rad s čovjekom u okvirima filozofske prakse biti usmjereno na čovjeka kao cijelo biće. Na čovjeka koji je nepodijeljen, koji ne dolazi s problemom koji ga muči samo ka specijalistu za posebno područje, već i ekspertu, filozofu kod kojega će pomiriti i sinkronizirati dušu, duh i tijelo u harmonijsku cjelinu. Pristupanjem čovjeku kao jednom cijelom biću, filozof je usmjeren na istraživanje čovjekovih neistraženosti, neotkrivenosti koje postoje u duhu, tijelu i duši, jer u neistraženim područjima sfera koje čine čovjeka postoji ono neotkriveno koje se ne može klasificirati samo kao nesvjesno, već ulazi u područje sakrivena djelovanja Duha u čovjeku. Bît čovjeka, njegov unutarnji princip, ono po čemu on jest ono što jest, sakrivena je i vanjskom se svijetu predočava u smislu očitosti (*quiditas rei materialis [sensibilis]*), koje objelodanjuju sakrivalačku narav bitka koji se kroz čovjeka manifestira u bivstvovanju (egzistenciji), a otkriva kroz razotkrivanje (*revelatio*) sama čovjeka drugome, ali i na razini njega samoga samome sebi (sebeotkrivanje). Filozofija, filozofiranje, filozofsko savjetovanje i praktična usmjerenost filozofa čovjeku bi trebali pristupati kao prema biću čija pojava u onome tko po naravi teži prema znanju izaziva poriv da se čudi. Da se divi onome što se u egzistenciji pokazuje kao fenomen (pojavnost) čijim se postepenim uviđanjem fantastično otkriva posve nova dubina, isprva nevidljiva, a dovoljno zagonetna da uz osjećaj čuđenja pobuđuje fascinaciju i u trenu obuzetosti još neistraženim pobuđuje želju za ponovnim, novim, novijim i hrabrijim istraživačkim pothvatima kako bi se ono što je neistraženo istražilo i ono što je sakriveno objavilo. *Homo absconditus* konceptualno odgovara onome tko filozofski istražuje stvarnost – filozofu, savjetniku koji sebi, ali i drugome, pristupa sa zadivljenošću. Koji otkriva u sebi i u drugome idealno, ono što može biti, a što vazda postoji na ivici već ustaljenoga, realiziranoga i sadašnjega. To što golica ljudski poriv za otkrivanjem, što neprestano postoji u drugome, što on može biti ili što je mogao biti – neotkriveno i toliko poželjno upravo zato što je netaknuto, neistraženo, potpuno novo, konceptualno – sažima *Homo absconditus* u filozofskoj praksi u čijem duhu prema naravi susreta filozofa sa stvarnošću stoji osjećanje čudnosti, misterije, avanture i neutaživa želja za otkrivanjem

onoga što je strano. U praksi filozofije zbog toga postoji tendiranje ka sintezi, prema razumijevanju ne samo onoga fenomenalnoga, već i onoga noumenalnoga. Filozof stoga ne treba strogo vršiti analizu stvarnosti pred sobom, on ne treba drugoga pred sobom, rabeći dedukciju i indukciju, u širem smislu riječi, određivati s obzirom na pojmovlje, sudove i zaključke. On iz stvarnosti koja je razlomljena na fragmente i podijeljena može načiniti jedno smisljeno cijelo, dati odgovor koji obuhvaća sve elemente onoga čemu se čudi i što istražuje. U smislu u kojem bi filozofija proučavala drugoga, drugi pred filozofa dolazi kao stranac, a odlazi kao gost, onaj koji je s domaćinom lomio kruh, okusio sol i podijelio čašu pića, ne više nedobrodošao, nego uvijek dobrodošao. Koji se, isprva nepoznat, predstavio i tako sam o sebi otkrio ono što mu leži na srcu, koji je dio svojega cijelog objavio i time sebe postavio pred svijet. Koji je od domaćina prepoznat isprva kao stran, a potom kao drug, onaj koji je u domaćinu izazvao osjećaj prisnosti, i koji, bio on ugodna ili neugodna ponašanja, slatkorječiv ili grub na jeziku, ne odlazi ne ostavljajući utisak. U filozofiji čovjek dolazi pred svijet, pred strano, novo, čudno i nepregledno i prema toj nepreglednoj cjelini postavlja se kao vlastitost, posve individualne, osobne i konkretne unikatnosti. Njemu se svijet pokorava, jer objavljivanjem onoga što jest u svijet manifestira jedan posve drugi svijet, drugačiji od onog putenog. U duhu filozofske prakse *Homo absconditus* pojmovno brani neistraženu čovjekovu cjelovitost, kreativni dio onoga što se u čovjeku čuva i objavljuje svijetu kao originalnost. Originalnost koja se otkriva unikatnost je jednog svijeta, svijeta koji je drugačiji od principa svijeta u kojem se odvija egzistiranje, jer se sakriveno otkriva kao ono što je strano svijetu, što mu je drugačije. Otkriva se širina svega onoga što je veće od onoga što je do sada istraženo o čovjeku – ljubav, sreća, svrha, vrijednost, sloboda, kreativnost, želja za otkrivanjem, upoznavanjem, prihvaćanjem, svrhom – a što još uvijek potpada pod neistraženog čovjeka. Filozof u duhu filozofske prakse mora biti onaj koji istražuje drugoga, koji drugome dopušta da se otkrije i koji to otkrivanje potiče. Koji na vidjelo iznosi ono još neupoznato u čovjeku i koji svijetu na adekvatan način predstavlja *Homo absconditus*.

## ZAKLJUČAK

U duhu filozofske prakse *Homo absconditus* može biti protumačen kao čovjek koji dolazi pred filozofa kao onaj koji svoje unutarnje svjetove i nazore želi podijeliti sa sugovornikom i tako objaviti ono što se u njemu nalazi, a što je do tog trenutka bilo sakriveno. Zadaća je filozofa prema onome koji mu dolazi ususret, na terapiju ili po savjet da bude otvoren za otkrivenje, za samoobjavu onoga što mu se prenosi, a što je do tog trenutka bilo sakriveno. Sakriveni čovjek nije samo onaj koji ima specifičan problem ili određenu brigu, koju valja analizom raspetljati i tako mu brigu

umanjiti ili razriješiti, već i ono u čovjeku koje žudi za ostvarenjem, za dokazivanjem, za istraživanjem, za prihvaćanjem, za zajedništvom, heroizmom i samoćom, unatoč svemu onome što je u životu neizgledno. Filozofija može i mora se baviti ne samo analizom čovjeka, već i sintetiziranjem njegovih modusa egzistiranja, ujedinjavajući ih u organsko-sintetsku cjelinu. Filozofska praksa ima jedinstvenu ulogu u tome što se u njenom duhu može načiniti antroposinteza i antropodiceja čovjeka i na taj način opravdati i razumjeti čovjeka kao kreativno-otkrivačko biće, ali i ukazati na to kako je čovjek cjelovito biće, cjelina koja osim analize treba sintezu.

## LITERATURA

- Bauman, Z. (2011). *Tekuća modernost*. Zagreb: Naklada Pelago.
- Berdajev N. (1984). *Ja i svijet objekata*. Zagreb: Kršćanska sadašnjost.
- Berdajev N. (1985). *Duh i realnost*. Zagreb: Kršćanska sadašnjost.
- Berdajev N. (1991). *Novo srednjovjekovlje*. Split: Laus.
- Berdyae, N. (1935). *Freedom and the Spirit*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
- Berdyae, N. (1949). *The Divine and The Human*. London: Geoffrey Bles.
- Berdyae, N. (1962). *The Meaning of the Creative Act*. New York: Collier Books.
- Buber, M. (1977). *Ja i ti*. Beograd: Izdavačko preduzeće »Rad«.
- Dostojevski, F. M. (2004). *Braća Karamazovi*. Zagreb: Globus Media.
- DSM–5, American Psychiatric Association (2013). *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders*. Washington DC, Lodnon, American Psychiatric Association.
- Erić, Lj. i Dimitrijević, A. (2018). *Psihoterapija*. Beograd: Clio.
- Jung, C. G. (1959). *Aion*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Jurčević, M. (2000). Skriveni Bog – Deus Absconditus, *Bogoslovska smotra*, 70(1), 129–150.
- Kant, I. (1953). *Dvije rasprave*. Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska.
- Kant, I. (1984). *Kritika čistog uma*. Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska.
- Kordić, I. (1996). *O biti istine: filozofske studije*. Zagreb: Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada.
- Kušar, S. (2001). *Bog kršćanske objave*. Zagreb: Kršćanska sadašnjost.
- Köhler, R. (1955). Der "deus absconditus" in philosophie und theologie. *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte*, 7(1), 46–58.
- Plessner, H. (2004). *Stupnjevi organskoga i čovjek*. Zagreb: Naklada Breza.
- Rohde, E. (1925). *Psyche*. London: Kegan Paul, Trubner & Co. LTD.
- Svibovec, F. M. (2023). Mentalno zdravlje pod vidom duhovne tehnologije i duhovnih tehnika. U L. Janeš i Š. Kožić (Ur.), *Bioetička motrišta o mentalnom zdravlju* (str. 223-240). Zagreb: Centar za bioetiku Fakulteta filozofije i religijskih znanosti Sveučilišta u Zagrebu.
- Van Rosem, K. (2018). How to Lead a Socratic Dialogue. U S. Ruchmann (Ur.), *Understanding the other and oneself* (str. 68 – 82). Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
- Yalom, I. D. (1980). *Existential psychotherapy*. New York: Basic Books.

# *Homo absconditus* in the spirit of philosophical practice

## ABSTRACT

---

“Man needs psycho-synthesis more than psychoanalysis”, writes the Russian philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev, along whose lines this work aims to explore the hidden man in the form of psychosynthesis that can be offered by philosophical practice, because according to the same philosopher, man is “an enigma in this world, possibly the biggest puzzle.” Unraveling the riddle of this *Homo absconditus* will reveal a man different from the one who needs psychotherapy, as a form of care for one’s mental composition to cope with society, societal-social, social-technical-organizational structures of one’s own immediate reality. In the spirit of good philosophical practice, aimed at the treatment of man under the form of psychosynthesis, attention must be drawn to the emergence of what is hidden in man, what exists under the mask of one’s social persona as the “real man”, who is seen in psychoanalysis as a “shadow” or something hidden, one who must be reached in order to even approach the path of one’s own healing.

**Keywords:** *Homo absconditus*, philosophical practice, psycho-synthesis, Berdyaev.



JAHHR

***ARTIFICIAL  
INTELLIGENCE  
HUMANITIES  
SPECIAL SECTION***

***EUROPEAN  
JOURNAL OF BIOETHICS***

**EUROPSKI  
ČASOPIS ZA BIOETIKU**



Jinyoung Han\*, Jung Lee\*\*, Juyeon Ham\*\*\*

# Learner perception changes of ChatGPT over ten days: Focusing on psychological anthropomorphism, privacy concerns and trust

## SUMMARY

Given the increasing popularity of generative artificial intelligence (GAI) among students, this study examined learners' experiences before and after a Python programming course using ChatGPT, conducted as part of a data-processing course. Using a pre-post study design, we gathered data from 23 participants to investigate the changes in learners' perceptions of ChatGPT, including perceived psychological anthropomorphism, privacy concerns, trust in ChatGPT, and continuance intentions. Our quantitative analysis revealed that perceived psychological anthropomorphism, privacy concerns, and trust increased significantly after participating in the course. The study also found that, despite being beginners in programming, learners showed a willingness to continue exploring related content after participating in the course. The participants also expressed that the use of ChatGPT lowered barriers to learning programming and text mining. These findings should be considered when planning or designing GAI-related literacy education programmes in the future.

**Keywords:** ChatGPT, Python programming course, privacy concern, psychological anthropomorphism, trust, learner awareness.

---

\* Artificial Intelligence Humanities Research Institute, Chung-Ang University, Seoul, Republic of Korea. ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6579-7610>.

\*\* Division of Global Business & Technology, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Yongin-si, Gyeonggi-do, Republic of Korea. ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9274-6739>.

\*\*\* College of Business, Chosun University, Gwangju, Republic of Korea. ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1079-8082>

*Correspondence Address:* Jung Lee, Division of Global Business & Technology, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, 81 Oedae-ro, Mohyeon-eup, Cheoin-gu, Yongin-si, Gyeonggi-do, Republic of Korea. Email: [jung.lee@hufs.ac.kr](mailto:jung.lee@hufs.ac.kr).

## INTRODUCTION

Generative artificial intelligence (GAI) is a subset of artificial intelligence (AI) dedicated to producing new and original content, such as images, texts, and music. GAIs are useful assistants in creative processes (Rios-Campos et al., 2023). Grand View Research (2022) forecasted an annual growth rate of 34.4% for the GAI market through 2030, highlighting its value across diverse sectors such as finance, healthcare, automotive, transportation, information technology, communications, media, and entertainment. The use of GAI has accelerated further since the emergence of ChatGPT 3.5 in November 2022. According to Fishbowl's 2023 survey, approximately 30% of 4,500 experts noted having experience using GAI, such as ChatGPT and Bard.

ChatGPT is a chatbot based on a large-scale language model and is increasingly being implemented in daily life. It enhances the interactions between humans and AI across various domains, including workplaces, educational and research sectors, and creative fields (Adiguzel et al., 2023; Kasneci et al., 2023; Lo, 2023). ChatGPT has become a pivotal tool for igniting creativity and expanding imagination; the outputs it generates are often indistinguishable from those created by humans (Guo et al., 2023; Herbold et al., 2023; Katib et al., 2023; Yeadon, 2023). Additionally, a humanoid robot powered by ChatGPT has been introduced. In February 2024, a video was released showcasing OpenAI's AI model integrated into Figure 01, a humanoid robot developed by Figure, an AI robotics start-up. Figure 01 demonstrated the ability to recognize and assess surrounding objects, exhibit human-like intonation, and perform actions. Figure AI attracted a substantial investment of \$675 million from OpenAI, Microsoft, NVIDIA, Amazon, and Intel (Figure AI Inc., 2024). As robots combine with multimodal AI, such as ChatGPT, to embody not only appearance of humans, but also aspects considered unique to humans, such as situational awareness, judgment, and communication, the level of anthropomorphism is predicted to increase.

However, ChatGPT includes potential risks, such as the leakage of sensitive personal and organisational information. It is trained with a large amount of data obtained from various inputs, which often include sensitive personal information; even anonymised personal information can be used to identify a person by combining various types of data. It remains unclear how this data will be used. The biggest problem with ChatGPT is that in addition to the inadvertent disclosure of sensitive information, users and developers remain unaware of the privacy risks of the new technology (BCG AI Ethics Consulting Team, 2023).

ChatGPT's large language model (LLM) provides users with a familiar interface, that is akin to talking to a person. Additionally, as context-based prompting

progresses, users can obtain more accurate and adjusted answers. In this process, users' perceptions of anthropomorphism, privacy concerns, trust in ChatGPT, and continuance usage intention can change, because users may provide more contextual or personal information to obtain more precise answers.

Higher education institutions are developing and implementing guidelines for the use of GAI, in their educational programmes. Many universities have adopted an open but cautious approach toward GAI and have left it up to instructors to decide how to use GAI in each class (Wang et al., 2024). Therefore, it is necessary for educational policymakers and instructors to understand changes in their learners' perceptions or the influence of GAI during the learning process when planning and implementing education policies or curricula (Chan & Hu, 2023).

Studies on ChatGPT conducted in the context of higher education have mainly focused on factors that influence its continued use or adoption, such as ease of use, perceived usefulness, anthropomorphism, and others (Abdaljaleel et al., 2024; Chan & Zhou, 2023; Lai et al., 2023; Polyportis & Pahos, 2024). However, there is still a lack of research on how courses using ChatGPT in higher education affect learners' perceptions of ChatGPT (except for Sun et al., 2024). Thus, this study intends to answer the following research question:

RQ: Do learners' perceptions of ChatGPT change after participating in programming activities using ChatGPT? Specifically, how do learners' perceptions shift regarding psychological anthropomorphism, privacy concerns, and trust?

To answer this question, this study examined changes in the perception of GAI among students in the humanities and social sciences, who are not computer science or AI majors. The study was conducted in a Python programming course using ChatGPT for humanities and social science majors, and pre- and post-surveys were analysed to investigate changes in students' perceptions.

## **RELATED WORK AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT**

Anthropomorphism refers to giving human characteristics (e.g., appearance, behaviour, and personality) to an inanimate object to make it appear like a human (Epley et al., 2007). Anthropomorphism can be performed in several ways, including giving names to objects (Eskine & Locander, 2014; Waytz et al., 2014) or designing their appearance to resemble that of a human, such as by adding limbs or eyes (Hur et al., 2015). Usually, people anthropomorphise inanimate objects and treat them as human beings (Freud, 2018; Hume, 2000). Because people have learned how to interact with humans, they feel uncertain when interacting with non-human objects,

which leads to cognitive and psychological discomfort. One strategy to resolve this discomfort is to anthropomorphise an object and view it as a human being, like oneself (Epley et al., 2007; MacInnis & Folkes, 2017). Anthropomorphism increases not only intimacy with the target (Epley et al., 2007), but also the sense of social presence toward it, which positively affects the effectiveness of the interaction (Duffy, 2003). The movie *Castaway* is a representative example where Wilson, a volleyball, is both a non-human object and a main character; Chuck thinks of Wilson as a human and interacts with it.

Anthropomorphism includes psychological features (i.e., emotions, personalities and gestures) as well as non-psychological features such as physical resemblance to human bodies (e.g., head, eyes, arms and legs) (Keeley, 2004). According to the CASA (Computers Are Social Actors) paradigm (Nass et al., 1994), individuals tend to treat computers as social actors rather than machines. The ways of thinking and behaving used when interacting with humans are also applied when interacting with computers. People adopt a polite attitude and tone of voice toward AI, as they do with other people, and they expect AI to reciprocate with similar politeness (Nass et al., 1999). This occurs because, in the process of interacting with AI, people come to believe that human attributes – such as emotions – are inherent in AI due to psychological anthropomorphism and physical characteristics (Duffy, 2003). Compared to when the CASA theory was proposed by Nass and colleagues (1994), current computer performance and services have advanced significantly. Luo et al. (2019) confirmed that the success rate of AI counsellors in inducing purchases for financial institution loan customers was no different from that of experienced counsellors. There is also a study showing that AI teaching assistants, which learn from students' questions posted in online lectures, can perform tasks better than human teaching assistants (Goel & Polepeddi, 2018). These results of extant studies further reinforce the position of AI as a social actor. This study focuses on psychological anthropomorphism in the case of AI software that does not have a physical appearance, such as ChatGPT, but interacts with people using human language.

