Individual Intentionality vs. Collective Intentionality

A Study of Wittgensteinian and Searlean Perspectives

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Summary

This paper explores the concept of intentionality from both the individual and collective perspectives, focusing on the arguments presented by Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle. Intentionality, the capacity of the mind to represent objects and states of affairs, is a fundamental concept in philosophy of mind. Wittgenstein's later works provide a basis for understanding how language and social practices shape intentionality, while Searle's contributions, particularly in his theory of collective intentionality, extend these ideas to social and institutional contexts. Through a comparative analysis, this paper aims to highlight the distinctions and intersections between individual and collective intentionality, offering insights into the broader implications for philosophy, cognitive science, and social theory. This comparative study seeks to deepen our understanding of the interplay between personal intentionality and collective intentionality, with implications for broader discussions on social ontology, language, and the philosophy of mind. A central issue is understanding how individual intentional states translate into collective intentionality, particularly the mechanisms that connect personal intentions with shared social realities. Another critical problem involves the role of language in shaping intentionality, exploring how Wittgenstein's ideas of language games and forms of life compare to Searle's concept of collective intentionality in the formation of shared meanings. Additionally, the study addresses the challenges of distinguishing collective intentionality from individual intentionality,

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especially in cases where individual intentions conflict with collective outcomes. A further problem is the ontological status of collective intentionality, questioning whether it can be reduced to individual intentionality or if it holds an independent existence. The study considers the broader implications for social ontology, examining how Wittgenstein and Searle's differing views influence our understanding of social institutions, norms, and collective practices.

Keywords: *intentionality; collectivity; facts; institutions; objectivity*

Introduction

Intentionality, as the directedness of the mind towards objects, events, or states of affairs, has been a central topic in the philosophy of mind since its inception by Brentano. The debate often revolves around whether intentional states are fundamentally individual or if they can be inherently collective. Wittgenstein and Searle are two pivotal figures in this discourse. Wittgenstein, primarily in his later works such as *Philosophical Investigations*, shifts the focus from individual mental states to language games and social practices. Searle, on the other hand, develops a comprehensive theory of collective intentionality, emphasizing how individuals can share intentional states, thus forming the basis of social reality. This paper examines their respective positions, analyzing the philosophical foundations and implications of individual versus collective intentionality.

The study of intentionality, our capacity to represent objects and states of affairs in the world has been a pivotal topic in the philosophy of mind and language. Two significant contributors to this discourse are Wittgenstein and Searle, who offer distinct perspectives on the nature of intentionality. This paper delves into their arguments, contrasting individual intentionality with collective intentionality. Wittgenstein, primarily in his later work *Philosophical Investigations*, argues for a view of language and meaning that emphasizes the communal and social aspects of our linguistic practices. He challenges the idea of a private language and suggests that meaning is rooted in public forms of life and shared human activities. For Wittgenstein, intentionality is deeply intertwined with the collective practices of language users.

Searle, on the other hand, while acknowledging the social dimension of language, provides a robust framework for understanding collective intentionality distinct from individual intentionality. In works such as *The Construction of Social Reality* and *Making the Social World*, Searle explores how individuals can share intentions and create social facts through collective intentionality, which is essential for understanding social institutions and structures. This paper aims to explore and compare Wittgenstein's and Searle's views on individual and collective intentionality, highlighting their contributions to our understanding of how humans engage with the world both individually and as part of a group. Through this comparative study, we will gain a deeper appreciation of the complexities and nuances in the philosophy of intentionality, and how these thinkers address

the interplay between the individual and the collective in the formation of meaning and social reality.

Philosophers, such as Brentano (1995), initially defined intentionality as the hallmark of the mental, but later thinkers expanded its scope to include the collective domain. Wittgenstein, in his later philosophy, challenged traditional views of intentionality by rooting it in linguistic and social practices. In *Philosophical Investigations* (1953), he contended that meaning and intentionality arise not in isolation but within shared forms of life (§23). For Wittgenstein, the public nature of language enables collective understanding, rendering the notion of purely private intentionality suspect (§243). Other thinkers contribute further dimensions to this debate. Heidegger's existential analysis in *Being and Time* (1996) situates intentionality within the context of being–with (*Mitsein*), highlighting the ontological interconnectedness of individuals in shared worlds (p. 118). Similarly, Husserl's phenomenology emphasizes the intersubjective basis of intentionality, suggesting that collective meaning arises from a "we–subjectivity" that transcends individual minds (Husserl,1970, p.175).

