

TURNING EU INTO ME AND YOU THE POLITICIZATION OF EU REPRESENTATIONS IN MACEDONIA

Aleksandar Takovski

*Institute for Social Sciences and Humanities –
Skopje, Republic of Macedonia*

SUMMARY

EU is discursive field where multiple meanings are created, negotiated and contested. Research has shown that it has interpretive power often used as an instrument of political confrontation. Such is the case, this study argues, with the two largest Macedonian parties – the Social Democrats and VMRO-DPMNE – who in a pursuit of changing or maintaining power have produced an EU discourse fitting to their own political agendas. In a situation of a prolonged political crisis, and a significant EU involvement in it, the two parties have turned their EU discourse into an instrument of positive presentation of the self and a negative presentation of the other. The general goal of the study is to analyze the specific discursive strategies in the party programs and media statements of the two parties and their leaders.

KEY WORDS: Macedonia, European Union, party programs, EU discourse, negative campaign.

INTRODUCTION

Republic of Macedonia has been a EU member candidate since December 2005. Ten years later, in January 2015, a political crisis broke out, the resolution of which necessitated the involvement of the Union. The two contexts require unambiguous and tactful representations of EU that will communicate commitment to the Union. However, instead of communicating EU in its cultural and political complexity, and perhaps using it as a unifying national goal in times of crisis, the political actors, the incumbent party at the time VMRO-DPMNE, and the largest party in opposition – the Social Democrats, have transformed the representations of EU into instruments of political confrontation, pursuing personal political agendas. In this respect, the general aim of this study is to analyze the strategic use of EU

in the interparty political conflict between the two parties as manifested in their election manifestoes and their everyday (mediatized) communication and confrontation.

The Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (further referred to as Social Democrats or SDS) acting as an opposition party was not involved in the processes of EU integration and hence it could not use such an engagement as a platform to create a positive image of itself and a negative image of the opponent. Instead, it used party's former track record and future pledges to accomplish these ends by relying on EU as the ideological core of these constructions. The Social Democrats while in opposition, created an image of the EU as a political actor whose political vision is almost identical to their own, and they have used this image to criticize the Government for being not-EU-like. This allowed them to both legitimize their own pro-European (positive) image and to criticize the incumbent VMRO-DPMNE for their UnEuropean actions and language. Although negative campaigning is nothing new or, sadly, scandalous, what is peculiar in this respect is its significant presence in the SDS's election programs that seem to respond to on-going political challenges and exhibit features of everyday political communication and confrontation rather than reflect the party's more stable positions. Having all this in mind, the first two objectives of the study are to: a) show how the Social Democrats have presented themselves positively as pro-EU actors, while presenting the adversary negatively, and b) how and why such representations – that can be found both in their election programs and the mediatized, everyday communication – converge or differ one from the other.

While the Social Democrats' EU-related discourses show some content and functional (self-praise and criticism of the opponent) convergence, VMRO's election manifestoes and their everyday communication, demonstrate some strategic divergence. VMRO manifestoes are overwhelmingly marked with instances of EU-commitment and achievement discursively accomplished by the party's successful involvement in EU-integrative processes and procedures (reforms, adoption of political criteria, etc.), and there is almost no criticism either of their political opponent or the EU. The only subject of criticism in the party's discourse up to 2015 was Greece due to its veto to the country's accession to the EU. However, the prolonged crisis that started in 2014 with the SDS' decision to withdraw from parliament after the elections in April and escalated with the tapped phone conversations scandal in 2015¹, urged a stronger EU presence and resulted

1 In February 2015, the Social Democrats started a public campaign against the incumbent VMRO through a public release of tapped phone conversations (popularly termed as "bombs") the contents of which revealed Government's high officials' involvement in series of crimes.

in VMRO's criticism of the EU. This seems to be at odds with the pro-European discourse present in the manifestoes and partly in the discourses of the party's leader and then prime minister Mr. Nikola Gruevski. Given that this discrepancy did not undermine the internal party cohesion, it could be argued that such seemingly contradicting discourse which accommodates both EU committed and EU critical voices, was a matter of political expediency, a maneuver designed to plausibly address two audiences, the international one, in an attempt to keep positive image and commitment to EU, and the domestic one, in order to maintain electoral support. In this context, the second objective of the study is to analyze how was a positive self-presentation of the VMRO as a pro-EU actor that stresses its commitment to the EU, interwoven into a discourse that is at the same time critical of the EU. In this respect, it can be argued that although the criticism is loud enough and not naïve, it is used strategically to highlight the party's commitment to the EU, discursively accomplished by emphasizing an external constraint (Greece and EU enlargement inertia) against which party's efforts are dramatized and made to appear even more significant.

The analysis presented here is based on data from several sources: party election manifestoes, published interviews with political leaders and party members, and mediatized statements by political leaders issued during official meetings with EU representatives. By analyzing the data, I hope to show that the representations of EU by the two Macedonian parties is markedly instrumental, serving domestic political ends, rather than being an explanatory account of the semantic and organizational complexities of the Union offered to the citizens.

MULTIPLE MEANINGS OF EU, MULTIPLE REPRESENTATIONS OF EU

Many studies have discussed the multiple, contested and contingent meanings of Europe and their use in the construction of national discourses and identities (Delanty 1995, Malmberg and Strath 2002, Pagden 2002). Delanty explains that "every age reinvented the idea of Europe in the mirror of its own identity" (Delanty 1995, 1), further contending that the idea of Europe came about through adversity and conflict rather than consensus. For Delanty, Europe is a historically fabricated reality of ever changing forms and dynamics, constituted by and constitutive of history (ibid.). In a similar vein, Bo Strath and Mikel Malmberg contend that "there are many images of Europe in terms of content and form developed historically over centuries of contentious attempts to appropriate the interpretative power contained in the concept" (Strath and Malmberg 2002, 3), concluding in similar fashion to Delanty, that "the discourses on Europe

are those of debate and conflict, where Europe was and is still used as a mobilizing political instrument (2002, 4).

No less complex notion than Europe is that of European Union which itself is an intricate discursive field where many meanings are being constructed, negotiated and contested by plethora of actors. The academic discourse has discussed the questions of integration (Diez 2001), Europeanization (Cowles et al. 2001), European identity (Strath 2002, Kryzanowski 2010), its perception by EU citizens (Bruter 2005), and many other.