In this study, individuals used ChatGPT to write codes in a course that processed and analysed data. During the course, participants explain the task to ChatGPT and execute the code provided by it. ChatGPT remembers requests and answers made in the same session, and responds to user requests in situations where it understands the prompt history. Through interaction with ChatGPT during the programming course, the degree to which users feel psychologically anthropomorphic toward ChatGPT increases. Therefore, the following hypothesis was proposed:

**H1. Learner's perceived psychological anthropomorphism toward ChatGPT increases after participating in a programming course using ChatGPT.**

Trust refers to a reliable belief in the accuracy of recommendations, that is, the quality or state of being correct or precise (Shin & Park, 2019). Trust denotes the reliability and credibility of a system. Many trust dimensions determine a user's decision to engage in technology; however, few studies have investigated this in the context of GAI services, particularly ChatGPT. In this study, trust denotes the degree to which ChatGPT recommendations or responses are considered reliable and credible. Kaplan et al.'s (2021) meta-analysis addressed the determinants of trust in AI. Among the three determinant categories, human-related significant factors were users' abilities: understanding and expertise. An individual's level of understanding of an AI system is a significant and positive predictor of trust, as is an individual's expertise in their task. The findings indicate that the more experienced the user, the higher their trust in the system. According to the results of prior research, we posit that participants in the programming course using ChatGPT will become knowledgeable about the virtual assistant, and will believe that its responses are reliable. Thus, we hypothesised the following:

**H2. Trust in ChatGPT increases after participating in a programming course using ChatGPT.**

Privacy concerns are among the most critical issues in the digital age. They refer to the degree of awareness and evaluation of the risks associated with privacy violations when using information services (Tan et al., 2012). Individuals can experience various benefits from personalised services by sharing personal information. However, sharing personal information can also lead to abuse or misuse of this information (Cram et al., 2019). A prominent privacy violation example is the Facebook-Cambridge Analytica data scandal (Confessore, 2018). Such examples illustrate how service organisations intentionally collect personal information without consent and misuse it. With the emergence of advanced technologies such as GAI, privacy concerns will only become more important and complex. Understanding information technology is believed to significantly impact privacy concerns. Knowledgeable individuals may be more concerned because they are more aware of the potential threats to privacy posed by information technology (e.g., Hoffman et al., 1999). However, previous studies on the relationship between IT knowledge and privacy concerns have produced mixed results (Hong et al., 2021).

In this study, privacy concerns denote the degree of awareness and assessment of the risks related to privacy violations using ChatGPT. As individuals understand ChatGPT, a relatively new technology, they become aware of its capabilities, benefits, and risks. Additionally, because ChatGPT retains context-based prompting information during a session, users can obtain more accurate and adjusted answers. Thus, we hypothesise that participants in a programming course using ChatGPT will

become knowledgeable about ChatGPT and become more concerned about their privacy. Thus, we posit:

**H3. Privacy concerns increase after participating in a programming course using ChatGPT.**

Dwivedi et al. (2019) highlighted that the relationship between facilitating conditions and behavioural intention is missing from Venkatesh et al.'s (2003) unified theory of acceptance and the use of technology model. In the context of technology adoption, facilitating conditions refer to technical infrastructure, ICT support, and sufficient knowledge to use the technology. Facilitating conditions help individuals perceive technological ease and positively influence effort expectancy (Patil et al., 2020; Polyportis & Pahos, 2024). Subsequently, the continuance intention of individuals to use certain technologies increases. In the context of the programming course, the participants learned how to use ChatGPT in programming and understood its benefits and functions. Thus, participants with the necessary knowledge or resources to use ChatGPT are likely to use ChatGPT continually. Thus,

**H4. Continuance intention to use ChatGPT increases after participating in a programming course using ChatGPT.**

## METHOD

To answer our research questions, we used a mixed-methods approach (Olds et al., 2005; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2003). The quantitative phase primarily used self-report ratings of Likert items with a pre- and post-test approach. In the qualitative phase, open-ended questions were asked and analysed to further understand the quantitative findings.

### Participants

This study was conducted at a large public university in Seoul, South Korea in January 2024, where 31 undergraduate and graduate students not majoring in computer science were registered in the 'Data-processing using ChatGPT' course.

The course was a non-regular program consisting of Python programming and basic text mining for data processing. It was conducted over 10 days, with sessions lasting 2 hours each. Students registered and participated in the class to develop their data-processing abilities. The tuition fee was \$30 (30,000 Korean won), and a refund was available for students who attended more than 70% of the course. The students were required to submit a programming assignment each day, which was admitted as attendance. When students uploaded their assignments to a learning management

system, they were required to use ChatGPT and were offered the opportunity to answer questions about their perceptions of and experiences with ChatGPT as part of the assignments. The open-ended question was: “Can I say that the results I requested from ChatGPT are the same as the results I programmed? If not, what are the differences between them? Please feel free to submit your comments.” Table 1 presents the details of the course.

Our study drew on a popular approach, combining multiple AI-based programming assistants, and iteratively eliciting ChatGPT’s power in Python programming (Yan, 2023). The steps were as follows: 1) taking basic programming lectures, 2) practising programming according to the directions in the lectures, 3) iteratively prompting with ChatGPT for the same directions, 4) comparing the outputs of ChatGPT with the participants’ output, and 5) writing a reflection note focusing on comparison details.

Table 1. Course details

| Day | Subjects                                      | Contents                                                                                                                                                                                                |
|-----|-----------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1   | Understanding of conversation-based GAI       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Background of artificial intelligence, introduction to conversation-based generative artificial intelligence (GAI) technology</li> <li>• Pre-survey</li> </ul> |
| 2   | Getting started with Python programming       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Programming environment, basic operations (input/output) and data</li> </ul>                                                                                   |
| 3   | Turn tasks into procedures                    | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conditional statements, types of actions: if, while, import</li> </ul>                                                                                         |
| 4   | Repetitive structure and modularity           | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Repetition structure: for, range</li> </ul>                                                                                                                    |
| 5   | Breaking down complex problems                | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Function handling (def), using turtle graphics, introduction to lists</li> </ul>                                                                               |
| 6   | Complex data handling and data pre-processing | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lists, dictionaries, and Pandas modules</li> </ul>                                                                                                             |
| 7   | Data collection and pre-processing            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reading file data (txt, csv), pre-processing process</li> </ul>                                                                                                |
| 8   | Text Mining (1)                               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Concept of text mining, word cloud</li> </ul>                                                                                                                  |
| 9   | Text Mining (2)                               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Text mining free practice, free problem practice</li> </ul>                                                                                                    |
| 10  | Final challenge event                         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Off-line competition</li> <li>• Post-survey</li> </ul>                                                                                                         |

Out of 31 participants, 23 responded to the pre-survey assessing their perceptions, and 17 of those also completed the post-survey. Since this study examines changes in participants’ perceptions of ChatGPT before and after the training course, only those who completed both the pre- and post-surveys were included in the analysis.

All had heard of ChatGPT and most had attempted to use it to write their reports and course papers (see Table 2).

Table 2. Participant characteristics

| Programming experience |                 | Frequency | Percentage (%) |
|------------------------|-----------------|-----------|----------------|
|                        | No experience   | 18        | 60.00          |
|                        | Python          | 11        | 36.67          |
|                        | C, C++          | 2         | 6.67           |
| Major                  |                 | Frequency | Percentage (%) |
|                        | Humanities      | 18        | 60.00          |
|                        | Social Science  | 7         | 23.33          |
|                        | Arts            | 2         | 6.67           |
|                        | Others          | 3         | 10.00          |
| Educational Level      |                 | Frequency | Percentage (%) |
|                        | Doctoral Course | 2         | 6.67           |
|                        | Masters Course  | 6         | 20.00          |
|                        | Undergraduate   | 22        | 73.33          |

### Development of measures

The research model includes four variables: perceived psychological anthropomorphism, privacy concerns, trust in ChatGPT, and intention to continue using ChatGPT. The measures of perceived psychological anthropomorphism were adapted from Jang and Lee (2020). The operationalisation of each construct is presented in Table 3. All the constructs were measured using the multiple-item method. Each item was measured on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 'strongly disagree' to 'strongly agree' (see Table 4).

Table 3. Operationalisation of constructs

| Constructs                                     | Operationalisation                                                                                                                    | Adapted from        |
|------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|
| Perceived psychological anthropomorphism (PPA) | The degree of imbuing the imagined or real behaviour of ChatGPT with humanlike characteristics, motivations, intentions, and emotions | Epley et al. (2007) |
| Privacy concerns (PC)                          | The degree of awareness and assessment of risks related to privacy violations using ChatGPT                                           | Tan et al. (2012)   |

|                                       |                                                                                             |                |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|
| Trust in ChatGPT (TR)                 | The degree of belief that ChatGPT's recommendations and responses are reliable and credible | Shin (2021)    |
| Continuance intention of ChatGPT (CI) | Individual's willingness to use ChatGPT continuously                                        | Alalwan (2020) |

Table 4. Measure items

| Constructs                                     | Items |                                                                                                                    | Adapted from                                            |
|------------------------------------------------|-------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|
| Perceived psychological anthropomorphism (PPA) | PPA1  | I believe that AI device has its own personality.                                                                  | Golossenko et al. (2020); Lu et al. (2019); Wang (2017) |
|                                                | PPA2  | I believe that AI device has consciousness.                                                                        |                                                         |
|                                                | PPA3  | I believe that AI device has its own reasoning.                                                                    |                                                         |
|                                                | PPA4  | I believe that AI is creative and has its own imagination.                                                         |                                                         |
|                                                | PPA5  | I believe that AI device can feel compassion.                                                                      |                                                         |
| Privacy concerns (PC)                          | PC1   | I am concerned that the information I submit to ChatGPT could be misused.                                          | Mohamed & Ahmad (2012)                                  |
|                                                | PC2   | I am concerned that others can find private information about me from ChatGPT.                                     |                                                         |
|                                                | PC3   | I am concerned about providing personal information to ChatGPT because of what others might do with it.            |                                                         |
|                                                | PC4   | I am concerned about providing personal information to ChatGPT because it could be used in a way I do not foresee. |                                                         |
| Trust in ChatGPT (TR)                          | TR1   | ChatGPT is believable.                                                                                             | Baek & Kim (2023)                                       |
|                                                | TR2   | ChatGPT is credible.                                                                                               |                                                         |
|                                                | TR3   | ChatGPT is trustworthy.                                                                                            |                                                         |
| Continuance intention of ChatGPT (CI)          | CI1   | I plan to keep using ChatGPT.                                                                                      |                                                         |
|                                                | CI2   | I want to continue using ChatGPT.                                                                                  |                                                         |

ANALYSIS AND RESULTS


Paired t-test results

Perceived psychological anthropomorphism, privacy concerns, and trust increased significantly after participation in the course. Table 5 and Figure 1 present the results of paired t-tests.

Table 5. The result of paired t-tests

| Concepts                                       | Pre-Mean | Post-Mean | t-test Result                    |
|------------------------------------------------|----------|-----------|----------------------------------|
| Perceived psychological anthropomorphism (PPA) | 3.000    | 3.134     | Not-significant but already high |
|                                                | 1.800    | 2.400     | Significant                      |
|                                                | 2.934    | 3.667     |                                  |
|                                                | 1.467    | 2.734     |                                  |
|                                                | 1.400    | 2.134     |                                  |
| Privacy concerns (PC)                          | 2.200    | 3.334     | Significant                      |
|                                                | 1.534    | 3.000     |                                  |
|                                                | 2.134    | 3.134     |                                  |
| Trust in ChatGPT (TR)                          | 1.467    | 3.734     | Significant                      |
|                                                | 1.734    | 3.467     |                                  |
|                                                | 1.734    | 3.534     |                                  |
| Continuance intention of ChatGPT (CI)          | 4.134    | 4.667     | Non-significant but already high |
|                                                | 4.334    | 4.600     |                                  |

Figure 1. Comparison of the paired t-test results



In the qualitative phase, students completed programming assignments after each lecture and compared the code written in the class with the code provided by ChatGPT. The students were able to understand the programme codes and compare the results. They left comments about each lecture and assignment and responded to the overall evaluation of the course in the post-survey.

### Measurement model

To assess convergent validity and reliability, we verified the following criteria: (1) all factor loadings exceeded 0.70 for their respective factors, (2) the average variance extracted (AVE) for each construct was greater than 0.50 and (3) both Cronbach's alpha and composite reliability exceeded 0.7 (MacKenzie et al., 2011). As shown in Table 6, all measurement item loadings and composite reliability were above the recommended values.

Table 6. Factor loadings

| Items | PPA          | CI           | PC           | TR           | Type       | SE    | p-value |
|-------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|------------|-------|---------|
| PPA1  | <b>0.801</b> | 0.327        | 0.055        | -0.503       | Reflective | 0.271 | 0.005   |
| PPA2  | <b>0.776</b> | -0.285       | 0.249        | 0.497        | Reflective | 0.197 | <0.001  |
| PPA3  | <b>0.759</b> | -0.103       | -0.077       | 0.679        | Reflective | 0.309 | 0.013   |
| PPA4  | <b>0.76</b>  | 0.252        | -0.136       | -0.657       | Reflective | 0.167 | <0.001  |
| PPA5  | <b>0.751</b> | 0.044        | -0.127       | -0.081       | Reflective | 0.231 | 0.003   |
| CI1   | 0.139        | <b>0.948</b> | 0.029        | -0.183       | Reflective | 0.284 | 0.002   |
| CI2   | -0.139       | <b>0.948</b> | -0.029       | 0.183        | Reflective | 0.204 | <0.001  |
| PC1   | 0.545        | 0.272        | <b>0.775</b> | -0.578       | Reflective | 0.256 | 0.004   |
| PC2   | -0.487       | 0.14         | <b>0.783</b> | 0.168        | Reflective | 0.216 | 0.001   |
| PC3   | -0.389       | -0.613       | <b>0.906</b> | 0.665        | Reflective | 0.186 | <0.001  |
| PC4   | 0.363        | 0.274        | <b>0.856</b> | -0.334       | Reflective | 0.205 | <0.001  |
| TR1   | -0.273       | -0.411       | -0.233       | <b>0.902</b> | Reflective | 0.266 | 0.002   |
| TR2   | 0.045        | 0.193        | 0.077        | <b>0.953</b> | Reflective | 0.167 | <0.001  |
| TR3   | 0.21         | 0.193        | 0.141        | <b>0.970</b> | Reflective | 0.206 | <0.001  |

Notes. PPA: Perceived psychological anthropomorphism; PC: Privacy concerns; TR: Trust in ChatGPT; CI: Continuance intention of ChatGPT.

Discriminant validity is assessed by examining the square roots of AVE. If the square root of each construct's AVE exceeds the inter-construct correlations, and the items load more strongly on their respective constructs than on other constructs, then the research model demonstrates distinct constructs and ensures discriminant validity. In Table 7, the square root of the AVE for each construct surpasses the cross-factors with all other constructs.

Table 7. Composite reliability, average variance extracted and correlations

| Construct | Cronbach's Alpha | Composite Reliability (CR) | PPA                 | CI                  | PC                  | TR                  |
|-----------|------------------|----------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| PPA       | 0.878            | 0.906                      | <b><i>0.763</i></b> |                     |                     |                     |
| CI        | 0.686            | 0.864                      | 0.189               | <b><i>0.872</i></b> |                     |                     |
| PC        | 0.815            | 0.880                      | 0.134               | 0.073               | <b><i>0.806</i></b> |                     |
| TR        | 0.899            | 0.937                      | 0.601               | 0.363               | 0.462               | <b><i>0.912</i></b> |

*Notes.* PPA: Perceived psychological anthropomorphism; PC: Privacy concerns; TR: Trust in ChatGPT; CI: Continuance intention of ChatGPT; \* Bold italic: Square root of AVE.

### ***Examination of open-response questions***

After every class, students submitted their programming assignments and responses to the question mentioned in the Methods section. Although most students were unfamiliar with programming, they could compare and evaluate the code they wrote and that presented by ChatGPT; accordingly, they left feedback on the parts that were different.

Interestingly, the students not only evaluated their level of understanding of the content in each class but also presented questions related to expansion. This shows that ChatGPT can be a helpful assistant for students' learning experiences in new fields. In addition, students identified what ChatGPT can do (answer 1), what areas they would use it for (answers 2-3), and expressed their thoughts on how they would use ChatGPT in the future to strengthen their capabilities (answer 3). As shown in Table 2, the majority of the participants were in the humanities, social sciences, or arts fields. Although they were unfamiliar with programming or text mining, they showed willingness to follow up on learning related content after participating (answers 4-5). Furthermore, they expressed in the post-survey that the use of ChatGPT lowered barriers to learning programming and text mining.

Answer 1. *‘It was amazing that through ChatGPT, I could easily analyse data without writing the code. I think the insight of interpreting graphs and analysing content will become more prominent in the future.’*

Answer 2. *‘I asked ChatGPT to write a graph, and ran the code written in Colab, and the table was actually created. I will be able to proceed very efficiently when writing my reports later.’*

Answer 3. *‘The code that derives correlations between variables felt new. When asking questions to ChatGPT, I think it is more efficient to be as specific as possible.’*

Answer 4. *‘I learned how to deal with various data in earnest, and I was proud of the time I had spent trying to solidify the basics, in that, I could only understand the new content if I was fully familiar with the previous class content.’*

Answer 5. *‘While taking the class, I felt that the scope of research methods could be further expanded through coding; I thought it would be great to improve my skills through many practices and projects.’*

## DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

### Observation of exploratory analysis and research agenda

In this study, we explored the changes in learners’ perceptions of ChatGPT in a ten-day programming course using ChatGPT. Learners participated in a survey consisting of perceived psychological anthropomorphism, privacy concerns, trust in ChatGPT, and intention to continue using ChatGPT before and after the course. In the analysis, changes in the items constituting each construct were examined using t-tests. Consequently, the perceived psychological anthropomorphism of ChatGPT was found to have significantly increased after participation compared to before participation (H1). After the course, the perception level of ChatGPT, its awareness, reasoning ability, creativity, imagination, and passion were higher than in the pre-survey. Trust in ChatGPT increased significantly after participation in the course (H2). Additionally, privacy concerns owing to ChatGPT increased significantly (H3). There was no significant difference in the intention to continue using ChatGPT before and after participation; however, since it had been high even before participation, confirming the effect of course participation was difficult (H4). Table 8 illustrates the results of four hypotheses.