1. Wittgenstein's Approach to Intentionality

Wittgenstein's Picture Theory of Language, as outlined in his early work *Tractatus Logico–Philosophicus* (1922), proposes that sentences function as pictures of facts. Words correspond to objects, and the logical structure of sentences mirrors the structure of reality. This theory suggests that language can represent the world by depicting states of affairs, where the truth or falsity of a proposition depends on its accuracy in reflecting reality (Wittgenstein, 1922, 14). Intentionality, or the mind's capacity to direct itself toward objects, is understood here as the ability of propositions to form a picture of reality. However, critics have noted the limitations of this theory in addressing the complexities of natural language, such as context and ambiguity (Frege, 1956, 78; Kripke, 1982, 110).

Wittgenstein's views on meaning evolved significantly over time. In his early work, he saw meaning as tied to reference — the idea that words correspond to objects, and sentences represent states of affairs. However, in his later work, especially in *Philosophical Investigations* (1953), Wittgenstein abandoned this view in favor of a more contextual approach. He introduced the concept of language games, where meaning is derived from the use of words within specific activities or forms of life (Wittgenstein, 1953, 21). This shift from a referential to a use–based theory highlights that meaning is not fixed but fluid and context–dependent, shaped by human interaction and the practical contexts in which language is used (Wittgenstein, 1953, 43).

Wittgenstein's concept of language games illustrates the diverse ways language is used in various contexts. The meaning of words arises from their use within specific forms of life, which are governed by rules and serve particular purposes (Wittgenstein, 1953, 25). This approach to intentionality contrasts with traditional views that consider it a mental state corresponding to external reality.

Instead, Wittgenstein suggests that intentionality is best understood through the language games we play, where meaning is determined by the context and social practices in which language is embedded (Wittgenstein, 1953, 58).

Wittgenstein's Use Theory of Meaning further develops his idea that the meaning of a word is not its reference but its use in a given language game (Wittgenstein, 1953, 21). This shifts the focus from static representations to dynamic practices, where meaning is rooted in the practical and social activities that give rise to language. Intentionality, in this context, is not a private mental state but a feature of how language is employed in various forms of life (Wittgenstein, 1953, 29). Wittgenstein challenges traditional views by emphasizing the public, social nature of language and the context–dependent understanding of meaning and intentionality. Meaning, for Wittgenstein, is inherently public, rooted in the rule–governed practices of a linguistic community. Thus, while private experiences exist, they do not provide the foundation for meaning or intentionality in Wittgenstein's framework. Instead, intentionality is tied to the shared practices that govern the use of language within a community.

Wittgenstein's later philosophy introduces the notion of forms of life, which are the shared cultural and social practices that provide the context for language use (Wittgenstein, 1953, 26). He argues that intentionality is inherently social, as language itself is a social phenomenon. To understand intentional states, one must consider the broader linguistic and social practices in which individuals participate. This perspective shifts the focus from individual mental representations to communal activities that constitute meaning, highlighting the importance of the social dimension in understanding intentionality (Wittgenstein, 1953, 43).

Wittgenstein's private language argument, primarily found in *Philosophical Investigations* (1953), challenges the notion of a purely private language. He contends that language is inherently public, grounded in shared practices, and that intentional states expressed through language must be understandable within a community of language users (Wittgenstein, 1953, 243–271). This argument emphasizes that the directedness of mental states cannot be fully understood in isolation from the social and linguistic practices of a community, reinforcing the communal nature of meaning and intentionality (Wittgenstein, 1953, 258).