The conceptual complexity of EU is a result of the multiple discourses produced by a plethora of institutional, national and social actors, all of whom construct a view of the Union that best fits their political agendas. EU institutional actors, for example, construct normative and strategic discourses of the Union attempting to legitimize its international presence, role, policies and missions (Zielonka 2013, Majstorovic 2007). In so doing, EU often deploys appropriating strategies which transform negative events and attitudes into a more positive, trust building and mission perpetuating framework (Forchtner and Kolvraa 2012, Helmstrom 2009).

Unlike the self-legitimizing discourse of EU representatives, media tend to represent it critically as a site of power struggle, very often casting a negative image on the Union. The analysis of media representations of EU and the 2003 ICG summit (Oberhuber et al. 2005) reveals that EU is often portrayed as a meeting place of divergent and conflicting national interests, constructed using the topological metaphor of core-periphery, and the dichotomy of reality versus vision. Often the negative media portrayal leads to a negative perception and even rejection of the EU by its citizens². Just (2009) demonstrates how media representation of citizens as disengaged and dissatisfied with EU, and the representation of EU as unstable entity have triggered citizens' rejection of common EU identity. Often, EU is represented as threat to national identity, as Hardt Mautner's (1995) case study of the British *the Sun* shows how the paper, trying to explain and simplify the complexity of EU to the uninformed citizens, has constructed a highly reductionist discourse on EU denouncing it as a threat to national interests.

Research has shown that ideology has a major formative influence on the party discourses on EU (Conti 2007, Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002). The broad, more stable and lasting positions are opposed to what Conti (2007, 201) calls contingent party positions on EU. While the former are tied to ideology, the latter are pragmatic and instrumental positions dependent on the ongoing political circumstances. Such positions are not mutually exclusive as Kotic and Triandafyllidou (2004) study on Italian

2 The most dramatic rejection was undoubtedly the „Leave“ vote in the UK European Union membership referendum in 2016.

parties' representations of Europe, EU and the nation demonstrates. The authors' analysis of the party platforms evidences how the ideologically based conceptions of nation inform the parties' representations of EU. Unlike these broad positions, their representations of EU, NATO and the nation state as present in the parliamentary debates are contingent on the specific political dilemma the parties are confronted with, such as the NATO intervention in Kosovo and the war in Afghanistan. Based on these findings, the authors conclude that being conditioned by a wide set of factors (coalition politics, international obligations, and pragmatic assessment of the situation), such positions develop as a response to concrete problems rather than party's ideological foundations. Gaining electorate support is another factor that frames political discourses on EU. EU and especially the process of integration have been effectively used by politicians as an opportunistic strategy to target voters through the adaptation of pro or anti EU positions. (Lardech 2002, 397). Building on this idea, Vassallo's shows how the two French presidential candidates Nikola Sarkozy and Francois Holland have tried to win Eurosceptic voters by trying to capitalize on popular high level of Euroscepticism.

Based on this research, one may extrapolate that party manifestoes would be instantiations of the stable party positions, while everyday communication (parliamentary debates, press conferences, televised statements) would be more responsive to the on-going challenges. Manifestoes are conventionally believed to communicate party's fundamental, ideological positions (broad positions in Conti's terms), with the principle focus on salience issues and pledges, while negative campaigning was considered untypical of the genre (Dolezal et al. 2016). Moreover, while current research reveals many instances of the appropriation of the concept of EU and its strategic use to promote national interests, gain power and control, win political elections, very little attention has been paid to the manners in which parties' have appropriated the concept (or at least their understanding of it) in the inter-party conflict in order to legitimize their own position while delegitimizing the position of the other. In this respect this study will show that negative campaigning is not only present in the manifestoes of the Social Democrats but is also consistent with their everyday political discourse, both discourses being responsive to the on-going challenges. On the other hand, while there is some consistency between the discourse on EU commitment in VMRO's election manifestoes and their mediatized discourse, there is a more poignant EU criticism in the latter. Interestingly, both party's discourses vis-à-vis EU serve the same ends – to present oneself positively and to present the opponent negatively, and thus perpetuate the inter-party conflict built around the key theme – EU.

Polarization is the structuring principle of political discourse and ideology in general, and the overall strategies to create and perpetuate the “us and them” dichotomy typical of such discourses, are those of positive self-presentation and negative presentation of the other. The idea is well encapsulated in van Dijk’s concept of ideological square (van Dijk 1998a, 1998b, 2011) representing the four strategies by which groups and group members represent themselves and the others. The strategies include: emphasizing *our* good things, emphasizing *their* bad things, de-emphasizing *our* bad things, and de-emphasizing *their* good things. A similar model describing the linguistic means of positive self-presentation and negative presentation of the other, is proposed by Wodak in Reisigl (2001) who list five strategies, among which: nomination, predication, argumentation, perspectivisation and intensification/mitigation. Predication and argumentation bear special relevance to the present case. Predication strategies are used to label social actors positively or negatively, and can be realized in several ways, among which: as attributes in the form of adjectives, prepositional phrases, relative clauses, infinitive clauses, but also as predicates, predicative nouns, collocations, comparisons, similes, metaphors. In other words, these act as specific evaluative descriptions of the “good” and the “bad” things, the justification of which is accomplished by the use of argumentation strategies and a fund of *topoi*, which are defined in formal terms as highly conventionalized and obligatory parts of argumentation, that take the form of premises and act as warrants, justifying the transition from an argument or arguments to the conclusion (Kienpointner in Wodak et al. 1999, 34–5). Some *topoi* particularly useful in political discourse analysis include: comparisons, examples, generalization, external constraints, appeal to authority, threat, consequence, and other. Concomitant to strategies of argumentation are those of legitimisation and deligitimisation. Legitimation, Chilton explains, is a strategy oriented to the self, manifested in acts of self-praise (boasting about performance, but also about understanding) self-justification, self-identification as a source of authority, reason, vision and sanity (Chilton 2004, 47). In this respect, Chilton distinguishes two types of legitimisation, epistemic which has to do with “the speaker’s claim to have better knowledge, recognition of the ‘real’ facts” (2004, 117) and deontic where the speaker claims “to be not only ‘right’ in a cognitive sense, but ‘right’ in a moral sense” (ibid.). As a counterpart, delegitimation is the act in which “others (foreigners, ‘enemies within’, institutional opposition) are presented negatively through speech acts of blaming, accusing, and insulting (Chilton 2004, 47).

METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

Having this in mind the study will set out to analyze the strategies of positive self-presentation and the negative presentation of the other deployed by the two main Macedonian parties. The general framework through which the Social Democrats have deployed these strategies is by the construction of a shared political horizon with the EU populated by similar political ideas, values and vision. This move has enabled the Social democrats to present themselves positively through the acts of self-praise about having a better knowledge of the Union (recognition of the 'real' facts) but also to identify themselves as source of reason, vision and sanity. At the same time, they have presented the opponent negatively, blaming VMRO for being non-European and supporting the claim by constructing its actions in a sheer contrast to their own understanding of EU. Analyzing and discussing the strategy of self-praise built on better understanding of EU and the strategy of blaming the opponent for being non-EU are the two methodological procedures the analysis will seek to accomplish.

VMRO on the other hand, has continuously boasted about its performance and emphasized their commitment to the EU by referring to their successful involvement in the EU related processes of reforms, standards accomplishments and criteria fulfillment. However, differently that the Social Democrats, the incumbent party has not raised much criticism and/or negative campaigning against their political opponent. Instead, the negatively presented other is Greece and to a milder degree EU. Even so, this criticism and open attack is framed as a self-justification strategy that allows the party to further enhance their positive image. Thus, using Greece objection to Macedonian ascension to EU and EU's own enlargement inertia are only external constraints that augment the significance of the party's efforts in the EU ascension process. Showing how these two strategies (boasting about performance and criticizing to justify one's own efforts) is the key objective of the second part of the analysis.

DATA SELECTION

In order to exemplify and analyze the strategies used by the Social Democrats (self-praise and blame casting) and those deployed by VMRO (boasting about performance and self-justification through an external constraint) and thus demonstrate the instrumental use of EU discourses, I have collected and organized data in two corpuses: a) election programs, b) party officials' mediatized statements on EU found in interviews, columns, press conferences, and news reports on their official meetings with EU representatives. The statements were issued in the period between 2014 and 2016. The sources used to harvest data include the two parties' web

sites, (<http://www.sdsm.org.mk/> and <https://vmro-dpmne.org.mk/>) and b) the news aggregator www.time.mk.

From the party's web sites four election programs were selected for analysis, two from each party. While the 2014 and 2016 manifestoes by VMRO were easily retrieved from their site, the 2014 manifesto by SDs was neither accessible, nor present on the party's site. To fill in this gap, the previous manifesto, that from 2011 was considered in the analysis. The reasons underlying the selection of data follow the logic that parliamentary elections are a discursive occasion for the communication of at international policy pledges, including EU. As such they should communicate party's fundamental ideological positions (broad positions in Conti terms), hence expectedly consistent positions on EU, while mediatized statements are taken as expressions of contingent (operational/adaptive) positions and attitudes created in response to ongoing political challenges. However, the analysis will show that even manifestoes can be used to respond to ongoing political challenges.

From the same source (the party sites) I have also collected news articles, press releases and columns using "EU", "European Union", and "Europe" as key search words. The procedure revealed 52 such texts on the Social Democrat's site and 913 occurrences on VMRO's site. The first criteria applied to narrow down the later number to 75 texts (columns, interviews and press releases) was eliminating texts which did not include parties' representation of the Union or their relation to the Union, but reported on EU policies, practices, regulations and/or institutions. The same criteria of searching and narrowing down the number of analyzed text were applied to the news reports harvested from www.time.mk. Doing so, helped in reducing the initial number of more than 1200 texts down to workable 184 texts (39 with official statements issued by the Social Democrats leader, Mr. Zoran Zaev and 145 with statements issued by VMRO's leader and the acting PM, Mr. Nikola Gruevski). Thus, finally a sizable corpus of 316 texts was created.

There is an obvious misbalance between the amounts of data collected about the two parties. The first reason for such huge disproportion is that the Social Democrats published much less of the relevant texts daily (while the incumbent party regularly posted ten or more EU related texts in a day, the Social Democrats hardly had one or two, at times none). The second reason is that the news archive on the SD official site does not contain any data prior to February 2015 (especially interviews, columns, public announcements.). Moreover, the news aggregate in the time of VMRO's rule had offered biased, misbalanced quantity of information coming from the two parties, and often the links to the news sites and portals communicating news releases by the Social Democrats were non-functional. Such

misbalance implies both, discrepancy in power (with the incumbent party's control over media) but also discrepancy in intensity and quality of daily communication (with Social Democrats' inexplicable underuse of their own communication platform).

DATA ANALYSIS

SOCIAL DEMOCRATS

ELECTION PROGRAMS

Chapter 15 from the Social Democrats' 2011 election program is suggestively titled "EU story, our story" to create a shared political horizon with the EU, a horizon that is constituted by mutually common political ideals and values. Within this framework the Social Democrats manage to present themselves positively through a series of acts of self-praise about their rational and visionary understanding of EU. At the same time, the political opponent is presented as not fitting in the EU picture. The following selection illustrates the claims:

- (1) We were the first to say "The Sun is also a star (...). We created the first national strategy for European integration. The Government lead by the Social Democrats commenced the implementation of the Agreement on stabilization and association. The previous SDS Government brought Macedonia the status of "candidate member" (...) We have created the first multi-ethnic coalition, which proves even now to be the best guarantee for security and stability in the country" (SDSM 2011, 172–182).

It is obvious that the party likes to present itself in a pioneering manner, as a first political actor to have voiced certain ideas (the sun in the clause "the sun is also a star" refers to the sun on the Macedonian national flag, while the star metonymically refers to the EU flag, thus the clause implies Macedonian close relation to, even belonging in EU), or have undertaken pioneering actions such as establishing the first strategy, achieving the status of a candidate member and establishing the first inter-ethnic coalition. The self-praise of the Social Democrats' political reasoning and responsibility when creating the first interethnic coalition epistemically legitimizes their capacity and knowledge to accomplish the end of inter-ethnic stability. Moreover, it is exactly around the same issue of inter-ethnic coalition that the text of the manifesto constructs the party's ideological proximity to EU and its criticism of the opponent.