Table 8. Results of analysis

| Hypothesis                                                                                                                                 | Results |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|
| H1. Learner’s perceived psychological anthropomorphism toward ChatGPT increases after participating in a programming course using ChatGPT. | Support |

|                                                                                                               |             |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| H2. Trust in ChatGPT increases after participating in a programming course using ChatGPT.                     | Support     |
| H3. Privacy concerns increase after participating in a programming course using ChatGPT.                      | Support     |
| H4. Continuance intention to use ChatGPT increases after participating in a programming course using ChatGPT. | Not Support |

This was a pilot study that examined changes in participants' perceptions of ChatGPT and examined the validity and reliability of measurement items for each construct. The validity and reliability of the measurement model were confirmed and the relationships between them were visualised (Figure 2). We examine the correlation between the major constructs and suggest future research contents.

Figure 2. Best fitting curve for multivariate relationship (standardised scales)



Perceived psychological anthropomorphism and trust in ChatGPT were positively correlated (Figure 2. a). The more the people feel that an AI has its own personality, consciousness, reasoning, creativity, imagination, and compassion, the more they trust it. This is consistent with the results of previous chatbot-related research (e.g., Cheng et al., 2022). Can trust in a product like Figure01, which combines ChatGPT's LLM with a robot, increase when elements of anthropomorphism are included? A study that investigated people's preferences when a robot's appearance was anthropomorphised showed an inverse U-curve. However, unlike physical anthropomorphism, psychological anthropomorphism increases trust in a service; therefore, in the case of a robot with an appearance like Figure01, it is worth conducting research on the degree of anthropomorphism, favourability, and trustworthiness in terms of both appearance and language.

Perceived psychological anthropomorphism and privacy concern levels were positively correlated (Figure 2.b). Up to a certain level of perceived psychological anthropomorphism, the correlation was not high; therefore, privacy concerns were also not very high; however, once it exceeded a certain level, it showed a high correlation. The two may not appear to be related, but as the degree of anthropomorphism of ChatGPT increases, people's concerns about privacy infringement increase significantly; therefore, further research is necessary to ascertain this relationship. For example, future studies can examine the kind of anthropomorphism that is sufficient to make people concerned about privacy breaches, and assess if it is possible to establish the criteria for this degree.

Privacy concerns and trust in ChatGPT were positively correlated (Figure 2.c). Previous studies in other contexts have shown mixed results, such as both positive and negative correlations between the two (e.g., Park et al., 2021; Wu et al., 2012). In our study, trust in ChatGPT increased as privacy concerns increased; however, trust decreased when privacy concerns exceeded a certain level. These results can be expanded to examine the results of previous studies and study contextual factors such as service, user, and technology characteristics, or whether there are certain other criteria.

Privacy concerns and continuation intention to use ChatGPT showed a negative correlation after a certain level (Figure 2.d). This was intuitive and consistent with the results of previous studies. As people become more concerned about their personal information, they will discontinue using ChatGPT. However, a privacy paradox occurs on social media. The phenomenon of being concerned about one's information being violated, but at the same time, wanting tailored information and services, and wanting to express oneself through photos, texts and thoughts, is called the privacy paradox. This can also appear in the use of ChatGPT. People may

feel concerned about privacy violations in ChatGPT but, at the same time, may voluntarily provide personal information to obtain more desired results. Therefore, it is necessary to examine whether the privacy paradox phenomenon appears when using a GAI service and its causes.

Trust in ChatGPT and the intention to continual usage were positively correlated, which is a typical result (Figure 2.e). Interestingly, the graph exhibits an inverse U-curve. As trust in ChatGPT increased, the usage intention also increased; however, when it exceeded a certain level, usage intention decreased. Figure 2.e shows that the results differ from those of previous studies; therefore, it is necessary to expand the sample and examine this relationship.

The anthropomorphism of AI influences a positive attitude toward AI and ease of use. Meanwhile, previous studies warn of the dangers of anthropomorphizing objects. A representative example of this is the Eliza effect, which refers to the tendency of users to anthropomorphize computer systems (Weizenbaum, 1977). The name comes from an early chatbot, which allegedly encouraged a Belgian man to commit suicide (Xiang, 2023).

The results of this study showed that after participating in a programming course using ChatGPT, learners' psychological anthropomorphism toward AI increased. Instructors and educational policymakers need to make efforts to reduce the adverse effects of AI anthropomorphism. For example, when conducting educational courses using ChatGPT, instructors should caution learners against unconditionally accepting the program-related code or answers provided by GAI. They can structure the classes in a way that encourages learners to actively assess whether the provided code or answers are appropriate, explore alternative solutions, engage in discussions with fellow learners, or conduct additional searches. When establishing class policies related to the use of GAI, guidelines can be provided that emphasize students' critical thinking, rather than leaving it entirely up to instructors.

In addition, after participating in the course, learners' privacy concerns and trust in ChatGPT also increased. Previous conducted in various contexts, such as e-commerce and social media environments, have shown a strong negative correlation between privacy concerns and trust (e.g., Eastlick et al., 2006; Kim et al., 2023). However, although this study is exploratory, it reveals that privacy concerns and trust in GAI not only significantly increased after participating in the course, but also showed a positive correlation between them. This result contradicts previous studies and may reflect the intervention effect of the GAI-integrated course. Considering the nature of the programming course and the educational content provided in Table 1, it is unlikely that learners interacted with ChatGPT in a private manner. Nevertheless, learners' psychological anthropomorphism toward ChatGPT and concerns about personal

information exposure increased. While analysing the causes of these results is beyond the scope of this study, several contextual factors can be considered. For instance, an instructor may have pointed out issues with ChatGPT, such as privacy concerns or hallucinations, and provided guidelines for using it in the course. Some students might have encountered errors or inaccuracies when using the ChatGPT recommendation codes. Additionally, some students may have used ChatGPT independently of the course content. In programming learning using GAI, participants appear to develop a better understanding of GAI, leading them to be concerned about the potential for personal information leakage, while simultaneously increasing their trust due to the useful and appropriate guidance on programming procedures or code provided by ChatGPT (Jian et al., 2024). Therefore, future research on this possibility needs to be conducted in depth through longitudinal studies to examine the causal relationship (Chan and Zhou, 2023).

## **Contributions**

This study contributes theoretically to the literature as follows. First, we examined the moderation effect of data processing and analysis training using ChatGPT on ChatGPT perception. In particular, there was a significant difference before and after training in characteristics recognised as uniquely human, such as compassion and creativity. Additionally, privacy concerns and trust in ChatGPT increased significantly. There have been many cases of applying ChatGPT to learning; however, research on the impact of GAI on learners is still in its early stages. This study can contribute to adding evidence to determine what kind of change in perception it brings about in terms of psychological anthropomorphism, privacy concerns, and trust. Second, the measurement model confirmed the items measured for each construct in the context of GAI and examined the correlation between major constructs such as psychological anthropomorphism, privacy concerns, trust, and continuance intention. Third, as GAI-related research progresses, this study contributes to future research by presenting several research questions that require verification.

The practical contributions of the study are threefold. First, this study presents experimental results on the effectiveness of ChatGPT in education, providing a basis for judging the future use of ChatGPT in various learning contexts. Learners not only increased their psychological anthropomorphism, privacy concerns, and trust in ChatGPT but also showed self-efficacy for programming. In particular, as can be seen through the learners' open responses, participants unfamiliar with programming not only participated in classes efficiently with the help of ChatGPT but also showed a sense of efficacy for the program by comparing and judging codes. In classes using GAI, lower learning barriers can be expected for non-majors. Second, this study

was conducted in a programming process so that the results of each class could be evaluated quantitatively; additionally, the method of interaction with ChatGPT was also quite structured. Similar results can be expected when using GAI in similar lectures; however, further research is required on the use and effectiveness of GAI in other types or unstructured lectures. Third, this study applied ChatGPT to one training course and examined changes in participants' perceptions. Currently, GAI is developing at a rapid pace, and its scope of application extends beyond education to various industries and services. In services that utilise GAI, users may psychologically personify or increase their trust in chatbots through interaction with GAI, and users' expectations may vary depending on their experience using GAI; therefore, this needs to be taken into consideration for designing services.

### **Limitations**

This study has several limitations. First, the sample size was relatively small because ChatGPT is not yet widely used by students and is certainly not incorporated into the curricula. However, small sample sizes are not uncommon in early studies on technology integration, including ChatGPT (Firat, 2023), smartphone use (Tossell et al., 2014) and robots (Donnermann et al., 2020) – presenting a trade-off between the impact of novel technology use and the generalisability of results. Although we employed mixed methods to complement small samples, further studies should diversify the educational backgrounds, technical skills, experience, and regions of research participants to ensure the generalizability of research findings. Second, the data-processing course was highly structured and specified in terms of how students worked with ChatGPT. This may have constrained the use of ChatGPT and students' perceptions of it. Future research can attempt to incorporate ChatGPT into other courses, such as creative writing, and examine the research model. Finally, most participants were undergraduate humanities and social science students. Their education on human factor processes, including knowledge elicitation through survey-based user feedback methods, may have influenced their responses. Further studies should examine the research approach with participants from diverse backgrounds and compare the results to confirm the generalisability of our findings. Furthermore, future studies could include a comparison of the cognitive changes in participants who do not use ChatGPT, serving as a control group, in order to strengthen the causal inference of the research results.

## CONCLUSION

This study exploratively examined changes in the perception of ChatGPT among participants who took a ten-day data processing and analysis course. The results showed that perceived psychological anthropomorphism, privacy concerns, and trust in ChatGPT significantly increased after participating in the course. In addition, the study confirmed the measurement model for major constructs and suggested future research agendas by examining the relationships between concepts. Amid the rapid development of the GAI and its application in various industries and services, including education, academic discussions and verified results are insufficient. Despite being an although exploratory study, it contributes to the accumulation of data on empirical research results in related fields.

## REFERENCES

- Abdaljaleel, M., Barakat, M., Alsanafi, M., Salim, N. A., Abazid, H., Malaeb, D., Mohammed, A. H., Hassan, B. A. R., Wayyes, A. M., Farhan, S. S., Khatib, S. E., Rahal, M., Sahban, A., Abdelaziz, D. H., Mansour, N. O., AlZayer, R., Khalil, R., Fekih-Romdhane, F., Hallit, R., Hallit, S., & Sallam, M. (2024). A multinational study on the factors influencing university students' attitudes and usage of ChatGPT. *Scientific Reports*, 14(1), 1983. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-024-52549-8>
- Adiguzel, T, Kaya, M. H., & Cansu, F. K. (2023). Revolutionizing education with AI: Exploring the transformative potential of ChatGPT. *Contemporary Educational Technology*, 15(3), ep429. <https://doi.org/10.30935/cedtech/13152>
- Alalwan, A. A. (2020). Mobile food ordering apps: An empirical study of the factors affecting customer e-satisfaction and continued intention to reuse. *International Journal of Information Management*, 50, 28-44.
- Baek, T. H., & Kim, M. (2023). Is ChatGPT scary good? How user motivations affect creepiness and trust in generative artificial intelligence. *Telematics and Informatics*, 83, 102030.
- BCG AI Ethics Consulting Team. (n.d.) Retrieved from: <https://www.bcg.com/capabilities/artificial-intelligence/responsible-ai>
- Chan, C. K. Y., & Hu, W. (2023). Students' voices on generative AI: Perceptions, benefits, and challenges in higher education. *International Journal of Educational Technology in Higher Education*, 20(1), 43. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s41239-023-00411-8>
- Chan, C. K. Y., & Zhou, W. (2023). An expectancy value theory (EVT) based instrument for measuring student perceptions of generative AI. *Smart Learning Environments*, 10(1), 64. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s40561-023-00284-4>
- Cheng, X., Zhang, X., Cohen, J., & Mou, J. (2022). Human vs. AI: Understanding the impact of anthropomorphism on consumer response to chatbots from the perspective of trust and relationship norms. *Information Processing & Management*, 59(3), 102940.
- Confessore, N. (2018). Cambridge Analytica and Facebook: The Scandal and the Fallout So Far. Retrieved from: <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-scandal-fallout.html>.
- Cram, W. A., D'arcy, J., & Proudfoot, J. G. (2019). Seeing the forest and the trees: a meta-analysis of the antecedents to information security policy compliance. *MIS quarterly*, 43(2), 525-554.
- Donnermann, M., Schaper, P., & Lugin, B. (2020, August). Integrating a social robot in higher education—a field study. In *2020 29th IEEE international conference on robot and human interactive communication (RO-MAN)* (pp. 573-579). IEEE.

- Duffy, B. R. (2003). Anthropomorphism and the social robot. *Robotics and Autonomous Systems*, 42(3-4), 177-190
- Eastlick, M. A., Lotz, S. L., & Warrington, P. (2006). Understanding online B-to-C relationships: An integrated model of privacy concerns, trust, and commitment. *Journal of Business Research*, 59(8), 877-886.
- Epley, N., Waytz, A., & Cacioppo, J. T. (2007). On seeing human: a three-factor theory of anthropomorphism. *Psychological review*, 114(4), 864.-886.
- Eskine, K. J., & Locander, W. H. (2014). A name you can trust? Personification effects are influenced by beliefs about company values. *Psychology & Marketing*, 31(1), 48-53.
- Figure AI Inc. (2024, February 29). Figure raises \$675M at \$2.6B valuation and signs collaboration agreement with OpenAI. *PR Newswire*. Retrieved from: <https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/figure-raises-675m-at-2-6b-valuation-and-signs-collaboration-agreement-with-openai-302074897.html>
- Firat, M. (2023). How Chat GPT can transform autodidactic experiences and open education? [Preprint]. *OSF Preprints*. <https://doi.org/10.31219/osf.io/9ge8m>
- Fishbowl. (2023, January 17). *ChatGPT sees strong early adoption in the workplace*. Fishbowl Insights. Retrieved from: <https://www.fishbowlapp.com/insights/chatgpt-sees-strong-early-adoption-in-the-workplace/>.
- Freud, A. (2018). *Normality and pathology in childhood: Assessments of development*. Routledge.
- Goel, A. K., & Polepeddi, L. (2018). Jill Watson: A virtual teaching assistant for online education. In C. Dede, J. Richards & B. Saxberg (Eds.), *Learning engineering for online education: Theoretical contexts and design-based examples* (pp. 120-143). Routledge.
- Golossenko, A., Pillai, K. G., & Aroean, L. (2020). Seeing brands as humans: Development and validation of a brand anthropomorphism scale. *International Journal of Research in Marketing*, 37(4), 737-755.
- Grand View Research. (2024). Generative AI market report [Industry analysis]. Grand View Research. Retrieved from: <https://www.grandviewresearch.com/industry-analysis/generative-ai-market-report>.
- Guo, B., Zhang, X., Wang, Z., Jiang, M., Nie, J., Ding, Y., Yue, J., & Wu, Y. (2023). How Close is ChatGPT to Human Experts? Comparison Corpus, Evaluation, and Detection (arXiv:2301.07597). arXiv. <https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2301.07597>
- Herbold, S., Hautli-Janisz, A., Heuer, U., Kiktev, Z., & Trautsch, A. (2023). A large-scale comparison of human-written versus ChatGPT-generated essays. *Scientific Reports*, 13(1), Article 1. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-023-45644-9>
- Hoffman, D. L., Novak, T., & Peralta, M. (1999). Building consumer trust online. *Communications of the ACM*, 42(4), 80-85.
- Hong, W., Chan, F. K., & Thong, J. Y. (2021). Drivers and inhibitors of internet privacy concern: a multidimensional development theory perspective. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 168(3), 539-564.
- Hume, D. (2000). *An enquiry concerning human understanding: A critical edition* (Vol. 3). Oxford University Press.
- Hur, J. D., Koo, M., & Hofmann, W. (2015). When temptations come alive: How anthropomorphism undermines self-control. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 42(2), 340-358.
- Jing, Y., Wang, H., Chen, X., & Wang, C. (2024). What factors will affect the effectiveness of using ChatGPT to solve programming problems? A quasi-experimental study. *Humanities and Social Sciences Communications*, 11(1), 1-12. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-024-02751-w>
- Kasneci, E., Seßler, K., Küchemann, S., Bannert, M., Dementieva, D., Fischer, F., Gasser, U., Groh, G., Günnemann, S., Hüllermeier, E., Krusche, S., Kutyniok, G., Michaeli, T., Nerdel, C., Pfeffer, J., Poquet, O., Sailer, M., Schmidt, A., Seidel, T., Stadler, M., Weller, J., Kuhn, J., & Kasneci, G. (2023). ChatGPT for good? On opportunities and challenge: of large language model: for education. *Leaning and individual Differences*, 103, Article 102274.