In his discussions on rule–following, Wittgenstein argues that following a rule is not an individual mental act but a practice embedded in a community (Wittgenstein, 1953, 143). The meaning of a rule is determined by the communal activities in which the rule is embedded, rather than by private intentions. This view has significant implications for understanding intentionality, as it emphasizes the role of shared human activities and communal practices in constituting meaning and intentionality (Wittgenstein, 1953, 202). Wittgenstein's analysis shifts the focus from internal mental states to external, communal practices, highlighting the social dimension of language and intentionality (Wittgenstein, 1953, 144).

2. Searle's Theory of Collective Intentionality

John Searle's theory of collective intentionality addresses how groups of individuals can have intentions and actions that are not reducible to the intentions and actions of individual members. Searle, a prominent philosopher of mind and language, explores this concept in the context of social ontology and the philosophy of social sciences.

Searle's concept of individual intentionality revolves around the idea that mental states are inherently about something; they possess aboutness or intentionality. Searle (1983) argues that this intentionality is a fundamental feature of the mind, distinguishing mental phenomena from physical phenomena. He posits that individual intentionality is tied to the subjective experience of the person, rooted in biological processes, and it is essential for understanding how humans perceive and interact with the world. It refers to the mental states (like beliefs, desires, and intentions) that are directed towards an object or a state of affairs. It is about how individuals relate to the world.

John Searle, in his works such as *The Construction of Social Reality* and *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind*, extends the concept of intentionality to collective dimensions. Collective intentionality refers to the capacity of individuals to share intentional states, enabling the creation and maintenance of social realities. For Searle, collective intentionality is not merely a summation of individual intentions but a fundamental feature of human cognition that allows for coordinated actions and shared beliefs. It refers to the shared mental states that arise when individuals act together as a group. These are the intentions and actions that can only exist when people participate collectively, such as playing in a band, working on a project as a team, or participating in a social institution.

Searle introduces the concept of 'we–intentions' as distinct from 'I–intentions'. We–intentions are the intentions individuals have as part of a collective. For example, if a group of people intend to lift a table together, each person has a 'we–intention' that includes their understanding of the collective action. Searle's theory of we–intentions explores how individuals can engage in collective intentionality, wherein they act together towards a shared goal. According to Searle, 'we–intentions' are not just a collection of individual intentions but a unique kind of intentional state that is directed towards a common purpose, involving a sense of collective commitment.

Searle's model of collective intentionality involves a "we–intentionality" that is distinct from individual intentionality. This "we–intentionality" is characterized by the ability of individuals to conceive of themselves as part of a collective with a common goal. Searle argues that collective intentionality is a primitive phenomenon, meaning it cannot be reduced to individual intentional states. It involves a network of mutual beliefs and commitments that enable coordinated actions, such as playing a symphony, engaging in a conversation, or participating in institutional activities.

A significant aspect of Searle's theory is the role of collective intentionality in the creation of institutional facts. Institutional facts are those that exist within human institutions, such as money, marriage, or government. These facts depend on collective recognition and acceptance by a community. For instance, a piece of paper is considered money because there is a collective agreement that it has value. Searle's theory shows how collective intentionality underpins the construction and maintenance of social and institutional realities. Searle distinguishes between "brute facts" (physical facts about the world that exist independently of human perception) and 'institutional facts' (facts that exist within human institutions and depend on collective intentionality). Institutional facts are created by collective intentionality and exist within a framework of social rules and conventions.

3. Comparative Analysis

Wittgenstein and Searle both emphasize the social dimensions of intentionality, but differ in their ontological commitments. Wittgenstein's approach is more concerned with the linguistic and practical contexts in which intentionality is embedded, viewing intentional states as inherently tied to forms of life and language games. Searle, while acknowledging the importance of social practices, posits a more structured and explicit framework for collective intentionality, focusing on how shared mental states contribute to social realities.

Wittgenstein's method is also descriptive and phenomenological, aiming to dissolve philosophical confusions by examining how language functions in everyday contexts. His approach is often seen as anti–theoretical, resisting the formulation of grand theories. In contrast, Searle adopts a more systematic and theoretical approach, proposing explicit models and frameworks to explain collective intentionality and its role in social ontology.