- (2) The Government openly advocates ethno-centrism (...) Ethno-centrism is a cancer to democracy. Europe knows this, we know this. One does not enter EU without stable inter-ethnic relations (...) The citizens live in fear, families are divided upon party lines, and neighbors are ethnically divided. (...) This cannot be seen anywhere,

least in the EU. (...) In the EU there is no space for fear and intimidation ...we all know this, EU knows this (ibid.).

The selection first accuses the VMRO-led government, then in power, of behavior predicated negatively as undesirable and destructive using the metaphor “cancer”, which is juxtaposed to the value of democracy only to create a shared political horizon between SDs and EU as rational political actors who equally recognize this deviant behavior of the Government. Furthermore, life in Macedonia is presented in negative terms like fear, intimidation, ethnic segregation, all pinned upon the VMRO-led Government and used as criticism of the opponent but also as an additional confirmation of the shared political vision between EU and SD who are both aware (are again rational actors) that such behavior is not present in EU.

While the self-praise in the 2011 SDS manifesto is built upon party's former track record and its more knowledgeable understanding of the political values of EU; such as political stability, inter-ethnic tolerance and cohabitation, the 2016 manifesto produced in the turbulent time of political crisis, also time of continuous communication with the EU representatives involved in the crisis resolution, has more relied on pledges in order to present the party as determined, reasonable actor whose future actions are created in accordance to EU, hence the repetitive use of structures like ‘in accordance with EU recommendations’, ‘by following the example of EU member states’, and ‘according to EU acquis,/he model applied in EU (Social Democratic Union 2016). While instances of acts of self-praise about former track record are present in the 2016 manifesto, the simultaneous construction of political commitment and obedience to EU and accusations of the opponent both crafted through election pledges is a novel discursive move. As can be seen in the next selection:

- (3) The phone conversation surveillance as a key element in the work of ASCI (Administration for Security and Counter-Intelligence), that was controlled by the party, was abused for political and economic interests. According to EU recommendations, we will abolish ASCI direct access to the technical equipment for phone surveillance... we will approach the reorganization of these bodies following the examples from the EU member states... (2016, 40)

The selection opens with an accusation of VMRO, here referred to as “the party” and its abuse of the national intelligence body (ASCI) to create a pretext for a positive presentation of the Social Democrats made by the pledge of introducing reforms in the corrupted system, and enhanced by highlighting that the reforms are not just of any kind, but those that have already been adopted and applied in the EU. Thus, the Social Democrats do not only construct an image of themselves as reformers but also show commitment to the Union as a role model, a blueprint in the implemen-

tation of the reforms. The next selection demonstrates a more explicit criticism (accusation) of the political opponent raised on the grounds of its lack of capacity and knowledge to manage EU funds, and even lack of understanding of the EU integration process.

(4) VMRO Government gained 87.5 billion euros from the 2007–2013 IPARD program but used only 4. (...) From a current perspective this Government has clearly neither the capacity nor the knowledge to fulfil this priority, which is partly due to not understanding the essence of euro integration. (...) VMRO DPMNE has spent the state budget in a non-transparent manner (...) VMRO DPMNE has turned the Parliament into a voiceless letter (...) turned the courts in party courts (2016, 175).

The selection demonstrates the two types of delegitimization defined by Chilton (2005), an epistemological one based on a lack of knowledge “not having the capacity or the knowledge to fulfil this priority³, but also a deontic one based on a claim that the opponent’s action is immoral (spend money lavishly, abused the parliament and the courts). Although the self-praise and the accusation of the VMRO government found in the SD party manifestoes are also structuring principles of the SD mediatized discourse, the two have been slightly reframed as to accommodate the ongoing events and challenges.

MEDIATIZED DISCOURSE

In the two long years (2015–2016) of the escalating political crisis, the SD party leader Mr. Zaev held series of meetings with EU representatives. In response to the ongoing political crisis and the events that came as a result (protests, negotiations with the incumbent party about premature elections, EU reports and involvement) the Social Democrats have often conflated the strategies of explicit self-praise, blame of the opponent and the perpetuation of the shared space with the EU. Commenting upon the May 17th, 2015 mass protests, president Zaev has stated:

(5) What we did together with the citizens on May 17th, what we continue to do, EU has acknowledged. Inter-ethnic differences were more than visible. Citizen aspects, intellectual values were all a strong message. All different, in their political orientation (...) The Roma and the LGBT were also present. (Zaev, 2015)

What the party leader implies is not only a successful voicing of people’s dissatisfaction on a mass protests, one that is also recognized as eligible/credible by the EU, but also that their action is a metonym of the cohesive force that they have generated in the society.

3 Refers to the use of the IPRAD funds.

Criticism of the VMRO led government variably occurs in implicit and explicit forms. The latter is especially used in SD criticism of the opponent's reluctance to participate in the democratization processes though the act of organizing premature elections.

(6) In Macedonia there are no conditions for fair elections on April 24th, what we have said was confirmed by EU and USA. The voter's registry is not updated, and reforms in media are not undertaken. (...) Yesterday, Nikola Gruevski escaped to face the truth, he made the elation on April 24th impossible. (...) Macedonia needs elections as soon as possible, without phantom voters, [elections] on which citizens will decide not the mafia. (Bashurovski, 2016).

The shared political horizon is, again, enhanced here by referring to EU and US confirmation of the original Social Democrats' diagnosis of the election conditions in the country. In addition, an implied criticism is raised by referring to non-updated registry and non-undertaken reforms, obligations that were expected to be undertaken by the Government, and direct accusation is made towards the Prime Minister Gruevski whose government is additionally blamed for organizing irregular (phantom voters and mafia) elections.

Unlike party president's discourse often constructed in the immediate presence of EU representatives, and therefore focused on presenting oneself as politically likeminded actor, the party discourse as manifested in the party's press releases, conferences, open lectures and debates is more focused on criticism. The focal point of the negative effects of government's policies are: worst health care system in Europe, highest prices of gas in Europe, unlawful employment based on party membership, and incapacity to use European funds. The last is a part of the fully-fledged criticism constructed by Lidija Dimova (2016), the Social Democrats' president of the commission for EU issues. For Dimova, the reasons underlying Governments' malpractice and misunderstanding of EU are: a) the treatment of EU as foreign policy, b) turning EU integration into a process of the privileged, c) failure to make full use of EU funds, and d) very little investment in EU integration. All considered, the representations of EU by the Social Democrats seem to serve several functions and objectives. By creating shared political perspective with EU, and presenting itself positively as a knowledgeable political actor, the party is promoting itself as responsible, pro-European, party. The party uses EU and its expert discourses to criticize and delegitimize the opponent. Finally, the variation in the discourse between the president on the one side, and the party's election programs and everyday communication with domestic audience on the other, is logically conditioned by the occasion and the addressees. The EU representatives need to hear more about the "European-ness" of

the party as to continue their support, while the audience needs to know more about the ill-doings of the opponents as to vote them out of office.