- Katib, I., Assiri, F. Y., Abdushkour, H. A., Hamed, D., & Ragab, M. (2023). Differentiating Chat Generative Pretrained Transformer from Humans: Detecting ChatGPT-Generated Text and Human Text Using Machine Learning. *Mathematics*, 11(15), Article 15.
- Keeley, B. L. (2004). Anthropomorphism, primatomorphism, mammalomorphism: understanding cross-species comparisons. *Biology and Philosophy*, 19, 521-540.
- Kim, Y., Kim, S. H., Peterson, R. A., & Choi, J. (2023). Privacy concern and its consequences: A meta-analysis. *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*, 196, 122789.
- Lai, C. Y., Cheung, K. Y., & Chan, C. S. (2023). Exploring the role of intrinsic motivation in ChatGPT adoption to support active learning: An extension of the technology acceptance model. *Computers and Education: Artificial Intelligence*, 5, 100178. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.caeai.2023.100178>
- Lo, C.K. (2023). What is the impact of chatgpt on education? a rapid review 'of the literature, *Education Sciences*, 13(4), p. 410.
- Lu, L., Cai, R., & Gursoy, D. (2019). Developing and validating a service robot integration willingness scale. *International Journal of Hospitality Management*, 80, 36-51.
- Luo, X., Tong, S., Fang, Z., & Qu, Z. (2019). Frontiers: Machines vs. humans: The impact of artificial intelligence chatbot disclosure on customer purchases. *Marketing Science*, 38(6), 937-947.
- Mac Innis, D. J., & Folkes, V. S. (2017). Humanizing brands: When brands seem to be like me, part of me, and in a relationship with me. *Journal of Consumer Psychology*, 27(3), 355-374.
- Mohamed, N., & Ahmad, I. H. (2012). Information privacy concerns, antecedents and privacy measure use in social networking sites: Evidence from Malaysia. *Computers in human behavior*, 28(6), 2366-2375.
- Nass, C., Moon, Y., & Carney, P. (1999). Are people polite to computers? Responses to computer based interviewing systems 1. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 29(5), 1093-1109.
- Nass, C., Steuer, J., & Tauber, E. R. (1994). Computers are social actors. In *Proceedings of the SIGCHI conference on Human factors in computing systems* (pp. 72-78). ACM.
- Olds, B. M., Moskal, B. M., & Miller, R. L. (2005). Assessment in engineering education: Evolution, approaches and future collaborations. *Journal of Engineering Education*, 94(1), 13-25.
- Park, S. S., Tung, C. D., & Lee, H. (2021). The adoption of AI service robots: A comparison between credence and experience service settings. *Psychology & Marketing*, 38(4), 691-703.
- Patil, P., Tamilmani, K., Rana, N. P., & Raghavan, V. (2020). Understanding consumer adoption of mobile payment in India: Extending Meta-UTAUT model with personal innovativeness, anxiety, trust, and grievance redressal. *International Journal of Information Management*, 54, 102144.
- Polyportis, A., & Pahos, N. (2024). Understanding students' adoption of the ChatGPT chatbot in higher education: the role of anthropomorphism, trust, design novelty and institutional policy. *Behaviour & Information Technology*, 1-22.
- PR Newswire. (2023, April 24). Figure raises \$675 M at \$2.6 B valuation and signs collaboration agreement with OpenAI [Press release]. PR Newswire. Retrieved from: <https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/figure-raises-675m-at-2-6b-valuation-and-signs-collaboration-agreement-with-openai-302074897.html>
- Rios-Campos, C., Viteri, J. D. C. L., Batalla, E. A. P., Castro, J. F. C., Núñez, J. B., Calderón, E. V., Nicacio, F. J. G., & Tello, M. Y. P. (2023). Generative artificial intelligence. *South Florida Journal of Development*, 4(6), 2305-2320.
- Shin, D. (2021). The effects of explainability and causability on perception, trust, and acceptance: Implications for explainable AI. *International Journal of Human-Computer Studies*, 146, 102551.
- Shin, D., & Park, Y. J. (2019). Role of fairness, accountability, and transparency in algorithmic affordance. *Computers in Human Behavior*, 98, 277-284.
- Sun, D., Boudouaia, A., Zhu, C., & Li, Y. (2024). Would ChatGPT-facilitated programming mode impact college students' programming behaviors, performances, and perceptions? An empirical

- study. *International Journal of Educational Technology in Higher Education*, 21(1), 14. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s41239-024-00446-5>
- Tan, X., Qin, L., Kim, Y., & Hsu, J. (2012). Impact of privacy concern in social networking web sites. *Internet Research*, 22(2), 211-233.
- Teddlic, C., & Tashakkori, A. (2003). Major issues and controversies in the use of mixed methods in the social and behavioral sciences. *Handbook of mixed methods in social and behavioral research*, 1(1), 13-50.
- Tossell, C. C., Kortum, P., Shepard, C., Rahmati, A., & Zhong, L. (2015). You can lead a horse to water but you cannot make him learn: Smartphone use in higher education. *British Journal of Educational Technology*, 46(4), 713-724.
- Venkatesh, V., Thong, J. Y., & Xu, X. (2012). Consumer acceptance and use of information technology: extending the unified theory of acceptance and use of technology. *MIS quarterly*, 36(1), 157-178.
- Wang, H., Dang, A., Wu, Z., & Mac, S. (2024). Generative AI in higher education: Seeing ChatGPT through universities' policies, resources, and guidelines. *Computers and Education: Artificial Intelligence*, 7, 100326.
- Wang, W. (2017). Smartphones as social actors? Social dispositional factors in assessing anthropomorphism. *Computers in Human Behavior*, 68, 334-344.
- Waytz, A., Heafner, J., & Epley, N. (2014). The mind in the machine: Anthropomorphism increases trust in an autonomous vehicle. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 52, 113-117.
- Weizenbaum, J. (1977). *Computer Power and Human Reason: From Judgement to Calculation*. W.H. Freeman, San Francisco.
- Wu, K. W., Huang, S. Y., Yen, D. C., & Popova, I. (2012). The effect of online privacy policy on consumer privacy concern and trust. *Computers in human behavior*, 28(3), 889-897.
- Xiang, C. (2023). 'He would still be here': Man dies by suicide after talking with AI chatbot, Widow says. Vice. Retrieved from: <https://www.vice.com/en/article/pkadgm/man-dies-by-suicide-after-talking-with-ai-chatbot-widow-says>
- Yeadon, W., Inyang, O.-O., Mizouri, A., Peach, A., & Testrow, C. (2023). The Death of the Short-Form Physics Essay in the Coming AI Revolution. *Physics Education*, 58(3), 035027. <https://doi.org/10.1088/1361-6552/acc5cf>

# Promjene u percepciji polaznika o ChatGPT-u tijekom deset dana: usmjerenost na psihološki antropomorfizam, čuvanje osobnih podataka i povjerenje

## SAŽETAK

S obzirom na sve veću popularnost generativne umjetne inteligencije (GAI) među studentima, ovo istraživanje ispitivalo je iskustva polaznika prije i nakon pohađanja tečaja programiranja u programskom jeziku Python koji je uključivao korištenje ChatGPT-a, a koji se provodio kao dio kolegija usmjerenog na obradu podataka. Istraživanjem provedenim prije i nakon pohađanja tečaja prikupili smo podatke od 23 sudionika kako bismo ispitali promjene u percepciji ChatGPT-a, uključujući percipirani psihološki antropomorfizam, pitanje čuvanja osobnih podataka i povjerenje u ChatGPT te namjeru njegova daljnjeg korištenja. Kvantitativna analiza pokazala je da su percipirani psihološki antropomorfizam, pitanje čuvanja osobnih podataka i povjerenje značajno porasli nakon sudjelovanja u tečaju. Istraživanje je također pokazalo da su unatoč početnoj razini programiranja polaznici pokazali spremnost za daljnje istraživanje srodnog sadržaja nakon završetka tečaja. Sudionici su također izrazili mišljenje da je korištenje ChatGPT-a smanjilo prepreke u učenju programiranja i rudarenja teksta. Ovi rezultati trebaju se uzeti u obzir pri budućem planiranju i oblikovanju obrazovnih programa unaprijeđenja pismenosti u području generativne umjetne inteligencije.

**Ključne riječi:** ChatGPT, tečaj programiranja u Pythonu, čuvanje osobnih podataka, psihološki antropomorfizam, povjerenje, svijest polaznika.



Kiseong Lee\*

# Improving fine-grained emotion classification using LLMs through sequential learning of emotions

## SUMMARY

This study proposes an approach to improving emotion classification performance by introducing a Sequential Emotion Learning (SEL) method. Conventional learning methods often struggle with fine-grained emotion categories. To address this, the SEL approach first trains the model on seven basic emotions, which are relatively easier to classify due to their clear distinctions. The model is then fine-tuned using 24 more nuanced emotion labels, enhancing its ability to tackle complex emotion classification tasks. Experimental results suggest that the SEL method performs better than the baseline, achieving higher accuracy from the early stages of training. The SEL model also reaches its peak performance relatively quickly and shows improved classification capabilities on unseen, general sentences, indicating its robustness across different text scenarios. These results suggest that the SEL method can effectively improve emotion classification, particularly in tasks that require distinguishing complex emotions. This sequential learning approach offers a potential advantage over traditional methods and may be applied to other domains that involve intricate classification tasks. Future research can explore the generalizability of this method to other classification problems to further enhance its utility.

**Keywords:** emotion classification, sequential learning, fine-grained classification, large language model, affective computing.

## INTRODUCTION

Recent advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) have significantly enhanced linguistic interactions with humans, particularly due to the emergence of large

---

\* AI Humanities Research Institute, Chung-Ang University, Seoul, Republic of Korea. ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0906-9552>.

*Correspondence Address:* Kiseong Lee, AI Humanities Research Institute, Chung-Ang University, 84 Heukseok-ro, Dongjak-gu, Seoul 06974, Republic of Korea. Email: [goory@cau.ac.kr](mailto:goory@cau.ac.kr).

language models (LLMs). LLMs are capable of learning from vast amounts of textual data, enabling them to understand and process complex patterns and language contexts (Mann, 2020). These models have demonstrated remarkable success in natural language processing (NLP) and have produced meaningful results across various domains. Among these, the potential of LLMs in the field of affective computing, especially in emotion analysis, is noteworthy (Kim, 2021). As AI continues to train on increasing volumes of textual data, it is expected to develop the ability to comprehend human emotions and interact based on this understanding.

However, for AI to accurately grasp emotions and appropriately reflect them, it must go beyond merely learning the semantic context of language and develop an understanding of emotional context as well. While emotions are sometimes directly revealed through specific vocabulary, they can also be conveyed indirectly, depending on the context. Metaphorical expressions and indirect methods of conveying emotions, in particular, can undermine the accuracy of emotion analysis (Mohammad, 2013). Therefore, AI models need to comprehend vocabulary related to emotions and learn how these emotions manifest through linguistic context in a complex manner. Additionally, addressing the complexity of emotional range and granularity is crucial for the empirical application of emotion recognition. When emotions are divided into several categories, models may experience performance degradation due to this complexity (Demszky, 2020).

In this study, we propose a sequential learning approach to classify fine-grained emotions. First, a large language model, with its strong ability to understand linguistic context, is trained on seven basic emotions that are relatively easy to distinguish. Then, the model is further trained on 24 fine-grained emotions based on an emotion dictionary. This approach gradually improves the model's ability to understand complex emotions, thereby enhancing its performance in emotion classification.

This research aims to contribute to the advancement of affective computing by presenting a methodology that improves the classification performance of fine-grained emotions. As a result, the potential for AI applications in various emotion-driven services is expected to expand further.

## RELATED WORKS

Emotion analysis is a technique for extracting and classifying emotions or opinions from data and is widely used in various fields such as marketing, social media monitoring, and public opinion analysis (Kim, 2019). Emotion analysis and classification have long been critical research topics in natural language processing (NLP). This chapter reviews key studies related to text-based emotion classification.

## **Emotion Classification and Natural Language Processing**

Emotion analysis involves classifying emotions from text. Early research primarily relied on rule-based systems to infer emotions (Pang, 2008). These systems classified text emotions based on a list of emotion-related words, where the presence of a specific emotion word would lead to classification in that emotion category. However, this approach faced challenges in determining which words to prioritize when multiple emotion words appeared together.

As a result, emotion classification expanded to incorporate machine learning techniques. Initially, binary or ternary classification focusing on positive, negative, and neutral emotions was prevalent, with machine learning algorithms such as Naive Bayes and SVM being commonly used (Khairnar, 2013). Since machine learning requires converting text into numerical vectors, common embedding techniques like Bag of Words (Pak, 2010), TF-IDF (Martínez-Cámara, 2014), and Word2Vec (Severyn, 2015) were employed. However, while these statistical embeddings were effective for topic identification, they struggled to capture the full context of sentences, and since emotions often go beyond the literal meaning of words, they faced limitations in emotion analysis.

Recently, advancements in deep learning-based NLP have allowed models like Transformers to understand the semantic context of text (Vaswani, 2017). Large language models (LLMs), pre-trained on vast amounts of textual data, are now capable of grasping subtle emotional nuances and context (Liu, 2019a). LLMs perform exceptionally well in precise emotion classification tasks, learning not only the emotions in text but also the subjects, objects, and causes of these emotions (Yang, 2022).

Transfer learning has proven to be an effective method when applying LLMs to specific problems. Transfer learning accelerates the training process and improves performance by applying models trained in one domain to related tasks (Pan, 2009). This is particularly useful when there is a lack of large datasets or when starting to learn from new datasets. In text classification, transfer learning is often used by fine-tuning pre-trained models, such as LLMs, for specific tasks (Howard, 2018). In this process, a model pre-trained on large general text datasets is applied to new domain data, enabling more accurate classification. This method can deliver better performance while reducing training costs compared to models trained from scratch on specific domain data (Liu, 2019a). Our study explores this potential of LLMs in the context of emotion classification, using a fine-tuning approach on the XLM-RoBERTa model (Conneau, 2019) with a small emotion dataset.

## Fine-Grained Emotion Types and Data

Emotion datasets for AI training consist of digital data such as images, text, and audio, labeled to reflect the emotions they contain. For AI to learn from emotion data, a sufficient amount of data is required, and labels must distinguish between at least two types of emotions. The construction of large-scale emotion datasets for AI learning became active in the late 2000s with the popularization of big data. Go and colleagues released a dataset of 1.6 million Twitter comments labeled as positive, neutral, or negative (Go et al., 2009), and Maas and colleagues distinguished between positive and negative reviews on IMDb, a movie review website (Maas et al., 2011). Additionally, SemEva,<sup>1</sup> an international competition for NLP research, has continuously provided datasets, including sentiment analysis datasets for Twitter. However, earlier datasets predominantly collected social media conversation data and focused mainly on polarity (positive versus negative).

In contrast, emotion labels have been expanded to include more specific emotion types. This is referred to as categorical emotion models, which use independent emotion labels representing universal emotions (Kusal, 2021). Prominent models include Plutchik's and Ekman's models. Plutchik proposed eight emotions (joy, trust, fear, surprise, sadness, disgust, anger, anticipation) (Plutchik, 1980), while Ekman defined six emotions (happiness, fear, surprise, sadness, disgust, anger) (Ekman, 1979). Based on these emotions, datasets have been generated from various sources beyond social media, including survey responses (Scherer, 1994), fairy tales (Alm, 2005), blogs (Aman, 2007), news headlines (Strapparava, 2007), election-related tweets (Mohammad, 2015), Facebook posts (Preoțiuc-Pietro, 2016), daily conversations (Li, 2017), Reddit comments (Demszky, 2020), and expressions and responses from authors and readers (Buechel, 2022).

Beyond these universal emotions, research began to expand into more complex and diverse expressions of human emotion. The OCC model proposed twenty-two emotion labels related to events, actions, and objects (Ortony et al., 2022). Yi and colleagues suggested 24 emotions specific to Korean language users, selecting words from an emotion dictionary and publicly labeling them (Yi et al., 2020). However, as emotion labels increase, building datasets becomes more challenging, and data scarcity remains a limitation.

Emotion classification generally does not achieve as high performance as general text classification, and despite various efforts to improve it, dramatic performance improvements are rarely observed. For instance, Google's GoEmotions dataset contains 58,009 Reddit comments labeled with 27 fine-grained emotions and

<sup>1</sup> <https://semeval.github.io/>

neutral emotion. When classified using the BERT model, the F1-score was only 0.46, indicating the difficulty of identifying fine-grained emotions accurately (Demszky, 2020). Singh and colleagues increased the classification performance on GoEmotions from an F1-score of 0.46 to 0.51 by teaching the model the dictionary definitions of emotions (Singh et al., 2021).

Fine-grained emotion classification aligns with the challenges inherent in multi-class text classification. In multi-class text classification, accuracy consistently decreases as the number of classes increases (Liu, 2019b). This trend varies depending on the type of text. For example, legal document classification has reported an F1-score of 0.72 for six classes (Luz de Araujo, 2022), while technical document classification achieved an F1-score of 0.53 for 33 classes (Hwang, 2020). Emotion classification, in particular, goes beyond understanding text to capturing subtle intrinsic tendencies that can vary significantly, making it inherently challenging.

In such a context, recent studies have continued to explore the performance of emotion classification models across diverse datasets and approaches. For instance, a study introduced a hybrid approach combining human-engineered features and deep learning-based representations, achieving a Jaccard accuracy of 68.40% on the SemEval-2018 dataset and 53.45% on the GoEmotions dataset (Ahanin, 2023). Similarly, the Transformer Transfer Learning (TTL) model demonstrated strong performance in emotion detection, achieving an average F1-score of 0.84 across test datasets, with 0.87 on annotator-rated emotions and 0.79 on self-reported emotions, showcasing its effectiveness in emotion classification (Lee, 2023).-Additionally, a study leveraging emotion-specific features to enhance transformer-based models achieved an accuracy of 61.9% and a macro F1-score of 0.52 on the WASSA 2022 emotion classification shared task (Desai, 2022).

These studies collectively demonstrate the ongoing efforts to address the inherent challenges of emotion classification, particularly in fine-grained and multi-label scenarios, and further highlight the importance of combining model architecture innovation with dataset-specific adaptations to achieve better outcomes.

This study challenges the task of fine-grained emotion classification using Korean text. We aimed to improve performance by applying transfer learning to LLMs, first training on seven basic emotions and then performing fine-grained classification of 24 specific emotions. This approach simultaneously considers both generalization and granularity in emotion classification, differentiating it from previous studies.

## RESEARCH METHOD

In this study, we propose a learning method to improve classification performance for fine-grained emotion labels, categorized into 24 distinct emotions.

### Emotion Dataset

To recognize fine-grained emotions, it is necessary to have a dataset for training. Most emotion datasets are based on Ekman's or Plutchik's emotion labels, consisting of 6 or 8 categories (Ekman, 1979; Plutchik, 1980). However, large amounts of text labeled with detailed emotions are rare. For this study, we utilized the *Multi-Label Korean Emotion Word Dictionary with 24 Emotions*<sup>2</sup> to ensure high-quality text suitable for training. This dataset consists of 19,617 Korean words, each labeled with one of 24 emotion categories. Since the words alone do not provide context, they were expanded into sentence form. Using ChatGPT, sentences were generated that express emotions using the specific words from the dictionary, resulting in approximately 480,000 sentences across the 24 emotions.

The emotion labels are: *disgust, anger, passion, distress, anxiety, sadness, happiness, peace, surprise, jeong (affection), fun, love, achievement, moved, depression, fear, shame, tedium, regret, excitement, compassion, jealousy, guilt, and neutral*. For each emotion, 20,000 sentences were generated to ensure a balanced dataset. For model training, 80% of the dataset was used as the training set, and the remaining 20% was used as the validation set. Additionally, two external test sets were created to more precisely evaluate the model's performance.

- Test Set-1: This test set consisted of sentences presented as “examples” in the dictionary. It contained 9,514 sentences collected from general dictionaries, which were direct uses of emotion words from the *Multi-Label Korean Emotion Word Dictionary with 24 Emotions*. As these were example sentences from the dictionary, the focus was on how the emotional words are used in specific situations. Since the words are more ‘the kind you would find in a dictionary,’ there are words that are less frequently used in everyday conversations, and many sentences are non-conversational.
- Test Set-2: ChatGPT was tasked with generating sentences for each of the 24 emotions, producing twenty sentences per emotion for a total of 480 sentences. This data is unrelated to the *Multi-Label Korean Emotion Word Dictionary with 24 Emotions* and represents more general expressions. The purpose was to determine how well the model, trained on sentences derived from the emotion dictionary,

<sup>2</sup> <http://aihumanities.org/en/archive/datasets/?vid=4>

can classify different types of emotional expressions. The prompt used to generate Test Set-2 is outlined below. Although the original experiment was conducted in Korean, it has been translated into English for this paper.