The differences between Wittgenstein and Searle have significant implications for social sciences. Wittgenstein's focus on the contextual and practical aspects of language suggests a methodological emphasis on ethnographic and interpretive approaches. Social scientists inspired by Wittgenstein might prioritize understanding the specific forms of life and language games within different cultures. Searle's framework, with its emphasis on the structure of collective intentionality and institutional facts, lends itself to more formal analyses of social systems and institutions, potentially integrating with fields like sociology, economics, and political science.

In discussing individual and collective intentionality, Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle provide contrasting yet complementary perspectives that illuminate the nature of human cognition and social interaction. Wittgenstein, particularly in Philosophical Investigations, argues that intentionality is fundamentally rooted in linguistic and social practices, asserting that »the meaning of a word is its use in the language« (Wittgenstein, 1953, §43). This implies that individual intentionality is not an isolated mental phenomenon, but is embedded in the

communal forms of life and language games in which it is expressed. Wittgenstein emphasizes that language is not merely a vehicle for conveying pre–existing thoughts, but is constitutive of thought itself; hence, our intentions are inherently social, shaped by public, rule–governed practices (Wittgenstein, 1953, §198). In contrast, John Searle offers a more structured account of intentionality, which he describes as an intrinsic feature of the mind in *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind*. Searle posits that individual intentional states have a "representational content" and a "psychological mode", directed towards objects or states of affairs (Searle, 1983, 5). Furthermore, Searle expands on the concept of collective intentionality in The Construction of Social Reality, where he introduces "we–intentionality" as a collective state that arises when individuals engage in shared intentions, such as in joint activities or social practices (Searle, 1995, 23).

This collective intentionality is crucial for the creation of social realities, where shared beliefs and agreements among individuals generate objective facts within a social context (Searle, 1995, 26). While Wittgenstein focuses on the external, social dimensions of intentionality through language and practices, Searle provides an internal, mentalistic account that nonetheless acknowledges the significance of social contexts in the emergence of collective intentionality. Despite their different approaches, both philosophers highlight the fundamental role of shared practices in shaping intentionality, whether through linguistic interactions (Wittgenstein) or coordinated mental states in social acts (Searle). Together, their theories offer a nuanced understanding of how individual intentions are formed and how they interact to create the collective intentionality that underpins social life, contributing to broader discussions in the philosophy of mind, language, and social ontology.

Table 1. Similarities and differences between the Wittgenstein and Searle views on intentionality and collective intentionality
Tablica 1. Sličnosti i razlike između Wittgensteinova i Searleova pogleda na intencionalnost i kolektivnu intencionalnost

Aspect	Wittgenstein	Searle	Similarities
General Approach	Descriptive, anti–theoretical, phenomenological	Systematic, theoretical, structured	Both emphasize the social dimensions of intentionality
View on Language	Language is constitutive of thought; meaning is use–based ("language games")	Language plays a role in constructing social realities, but intentionality is grounded in mental states	Recognize the role of language in shaping social practices

Intentionality	Embedded in social practices and forms of life; inherently social	Intrinsic feature of the mind with representational content; includes individual and collective forms	Highlight social dimensions of intentionality
Collective Intentionality	Implied through shared language games and communal practices	Explicitly theorized through "We–intentionality" and shared mental states	Acknowledge the importance of shared practices
Focus on Social Context	Emphasizes contextual, practical aspects of language and action ("forms of life")	Structured analysis of how collective intentionality creates social facts	Both explore the impact of social context on human behavior
Methodology	Ethnographic, interpretive, descriptive; dissolves philosophical confusions	Formal, analytical, theoretical; builds explicit models and frameworks	Both contribute to understanding human social interactions
Implications for Social Sciences	Prioritizes qualitative, interpretive methods (e.g., ethnography)	Supports formal, quantitative analyses in social sciences like sociology and economics	Both provide insights for analyzing social phenomena
Key Works	*Philosophical Investigations* (1953)	Intentionality: *An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind* (1983), *The Construction of Social Reality* (1995)	Engage in philosophical inquiry into language and social interaction
Ontological Commitments	Anti–essentialist, focused on every day practices and dissolvingmetaphysical questions	Essentialist, positing structured frameworks for understanding social ontology	Both acknowledge the creation of social realities through practices

Nature of Intentions	Intentions are context–dependent, tied to language games	Intentions have intrinsic mental content that can extend to shared intentions	Both highlight the interplay between individual and collective intentions

Table 1 captures the nuanced similarities and differences between Wittgenstein's and Searle's views on intentionality, language, and social ontology.