VMRO ELECTION PROGRAMS

In the 2014 election manifesto, VMRO DPMNE has expectedly relied on its eight-year rule that has enabled them involvement in the EU ascension processes. The text of the manifesto relies on this involvement to create a positive image of the party, one that highlights the party's commitment to the processes. As stated in the manifesto:

(7) VMRO DPMNE remains committed to European integration and will continue with the implementation of essential reforms and the implementation of the values and criteria which will bring us closer to the desired goal. Continued implementation of the Copenhagen criteria remains our firm determination on the road towards EU membership where we naturally belong. We shall continue the preparations for Macedonian future membership in EU by further accomplishment of the activities related to the reforms in the judiciary system, the modernization of administration, the fight against corruption (...) we remain being focused on the adaption of EU legislative, and its implementation (2014, 252).

While the expression of commitment to EU requirements, criteria, and legislation is obvious, what is also noticeable in the selection is the repetitive use of the expression "continue" as well as "remain". These expressions existentially presuppose the object they modify (implementation of reforms and criteria, preparations, adoption of legislative) while at the same time adding a progressive; still on going, aspect of the process. This allows the party to create a positive image of itself by referring to their past achievements (boasting about performance) while at the same time expressing commitment to the continuation of the processes. The strategy of creating a positive image by reference to track record is expected considering VMRO's status as an incumbent party and hence being in advantage to participate in the EU ascension processes.

VMRO's negative campaigning compared to that of SD, who unambiguously accuse VMRO of being incompetent and immoral political actor, is focused on the Republic of Greece. The trigger for the continuous accusation of Greece and its depiction as a constraint to the Macedonian integration in both EU and NATO, is the Greek veto on the Macedonian ascension to NATO at the Bucharest summit in 2008 and the continuous veto on Macedonian membership in the EU. However, this line of criticism is only a means to a different end, and that is to justify the limited success of the VMRO led government in the ascension processes and even to emphasize

their political will and efforts against this obstacle. The following selection exemplifies the assumptions made:

- (8) Republic of Macedonia fulfilled all essential standards for NATO membership. Membership is made impossible only because of the objections (...) raised by Greece. (...) As a country that respects the international law, Macedonia filed a complaint against Greece at the International Court of Justice in Hague (...) reached a verdict in December 2011 that our southern neighbor has broken its internationally acknowledged obligations (...). This made clear that international law is unambiguously on Macedonian side regarding the unjust fully imposed bilateral dispute that is abused to unlawfully hinder the EU and NATO integration processes. VMRO DPMNE is ready to continue the political dialogue. (2014, 252)

Although the text opens with a self-praise regarding the accomplishment of all criteria necessary for NATO membership, both the self-justifying narrative and the external constraint are the same. On one hand, Macedonia; led by VMRO Government, is not only a committed political actor (fulfilling all criteria) but is also respectful of international laws and procedures. On the other hand, Greece is the obstacle towards Macedonian ascension to EU and NATO, and an actor who is disrespectful of the international law and who deliberately imposes a political problem and abuses it for its own (irrational and unacceptable) purposes. The accusations do not only justify the limited scope and power for VMRO to act and do more, but also enhance their 'Samaritan' efforts because, even despite these obstacles, the party is a mature political actor who is ready to continue the dialogue. The same strategies of boasting about performance and commitment, and accusation of Greece and its framing as a devise to justify limited success are present in the 2016 manifesto.

- (9) In the period up to now we have shown and proven that we can make progress even with the blockage by our southern neighbor and that we can continuously come near the euro Atlantic standards (...) Albeit these imposed obstacles, VMRO DPMNE remains strongly committed to the process of integration in the family to which it belongs politically, culturally and economically. (...) the huge number of measures and reforms undertaken in the past have prepared the state for a full membership in these institutions. In the future mandate as well, VMRO-DPMNE will remain committed to its European principles and values and to the reform agenda (2016, 294)

The text opens by a self-praise that refers to the party's recognized ("shown" and "proven") capacity to make progress albeit obstacle – the blockage by Greece. The second sentence then builds upon this juxtaposi-

tion to dramatize VMRO's determination (strongly commented) to succeed in the process, an assumption which once again is supported by boastful previous performance – huge number of measures that have prepared the state for membership. It then ends with the pledge of continuing the progress already at play.

MEDIATIZED DISCOURSE

One of the many converging points between the election manifestoes and the everyday mediatised discourse of the party's high representatives is the way they continue to exploit the same self-boasting language which expresses enthusiastic commitment to the processes, and a successful involvement in the implementation of reforms, adoption of criteria and other institutional transformations necessary for EU full membership. Upon receiving the EC report from the Euro ambassador Aivo Orala, then Prime Minister Gruevski stated:

- (10) We continue on the road to euro integration by making maximum efforts for the accomplishment of this strategic goal (...) the reforms will continue with a greater dynamic until Macedonia becomes a full EU member (Gruevski, 2014).

As already pointed, "continue" seems to be one of the mostly used predicates in the party's discourses, conveniently deployed throughout, not only to create an on-going progression of political processes but to also enable the party to present itself positively against such image of never ceasing engagement that is highlighted here by the positive attribution of the VMRO's involvement with the use of the clause "making maximum efforts" and the phrase "great dynamics. The positive image once again is enhanced by the representation of VMRO as an incumbent party which faces grave challenges but remains committed to the goal of EU membership. In a similar fashion as in the election manifestoes, then Prime Minister Gruevski has on many occasions pointed to the political dispute with Greece to both make a sympathetic image of the state and a positive image of the party.

- (11) The veto for our long deserved place in EU and NATO was one of our big challenges (...) however we are not giving up (...) Macedonia continues to gain positive reports from EU with recommendations about the start of the negotiations, which unfortunately due to the objections by the southern neighbor have not started yet, (...) all our efforts (...) have ended with the answer that the Greek Government due to domestic problems is not in a position to make a compromise on this issue (...). It is frustrating to talk about this question that contains great injustice to us. Nonethe-

less we are not giving up, we will continue to fight (...) and prove the radical and nationalist position of Greece (Gruevski, 2015a).