*Prompt:*

*I have created an emotion classification model and would like you to generate test data. The labels are as follows:*

*moved, fear, happiness, peace, jealousy, neutral, guilt, affection, fun, depression, passion, compassion, distress, sadness, shame, achievement, regret, excitement, love, anxiety, anger, surprise, tedium, and disgust.*

*Please create sentences that reflect each of these emotions. Generate 20 sentences for each emotion, ensuring that the name of the label does not directly appear in the sentences.*

The examples generated by ChatGPT are provided below.

*Distress*

1. *My thoughts were tangled, and I couldn't organize anything in my mind.*
  2. *I had no idea what decision to make.*
  3. *A sigh escaped me without even realizing it.*
  4. *I kept feeling like something was going wrong.*
  5. *It felt like everything was falling apart.*
- ...Remaining sentences omitted...*

We aimed to evaluate the model's performance from various perspectives using this dataset.

## Model Training

In this study, we fine-tuned one of the LLMs, XLM-RoBERTa-base<sup>3</sup>, to create an emotion classification model. XLM-RoBERTa-base is a transformer-based language model that belongs to the state-of-the-art BERT family and performs exceptionally well in multilingual environments, having been trained on over 100 languages, and can be applied to various natural language processing tasks. The model is pre-trained on a vast amount of text collected from the web, without specific labels or annotations, and excels in cross-lingual transfer learning and multilingual support. Since it can autonomously understand sentence structure, relationships between words, and context, it was chosen for its expected strong performance in emotion classification tasks. The model training was divided into two approaches: the basic approach (baseline) and the proposed method (SEL).

<sup>3</sup> <https://huggingface.co/FacebookAI/xlm-roberta-base>

- **Baseline Model Training:** First, the XLM-RoBERTa-base model was trained on 480,000 sentences with 24 emotion labels, split 80:20 for training and validation. This model served as the baseline to measure the basic performance of the study. We used the Hugging Face transformers module, and the optimizer was left as the default AdamW.
- **Sequential Emotion Learning (SEL):** This is the method proposed in this study, in which emotions are learned sequentially in two stages. First, the XLM-RoBERTa-base model is trained on data with seven emotion labels. Then, the output layer of the model is modified, and it is further trained on data with 24 emotion labels. The goal is to improve the model's ability to distinguish more complex emotions by first enhancing its understanding of simpler emotions. The seven-label emotion data was obtained from two datasets provided by the AI-hub website. These datasets consist of sentences expressing emotions from everyday life<sup>4</sup> and sentences extracted from literary works<sup>5</sup>. A total of 319,600 sentences were collected, and the labels consist of seven classes: *sadness*, *anger*, *anxiety*, *embarrassment*, *hurt*, *joy*, and *no emotion*. In the first phase of training, this dataset was split 80% for training and 20% for validation. In the second phase of training, the same dataset and methods as the baseline were used to complete the 24-label classification model.

## Performance Evaluation

The performance of the model was measured using accuracy, precision, recall, and the F1-score, with the F1-score reported as the weighted F1. Additionally, top-3 accuracy was included in the evaluation for the test sets. Top-3 accuracy measures whether the correct label is among the top three predicted labels by the model. The baseline model and the proposed sequential learning model were compared in terms of their learning process, validation set, and test sets. The validation set consisted of 20% of the training data, representing similar sentences, while Test Set-1 and Test Set-2 were completely external datasets. This allowed us to analyze the performance differences between the models.

## RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

The learning results of the baseline and SEL models were examined and compared.

<sup>4</sup> <https://www.aihub.or.kr/aihubdata/data/view.do?dataSetSn=86>

<sup>5</sup> <https://www.aihub.or.kr/aihubdata/data/view.do?dataSetSn=485>

## Baseline Learning Results

Table 1 shows the learning results of the baseline model. The accuracy of the baseline model for classifying 24 emotions reached 0.958 at epoch 5, demonstrating very high performance. The F1-score was similarly high at 0.958. When fine-tuning large models like XLM-RoBERTa, it is common practice to set the number of epochs between 3 and 5 to prevent overfitting, as shown in studies such as Devlin et al., where 3 or 4 epochs were used during fine-tuning to achieve optimal performance depending on the dataset (Devlin, 2019). Similarly, Arslan and colleagues demonstrated that performance improvements in multi-class text classification tasks typically plateau after 5 epochs, suggesting that additional training offers diminishing returns and increases the risk of overfitting (Arslan et al., 2021). In this experiment, performance plateaued at epoch 5, leading us to stop training to maintain model generalization. This approach aligns with standard practices in optimizing performance while avoiding overfitting, especially for datasets where the training and validation sets share similar linguistic patterns. These results are based on the evaluation of the validation dataset, and since the training data and validation data contain very similar forms of emotional expression, the classification performance is exceptionally good. Despite the 24 classes being highly granular, the emotion classification performance, based on the contextual understanding capabilities of the LLM, is notably high.

Table 1. Baseline training: Results of 24-emotion classification

| epoch | accuracy        | precision       | recall          | F1-score        |
|-------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| 1     | 0.895760        | 0.896703        | 0.895760        | 0.895509        |
| 2     | 0.934385        | 0.934644        | 0.934385        | 0.934171        |
| 3     | 0.949239        | 0.949575        | 0.949239        | 0.949239        |
| 4     | 0.956822        | 0.956840        | 0.956822        | 0.956788        |
| 5     | <b>0.958447</b> | <b>0.958466</b> | <b>0.958447</b> | <b>0.958424</b> |

## Sequential Emotion Learning (SEL) Results

The sequential learning proposed in this paper is divided into two steps. First, the results of training the seven-emotion classification are shown in Table 2. At epoch 7, the model reached an accuracy of 0.923 and an F1-score of 0.923, demonstrating excellent classification performance. It was determined that the model had sufficiently acquired basic emotion recognition capabilities, and this model was then used for transfer learning to perform the second phase of training, which involved classifying 24 emotions.

Table 2. SEL-step1 : Results of seven-emotion classification

| epoch | accuracy        | precision       | recall          | F1-score        |
|-------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| 1     | 0.671292        | 0.669688        | 0.671292        | 0.668243        |
| 2     | 0.877080        | 0.877042        | 0.877080        | 0.876621        |
| 3     | 0.908667        | 0.909143        | 0.908667        | 0.908729        |
| 4     | 0.902550        | 0.904122        | 0.902550        | 0.902767        |
| 5     | 0.917584        | 0.917975        | 0.917584        | 0.917573        |
| 6     | 0.920447        | 0.920905        | 0.920447        | 0.920332        |
| 7     | <b>0.923545</b> | <b>0.923698</b> | <b>0.923545</b> | <b>0.923522</b> |
| 8     | 0.923388        | 0.923584        | 0.923388        | 0.923407        |

The results of the second phase of training are shown in Table 3. At epoch 5, both the accuracy and F1-score reached 0.959, demonstrating excellent performance in the 24-emotion classification. As a result, it can be seen that the performance is similar to that of the baseline model.

Table 3 SEL-step2 : Results of 24-emotion classification

| epoch | accuracy        | precision       | recall          | F1-score        |
|-------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| 1     | 0.928604        | 0.928524        | 0.928604        | 0.928384        |
| 2     | 0.949375        | 0.949386        | 0.949375        | 0.949305        |
| 3     | 0.955489        | 0.955505        | 0.955489        | 0.955456        |
| 4     | 0.958145        | 0.958205        | 0.958145        | 0.958134        |
| 5     | <b>0.959812</b> | <b>0.959836</b> | <b>0.959812</b> | <b>0.959795</b> |

### Comparative Analysis Using Test Sets

The comparison of learning results using the validation set showed that both the baseline and the proposed SEL method achieved a similar accuracy level, close to 0.96. However, for this model to be practically useful, it must also demonstrate good performance on data beyond the training set. In this study, we evaluated the performance of the emotion classification model using two test sets to measure the model's classification performance on example sentences from the emotion dictionary and more general sentences. First, Table 4 shows the performance of both models on Test Set-1.

Table 4. Performance comparison on Test Set-1

|          | <b>accuracy</b> | <b>precision</b> | <b>recall</b> | <b>F1-score</b> | <b>top3 accuracy</b> |
|----------|-----------------|------------------|---------------|-----------------|----------------------|
| Baseline | 0.686882        | 0.715876         | 0.686882      | 0.685668        | 0.8461               |
| SEL      | 0.681627        | 0.711795         | 0.681627      | 0.680141        | 0.8421               |

In Test Set-1, the baseline model recorded an accuracy of 0.686 and an F1-score of 0.685, while the SEL model showed an accuracy of 0.681 and an F1-score of 0.680. The performance difference between the two models is minimal, and the difference in the third decimal place is not considered to be significant. No substantial differences were observed between the two models here as well. Although the performance is significantly lower compared to the 0.96 accuracy achieved during training, given that the task was to choose one out of 24 finely categorized emotions, a 68% success rate is considered high. This level of performance is likely due to the fact that Test Set-1 included the emotion words used during training. However, the sentences in Test Set-1 are diverse and not as well-structured as the training data, which may have contributed to the drop in classification performance. Nevertheless, the top-3 accuracy reached 0.84 for both models, indicating a high probability of correctly identifying the correct emotion among the top three choices out of 24.

On the other hand, Test Set-2 consists of general sentences that are unrelated to the emotion dictionary. Table 5 shows the comparative results for Test Set-2.

Table 5. Performance comparison on Test Set-2

|          | <b>accuracy</b> | <b>precision</b> | <b>recall</b>   | <b>F1-score</b> | <b>top3 accuracy</b> |
|----------|-----------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------------|----------------------|
| baseline | 0.531250        | 0.591920         | 0.531250        | 0.531193        | 0.7750               |
| SEL      | <b>0.560417</b> | <b>0.598714</b>  | <b>0.560417</b> | <b>0.552828</b> | <b>0.8021</b>        |

In both models, the accuracy decreased. However, a significant difference emerged between the two models, with the SEL model proposed in this paper outperforming the baseline model. The SEL model achieved an accuracy of 0.56, surpassing the baseline model's accuracy of 0.53. The F1-score for SEL was also higher at 0.55, compared to 0.53 for the baseline model. Additionally, the top-3 accuracy for the SEL model was 0.80, further demonstrating better performance.

These results suggest that the SEL method performs better on general sentences that are unrelated to the emotion dictionary. This indicates that the SEL approach, by learning emotions in stages, is better at classifying more generalized emotional expressions. Unlike the baseline model, which is specialized for the emotion dictionary, the SEL model enhances its understanding of emotions, resulting in less

performance degradation. In other words, the SEL model shows potential as a model that can provide more flexible emotion recognition in everyday situations.

In addition to the comparison with the baseline model, we conducted experiments using additional classification models, including Logistic Regression, SVM, Naïve Bayes, and Random Forest. Table 6 presents the accuracy of these models on the validation set, Test Set-1, and Test Set-2. The results show that SEL significantly outperforms traditional classification models, particularly in Test Set-1 and Test Set-2, which consist of more diverse and challenging data. While Naïve Bayes achieved slightly higher accuracy than SEL on Test Set-2, SEL consistently demonstrated superior performance across all metrics and datasets. These findings emphasize the effectiveness of the SEL approach in fine-grained emotion classification compared to existing methods.

Table 6. Accuracy comparison of SEL and traditional classification models on validation and test sets


| models              | validation set | Test Set-1    | Test Set-2    |
|---------------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|
| SEL                 | <b>0.9598</b>  | <b>0.6816</b> | 0.5604        |
| Logistic Regression | 0.7155         | 0.2748        | 0.5667        |
| SVM                 | 0.7644         | 0.2927        | 0.5542        |
| Naïve Bayes         | 0.7051         | 0.317         | <b>0.5979</b> |
| Random Forest       | 0.5266         | 0.1494        | 0.4688        |

## DISCUSSION

In this study, we identified a significant performance difference by applying the Sequential Emotion Learning (SEL) method to the emotion classification task and comparing it with the baseline model. In this section, we analyze the advantages and implications of the SEL method based on the experimental results and discuss potential directions for future research.

First, Figure 1 compares the accuracy improvement trends by epoch during the training process of both the baseline and SEL in step 2.

Figure 1. Comparison of accuracy by epoch between the baseline and SEL-step2



As seen in the first epoch of the second phase of training in the SEL method, the accuracy starts at a considerably high level of 0.928. Compared to the baseline, which starts at 0.895, SEL demonstrates a better classification ability from the beginning of the training and reaches the peak more quickly than the baseline. Given that both the baseline and SEL-step2 models were trained on the same data and with the same settings, this difference is quite significant. It is likely that SEL already possessed a strong ability to differentiate between emotions because it had already learned the seven emotion labels in step 1. Therefore, SEL achieves good performance to the extent that it could be sufficiently utilized even if training is stopped at epoch 2 or 3.

The importance of sequential learning becomes particularly apparent in complex tasks such as multi-label problems, like emotion classification. By first learning the seven emotions, the model was able to distinguish more clearly between emotional differences, and as it expanded to 24 emotions, performance improved rapidly. This suggests that sequential learning methods may be advantageous in finely detailed tasks such as emotion classification.

To further evaluate the practical application and generalization capability of the proposed method, we tested the model on a set of arbitrary sentences reflecting various emotions. These sentences were carefully constructed to avoid directly using the emotion labels, ensuring thereby a more realistic evaluation of the model's ability to infer emotions from contextual cues. The results highlight the model's ability to predict emotions, as shown in Table 7.

Table 7. Emotion prediction results for arbitrary sentences

| Sentence                                                                                                               | Predicted Emotions<br>(Top 3)                                                     |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| I couldn't stop crying all day after losing my beloved pet yesterday.                                                  | <i>sadness</i> (98.54%)<br><i>depression</i> (0.58%)<br><i>compassion</i> (0.19%) |
| The whole family cheered together after hearing the news of my acceptance today.                                       | <i>happiness</i> (99.40%)<br><i>fun</i> (0.31%)<br><i>achievement</i> (0.12%)     |
| I thought I had everything ready, but I kept feeling like something was missing, and my heart was racing.              | <i>anxiety</i> (98.58%)<br><i>distress</i> (1.24%)<br><i>neutral</i> (0.04%)      |
| After making a poor decision that disappointed a friend, I felt a sharp pain every time I saw their pained expression. | <i>sadness</i> (37.81%)<br><i>guilt</i> (20.50%)<br><i>compassion</i> (14.92%)    |
| It feels like all the meaningful moments have passed, leaving my heart empty.                                          | <i>depression</i> (98.74%) <i>tedium</i> (1.10%)<br><i>distress</i> (0.06%)       |
| When someone distorted my intentions and criticized me, I felt an uncontrollable emotion surging within me.            | <i>anger</i> (91.24%)<br><i>shame</i> (6.28%)<br><i>disgust</i> (0.93%)           |
| I couldn't believe it when I bumped into a friend I hadn't seen in years.                                              | <i>surprise</i> (97.90%)<br><i>neutral</i> (0.49%)<br><i>fear</i> (0.49%)         |
| The smell in the messy room was unbearable.                                                                            | <i>disgust</i> (52.16%)<br><i>tedium</i> (16.33%)<br><i>anxiety</i> (15.82%)      |
| I was so excited about starting a new journey that I stayed up all night with anticipation.                            | <i>excitement</i> (80.18%) <i>surprise</i> (11.64%)<br><i>anxiety</i> (2.30%)     |
| Everyone burst into laughter and had a wonderful time together.                                                        | <i>fun</i> (98.81%)<br><i>neutral</i> (0.98%)<br><i>happiness</i> (0.05%)         |
| After persevering until the end, I finally achieved my goal.                                                           | <i>achievement</i> (98.24%)<br><i>passion</i> (0.84%)<br><i>neutral</i> (0.25%)   |
| Seeing a small puppy shivering on the street made my heart ache.                                                       | <i>compassion</i> (96.83%)<br><i>sadness</i> (1.81%)<br><i>moved</i> (0.28%)      |

The evaluation demonstrated that the model could accurately infer fine-grained emotions in diverse contexts, with particularly high performance on primary emotions such as *happiness*, *sadness*, and *anxiety*. However, an analysis of error patterns in SEL model predictions, as summarized in Table 8, provides insights into how the model handles overlapping or contextually similar emotions. For instance, *distressed* was often misclassified as *anxiety* (45.45%), and *disgust* as *anger* (50.41%), likely due to shared contextual or affective features. Similarly, *tedium* was confused with *depression* (61.17%), and *excitement* with *love* (59.57%), reflecting the subtle contextual nuances in these emotional expressions. These findings highlight specific areas where the SEL model, despite its high overall accuracy exceeding 95%, can be further refined to improve its handling of complex emotional overlaps. Future work could focus on augmenting the training dataset with examples that emphasize distinctions between overlapping emotions and exploring advanced architectures, such as multi-label learning, to better capture subtle emotional differences.

Table 8. Frequent error patterns in SEL model predictions

| Actual Label      | Most Frequent Error Label | Proportion of Misclassified Predictions (%) |
|-------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------------------------|
| <i>distressed</i> | <i>anxiety</i>            | 45.45                                       |
| <i>disgust</i>    | <i>anger</i>              | 50.41                                       |
| <i>moved</i>      | <i>affection</i>          | 40.19                                       |
| <i>tedium</i>     | <i>depression</i>         | 61.17                                       |
| <i>excitement</i> | <i>love</i>               | 59.57                                       |

While this study focused on Korean datasets, the SEL method is not language-dependent and can be extended to other languages and datasets. Testing the method on multilingual and cross-cultural datasets would validate its generalizability and enhance its global applicability.

Overall, these results validate the robustness of the proposed method in practical scenarios and highlight its potential for applications in emotion-sensitive domains such as customer support, mental health, and social communication analysis. For example, in healthcare, the SEL model can be utilized for analyzing patient emotions to enhance psychological assessments or support therapy sessions. In education, the model could help measure student engagement by identifying emotional states during learning activities, enabling personalized learning strategies. In customer service, the SEL model can assist in developing emotion-based counseling systems that improve user satisfaction and personalize interactions. These applications demonstrate the versatility of the SEL model in addressing real-world challenges across various

domains. Future work could explore expanding the training dataset with more varied emotional expressions to further enhance the model's generalization capability.

