Some (Wittgensteinian) Remarks on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence
Keywords:
Wittgenstein, artificial intelligence, applied ethics, understanding, human, robot, machineAbstract
I argue in favor of a distinction between human understanding and machine “understanding”. Based on Wittgenstein’s view on machines and his considerations on understanding, I aim to demonstrate that no machine with artificial intelligence can reach functional equality with human beings. In particular, this also holds for ethical praxis because it consists of an extremely blurred net of language– games, guided by ethical rules. Therefore, a machine can never have the human ability (disposition) to act ethically and cannot be a moral agent.
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