The selection skillfully conflates accusations of Greece, presented as a key obstacle and a challenge to EU ascension, while framing the Greece domestic crisis as an additional challenge, and even overtly pinning on Greece negative attributes such as nationalism and radicalism. The imagery so created seems to work well, because it creates an image of Macedonia as a victim, but more importantly, it allows the party to stress their determination and intention to achieve their highest international goal, and once again to justify their efforts in the face of the external threat. Although Greece remains to be the key subject of VMRO's negative othering, the development of the political crisis and EU involvement in the resolution which necessitated urgent changes in many sectors, such as media, judiciary system, election procedures, but changes that would mean the withering of VMRO's access to institutional means of power and control, the party has more often than before issued both covert and overt criticism of the Union. Addressing a party convention, Gruevski warned:

- (12) Now more than ever, the allegations for recommendation withdrawal are the loudest. I hope that those in charge are aware that after such decision things will go the wrong way. (...) The accusations after (...) will only be the beginning of a new uncertainty (...) will stimulate hatred and anger (...) (Gruevski, 2015b).

Although Gruevski neither specifically refers to the Union nor does he unambiguously accuse and/or criticize it, the warning he issues is clearly addressed to the European Commission by his suggestion that the EC has a mandate to issue or withdraw recommendations. The force of this act of warning is built by a series of negative outcomes of the possible recommendation withdrawal such as uncertainty, hatred, anger. Given the timing of the statement in October 2015, when the state was engulfed in an ongoing political crisis, it is not surprising that Gruevski's discourse turned into criticism of the EU, partly to defocus the audience from domestic problems, and partly to take responsibility for the crisis away from the party. Unlike the party programs focused on the procedural account of EU as strategic end hindered by Greece irrational policy, the representations of EU in the party president's discourse are more aptly responsive to the ongoing challenges (political crisis) and implicitly critical of EU. Because of his position as the county's prime minister at that moment, his criticism is more implied and covert rather than open and harsh. Instances of harsher criticism of EU can be found in the discourses of other party members, one of whom is Ilija Dimovski. In a column published on the party's site Mr. Dimovski wrote:

- (13) Macedonia's democracy shouldn't consent to be blindly submissive and uncritical of certain processes in the Union. Can anyone be silent and not express disagreement with the unprincipled politics of EU regarding our non-integration in it (...) should one not discuss the unequal treatment of the Union towards the northern states as compared to its southern states (...) Finally, should we be silent and not mention that today in the 21. century, inside the best international organization ever seen on the European continent, there are minorities that are not allowed to express their national identity and have no right to use their mother tongue (Dimovski 2016).

Although Dimovski tries to mitigate his criticism by predicating the European Union with the phrase "the best international organization", the number and the nature of the critical issues raised (unprincipled politics, unequal treatment, disregard for discriminated minorities) overshadow the mitigation move used. What he additionally manages to accomplish is to anonymize the source of the criticism, to skillfully hide the fact that the criticism comes from the party itself. Instead, the source of such criticism is either a non-human agent such as the democracy in Macedonia or (any)one who sympathizes with the country by recognizing and sharing the feeling of injustice done to Macedonia.

Different that Mr. Dimovski and in a similar manner to Prime Minister Gruevski, the country's president Mr. Ivanov relies on the same argumentative strategy, using the topos of negative consequences, to criticize the EU enlargement inertia and the lack of initiative and/or help. The core of the President's criticism of the EU are the consequences the country suffers from the postponing of the enlargement. As he stated:

- (14) "The status quo (...) demotivates and causes frustrations in Macedonian society. It creates instability in political life and tension in inter-ethnic relations. (...) stagnation in the integration has caused a political crisis, which in turn caused security crisis. (...) Unless EU does not help us remove the obstacle to integration, it will be directly responsible for worsening the circumstances in Macedonia and the region (...) (Ivanov 2015).

While Mr. Gruevski's covert critique of EU refers to the alleged withdrawal of the country's recommendation for EU membership by the EC, president's Ivanov creates a negative image of the Union for not being active and involved, but being stagnant and thus responsible for the status quo, and enhances this negative image by pointing to a series of negative consequences (instability, tension, crisis) that such inertia will likely cause. Moreover, by blaming EU as not helpful he tries to legitimize his assumption that such a passive disinterested behavior by the EU will directly

contribute to the escalation of a series of problems. The peak of the president's criticism came in an interview for the German Bild magazine:

- (15) What would you do if your country had all the routes closed for 25 years, and has been manipulated and lied to? Despite numerous positive reports there is no progress in the EU perspective what so ever, for 25 years we are stuck in an elevator (...) we have become collectionners. We have 17 action plans for NATO membership (...) and yet we are standing in a single spot. Why? Because we had the fate to have a neighbor with whom neither EU nor the whole world can deal with. Its name is Greece (Ivanov 2016).

The text is structured through a series of rhetorical questions which seek empathy ("what would you do?") for the situation Macedonia is found in (destitute, stuck, not moving, manipulated and lied to). Although it is not explicitly clear who may be the source of manipulation and lies, Macedonia has clearly invested serious efforts which have been recognized (positive reports, action plans) and that the main reason for this impasse is Greece represented negatively as an irrational actor that no one in the world can make any reasonable political agreement.

CONCLUSION

The instrumentally produced representations of EU are present throughout the party discourses of both major Macedonian parties. The election programs of the Social Democrats create a shared political space between EU and the party, populated by the party's self-praise for being a responsible and knowledgeable political actor, one who understands EU better than the opponent who is criticized for deviant not-EU-like, non-democratic behavior (spread of fear and ethnocentrism) and for not being capable (lacks knowledge) to lead the process of Euro-integration. Self-praise and accusation of the opponent are also present in the party's mediated discourse. However, the focal points of the mediated discourse differ from the manifestos. While being knowledgeable about EU values such as inter-ethnic relations is one of the building blocks of SD strategy of positive representation in the manifestoes, doing it through an act of mass protests, that embody this value, is a way the Social Democrats have used the current circumstances and appropriated them as a tool in the general strategy of positive representation. Although the protests *per se* had no immediate relation to EU, the mere reference to EU's recognition and acknowledgement implied acceptance, support and shared ideology with EU. On the other hand, while the manifestoes accuse the political opponent as UnEuropean in language and actions (incapable, immoral) the everyday discourse of the Social Democrats has reframed the on-going negotiations about early elections into a full-fledged criticism of VMRO

for undermining the political negotiations on early elections (conducted under the auspices of EU) and thus, for showing no will to contribute to the success of the early elections and for disrespect towards the Union.