Although this study focused on emotion classification, the SEL method presents the potential to be applied to other complex classification tasks. In domains beyond emotion, the strategy of first learning basic features with broad categories and then progressively expanding to more detailed classification tasks may prove effective. Of course, further evaluation of the generalizability of this method to other domains and various datasets is needed. Future research should explore the application of the SEL method to other classification tasks to assess its versatility.

Moreover, the quantity and quality of training data are critical factors that influence SEL model performance. While this study employed a balanced dataset carefully curated for fine-grained emotion classification, future research should examine how variations in data size, noise levels, and class imbalances affect learning outcomes. For example, noise reduction techniques, such as outlier detection and data cleaning, could improve the reliability of training data. Enhanced labeling processes, including expert annotation or consensus-based approaches, may also contribute to better model generalization. Additionally, increasing data quantity through data augmentation or by incorporating diverse datasets could help the SEL model generalize across broader scenarios. Such investigations will aid in deriving optimal strategies for data selection and preparation, enhancing the robustness and applicability of models.

Additionally, a more detailed analysis of the impact of the quantity and quality of training data on model performance could help in deriving optimal learning strategies, which could be proposed as a future research direction. Adjusting hyperparameters such as batch size and learning rate during step 1 and step 2 of SEL may further improve performance. In this study, these hyperparameters were carefully selected based on the computational resources available, including an Intel i7 CPU and an NVIDIA RTX 3090 GPU. These hardware constraints necessitated balancing model performance with memory and processing capacity limitations, influencing the choice of hyperparameters to ensure stable training. Future research could systematically explore automated hyperparameter optimization techniques, such as grid search or Bayesian optimization, to further enhance model performance. Adopting resource-efficient learning methods, such as knowledge distillation and lightweight architectures, could also address these constraints and improve scalability. In addition, we are considering leveraging state-of-the-art language models, such as T5 or GPT-based architectures, to further refine the SEL method. These advanced models represent the cutting edge of natural language processing and could significantly enhance the SEL model's effectiveness in complex and nuanced classification tasks.

## CONCLUSION

This study introduced a Sequential Emotion Learning (SEL) method for fine-grained emotion classification and demonstrated its performance compared to simpler learning methods. The SEL approach, particularly, showed high accuracy from the early stages of training and quickly converged to its peak. It also proved to be effective in improving the classification of emotions in general, unseen sentences, demonstrating the model's ability to generalize beyond the training data. These findings suggest that sequential learning can be an effective strategy for tackling complex emotion classification tasks, offering a promising approach that could be applied across various domains.

Looking ahead, it will be essential to apply the SEL approach to other classification tasks to fully evaluate its versatility and generalizability across different datasets and domains. Beyond emotion classification, SEL shows potential for broader applications in complex classification tasks, such as multi-label classification, intent detection, and topic categorization. Exploring these possibilities will help validate its utility and expand its practical applications. Future studies should also explore the applicability of SEL to multilingual and culturally diverse datasets, as this would enhance its practical value and establish its robustness across languages. Investigating how classification patterns evolve when the SEL method is trained on multilingual datasets will provide insights into its performance across various languages and cultural contexts. These studies could not only validate the generalizability of SEL but also identify the most effective ways to implement sequential learning in diverse fields.

Further research is also needed to explore the optimal learning strategies, including fine-tuning hyperparameters and analyzing the impact of training data size and quality. Such efforts will contribute to the development of more robust and efficient models for complex classification tasks.

## REFERENCES

- Ahanin, Z., Ismail, M. A., Singh, N. S. S., & AL-Ashmori, A. (2023). Hybrid feature extraction for multi-label emotion classification in English text messages. *Sustainability*, 15(16), 12539.
- Alm, C. O., Roth, D., & Sproat, R. (2005). Emotions from text: machine learning for text-based emotion prediction. In R. Mooney, C. Brew, L.F. Chien & K. Kirchhoff (Eds.), *Proceedings of human language technology conference and conference on empirical methods in natural language processing* (pp. 579–586).
- Aman, S., & Szpakowicz, S. (2007). Identifying expressions of emotion in text. In *International Conference on Text, Speech and Dialogue* (pp. 196–205). Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
- Arslan, Y., Allix, K., Veiber, L., Lothritz, C., Bissyandé, T. F., Klein, J., & Goujon, A. (2021). A comparison of pre-trained language models for multi-class text classification in the financial domain. In J. Leskovec, M. Grobelenik, M. Najork, J. Tang & L. Zia (Eds.), *Companion Proceedings of the Web Conference 2021* (pp. 260–268).

- Brown, T. B., Mann, B., Ryder, N., Subbiah, M., Kaplan, J., Dhariwal, P., Neelakantan, A., Shyam, P., Sastry, G., Askell, A., Agarwal, S., Herbert-Voss, A., Krueger, G., Henighan, T., Child, R., Ramesh, A., Ziegler, D. M., Wu, J., Winter, C., Hesse, C., Chen, M., Sigler, E., Litwin, M., Gray, S., Chess, B., Clark, J., Berner, C., McCandlish, S., Radford, A., Sutskever, I., & Amodei, D. (2020). Language models are few-shot learners. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2005.14165*, 1.
- Buechel, S., & Hahn, U. (2022). Emobank: Studying the impact of annotation perspective and representation format on dimensional emotion analysis. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2205.01996*.
- Conneau, A. (2019). Unsupervised cross-lingual representation learning at scale. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1911.02116*.
- Demszky, D., Movshovitz-Attias, D., Ko, J., Cowen, A., Nemade, G., & Ravi, S. (2020). GoEmotions: A dataset of fine-grained emotions. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2005.00547*.
- Desai, S., Kshirsagar, A., Sidnerlikar, A., Khodake, N., & Marathe, M. (2022). Leveraging emotion-specific features to improve transformer performance for emotion classification. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2205.00283*.
- Devlin, J., Chang, M.-W., Lee, K., & Toutanova, K. (2019). BERT: Pre-training of Deep Bidirectional Transformers for Language Understanding. In J. Burstein, C. Doran & T. Solorio (Eds.), *Proceedings of the 2019 Conference of the North American Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics: Human Language Technologies* (pp. 4171–4186).
- Ekman, P., & Oster, H. (1979). Facial expressions of emotion. *Annual review of psychology*, 30(1), 527-554.
- Go, A., Bhayani, R., & Huang, L. (2009). Twitter sentiment classification using distant supervision. *CS224N project report, Stanford*, 1(12), 2009.
- Howard, J., & Ruder, S. (2018). Universal language model fine-tuning for text classification. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1801.06146*.
- Hwang, S., & Kim, D. (2020). BERT-based classification model for Korean documents. *Journal of Society for e-Business Studies*, 25(1).
- Khairnar, J., & Kinikar, M. (2013). Machine learning algorithms for opinion mining and sentiment classification. *International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications*, 3(6), 1-6.
- Kim, T., & Vossen, P. (2021). Emoberta: Speaker-aware emotion recognition in conversation with roberta. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2108.12009*.
- Kusal, S., Patil, S., Kotecha, K., Aluvalu, R., & Varadarajan, V. (2021). AI based emotion detection for textual big data: Techniques and contribution. *Big Data and Cognitive Computing*, 5(3), 43.
- Lee, S. J., Lim, J., Paas, L., & Ahn, H. S. (2023). Transformer transfer learning emotion detection model: synchronizing socially agreed and self-reported emotions in big data. *Neural Computing and Applications*, 35(15), 10945-10956.
- Li, Y., Su, H., Shen, X., Li, W., Cao, Z., & Niu, S. (2017). Dailydialog: A manually labelled multi-turn dialogue dataset. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1710.03957*.
- Liu, X., & Wangperawong, A. (2019b). Transfer learning robustness in multi-class categorization by fine-tuning pre-trained contextualized language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1909.03564*.
- Liu, Y. (2019a). Roberta: A robustly optimized bert pretraining approach. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1907.11692*.
- Luz de Araujo, P. H., de Almeida, A. P. G., Ataide Braz, F., Correia da Silva, N., de Barros Vidal, F., & de Campos, T. E. (2023). Sequence-aware multimodal page classification of Brazilian legal documents. *International Journal on Document Analysis and Recognition (IJDAR)*, 26(1), 33-49.
- Maas, A., Daly, R. E., Pham, P. T., Huang, D., Ng, A. Y., & Potts, C. (2011, June). Learning word vectors for sentiment analysis. In D. Lin, Y. Matsumoto & R. Mihalcea (Eds.), *Proceedings of the 49th annual meeting of the association for computational linguistics: Human language technologies* (pp. 142-150).
- Martínez-Cámara, E., Martín-Valdivia, M. T., Urena-López, L. A., & Montejo-Ráez, A. R. (2014). Sentiment analysis in Twitter. *Natural language engineering*, 20(1), 1-28.
- Mohammad, S. M., & Turney, P. D. (2013). Crowdsourcing a word-emotion association lexicon. *Computational intelligence*, 29(3), 436-465.

- Mohammad, S. M., Zhu, X., Kiritchenko, S., & Martin, J. (2015). Sentiment, emotion, purpose, and style in electoral tweets. *Information Processing & Management*, 51(4), 480–499.
- Oberländer, L. A. M., & Klinger, R. (2018). An analysis of annotated corpora for emotion classification in text. In E. M. Bender, L. Derczynski & P. Isabelle (Eds.), *Proceedings of the 27th international conference on computational linguistics* (pp. 2104–2119).
- Ortony, A., Clore, G. L., & Collins, A. (2022). *The cognitive structure of emotions*. Cambridge university press.
- Pak, A., & Paroubek, P. (2010). Twitter as a corpus for sentiment analysis and opinion mining. In N. Calzolari, K. Choukri, B. Maegaard, J. Mariani, J. Odijk, S. Piperidis, M. Rosner & D. Tapias (Eds.), *Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference on Language Resources and Evaluation (LREC 2010)* (pp. 1320–1326).
- Pan, S. J., & Yang, Q. (2009). A survey on transfer learning. *IEEE Transactions on knowledge and data engineering*, 22(10), 1345–1359.
- Pang, B., & Lee, L. (2008). Opinion mining and sentiment analysis. *Foundations and Trends® in information retrieval*, 2(1–2), 1–135.
- Plutchik, R. (1980). A general psychoevolutionary theory of emotion. In R. Plutchik & H. Kellerman (eds.), *Theories of emotion* (pp. 3–33). Academic press.
- Preoțiuc-Pietro, D., Schwartz, H. A., Park, G., Eichstaedt, J., Kern, M., Ungar, L., & Shulman, E. (2016). Modelling valence and arousal in facebook posts. In A. Balahur, E. van der Goot, P. Vossen & A. Montoyo (Eds.), *Proceedings of the 7th workshop on computational approaches to subjectivity, sentiment and social media analysis* (pp. 9–15).
- Scherer, K. R., & Wallbott, H. G. (1994). Evidence for universality and cultural variation of differential emotion response patterning. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, 66(2), 310.
- Severyn, A., & Moschitti, A. (2015). Twitter sentiment analysis with deep convolutional neural networks. In R. Baeza-Yates, M. Lalmas, A. Moffat & B. A. Ribeiro-Neto (Eds.), *Proceedings of the 38th international ACM SIGIR conference on research and development in information retrieval* (pp. 959–962).
- Singh, G., Brahma, D., Rai, P., & Modi, A. (2021). Fine-grained emotion prediction by modeling emotion definitions. In *2021 9th International Conference on Affective Computing and Intelligent Interaction (ACII)* (pp. 1–8). IEEE.
- Strapparava, C., & Mihalcea, R. (2007). Semeval-2007 task 14: Affective text. In E. Agirre, L. Màrquez & R. Wicentowski (Eds.), *Proceedings of the fourth international workshop on semantic evaluations (SemEval-2007)* (pp. 70–74).
- Vaswani, A. (2017). Attention is all you need. *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*.
- Yang, Z. (2019). XLNet: Generalized Autoregressive Pretraining for Language Understanding. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1906.08237*.
- Yi, Y., Park, J., & Kim, B. (2020). The construction of digital ontology for Korean emotions. *Korean Semantics*, 68, 131–162.

# Unaprjeđenje precizne klasifikacije emocija korištenjem velikih jezičnih modela putem sekvencijalnog učenja emocija

## SAŽETAK

Ovim istraživanjem predlaže se pristup za poboljšanje učinkovitosti klasifikacije emocija uvođenjem metode sekvencijalnog učenja emocija (*Sequential Emotion Learning*, SEL). Konvencionalne metode učenja često imaju poteškoća s preciznim klasificiranjem emocija. Kako bi se to prevladalo, pristupom SEL prvo se trenira model na sedam osnovnih emocija, koje je relativno lakše klasificirati zbog njihove jasne međusobne razlike. Potom se model dodatno prilagođava pomoću 24 specifičnije emocionalne oznake, čime se poboljšava njegova sposobnost rješavanja složenih zadataka klasifikacije emocija. Eksperimentalni rezultati pokazuju da metoda SEL nadmašuje osnovni model, postižući veću točnost već u ranim fazama treniranja. Model SEL vrlo brzo postiže svoju maksimalnu učinkovitost te pokazuje poboljšane sposobnosti klasifikacije na nevidenim, općenitim rečenicama, što ukazuje na njegovu robusnost u različitim tekstualnim kontekstima. Dobiveni rezultati sugeriraju da metoda SEL može učinkovito poboljšati klasifikaciju emocija, osobito u zadacima koji zahtijevaju razlikovanje složenih emocija. Ovaj sekvencijalni pristup učenju nudi potencijalnu prednost u odnosu na tradicionalne metode i može se primijeniti na druga područja koja uključuju složene zadatke klasifikacije. Budućim istraživanjima mogla bi se istražiti opća primjenjivost ove metode na druge probleme klasifikacije kako bi se dodatno povećala njezina korisnost.

**Ključne riječi:** klasifikacija emocija, sekvencijalno učenje, precizna klasifikacija, veliki jezični model, afektivno računarstvo.

JHR

*BOOK REVIEWS*

PRIKAZI KNJIGA

*EUROPEAN  
JOURNAL OF BIOETHICS*

EUROPSKI  
ČASOPIS ZA BIOETIKU



Tomislav Nedić

## *Presadivanje organa – pravo, (bio)etika i moral*

Medicinska naklada – Hrvatsko filozofsko društvo,  
Zagreb 2023., str. 264

Danas bez imalo sumnje možemo kazati da presađivanje organa predstavlja jedno od najznačajnijih dostignuća suvremene (transplantacijske) medicine, ali i da istodobno otvara niz složenih pravnih, etičkih i moralnih pitanja i problema. Kao postupak koji podrazumijeva uzimanje organa sa svrhom spašavanja ili poboljšanja života drugog čovjeka, transplantacija zahtijeva pažljivo razmatranje granica individualne autonomije, pristanka, definicije smrti, pravičnosti u raspodjeli resursa i potencijalne eksploatacije ranjivih grupa. U tom smislu, presađivanje organa nije samo strogo medicinski, nego u određenom smislu i društveno-filozofski fenomen. A u tom kontekstu, među ostalim, pravo i bioetika igraju jednu od ključnih uloga u oblikovanju normativnog okvira koji treba osigurati zaštitu osnovnih ljudskih prava, ali i pravednost i transparentnost u ovome osjetljivom području. Upravo ta međuigra prava, (bio)etike i morala nalazi se u središtu knjige *Presadivanje organa – pravo, (bio)etika i moral* Tomislava Nedića, mladog i perspektivnog doktora pravnih znanosti i studenta poslijediplomskoga doktorskog studija Filozofija na Filozofskom fakultetu Sveučilišta u Zagrebu.

Riječ je o znanstvenoj monografiji koja je nastala na temelju doktorske disertacije „Bioetički aspekti presađivanja organa”, obranjene na Pravnom fakultetu Osijek Sveučilišta Josipa Jurja Strossmayera u Osijeku 6. srpnja 2022. godine, i koja je u ponešto doradenom, izmijenjenom i proširenom obliku 2023. godine tiskana u suradnji Medicinske naklade i Hrvatskoga filozofskog društva. Osim značajne suradnje u pogledu tiskanja knjige, ova impozantna studija posebna je i po broju

recenzenata. Knjigu je, naime, recenziralo čak sedmero stručnjaka iz različitih znanstvenih područja i disciplina (filozofija, pravo, bioetika, medicina, odgojne i obrazovne znanosti, kineziologija) s pet različitih fakulteta u Republici Hrvatskoj. No, usudio bih se reći da se primarna važnost ove knjige ponajviše krije u autorovu sveobuhvatnom pristupu predmetu istraživanja, koji u pogledu teorijskih i praktičnih dilema koje prate transplantacijsku medicinu gotovo niti jedan relevantan element nije ostavio teorijski nepropitanim i diskurzivno neraščlanjenim, a sve s ciljem istjerivanja na vidjelo prividne samorazumljivosti raznih filozofskih i pravnih predrasuda koje prate fenomen presađivanja organa. Nedić je tako u uvodnom dijelu knjige zapisao sljedeće riječi:

Premda je postupak presađivanja organa prilično učestala pojava u suvremenoj (transplantacijskoj) medicini, svaki postupak, bez obzira na to o kojem je organu riječ, uistinu je čudo za sebe. Sama činjenica da određeni entitet koji je *eo ipso* pridonosio integritetu i životu jedne osobe odjednom to isto čini životu druge, zaista je trenutak neopisiva zadovoljstva i divljenja, ali i daljnje inspiracije u svakom znanstvenom pokušaju unaprjeđenja – jer ljepota se intersekcije prava i bioetike ogleda upravo u zaštiti života kao temeljne društvene vrijednosti. (str. V)

Naime, autorova nepokolebljiva fascinacija predmetom njegova istraživanja evidentna je na gotovo svakoj stranici ove znanstvene monografije, koja sveukupno broji 264 stranice. Da budem precizniji, osim predgovora i zahvala, uvoda, zaključka i bogatog popisa literature, Nedićeva studija sastoji se od 8 glavnih poglavlja u kojima je autor razmotrio širok spektar tema. Primjerice, čitatelji tako u ovoj studiji mogu pronaći (1) kritičku raspravu o odnosu bioetike, (bio)medicinske etike i medicinskog prava, (2) povijesni pregled postupka uzimanja, darivanja i presađivanja organa, (3) temeljitu analizu pozitivno-pravnog okvira uzimanja, darivanja i presađivanja organa, (4) sistematičnu raščlambu sustava pretpostavljenog pristanka darivanja organa, (5) argumentiranu polemiku o moždanoj smrti kao glavnom uvjetu uzimanja organa od preminule osobe, (6) teorijsku evaluaciju fenomena pristanka obitelji na darivanje organa preminule osobe, (7) stručnu klasifikaciju stvarnih prava u kontekstu filozofsko-pravne rasprave o ljudskom tijelu i (8) zanimljiv osvrt na ksenotransplantaciju kao budućnost presađivanja organa.