4. Criticisms and Counterarguments

One common criticism of Wittgenstein's approach is its perceived relativism. By emphasizing the contextual nature of meaning and intentionality, Wittgenstein's philosophy can be interpreted as denying the possibility of objective or universal truths. Critics argue that this perspective may undermine the ability to critique social practices or institutions from an external standpoint. Furthermore, some philosophers find Wittgenstein's anti–theoretical stance limiting, as it resists the development of systematic theories that can be applied across different contexts. Searle's theory of collective intentionality has been critiqued for its reliance on the notion of shared mental states. Philosophers like Foucault (1977), Bourdieu (1990), Butler (1997), Latour (2005), Fraser (1995), Honneth (1996) argue that Searle's model presupposes a level of homogeneity and coordination in human cognition that may not reflect the complexity and diversity of actual social interactions. Additionally, Searle's emphasis on intentionality has been challenged by those who argue that social and institutional phenomena can be explained without recourse to mental states, focusing instead on material conditions and power structures.

Gilbert (2009, 145) critiques Searle's focus on constitutive rules as insufficient for explaining the persistence of social norms in contexts of dissent or coercion. Similarly, Tuomela (2013, 102–104) argues for a broader understanding of group agency that accommodates both shared goals and normative commitments, aspects underemphasized in Searle's framework. More recently, theorists such as Rouse (2020, 67–69) and Pacherie (2022, 1250) have questioned the epistemological foundations of collective intentionality, suggesting that Searle's reliance on individualistic intentionality fails to capture the emergent and distributed nature of collective thought. These critiques collectively underscore the need for an account that integrates Searle's insights with a richer analysis of the social and material conditions shaping collective intentionality.

Criticisms of individual intentionality often focus on the limitations it imposes on understanding social phenomena. Ludwig Wittgenstein's later philosophy, particularly his concept of language games, emphasizes that meaning arises from social practices rather than isolated individual minds. This view suggests that individual intentionality is insufficient for explaining shared meanings and

collective actions because it overlooks the embeddedness of individuals in social contexts (Wittgenstein, 1953, 66). In contrast, John Searle's concept of collective intentionality argues that individuals can engage in shared intentionality, which is necessary for understanding social reality. Critics of Searle might argue that his theory, while addressing the limitations of individual intentionality, still relies on the idea of intentional states that originate in individual minds and are then somehow "shared", which could be seen as a problematic or reductive explanation of social practices (Searle, 1995,24).

One area of critique could be Searle's reduction of collective intentionality to individual intentions that are simply aligned. Searle (1990, 401–415) argues that "we–intentionality" can be explained by individual members having the intention to act together (the "I intend that we…"). Critics argue that this approach fails to capture the genuinely emergent properties of collective action (Gilbert, 2013; Tuomela, 2007). Instead of explaining how a group forms a single intentional state, Searle's view could be seen as reducing group intentions to an aggregate of individual intentions (Schweikard& Schmid, 2013).

Counterarguments to these criticisms might highlight that individual intentionality is not inherently opposed to collective intentionality but rather complementary. From a Searlean perspective, collective intentionality is not merely a summation of individual intentions but a distinct phenomenon that emerges when individuals recognize and align their intentions with others in a shared context (Searle, 1995, 25). Moreover, while Wittgenstein's focus on language games underscores the social nature of meaning, it does not necessarily negate the role of individual intentionality in contributing to collective actions and shared understandings. Instead, both perspectives can be seen as addressing different aspects of the same phenomenon: Wittgenstein focuses on the social fabric of meaning–making, while Searle provides a framework for understanding how individuals participate in creating and sustaining that fabric (Wittgenstein, 1953, 67).