VMRO-DPMNE on the other hand, constructed a highly procedural account of the EU framed around the topics of ends, reforms, procedures and implementation. The party's involvement in these processes allowed it to create a self-praising discourse built around the key notions of commitment and determination to continue the success already achieved. However, EU membership was not achieved during the VMRO rule. The circumstance was skillfully adapted in the party discourse to justify the limited success. To do so, the party continuously used the topos of external constraints – EU and Greece. Using the Greek veto on Macedonian accession to the EU and NATO is a pervasive element of VMRO' discourse of negative othering which is instrumentally used to make the limited success more acceptable. It is presented as accomplished in very challenging circumstances with a purpose of highlighting the party's commitment, and thus enhancing the positive image. In contrast, VMRO's criticism of EU is a consequence of the emerging political crisis in Macedonia in 2015, which required EU involvement in the negotiations among the two main parties and in designing solutions. The results of the negotiations were going to entail reforms in the courts, media, police that were leading to VMRO's loss of control over these institutions and a gradual loss of the total control of society. These developments were most probably the reason why EU criticism started to appear throughout the party's mediatized discourse. However, this criticism was not always overt. The party's high officials like then Prime Minister Gruevski, president Ivanov, MP Dimovski all raise criticism based on EU's enlargement fatigue and the lack of support for Macedonia in the dispute with Greece, but none of them makes an unambiguous, direct accusation. Instead, the EU is either implied or the criticism mitigated. Be it as it may, it seems that the criticism is only a stage to once again enhance the party's positive image created by the repetitive references to its efforts and success in the light of the existent obstacles, EU's inertia and Greece's irrationality.

All this instrumental use of EU as a tool of self-praise, self-justification and criticism conform to Delanty's observation (2002, 4) that Europe, EU is no exception, is a mobilizing political instrument, one whose interpretative power is used as a building block in the confrontation between the two largest political parties in Macedonia. The Social Democrats, in a pursuit of political change, constructed a critical discourse of their political opponent using EU representations that best responded to the on-going political needs and circumstances. And VMRO-DPMNE in their bid to maintain power produced highly procedural account of EU, centered around party's

own political responsibility and achievements, but unlike the Social Democrats, succeeded to articulate a seemingly critical discourse of the EU carefully dispersed among the party's statements and documents. EU, finally, seems stranded in between two political agendas, used as indispensable tool of political confrontation.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Af Malmberg M. and Bo Strath. 2002. "Introduction: The national meanings of Europe." In: Af Malmberg M and Strath B (eds) *The Meaning of Europe: Variety and Contention within and among Nations*. Berg.
- Bruter, Michael. 2005. *Citizens of Europe? The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Chilton, Paul. 2004. *Analyzing Political Discourse: Theory and Practice*. Routledge.
- Conti, Nicolo. 2007. "Domestic parties and European integration: The problem of party attitudes to the EU, and the europeanisation of parties". *European Political Science* 6 (2):192–207.
- Cowles, Maria, G. James Caporaso, and Thomas Risse T (eds.). 2001. *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change*. Cornell University Press.
- Delanty, Gerard. 1995. *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality*. Martin's Press.
- Diez, Thomas. 2001. "Europe as a discursive battleground: discourse analysis and European integration studies." *Cooperation and Conflict* 36 (1): 5–38.
- Dolezal Martin, Laurenz Ennser-Jedenastik, Wolfgang C. Muller C, Katrin Praprotnik, and Anna Katarina Winkler. 2016 "Beyond salience and position taking: How political parties communicate through their manifestos." *Party Politics* 1–13
- Fortchner, Bernhard, and Christoffer Kølvrå. 2012. "Narrating a 'new Europe': From 'bitter past' to self-righteousness?" *Discourse & Society* 23 (4): 377–400.
- Hardt – Mautner, Gerlinde. 1995. "How does one become a good European? : The British press and European integration". *Discourse & Society* 6 (2): 177–205.
- Hellstrom, Aanders .2009. "Teaching Europeans how to be Europeans". *Journal of Language and Politics* 8 (2): 167–194.
- Hooghe, Liesbet, Gary Marks, and Carole Wilson C. 2002. "Does left/right structure party positions on European integration?". *Comparative Political Studies* 35 (8) : 965–989.
- Just, Sine, N .2009. "No place like home? The role of the media in the framing of Europe". *Journal of Language and Politics* 8 (2): 244–268.
- Kosic, Ankica, and Anna Triandafyllidou. 2004. "Representations of the European Union and the nation(-state) in Italian party discourse: A critical analysis of

- electoral platforms and parliamentary debates". *Journal of Language and Politics* 3 (1): 53–80.
- Krzyzanowski, Michal .2010. *The Discursive Construction of European Identities: A Multi-Level Approach to Discourse and Identity in the Transforming European Union*. Peter Lang.
- Lardech, Robert. 2002. "Europeanization and political parties: Towards a Framework for Analysis". *Party Politics* 8 (4): 389–403.
- Majstorovic, Daniela. 2007. "Construction of Europeanization in the High Representatives discourse in Bosnia and Herzegovina." *Discourse & Society* 18 (5): 627–651.
- Oberhuber Florian, Christoph, Bärenreuter, Michal, Krzyzanowski, Heinz Schönbauer, and Ruth Wodak. 2005. "Debating the European Constitution: On representations of Europe/the EU in the press". *Journal of Language and Politics* 4 (2): 227–271.
- Pagden Anthony. 2002. "Europe: conceptualizing a continent". In: Pagden (ed) *The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to European Union*. Cambridge University Press, 33–54.
- Reisigl, Martin, and Ruth Wodak .2001. *Discourse and Discrimination: Rhetorics of Racism and Antisemitism*. Routledge.
- Strath, Bo. 2002. "A European identity: to the historical limits of a concept". *European Journal of Social Theory* 5 (4): 387–401.
- Van Dijk, Teun, A. 1998a. "Opinions and ideologies in the press". In Garrett, Peter, and Allan Bell. (eds) *Approaches to Media Discourse*. Blackwell. 21–63.
- Van Dijk, Teun, A. 1998b. *Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach*. Sage.
- Van Dijk, Teun, A. 2011. "Discourse and ideology" In Van Dijk, Teun, A. (ed) *Discourse Studies. A Multidisciplinary Introduction*. Sage, 379–407.
- Vassallo, Frabcesca. 2012. "The EU discourse in the 2012 French presidential election". *French Politics, Culture & Society* 30 (3): 79–95.
- Wodak, Ruth, Rudolf de Cillia, Martin Reisigl, and Karin Liebhart. 2009. *The Discursive Construction of National Identity*. Edinburgh University Press.
- Zielonka, Jan. 2013. "Europe's new civilizing missions: the EU's normative power discourse." *Journal of Political Ideologies* 18 (1): 35–55.