Imajući na umu teorijsko bogatstvo Nedićeve studije, vjerujem da ne bi bilo pogrešno tvrditi da ova znanstvena monografija donosi sistematizaciju svih temeljnih pravnih i filozofijsko-etičkih problema presađivanja organa, ali i da ujedno nudi i neka nova rješenja i spoznaje koje bi taj postupak mogle učiniti još učinkovitijim. Kroz harmoniziranje pravnog, filozofskog i medicinskog diskursa, što nije bio nimalo lak zadatak, Nedić je i više nego uspješno uspio približiti glavna pitanja i probleme presađivanja organa, i to na diskurzivno jasan i precizan način u studiji koja bi zasigurno mogla biti korisna, ali i zanimljiva gotovo svima – od studenata i

profesore pa sve do stručnjaka i laika. Stoga, uzimajući u obzir sadržajno bogatstvo i sveobuhvatnost pristupa, s jedne strane, te preciznost i jasnoću autorova izraza, s druge strane, bez ikakve dvojbe možemo očekivati da će ova studija u bližoj budućnosti postati jedno od glavnih, a zasigurno i glavno „domaće” orijentacijsko i referentno mjesto svima onima koji se bave ovom složenom tematikom.

**Jan Defrančeski**



Draženko Tomić

## *Bioethical Miscellany*

University of Zagreb, Faculty of Teacher education,  
2024, 138 pages

Knjiga *Bioethical Miscellany* autora Draženka Tomića, objavljena 2024. godine na engleskom jeziku, na 138 stranica donosi zbirku bioetičkih tema koje istražuju svakodnevne etičke dileme povezane s ljudskim životom i okolišem. Autor, izv. prof. dr. sc. Draženko Tomić, zaposlen je na Učiteljskom fakultetu Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, gdje predaje filozofiju i sociologiju. Njegova istraživanja obuhvaćaju područja filozofije odgoja, etike, teodiceje, lingvistike, kineziologije, folkloristike i etnologije. Kroz četiri poglavlja autor istražuje različite aspekte bioetike, uključujući etiku u prirodnom okolišu, etiku u psihijatriji, pitanja kraja ljudskog života te razne druge teme poput ovisnosti, samoubojstva, HIV-a, demografskih izazova, Hipokratove tradicije i priziva savjesti među zdravstvenim djelatnicima.

Knjiga *Bioethical Miscellany* predstavlja značajan doprinos proučavanju bioetičkih tema u akademskom i društvenom kontekstu, baveći se raznim etičkim dilemama koje proizlaze iz svakodnevnog bavljenja ljudskim životom i okolinom. Središnja je nit svih obrađenih tema moguće ugrožavanje ljudskog dostojanstva, kvalitete života te čak i proklamirane razine ljudskih prava. Ova je knjiga dio projekta koji sustavno obrađuje bioetičke teme objavljene u stručnom tromjesečniku Glasnik Hrvatskoga katoličkog društva, koji izdaje istoimena udruga od 1991. godine. Knjiga se sastoji od četiri velika poglavlja: *Ecoethical Topics*, *Psychoethical Topics*, *Thanatoethical Topics* i *Bioethical Miscellany*. Svako poglavlje započinje istaknutim natuknicama koje sažeto predstavljaju glavnu temu cjeline. Svako poglavlje sadrži nekoliko potpoglavlja koja detaljno razrađuju ključne teme, pružajući širi kontekst analizirane problematike. Svaka cjelina uključuje uvod, zaključak te popis literature. Knjiga je posebno značajna jer je usmjerena na hrvatske izvore i prijevode hrvatskih tekstova na engleski jezik, što

čini njezinu perspektivu specifičnom i relevantnom za čitatelje koji se bave etičkim pitanjima u kontekstu Hrvatske i šire.

Prvo poglavlje posvećeno je etici prirodnog okoliša, a bavi se temama vezanim uz genetiku i kloniranje. Konkretno, razmatraju se moralne dvojbe povezane s genetskim inženjeringom, primjenom biotehnologije u medicinske svrhe te potencijalnim ekološkim posljedicama kloniranja. U knjizi su navedeni primjeri stvarnih bioetičkih dilema, poput regulacije genetski modificiranih organizama i etike eksperimentalnog kloniranja životinja u svrhu medicinskog istraživanja. Osim teorijskog pristupa, poglavlje pruža i konkretne primjere stvarnih bioetičkih dilema, poput regulacije genetski modificiranih organizama (GMO) te etičkih izazova eksperimentalnog kloniranja životinja za medicinska istraživanja. Ove su teme ključne za suvremenu bioetiku jer postavljaju pitanja o granicama znanstvenih istraživanja i njihovim mogućim posljedicama na društvo i okoliš. Ovo poglavlje donosi uravnotežen prikaz bioetičkih izazova, uz osvrt na stvarne primjere i etičke argumente. Razmatraju se sukobi između znanstvenog napretka i moralnih ograničenja, što ga čini relevantnim za akademsku zajednicu i širu javnost.

Drugo poglavlje istražuje složene odnose između etike i psihijatrije, stavljajući poseban naglasak na društveni odnos prema osobama s mentalnim poteškoćama. Ovo poglavlje analizira kako društvene norme, medicinska praksa i pravni okviri utječu na tretman i prava osoba koje se suočavaju s mentalnim bolestima. Posebna pažnja posvećena je etičkim dilemama u psihijatrijskoj skrbi, poput prisilne hospitalizacije, upotrebe psihofarmaka, prava pacijenata na informirani pristanak te stigmatizacije osoba s mentalnim poteškoćama. Također se razmatra povijesni kontekst razvoja psihijatrije i bioetičke rasprave o granicama između terapije i kontrole ponašanja. Poglavlje donosi i konkretne primjere slučajeva iz prakse, oslanjajući se na medicinske i pravne izvore, kako bi prikazalo kompleksnost odluka koje uključuju autonomiju pacijenata, zaštitu javnog zdravlja i profesionalnu odgovornost psihijatar.

Treće poglavlje analizira ključna pitanja vezana uz kraj ljudskog života, razmatrajući etičke i medicinske aspekte utvrđivanja trenutka smrti, vegetativnog stanja, palijativne skrbi te doniranja organa i transplantacije. Ova se tematika dotiče fundamentalnih bioetičkih dilema, poput granice između života i smrti te moralne opravdanosti određenih medicinskih postupaka. Jedan je od ključnih problema koje poglavlje razmatra kako definirati smrt u medicinskom i etičkom smislu – kroz prestanak moždane aktivnosti ili prestanak funkcije srca i pluća. Također, raspravlja se o pravima pacijenata u terminalnim fazama bolesti, uključujući pravo na palijativnu skrb i odluke vezane uz produženje ili prekid liječenja. Poglavlje također istražuje etičke aspekte darivanja organa, posebice kriterije određivanja smrti darivatelja i pitanja informiranog pristanka. Transplantacijska etika bavi se i mogućim zloupotrebama

u sustavu doniranja organa te dilemama vezanim uz alokaciju organa u kontekstu pravednosti i prioritizacije pacijenata.

Posljednje poglavlje bavi se širokim spektrom etičkih pitanja vezanih uz medicinu, društvo i individualna prava. Analizira problematiku ovisnosti, sagledavajući je iz bioetičkog i javnozdravstvenog aspekta, uključujući odgovornost društva u prevenciji i liječenju. Samoubojstvo se obrađuje kroz prizmu medicinske etike, s posebnim naglaskom na pravo pojedinca na samoodređenje i moralne dileme eutanazije. Poglavlje također donosi rasprave o HIV-u, fokusirajući se na etičke izazove u dijagnostici, liječenju i društvenoj stigmatizaciji oboljelih. Demografski izazovi obrađuju se kroz analizu problema starenja populacije, smanjenja nataliteta i održivosti zdravstvenih sustava. Posebna pažnja posvećena je Hipokratovoj tradiciji i njezinu suvremenom značenju, osobito u kontekstu medicinske etike i profesionalnih obaveza liječnika. Konačno, razmatra se priziv savjesti među medicinskim profesionalcima – pitanje koje otvara rasprave o granicama između osobnih uvjerenja i profesionalnih dužnosti.

Knjiga se odlikuje jasnim i pristupačnim stilom pisanja, što omogućuje čitateljima svih akademskih i profesionalnih profila da je razumiju i primijene u svojoj svakodnevnoj praksi. Autor se jasno drži etičkih okvira koji se temelje na principima ljudskih prava, uvažavanja osobne slobode, kao i društvene odgovornosti, čime čitateljima nudi čvrstu osnovu za vlastito razmatranje bioetičkih dilema. Knjiga je namijenjena širokoj publici, uključujući studente, istraživače i sve zainteresirane za bioetička pitanja. Nudi detaljan uvid u različite aspekte bioetike, potičući čitatelje na razmišljanje o etičkim izazovima s kojima se suočavamo u svakodnevnom životu. Za sve koji žele duboko razumjeti i kritički razmišljati o bioetičkim pitanjima u modernom društvu, *Bioethical Miscellany* Draženka Tomića predstavlja ne samo izvrsno polazište, već i značajan doprinos bioetičkoj literaturi.

**Ivana Lalić Čičković**



## PUBLICATION ETHICS AND PUBLICATION MALPRACTICE STATEMENT

The following are the standards of expected ethical behaviour for all parties involved in publishing in the journal *Jahr – European Journal of Bioethics*: the author, the journal editor and editorial board, the peer reviewer and the publisher.

These guidelines are based on the existing Elsevier policies and COPE's Best Practice Guidelines for Journal Editors.

### Duties of the Editor and the Editorial Board

**Publication Decisions:** the editor of the journal *Jahr* is responsible for deciding which of the articles submitted to the journal should be published. The editor is guided by the policies of the journal's editorial board and constrained by such legal requirements as shall then be in force regarding libel, copyright infringement and plagiarism. The editor may consult with the members of the editorial board or reviewers in decision making.

**Fair Play:** the editor should evaluate manuscripts for their intellectual content without regard to race, gender, sexual orientation, religious belief, ethnic origin, citizenship, or political philosophy of the authors.

**Confidentiality:** the editor and any editorial staff must not disclose any information about a submitted manuscript to anyone other than the corresponding author, reviewers, potential reviewers, other editorial advisers, and the publisher, as appropriate.

## Duties of Reviewers

**Contribution to Editorial Decisions:** peer review assists the editor in making editorial decisions and through the editorial communications with the author may also assist the author in improving the paper.

**Promptness:** any selected reviewer who feels unqualified to review the research reported in a manuscript or knows that its prompt review will be impossible should notify the editor and excuse himself from the review process.

**Confidentiality:** any manuscripts received for review must be treated as confidential documents. They must not be shown to or discussed with others.

**Standards of Objectivity:** reviews should be conducted objectively. Personal criticism of the author is inappropriate. Reviewers should express their views clearly with supporting arguments.

**Disclosure and Conflict of Interest:** privileged information or ideas obtained through peer review must be kept confidential and not used for personal advantage. Reviewers should not consider manuscripts in which they have conflicts of interest resulting from competitive, collaborative, or other relationships or connections with any of the authors, companies, or institutions connected to the papers.

## Duties of Authors

**Reporting Standards:** authors of reports of original research should present an accurate account of the work performed as well as an objective discussion of its significance. Underlying data should be represented accurately in the paper. A paper should contain sufficient detail and references to permit others to replicate the work. Fraudulent or knowingly inaccurate statements constitute unethical behaviour and are unacceptable.

**Originality and Plagiarism:** the authors should ensure that they have written entirely original works, and if the authors have used the work and/or words of others that this has been appropriately cited or quoted. Plagiarism takes many forms, from 'passing off' another author's paper as the one's own paper, to copying or paraphrasing substantial parts of another author's paper (without attribution), to claiming results from research conducted by others. Plagiarism in all its forms constitutes unethical publishing behaviour and is unacceptable. Applicable copyright laws and conventions should be followed. Copyright material (e.g. tables, figures or extensive quotations) should be reproduced only with appropriate permission and acknowledgement.

**Multiple, Redundant or Concurrent Publication:** an author should not in general publish manuscripts describing essentially the same research in more than one journal or primary publication. Submitting the same manuscript to more than one journal concurrently constitutes unethical publishing behaviour and is unacceptable.

**Acknowledgement of Sources:** proper acknowledgement of the work of others must always be given. Authors should cite publications that have been influential in determining the nature of the reported work.

**Authorship of the Paper:** authorship should be limited to those who have made a significant contribution to the conception, design, execution, or interpretation of the reported study. All those who have made significant contributions should be listed as co-authors. Where there are others who have participated in certain substantive aspects of the research project, they should be acknowledged or listed as contributors. The corresponding author should ensure that all appropriate co-authors and no inappropriate co-authors are included on the paper, and that all co-authors have seen and approved the final version of the paper and have agreed to its submission for publication.

**Hazards:** If the work involves chemicals, procedures or equipment that have any unusual hazards inherent in their use, the author must clearly identify these in the manuscript.

**Reporting of Research Involving Humans or Animals:** Appropriate approval, licensing or registration should be obtained before the research begins and details should be provided in the report (e.g. Institutional Review Board, Research Ethics Committee approval, national licensing authorities for the use of animals). If requested by editors, authors should supply evidence that reported research received the appropriate approval and was carried out ethically (e.g. copies of approvals, licences, participant consent forms). Researchers should not generally publish or share identifiable individual data collected in the course of research without specific consent from the individual (or their representative).

The appropriate statistical analyses should be determined at the start of the study and a data analysis plan for the prespecified outcomes should be prepared and followed. Secondary or *post hoc* analyses should be distinguished from primary analyses and those set out in the data analysis plan. Researchers should publish all meaningful research results that might contribute to understanding.

Authors should supply research protocols to journal editors if requested (e.g. for clinical trials) so that reviewers and editors can compare the research report to the protocol to check that it was carried out as planned and that no relevant details have been omitted. Researchers should follow relevant requirements for clinical

trial registration and should include the trial registration number in all publications arising from the trial.

**Disclosure and Conflicts of Interest:** all authors should disclose in their manuscript any financial or other substantive conflict of interest that might be construed to influence the results or interpretation of their manuscript. All sources of financial support for the project should be disclosed.

**Fundamental Errors in Published Works:** when an author discovers a significant error or inaccuracy in his/her own published work, it is the author's obligation to promptly notify the journal editor or publisher and cooperate with the editor to retract or correct the paper.

## IZJAVA O ETICI OBJAVLJIVANJA I NESAVJESNIM POSTUPCIMA

U ovom dokumentu prikazani su standardi očekivanog etičnog ponašanja svih strana uključenih u objavljivanje u časopisu *Jahr – Europski časopis za bioetiku*: autora, urednika i uredništva časopisa, recenzenta i izdavača.

Ove smjernice zasnivaju se na postojećim politikama Elsevierovih i COPE-ovih smjernica najbolje prakse za urednike časopisa.

### Dužnosti urednika i uredništva

**Odlučivanje o objavljivanju:** urednik časopisa *Jahr* odgovoran je za odluku o tome koji od članaka podastrijetih časopisu može biti objavljen. Urednik se rukovodi politikama uredništva časopisa i vezan je zakonskim okvirima koji se odnose na eventualnu klevetu, povredu intelektualnog vlasništva i plagiranje. Pri odlučivanju urednik se može savjetovati s uredništvom ili recenzentima.

**Fair play:** urednik rukopise mora procjenjivati prema njihovom intelektualnom sadržaju, bez obzira na rasu, rod, spolnu orijentaciju, vjeru, etničku pripadnost, državljanstvo ili političko opredjeljenje autora.

**Povjerljivost:** urednik, kao ni bilo tko iz uredništva, ne smije odati informaciju o podastrijetom rukopisu nikome drugome osim autoru određenom za korespondenciju, recenzentima, potencijalnim recenzentima, drugim savjetnicima uredništva i izdavaču.

## Dužnosti recenzenata

**Doprinos uredničkom odlučivanju:** istorazinska recenzija pomaže uredniku pri donošenju uredničkih odluka, a u uredničkoj komunikaciji s autorom može pomoći i autoru pri poboljšanju članka.

**Ekspeditivnost:** svaki odabrani recenzent koji se ne osjeća kvalificiranim za recenziju rukopisa ili zna da recenziju neće moći ekspeditivno pripremiti, mora obavijestiti o tome urednika i otkloniti recenziranje.

**Povjerljivost:** svaki rukopis dobiven na recenziju mora biti smatran povjerljivim dokumentom. Ne smije ga se pokazati drugome ili o njemu s drugima diskutirati.

**Standardi objektivnosti:** recenziju treba provesti objektivno. Osobna kritika autora nije primjerena. Recenzenti moraju svoje poglede izražavati jasno i s podupirućim argumentima.

**Očitovanje o sukobu interesa:** povlaštene informacije ili ideje pribavljene istorazinskom recenzijom moraju se povjerljivo čuvati i ne smiju se koristiti za osobni probitak. Recenzenti ne smiju recenzirati rukopise koji im nameću sukob interesa slijedom kompetitivnog, suradničkog ili drugog odnosa ili veze s bilo kojim od autora, tvrtki ili ustanova povezanih s člankom.

## Dužnosti autora

**Standardi izvješćivanja:** autori koji izvješćuju o izvornom istraživanju moraju iznijeti točan prikaz provedenog rada, kao i objektivnu raspravu njegova značaja. Podaci na kojima se rad temelji moraju u članku biti precizno prikazani. Članak mora sadržavati dovoljno pojedinosti i referenci kako bi drugima omogućio ponavljanje postupka. Lažne ili svjesno neprecizne izjave predstavljaju neetično ponašanje i nisu prihvatljive.

**Izvornost i plagiranje:** autori moraju jamčiti da su napisali posve izvorno djelo, a ako su koristili djelo i/ili riječi drugih, da su to učinili ispravno ih citirajući. Plagijat ima mnogo oblika, od podvaljivanja tuđeg članka kao vlastitoga, do prepisivanja ili prepričavanja značajnih dijelova tuđeg članka (bez citata), ili prisvajanja rezultata istraživanja koja su proveli drugi. U svim svojim oblicima plagiranje predstavlja neetično ponašanje koje nije prihvatljivo. Postupati treba sukladno zakonima i konvencijama o intelektualnom vlasništvu koji su na snazi. Sadržaj koji podliježe autorskim pravima (npr. tablice, slike ili opsežni citati) moraju se reproducirati samo s odgovarajućim dopuštenjem i navodom.