5. Synthesis and Future Directions

Despite their differences, Wittgenstein and Searle offer complementary insights into the nature of intentionality. Wittgenstein's emphasis on the practical and contextual aspects of meaning can enrich Searle's more structured approach by highlighting the fluid and dynamic nature of social practices. Conversely, Searle's theoretical framework can provide Wittgensteinian approaches with tools to systematically analyze the structures of collective intentionality and institutional facts. The study of intentionality, both individual and collective, has important implications for cognitive science. Understanding how individuals and groups form and share intentional states can inform research in areas such as social cognition, communication, and artificial intelligence. Integrating insights from Wittgenstein and Searle can lead to a more comprehensive understanding of the cognitive mechanisms underlying social interactions and institutional dynamics.

The debate between individual and collective intentionality can be further enriched by considering contributions from other philosophers, such as Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and Maurice Merleau–Ponty, alongside Wittgenstein and Searle. Husserl's phenomenology offers a foundational analysis of intentionality as a core aspect of consciousness, where he explores how individual intentions give rise to meaning through acts of perception and thought (Husserl, 2001, p. 67). Heidegger shifts the focus by emphasizing being–in–the–world, where individual intentionality is always already situated within a shared, cultural world (*Mitsein*), making collective intentionality a fundamental aspect of existence (Heidegger, 1962, p. 118). Merleau–Ponty further complicates the picture by introducing the embodied nature of intentionality, where individual and collective intentionality are mediated through the lived body in a perceptual and social field (Merleau–Ponty, 1962, p. 171). Individual versus collective intentionality also has ethical and political dimensions. Examining how intentionality is shaped by social practices and institutions can shed light on issues of agency, responsibility, and social justice. McDowell (1992) expands on this by emphasizing that, in Wittgenstein's later philosophy; meaning is not tied to a final interpretation, but is grounded in our shared social practices. This perspective helps dissolve philosophical confusions about language by highlighting that meaning is context–dependent and intertwined with our forms of life. In discussing Michael Tomasello's perspective, we focus on intentionality as 'intention to action'. Tomasello (2005) emphasizes that shared intentions among individuals, particularly in early childhood development, are crucial for the emergence of collective activities. His research demonstrates that young children are capable of engaging in joint intentional activities, where they not only recognize the goals of others but also align their own actions towards achieving a common goal. This early capacity for shared intentionality is seen as foundational for the development of complex social behaviors and cultural practices (Tomasello, 2009). According to Tomasello, the ability to form shared goals and coordinate actions is what differentiates human social cognition from that of other primates, thereby aligning more closely with Searle's (1995) concept of collective intentionality, where individuals come together to create social facts and institutional realities. Philosophers and social theorists can draw on the insights of Wittgenstein and Searle to develop frameworks for addressing ethical dilemmas and promoting social change.

Husserl, building on Brentano, refined the concept of intentionality by introducing the notions of *noema* and *noesis*. Brentano saw intentionality as the hallmark of mental acts, each directed toward an object, real or imagined. Husserl expanded this by distinguishing between the noetic (the subjective, active process of intending, such as perceiving or judging) and the noematic (the content or meaning of what is intended, the object as it appears in consciousness). This distinction allows for a deeper exploration of consciousness, particularly regarding non–existent objects like fictional entities (Husserl, 1983; Smith & McIntyre, 1982). Husserl's framework influenced later analytic philosophers such as Se-

arle and Dretske, who explored mental representation, and his ideas anticipate Frege's sense–reference distinction, enriching discussions in the philosophy of mind and language (Frege, 1952; Searle, 1983; Dretske, 1995).

These perspectives collectively suggest that individual and collective intentionality are not oppositional but interdependent. Wittgenstein's notion of language games, Searle's social ontology, and the phenomenological emphasis on embodiment and being–with–others converge on the idea that individual intentionality is always already embedded in a social context. Future research could delve into how these theories interact with contemporary challenges, such as the impact of virtual reality on our understanding of embodied intentionality or the ways in which globalized networks of communication transform collective intentionality. Furthermore, exploring how these ideas intersect with post–structuralist critiques, such as those from Derrida or Foucault, could offer new insights into the power dynamics inherent in the construction of social realities.