WEBPAGES AND MEDIA

- Bashurovski, Stevo. 2016. Заев за оценката на ЕУ и САД [Zaev on EU and US evaluation], February 22, 2016. Available at <http://tera.mk/zaev-za-otsenkata-na-eu-i-sad>. (accessed November 26, 2018)

- Dimova, Lidija. 2016. Европските пари не се кредити, мислете на граѓаните и искористете ги европските фондови [European money is not credit, think of the citizens and use the European funds], an address to the Parliament. Available at <http://www.sds.org.mk/News.aspx?idNews=930&lng=1> (accessed September 2, 2018).
- Dimovski, Ilija. 2016. Европа е повеќе од ЕУ [Europe is more than EU]. Available at <https://vmro-dpmne.org.mk/node/5253> (accessed September 2, 2018).
- Gruevski, Nikola. 2014. Препораката е потврда дека Македонија е подготвена за преговори со ЕУ [The recommendation is a confirmation that Macedonia is prepared for the negotiation with EU]. *Makfax*, 8 October. Available at: <http://makfax.com.mk/makedonija/nadvoresna-politika/gruevski-preporakata-e-potvrda-deka-makedonija-e-podgotvena-za-pregovori-so-eu/> (accessed September 2, 2018).
- Gruevski, Nikola. 2015a. Влез во НАТО и ЕУ останува наша стратешка цел. [Gruevski: entering NATO and EU remains our strategic goal], *Kanal 5*, May 2, 2015. Available at: http://kanal5.com.mk/vesti_detail.asp?ID=68210 (accessed 28 October 2018)
- Gruevski, Nikola. 2015b. Македонија не заслужува одземање на препораката за преговори за членство во ЕУ [Macedonia does not deserve withdrawal of recommendation for membership negotiation for EU] *Press 24*. 23 October. <http://www.press24.mk/gruevski-makedonija-ne-zasluzhuva-odzemanje-na-preporakata-za-pregovori-za-chlenstvo-vo-eu> (accessed September 2, 2018).
- Ivanov, Gjorgje. 2015. На регионот му е потребна недолжна интеграција во ЕУ и НАТО [The region needs an urgent integration in EU and NATO]. *Netpress*, June 8, 2015. Available at: <http://netpress.com.mk/ivanov-na-regionot-mu-e-potrebna-neodlozhna-integracija-vo-eu-i-nato/> (accessed November 26, 2018).
- Ivanov, Gjorgje. 2016. Иванов за „Билд“: 25 години ЕУ не лаже и манипулира! [Ivanov for “Der Bild”: For 25 years EU has lied and manipulated us!] Available at: http://www.dw.com/mk/%D0%B8%D0%B2%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B2-%D0%B7%D0%B0-%D0%B1%D0%B8%D0%BB%D0%B4-25-%D0%B3%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8-%D0%B5%D1%83-%D0%BD%D1%90-%D0%BB%D0%B0%D0%B6%D0%B5-%D0%B8-%D0%BC%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%BF%D1%83%D0%BB%D0%B8%D1%80%D0%B0/a-19110467?maca=maz-rss-maz-pol_makedonija_timemk-4727-xml-mrss (accessed September 2, 2018).
- Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (2011) Имаме решенија [We have solutions], election program. Available at: http://arhiva.sds.org.mk/upload/PROGRAMA_PDF_Web.pdf (accessed September 2, 2018).
- Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (2016) План за живот во Македонија [Plan for a life in Macedonia], election program. Available at: <http://zazivot.mk/plan/> (accessed September 2018).

VMRO DPMNE. 2014. Проверено [Checked], election program. Available at: <https://vmro-dpmne.org.mk/node/2758> (accessed September 2, 2018).

VMRO DPMNE (2016a) Реално [Real], election program. Available at: <https://vmro-dpmne.org.mk/> (accessed September 2, 2018).

Zaev, Zoran. 2015. Има политичарот да игра пред новинарот, а не новинарот да се плаши од политичарот! [It will be the politician dancing in front of the journalist, and not the journalist to be afraid of the politician]. MKD. 25 May. Available at <http://www.mkd.mk/makedonija/politika/zaev-ima-politicharot-da-igra-pred-novinarot-a-ne-novinarot-da-se-plashi-od>. (accessed November 26, 2018)

SAŽETAK

“MI”, “ONI” I EU

POLITIZACIJA SLIKE O EUROPSKOJ UNIJI U MAKEDONIJI

Europska unija je diskurzivno polje u kojem se konstruiraju, osporavaju i dogovaraju višestruka značenja. Istraživanja su pokazala da Europska unija posjeduje interpretativnu moć koja se često koristi za politička sukobljavanja. Takav je slučaj, pokazuje to ova studija, i s dvije najveće makedonske stranke Socijaldemokratske i VMRO-DPMNE – koje su u nastojanju da osvoje, odnosno zadrže vlast, proizvodile EU diskurse u skladu sa svojim političkim agenda-ma. U situaciji produžene političke krize, s velikim uplivom Europske unije, dvije su strane pretvorile svoj EU diskurs u instrument pozitivnog predstavljanja sebe i negativnog predstavljanja političkog protivnika. Cilj ove studije je analizirati specifične diskursivne strategije u programima i priopćenjima dviju stranaka i njihovih lidera.

KLJUČNE RIJEČI: Makedonija, Europska unija, stranački programi, EU diskurs, negativna kampanja