**Višestruke, suviše ili istodobne publikacije:** općenito uzevši, autor ne smije objavljivati rukopise koji opisuju u bitnome isto istraživanje u više nego jednom časopisu ili primarnoj publikaciji. Podastiranje istog rukopisa istodobno više nego jednom časopisu predstavlja neetično ponašanje koje nije prihvatljivo.

**Navođenje izvora:** rad drugih treba navesti uvijek na odgovarajući način. Autori moraju citirati sve publikacije koje su utjecale na određenje prirode iznietog rada.

**Autorstvo članka:** autorstvo treba ograničiti na one koji su značajno pridonijeli konceptu, nacrtu, izvedbi ili tumačenju iznietje studije. Svi oni koji su dali značajan doprinos moraju biti navedeni kao koautori. Ako postoje još neki koji su sudjelovali u bitnim aspektima istraživanja, mora im se istaknuti zahvala ili ih se treba navesti kao suradnike. Autor za korespondenciju mora jamčiti da su u članak uključeni svi odgovarajući koautori i iz članka isključeni svi neodgovarajući koautori, kao i da su svi koautori vidjeli i odobrili konačnu verziju članka te se složili da je se podastre za objavu.

**Rizici:** ako rad uključuje kemikalije, postupke ili opremu koja svojom uporabom otvara bilo kakav neuobičajen rizik, autor to mora u članku jasno naznačiti.

**Izješćivanje o istraživanju koje uključuje ljude ili životinje:** prije no što istraživanje započne, potrebno je pribaviti odgovarajuće dopuštenje, odobrenje ili registraciju, a u izvješću treba navesti pojedinosti (npr. dozvola Etičkog povjerenstva ustanove, državne institucije nadležne za uporabu životinja i sl.). Ako to zatraži urednik, autori moraju dostaviti dokaz da je istraživanje dobilo odgovarajuću dozvolu i da je provedeno etički (npr. presliku dozvole, odobrenja, obrazac za pristanak sudionika i sl.). Općenito uzevši, istraživači ne smiju objavljivati ili distribuirati pojedinačne podatke prikupljene tijekom istraživanja bez posebnog pristanka pojedinca (ili njegova/njena zastupnika).

Odgovarajuće statističke analize moraju biti utvrđene na početku studije, nakon čega treba pripremiti i slijediti plan analize podataka za pretpostavljene rezultate. Sekundarne ili *post hoc* analize treba razlikovati od primarnih i onih najavljenih u planu analize podataka. Istraživači moraju objaviti sve značajne rezultate istraživanja koji bi mogli pridonijeti razumijevanju problematike koja se spominje.

Ako se to zatraži, autori moraju priskrbiti uredniku časopisa istraživačke protokole (npr. za kliničke pokuse), kako bi recenzenti i urednici mogli usporediti izvješće o istraživanju s protokolom i provjerili je li provedeno kako je bilo planirano te kako nisu izostavljene nikakve relevantne pojedinosti. Istraživači moraju slijediti sve bitne uvjete registracije kliničkih pokusa i uključiti broj registracije pokusa u sve publikacije koje iz njega proizađu.

**Očitovanje o sukobu interesa:** svi autori moraju se u svom rukopisu očitovati o bilo kakvom financijskom ili drugom bitnom sukobu interesa koji bi mogao biti protumačen kao utjecaj na rezultate ili tumačenje njihova rukopisa. Očitovati se mora i o svim izvorima financijske potpore projekta.

**Bitne pogreške u objavljenim radovima:** ako autor otkrije bitnu pogrešku ili netočnost u njegovu/njenu objavljeni radu, autorova je obveza odmah obavijestiti urednika časopisa ili izdavača i surađivati s urednikom kako bi se članak povukao ili popravio.

## INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE AUTHORS

*Jahr* – *European Journal of Bioethics* is a journal that deals with a wide range of bioethical topics. The Editorial Board aims to publish articles related to bioethics in social sciences, humanities, biomedicine, and other sciences. *Jahr* is published twice a year.

### Types of articles and a way of assessing articles

*Jahr* publishes reviewed articles as well as articles that are not subject to the reviewing procedure. The reviewed articles are accepted to be published after having received at least two anonymous positive reviews. The Editorial Board makes the final decision on the publication of articles in the *Jahr*.

Positively evaluated manuscripts can be classified according to the following categorisation:

- Original scientific articles;
- Preliminary communications;
- Review articles;
- Professional articles.

*Jahr* also publishes book reviews (extending to publications not older than three years), reports, and announcements of upcoming bioethics events (public lectures, book promotions, scientific conferences, etc.).

There are no costs to authors for publication. *Jahr* publishes manuscripts that have not been previously published and are not submitted to any other journal at the time of submission to *Jahr*. Authors are responsible for the originality and authorship of their manuscript and are expected to behave with academic integrity. Authors give the journal the right for the first publication of the article both in its printed and electronic format. Articles published in the *Jahr*, authors may also publish in other publications by citing the data about the articles' first publication.

## Layout and manuscripts

Preferable document **size** is up to 20 pages (including notes, references, tables, graphs, keywords, and summary between 1 200 and 1 400 characters with spaces), while reviews and overviews should consist of 4-8 pages.

The manuscripts should be designed according to the **Manuscripts Writing Template**. The text should be written in 12-point Times New Roman font type, 1,5 spacing. Tables and graphs should be included in the text. Pages are numbered in the lower right corner of each page (including pages with a bibliography). Notes (footnotes) should be inserted at the bottom of the page, where the footnotes' numerical code is.

Authors are encouraged to submit their unique **ORCID** identifier during the manuscript submission process, following the Manuscripts Writing Template.

**Graphs, tables, and images** are generally included within the text at the point where they need to be displayed. Images should be enlarged to the whole page and possess adequate resolution (preferably 300dpi). Graphs, tables, and images should be properly numbered and titled, but they also need to be sent as separate attachments. If the figures, tables, etc. are reproduced from another source, the source must be properly cited. Due to monochrome printing, all figures, graphs, etc. should be monochrome or grayscale, have a white background, and be made in applications, such as MS Office.

The accustomed foreign expressions, including the names of documents and institutions in a foreign language, should be written in italics – for example, *de facto*. **Bold** is used for highlighting the text. Underlined characters are not used in the text.

Dates are listed as follows: 01 July 2014. Numbers at the beginning of sentences and approximate numbers are written in words – hundreds, thousands, millions, etc. Decimal is separated exclusively by commas (e.g. 621,57), and thousands with a single space (1 532 or 10 589 163). Statistical expressions are written in the whole decimal numbers (e.g.  $p < 0,05$ ).

All **abbreviations** should be expanded at first mention in the text and introduced by placing them in parentheses after the term. It is necessary to respect standard abbreviations and the rules of shortening.

**Quotation** taken directly from another author's text is placed in quotation marks, and if one part of a quoted text is omitted, it is marked [...].

## Citing references in the text

APA style is used as a citation method. Sources should be cited in the text, not in footnotes. The reference in the text is enclosed in parentheses, as follows:

(Andorno, 2005) or Andorno (2005) or (Andorno, 2005, p. 138).

If the work has two or three authors, all are listed, for example:

(Rendtorf & Kemp, 2000).

If the work has more than three authors, the form “et al.” is used in the first citation in the text, for example:

(Pelčić et al., 2020).

All references in the text are used as stated, forms such as “ibid.”, “op. cit.” and others are not used.

## Listing a bibliography (at the end of the manuscript)

In the bibliography, it is necessary to provide full data on all works mentioned in the text. Works (references) in the bibliography must be listed alphabetically according to the author’s surnames and chronological order for the same author works. If two or more works by the same author, published in the same year, are cited, it is necessary to add lower-case letters immediately after the year in brackets: (1996a). When citing several authors’ joint work in the bibliography, the form “et al.” is not used, but it is necessary to list all the authors.

## Examples of citations

**Book, one author:** Engelhardt, T. H. (1986). *The Foundations of Bioethics*. New York: Oxford University Press.

**Book, multiple authors:** Beauchamp, T. L. & Childress, J. F. (2013). *Principles of Biomedical Ethics*. New York: Oxford University Press.

**Proceedings:** Rendtorf, J. D. & Kemp, P. (Eds.). (2000). *Basic Ethical Principles in Bioethics and Biolaw, Vol. I. Autonomy, Dignity, Integrity, and Vulnerability*. Copenhagen/Barcelona: Center for Ethics and Law/Institut Borja de Bioetica.

**Article from the proceedings/book chapter:** Gracia, D. (2001). History of Medical Ethics. In H. T. Have & B. Gordjin (Eds.), *Bioethics in European Perspective* (pp. 3417-3450). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

**Journal article (DOI number should be listed whenever available):** Andorno, R. (2005). The Oviedo Convention: A European Legal Framework at the Intersection of Human Rights and Health Law. *Journal of International Biotechnology Law*, 2(4), 133-143. <https://doi.org/10.1515/jibl.2005.2.4.133>

**Electronic sources:** Faden, R. & Shebaya, S. (2016, June 16). Public Health Ethics. In E. N. Zalta The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/publichealth-ethics/> (access: 16 June 2017).

**Editions of institutions:** The Croatian Bureau of Statistics (2006). *Statistical Yearbook 2006*. Zagreb: The Croatian Bureau of Statistics.

**Legislation and other regulations:** Environmental Protection Act. *Official Gazette*, 110/2007.

The Editorial Board reserves the right to adjust the manuscript submitted according to the editorial propositions and standards of the language in which the manuscript is written.

## Manuscript submission

*Jahr* has an online system for submitting manuscripts. To submit your manuscript, please visit the website of the journal: <https://hrcak.srce.hr/ojs/index.php/jahr>.

For any additional questions, please feel free to contact the Editorial Board: [jahr@uniri.hr](mailto:jahr@uniri.hr).

## Open Access Policy

*Jahr* provides direct open access to its content, free of charge to users or their institutions. In doing so, the principle is respected, according to which research that is freely available to the public enables a greater global exchange of knowledge, under the Creative Commons license.

## UPUTE AUTORIMA

*Jahr* – *European Journal of Bioethics* časopis je koji tematizira širok raspon bioetičkih tema. Namjera Uredništva je objavljivati članke koji se tiču bioetike u društvenim, humanističkim, biomedicinskim, ali i u drugim znanostima. Časopis izlazi dva puta godišnje.

### Vrste članaka i način procjene članka

*Jahr* objavljuje neobjavljene radove, odnosno članke koji se recenziraju i one koji ne podliježu recenzijskom postupku. Članci koji se recenziraju prihvaćaju se za objavljivanje nakon provedenog recenzijskog postupka, na temelju najmanje dviju anonimnih pozitivnih recenzija. Konačnu odluku o objavljivanju radova u časopisu *Jahr* donosi uredništvo.

Recenzirani članci kategoriziraju se na sljedeći način:

- izvorni znanstveni članci
- prethodna priopćenja
- pregledni članci
- stručni članci.

Časopis objavljuje i prikaze bioetičkih, ali i drugih relevantnih izdanja (objavljenih u prethodne tri godine) te izvještaje i najave bioetičkih zbivanja (javna predavanja, predstavljanja knjiga, znanstveni skupovi itd.).

Za objavljivanje rada ne plaćaju se nikakvi troškovi. *Jahr* objavljuje radove koji nisu prethodno objavljeni i koji u trenu predaje u *Jahr* nisu predani na razmatranje niti jednom drugom časopisu. Autori su odgovorni za originalnost i autorstvo svog rukopisa te se od njih očekuje ponašanje u skladu s akademskom čestitošću. Svojim pristankom na objavljivanje autori daju časopisu pravo prvog objavljivanja u tiskanom i elektroničkom formatu. Radove objavljene u časopisu *Jahr* autori mogu objaviti u drugim publikacijama uz navođenje podataka o njihovom prvom objavljivanju.

## Oblikovanje teksta i grafička oprema

Poželjni **opseg** članaka je do 20 stranica (uključujući bilješke, literaturu, tablice, grafičke prikaze i sažetak), a recenzija i prikaza od 4 do 8 stranica.

Tekst treba biti oblikovan sukladno **Predlošku za pisanje rada**. Tekst treba biti napisan Times New Roman fontom, veličina slova 12, prored 1,5. Tablice i grafikoni trebaju biti smješteni unutar teksta. Stranice se numeriraju u donjem desnom kutu na svakoj stranici (uključujući i stranicu/e s bibliografijom). Bilješke (fusnote) nalaze se na podnožju stranice, gdje se nalazi brojčana oznaka fusnote.

Knjige i časopisi koji se prikazuju ne smiju biti stariji od tri godine, a prikaz treba uključivati ime i prezime autora čije se djelo prikazuje, naslov djela, naziv izdavača, mjesto izdavanja, godinu izdavanja, broj stranica te na kraju prikaza puno ime i prezime autora prikaza.

Autore se ohrabruje na slanje njihova jedinstvenog **ORCID** identifikatora tijekom procesa predaje rukopisa, sukladno Predlošku za pisanje rada.

**Grafikoni, tablice i slike** u pravilu se prilažu unutar teksta na mjestu gdje trebaju biti prikazani, ali obavezno i odvojeno kao zasebni prilozi. Unutar priloga slike trebaju biti povećane na čitavu stranicu i posjedovati adekvatnu razlučivost (poželjno 300 dpi). Svaki grafikon, tablica i slika trebaju biti numerirani i imati naslov. Ako su preuzeti, izvor mora biti naveden. S obzirom na jednobojni tisak, svi grafički prikazi trebaju biti monokromatski ili u nijansama sive, imati bijelu podlogu i biti izrađeni u programu MS Office.

Uvriježeni strani izrazi, uključujući nazive dokumenata i institucija na stranom jeziku pišu se kurzivom, npr. *de facto*. Sva naglašavanja u tekstu vrše se **podebljanim slovima**. Podvlake se u tekstu ne koriste.

Datumi se navode na sljedeći način: 1. srpnja 2014. Brojevi kojima započinje rečenica i aproksimativni brojevi izražavaju se riječima – stotina, tisuću, milijun i sl. Decimalno mjesto odvađa se isključivo zarezom (npr. 621,57), a tisućice jednim razmakom (1 532 ili 10 589 163). Statistički izrazi pišu se cijelim decimalnim brojevima (npr.  $p < 0,05$ ).

Prilikom prvog pojavljivanja izraza koji se krati potrebno je navesti izraz u cijelosti, a kraticu definirati u zagradama. Potrebno je uvažavati standardne kratice i pravila skraćivanja.

Citat koji se izravno prenosi iz teksta drugog autora stavlja se u navodnike, a ako se jedan dio većeg teksta koji se citira želi ispustiti, ispušteni dio označava se znakom [...].

## Navođenje referenci u tekstu

Kao metoda citiranja koristi se APA stil. Izvore je potrebno navoditi u tekstu, a ne u bilješkama (fusnotama). Referenca u tekstu stavlja se u zagradu, na sljedeći način:

(Andorno, 2005) ili Andorno (2005) ili (Andorno, 2005, str. 138).

Ako rad ima dva ili tri autora, navode se svi, primjerice:

(Rendtorf i Kemp, 2000) ili Rendtorf i Kemp (2000).

Ako rad ima više od tri autora, već kod prvog citiranja u tekstu koristi se oblik „i sur.“, primjerice:

(Pelčić i sur., 2020).

Sve reference u tekstu koriste se kao što je navedeno; ne koriste se oblici poput „ibid.“, „op. cit.“ i drugo.

## Izrada popisa literature (na kraju rada)

U popisu literature (bibliografiji) potrebno je navesti pune podatke o svim radovima spomenutim u tekstu. Radovi u popisu literature moraju biti navedeni abecednim redom prema prezimenima autora te kronološkim redom za radove istog autora. Ako se navode dva ili više djela istog autora, objavljena iste godine, potrebno je dodati mala pisana slova neposredno nakon navođenja godine u zagrade: (1996a). U popisu literature, prilikom navođenja zajedničkog rada više autora, ne koristi se oblik „i sur.“, nego je potrebno navesti sve autore.

## Primjeri navođenja literature

**Knjiga, jedan autor:** Engelhardt, T. H. (1986). *The Foundations of Bioethics*. New York: Oxford University Press.

**Knjiga, više autora:** Beauchamp, T. L. i Childress, J. F. (2013). *Principles of Biomedical Ethics*. New York: Oxford University Press.

**Zbornici:** Rendtorf, J. D. i Kemp, P. (Ur.). (2000). *Basic Ethical Principles in Bioethics and Biolaw, Vol. I. Autonomy, Dignity, Integrity and Vulnerability*, Copenhagen/Barcelona: Centre for Ethics and Law/Institut Borja de Bioetica.

**Rad iz zbornika/poglavlje knjige:** Gracia, D. (2001). History of Medical Ethics. U H. T. Have i B. Gordjin (Ur.), *Bioethics in European Perspective* (str. 3417–3450). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

**Članak u časopisu (DOI broj treba navesti kad god je dostupan):** Andorno, R. (2005). The Oviedo Convention: A European Legal Framework at the Intersection of Human Rights and Health Law. *Journal of International Biotechnology Law*, 2(4), 133–143. <https://doi.org/10.1515/jibl.2005.2.4.133>

**Elektronski izvori:** Faden, R. i Shebaya, S. (2016). Public Health Ethics. U E. N. Zalta *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/publichealth-ethics/> (pristup: 16 June 2017).

**Izdanja institucija:** Hrvatski zavod za statistiku (2006). *Statistički godišnjak 2006*. Zagreb: Hrvatski zavod za statistiku.

**Zakonski propisi i druge regulative:** Zakon o zaštiti okoliša. *Narodne novine*, 80/13, 153/13, 78/15, 12/18, 118/18.

Uredništvo zadržava pravo prilagodbe rada uredničkim propozicijama i standardima jezika na kojemu je rad napisan.

## Predaja rukopisa

*Jahr* koristi mrežni sustav predaje rukopisa. Za predaju rukopisa molimo Vas da posjetite mrežnu stranicu časopisa: <https://hrcak.srce.hr/ojs/index.php/jahr>.

Za sva ostala pitanja budite slobodni kontaktirati Uredništvo: [jahr@uniri.hr](mailto:jahr@uniri.hr).

## Politika otvorenog pristupa

*Jahr* omogućuje neposredni otvoreni pristup svome sadržaju, bez naplaćivanja korisnicima ili njihovim institucijama. Pritom se poštuje načelo sukladno kojem istraživanje koje je slobodno dostupno javnosti omogućuje veću globalnu razmjenu znanja, u skladu s licencom Creative Commons.

*PERMANENT PARTNER / STALNI PARTNER*