Conclusion

On the basis of the arguments presented in the preceding sections, it can be concluded that the study of individual versus collective intentionality, as explored through the works of Wittgenstein and Searle, highlights the intricate relationship between mental states, language, and social practices. The analysis reveals that while both philosophers emphasize the social dimensions of intentionality, they diverge in their ontological commitments and methodological approaches.

Wittgenstein's emphasis on the contextual and practical dimensions of meaning situates intentionality within the fabric of social and linguistic practices. His perspective suggests that both individual and collective intentionality are inherently intertwined through shared language games and forms of life, dissolving any sharp distinction between them. In contrast, Searle provides a more structured and theoretical framework, distinguishing between individual intentionality as a biologically grounded mental phenomenon and collective intentionality as a "we–intentionality" that underpins the creation of social institutions and objective social facts.

By integrating Wittgenstein's descriptive, practice–oriented approach with Searle's systematic analysis of collective intentionality, we gain a comprehensive understanding of the nature of intentionality and its broader implications for philosophy, cognitive science, and social theory. Wittgenstein's focus on language and forms of life aligns with interpretive and ethnographic methodologies, enriching qualitative research in social sciences, while Searle's formal frameworks lend themselves to quantitative analyses of social systems and institutions.

Future research should continue to explore the intersections between the individual and collective dimensions of intentionality, particularly in how these concepts can inform our understanding of human cognition, social interaction, and the construction of social realities. A deeper examination of how individu-

al intentions contribute to collective actions and how collective practices shape individual cognition can further illuminate the dynamic interplay between mind, language, and society, contributing to a richer and more nuanced understanding of human social reality.

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Individualna naspram kolektivne intencionalnosti

Prikaz Wittgensteinove i Searlove perspektive

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Rad istražuje pojam individualne i kolektivne intencionalnosti fokusirajući se na argumente Ludwiga Wittgensteina i Johna Searlea. Intencionalnost, sposobnost uma da reprezentira predmete i stanja stvari, temeljni je pojam u filozofiji uma. Wittgensteinova kasnija djela pružaju osnovu za razumijevanje kako jezik i društvene prakse oblikuju intencionalnost, aSearleovse doprinos, posebice u kontekstu teorija kolektivne intencionalnosti, očituje u proširivanju tih ideja na društvene i institucionalne kontekste. Kroz komparativnu analizu, ovaj rad nastoji istaknuti razlike i dodirne točke između individualne i kolektivne intencionalnosti, nudeći uvide u šire implikacije za filozofiju, kognitivnu znanost i društvenu teoriju. Cilj je ovoga istraživanja produbiti naše razumijevanje međudjelovanja individualne i kolektivne intencionalnosti, s implikacijama za šire rasprave o društvenoj ontologiji, jeziku i filozofiji

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uma. Ključno je pitanje kako individualna intencionalna stanja prelaze u kolektivnu intencionalnost, osobito koji mehanizmi povezuju namjere pojedine osobe sa zajedničkom društvenom zbiljom. Drugi važan problem odnosi se na ulogu jezika u oblikovanju intencionalnosti, istražujući usporedivost Wittgensteinovih ideja jezičnih igara i formi života sa Searleovim pojmom kolektivne intencionalnosti u stvaranju zajedničkoga značenja. Nadalje, rad se bavi izazovima razlikovanja individualne i kolektivne intencionalnosti, osobito u slučajevima gdje individualne namjere dolaze u sukob s kolektivnim ishodima. Rad konačno propituje ontološki status kolektivne intencionalnosti, razmatrajući može li se ona svesti na individualnu intencionalnost ili pak ima neovisno postojanje. Rad razmatra šire implikacije za društvenu ontologiju, ispitujući kako različita gledišta Wittgensteina i Searlea utječu na naše razumijevanje društvenih institucija, normi i kolektivnoga djelovanja.

Ključne riječi: *intencionalonst; kolektivnost; činjenice; institucije; objektivnost*